CARLOS CASTAÑARES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Carlos Castañares was
charged before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
under two separate informations for homicide for the
deaths of Manuel Pacheco and Felizardo Pacheco,
brothers, on February 7, 1967
between ten o’clock and eleven o’clock in the evening within the Rufina Patis Compound at Calle Pescador, Malabon, Rizal.  The accused admitted the fact of killing the
two brothers but he interposed as his defense the justifying circumstance of
complete self-defense.  After trial, the
lower court convicted him and imposed the following sentence:

“WHEREFORE, the accused Carlos Castañares,
is hereby sentenced in each case to an indeterminate penalty of from EIGHT (8)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum,
to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, together with all the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Manuel Pacheco in the amount of P12,000.00, and the heirs of
the late Felizardo Pacheco also in the amount of P12,000.00,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs.”

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals^[1]
modified the judgment of the lower court in that it appreciated in favor of the
accused the mitigating circumstance of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims and accordingly rendered the Decision dated February 21, 1975, the pertinent portion of which
states:

“Nevertheless, since the mitigating circumstance of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims has been duly established, the appellant
is entitled to be credited the same. 
(Article 13, par. (2), Revised Penal Code).  The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation with Article 64, paragraph (2) of the same
Code, should be imposed in its minimum, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty that should be imposed on the appellant for each of the two
homicides charged is that of Six (6) years and one (1) day of prison (sic)
mayor as minimum, to Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

WHEREFORE, with the above modifications as to the penalty, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with costs against
appellant.”

Accused’s motion for reconsideration
having been denied, he filed this petition for review seeking the reversal of
the above decision and praying that he be acquitted of the crimes charged, with
costs de oficio.

The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the
civilized world finds justification in man’s natural instinct to protect,
repel, and save his person or rights from impending danger or peril; it is
based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature
as a human being.  x x
x.  To the
Classicists in penal law, lawful defense is grounded on the impossibility on
the part of the State to avoid a present unjust aggression and protect a person
unlawfully attacked, and therefore it is inconceivable for the State to require
that the innocent succumb to an unlawful aggression without resistance, while
to the Positivists, lawful defense is an exercise of a right, an act of social
justice done to repel the attack of an aggressor.^[2]

Our law on the matter is embodied in Article 11, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, thus –

“Art. 11.  The following
do not incur any criminal liability:

(1) Anyone who acts
in defense of his person or rights provided that the following circumstances
concur:

First.  Unlawful aggression;

Second.  Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;

Third.  Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.”

x x x

It is further required that the presence
of all the abovecited circumstances must be proved
clearly and convincingly with the burden of proof on the accused, relying on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution.  The rationale for such
requirement proceeds from the admission of the accused that he has killed or
wounded another which is a felony for which he should be criminally liable
unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate
defense.^[3]

Based on the above discussion, We are faced with the lone issue
presented by the petition at bar: 
whether or not accused Carlos Castañares acted
in complete self-defense in the killing of Manuel Pacheco and Felizardo Pacheco and thus be absolved from any criminal
liability thereon.

Witnesses for the prosecution testified that on the evening of
February 7, 1967 between ten o’clock and eleven o’clock in the evening, Pablito de Jesus Aquino, Mariano
Flores, Felicisimo Fuertes
and Felizardo Pacheco were then conversing at the
gate of the Rufina Patis
Compound at Pescador St., Malabon,
Rizal, “when later Felizardo
Pacheco left and went towards the riverside about fifteen (15) meters away from
the gate where he met the appellant (accused) who boxed him.  Felizardo returned
to the gate of the compound, his mouth bleeding, and when he was asked by Aquino why he was boxed by the appellant, he did not
answer.  Manuel Pacheco, brother of Felizardo, arrived and Felizardo
told him about the incident with the appellant, so the Pacheco brothers went to
the riverside to inquire from the appellant why he boxed Felizardo.  The appellant was then on the fishing boat,
about 5 meters from the riverbank, when Manuel Pacheco asked him why he boxed Felizardo, but the appellant did not answer.  Instead, he went down by the outriggers of
the boat and after pulling his gun, fired at Manuel twice, so Manuel fell in a
sitting position at the rear of the toilet of the Rufina
Patis Factory. 
When Felizardo saw that Manuel was shot, he
ran away but the appellant pursued him, and between a parked truck and the
walls of the factory, the appellant fired at him and hit him at the back so the
latter fell with his face down.  The
appellant again fired twice at Felizardo.  After the shooting, the appellant scattered a
basketful of fishes between the fallen bodies of the Pacheco brothers and went
back to the fishing boat.  The Pacheco
brothers died because of the gunshot wounds.” (CA decision, p. 2).

On the other hand, witnesses for the defense, including the
accused, testified that “when Felizardo saw the
appellant (accused) on that evening, he demanded that he be given fish and the
appellant asked him to wait until the fishes falling down from the “canastros” had been gathered.  Felizardo was
angered, so he asked, “Anong palagay
mo sa akin, aso?” The
appellant answered that he must wait as he was just asking for fish.  Felizardo boxed the
appellant who ducked the blow and who instinctively fought back.  The two were pacified by the workers loading
fishes into the truck.  Felizardo left with his lips bleeding but only after he
threatened the appellant “May araw ka rin!” About ten minutes later, Felizardo
with the handle of a knife sticking out of his front waist returned with his
brother, Manuel, who was armed with a hand gun tucked in his waist.  They proceeded to where the appellant was.^[4]
Manuel stood near the toilet of the compound, about an arm’s length from the
appellant, while Felizardo went to the rear of the
parked truck, about 1-1/2 arm’s length from the appellant.  Manuel then asked the appellant, “Baket (sic) mo sinuntok ang kapatid ko?”
and the appellant answered, “Siya ang nauna.” While thus
explaining, the appellant slowly approached Manuel, who suddenly warned him,
“Huwag kang lalapit, putang-ina mo!”
drawing from his waist a halfcocked .45 caliber pistol.  The appellant jumped at Manuel and grabbed
the gun from him.  So Manuel was pushed
back on the ground sitting down against the toilet wall.  When the appellant saw Manuel pick up
something from the ground that appeared to be a piece of broken iron gear and
as Manuel stood up, half-crouching charging towards the appellant, the appellant
fired at Manuel.  At this moment, Felizardo drew his knife from his waist and swung his hand
back to stab the appellant but the latter suddenly turned around and evaded the
thrust of Felizardo, and the appellant fired at Felizardo.  Felizardo must have been hit at the right upper arm above
the elbow, as he lost hold of the knife, which was thrown underneath the rear
of the parked truck.  He tried to grab
the knife.  The appellant warned Felizardo, “Bitiwan mo iyan” but Felizardo did not
release the knife and was about to stand up so the appellant fired at Felizardo. 
Immediately, after the shooting, two persons scampered from the rear of
the parked truck causing a “canastro” of
fish to fall down the truck and overturn thus scattering its contents.  The appellant returned to the boat where he
told his wife about the incident.  He
showed the gun to his wife but the latter in her excitement brushed the same
aside and it fell into the river.  After
the appellant was detained and upon his release, he looked for a diver to find
the gun that fell into the river, but all efforts to locate the same proved
futile.” (CA decision, pp. 3-4).

Based on the following testimonies, the trial court completely
disregarded the theory of self-defense and upheld the prosecution’s version of
the incident.  On appeal, the respondent
Court of Appeals, while stating that unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims was clearly established, nevertheless concurred in the other factual
findings of the trial court.  We are
constrained, however, to disagree with the court a quo and depart from the rule
that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial
court on facts testified to by the witnesses. 
After carefully reading and analyzing the whole records of the case
including the testimonies of all witnesses, We are unable to admit the guilt of
the accused of the crimes charged or to affirm his conviction.

Before discussing at full length the merits of the petition at
bar, We must direct attention to certain statements of the respondent court in
its Decision subject of review which negate the court’s finding the accused
guilty as charged.  Thus, the court said,
“However, the presence of unlawful aggression in the case on the part of
the Pacheco brothers has been clearly established.  There is no question as to the fact that the
Pacheco brothers returned to meet the appellant (accused) because the appellant
boxed Felizardo. 
It is safe to assume that when the Pacheco brothers returned they were
prepared, not only to inquire from the appellant why he boxed Felizardo, but that they intended to cause injury to the
appellant in return.” (CA decision, pp. 9-10).  We find Ourselves curious as to how
respondent court arrived at the conclusion that unlawful aggression on the part
of the victims is present despite its finding that (1) Manuel Pacheco was not
armed with a gun (CA Decision, p. 10), and that (2) Felizardo
Pacheco, con­ceded to be armed with a knife, was already in flight when the
accused fired at him (CA Decision, p. 8). 
It is well-established in jurisprudence that unlawful aggression is
equivalent to an attack; it is necessary that the accused be assaulted or that
he be attacked, or at least that he be threatened with an attack in an
immediate and imminent manner, such as brandishing the knife with which to stab
or pointing the gun to discharge against the accused.^[5] A
mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not a sufficient equivalence of
unlawful aggression as it requires for an offensive act to have been made
positively determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury.^[6]
Therefore, with the findings that Manuel was not armed with a gun nor any
weapon with which he can cause injury and absent any finding that he made any
move to place the accused in actual danger of his life because as found by the
respondent court, the accused shot Manuel who was merely asking why he boxed Felizardo, respondent court cannot assume the fact of
unlawful aggression on the part of victim Manuel Pacheco.  Likewise, with the finding that Felizardo Pacheco, who was armed with a knife, had no
opportunity to stab the accused as he immediately ran away when he saw his
brother shot, respondent court erred in holding that victim Felizardo
Pacheco was an unlawful aggressor because having fled, he posed no more danger
to the accused who would then have no more reason to kill or wound him.^[7]
The above observations force Us to disregard that particular holding of the
questioned decision and review the records in its entirety.

In cases such as the one now before Us where there are directly
conflicting versions of the incident object of the accusation, the Court in its
search for the truth perforce has to look for some facts or circumstances which
can be used as valuable aids in evaluating the probability or improbability of
a testimony.^[8]
We have reviewed the conflicting testimonies of the several witnesses presented
by both the defense and prosecution and We are convinced that the testimonies
of the two eyewitnesses for the prosecution could not be believed in the face
of their statements made in trial court which are at variance with objective
physical facts duly established and likewise found improbable, considering the
scene or location of the occurrence.

1. Prosecution witness Pablito de Jesus
Aquino testified that after the altercation between Felizardo Pacheco and the accused, Felizardo
returned to their group conversing at the gate of the compound; that Manuel
Pacheco arrived several minutes later and insisted that they (Manuel and Felizardo) ask the accused why he boxed Felizardo;
that the brothers went to the riverbank and asked the accused why he boxed Felizardo; that the accused, without answering, went down
by the outriggers of his boat and started to shoot at Manuel;^[9]
that Manuel was shot on the right side of his chest; that the accused shot him
from the outriggers of the boat; that immediately after, Felizardo
started to run towards Calle Pescador
but was pursued by the accused; that the accused shot once at Felizardo who fell face down; that in that position, the
accused again shot at him twice; and that he never lost sight of Felizardo from the time Manuel was shot by the accused and Felizardo ran.^[10]

The candor and credibility of the witness is very much put in doubt
by the following:  (a) The necropsy
report and the testimony of Dr. Cueva, a medico-legal
officer of the NBI who conducted an autopsy on the
victims, state that Manuel sustained gunshot wounds behind the left armpit, at
the left side of the chest, and on the left arm,^[11]
and, therefore, belying the claim of the witness that he actually saw Manuel
shot at the right side of his chest.  (b)
Exhibits “F” and “F-1”, consisting of pictures of victim Felizardo lying on the ground face up, and Exhibit
“F-8”, a picture of Felizardo Pacheco lying
beneath the truck, face up, show the falsity in the witness’ testimony that he
saw the accused shoot at Felizardo twice while lying
face down after which Felizardo no longer moved.  (c) His testimony on cross-examination that
he never lost sight of Felizardo and the accused from
the time Manuel was killed and Felizardo immediately
fled towards Calle Pescador
could not be believed without nagging doubts because of the undisputed presence
of a fishtruck parked along Calle
Pescador near the riverbank.  In the course of his testimony, the witness
admitted that after the second shot, he immediately crossed Calle
Pescador to go to the building on the south,
therefore, during those few seconds that he was crossing the street by the
front of the fishtruck, he was not able to observe
what transpired between the accused and Felizardo,
hence destroying his candor in claiming otherwise.  (d) If the version of the witness would be
believed that the accused was down by the outrigger of his fishing boat moored
on the Navotas-Malabon river which on the night in
question was on a lower level than Calle Pescador while Manuel, at the time he was shot was facing
the accused while leaning against the wall of the toilet, their relative
position would, therefore, make it physically impossible to explain the gunshot
wound found behind Manuel’s left armpit and the other wounds admittedly
inflicted by an assailant who stood on a higher elevation than the victim.  Aquino’s testimony
is not only inconsistent with physical facts duly established, but it also
destroys the prose­cution’s own theory that the victim Manuel Pacheco was
killed from behind.

2. The prosecution also presented Felicisimo
Fuertes as an eye-witness to the incident who testified
on direct examination^[12]
that when Manuel and Felizardo left them, they (the Pachecos) proceeded to the riverbank where the accused’s motorboat was docked; that Manuel asked the
accused, “Bakit mo naman
sinuntok ang utol ko?”; that Manuel was
standing by the toilet of the factory, seven meters away from the accused who
was on his motorboat and fourteen meters away from where the witness was; that
the accused went down from his motorboat and when he was near Manuel, he drew
his gun and shot Manuel; that immediately after, Felizardo
fled towards the side of the truck pursued by the accused; that the accused
shot at Felizardo while he was still running; that Felizardo fell face down when hit and the accused again
fired twice at Felizardo; that Felizardo
ducked under the truck; that the accused then went the back of the truck, got 2
big fishes and placed them beside Felizardo; that the
accused also got a basketful of fish and poured it in-between the brothers; and
that the accused finally returned to his motorboat.

Fuertes‘ detailed testimony regarding
Manuel’s death appears doubtful considering the following facts:  he was conversing with others at the gate of
the compound found on the building north of Calle Pescador; the gate was about fourteen meters away from
Manuel and seven meters away from the front of a fishtruck
parked along Calle Pescador
with its rear portion about 1 meter away from the riverbank; he admitted on
cross-examination that when the brothers left them, his attention was already
diverted to the topic of conversation and that he continued conversing with the
group because he found the topic interesting as it was about the forthcoming
fiesta of Caloocan and the possibility of Felizardo Pacheco becoming the godfather of his son.^[13]
Viewing all these facts, We are not ready to admit without caution that Fuertes could describe in detail an incident happening
fourteen or fifteen meters away seen through a one meter space (from the wall
of the northern building to the high sides of the fish-truck) while he was
admittedly actively engaged in a conversation with others.  But what convinces Us to regard the testimony
of Fuertes as incredulous is the very much more
detailed description of the circumstances leading to Felizardo’s
death.  On cross-examination, Fuertes stated that he “did not seek cover when he
heard the gunshots”^[14]
– an implied admission that he did not move from his previous position.  He could not, there­fore, have seen the
accused pursuing Felizardo or that Felizardo fled towards the sides of the truck or that Felizardo fell when hit or that the accused shot twice at Felizardo when he was already down or that the accused
afterwards returned to the rear of the truck and got the fish and the basket or
that he poured them in between the brothers, the reason being that all of these
transpired behind the rear portion and by that side of the fishtruck
near the building on the south of Calle Pescador.  It is an
inhuman feat for Fuertes, undisputedly standing seven
meters away from the front of the fishtruck by that
side near the building north of Calle Pescador to see through the body of the said truck shown to
have very high sides so that a person standing upright can barely touch with
his raised hand the upper edge of the sides^[15]
and observe what transpired behind the rear portion and by that side of the
same fishtruck near the building south of Calle Pescador.  Evidence, to be believed, must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
– such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.  We
have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation and experience. 
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside
of judi­cial cognizance.^[16]

Upon the other hand, without relying on the weakness of
prosecution’s evidence, the defense has met the requirement of proving by clear
and convincing evidence all the justifying circumstances of complete
self-defense.  Three witnesses
corroborated the accused’s testimony.  There is no reason to disbelieve their
testimonies because two of them, Telesforo Andrade
and Salvador del Mundo, were on the deck of the
fishing boat directly behind the particular area where the shooting took place,
and, therefore, in a better position to observe the entire event as there was
no obstruction to their lines of vision. 
The third witness, Romeo Santiago, who testified only to the fact that
Manuel had a gun tucked inside his waistband, was in a store closely by-passed
by Manuel when he first approached the group of Aquino.  Not only are the witnesses for the defense
more credible because of their vantage position, but the facts testi­fied to by
the defense are confirmed by objective facts not disputed.

From the facts established by the defense, it is clear that
Manuel and Felizardo, and not the accused, initiated
the unlawful aggression resulting in their deaths.  The fact that the two victims, evidently
hostile, placed themselves on either side of the accused who was by the rear of
the truck, presumably to cut off venues of escape, coupled with the fact that
both were armed with a gun and a knife, weapons ordinarily considered as
fatally dangerous, show that the victims were ready and looking for
trouble.  Even the respondent court is of
the impression that “when the Pacheco brothers re­turned they were
prepared not only to inquire from the appellant (accused) why he boxed Felizardo, but that they intended to cause injury to the
appellant in return.” (CA decision, pp. 9-10).  So when Manuel drew his halfcocked gun from
his waist which the accused successfully wrested from him resulting in Manuel’s
being pushed against the wall where he fell in a sitting position, and despite
this, he picked up what the accused thought to be was an iron gear and moved to
charge towards the accused, the only normal conclusion to be derived from such
acts of Manuel is his evident intent and persistent determination to harm the
accused.  The same is true of Felizardo.  When he
attempted to stab the accused but was frustrated only because the thrust was
evaded by the latter, and though hit in the arm he still followed the knife
thrown beneath the truck, picked the knife and stood (“akmang
tatayo“) despite warnings from the accused to
release the knife, such acts amount to continuing acts of unlawful aggression
showing the victim’s determination to persist in his purpose of wounding or
killing the accused.  In both cases of
clear, real, direct and positive aggression, the accused was justified in using
the gun, his only means of defense, against his assailants as he was placed in
real peril of his life.

In the decision under review, the respondent court made a finding
that Manuel was not armed with a gun and that the gun belonged to the
accused.  One of the reasons intimated by
the respondent court is the incredibility for the accused, if truly unarmed, to
have had the nerve to wrest the gun from Manuel.  The court further stressed that “(T)he
natural reaction of any reasoning man under such circumstances, however daring
he may be, would be either to retreat or get his own weapon or better still
manifest his desire for peace or unwillingness to fight.” (CA decision, p.
6).  This is mere conjecture and cannot
prevail over positive testimonies that Manuel had a gun tucked in his waistband^[17]
and that the accused suc­cessfully wrested the gun from Manuel.^[18]

Another reason offered by respondent court is the fact that the
accused could not produce the gun when asked by the proper authorities.  Of course, We have held that the act of
throwing away the weapon used in the commission of the crime may be considered
a circumstance which negates the plea of self-defense.^[19]
However, this is not meant to be an absolute rule precluding the consi­deration
of other factors in determining the probability or improbability of an offered
explanation.  Herein, the conduct of the
accused shortly after the incident im­presses upon the Court that the throwing
away of the gun was not for the purpose of concealment but did happen as
explained.  When investigated by the
proper authorities immediately after the incident, the accused admitted the
killing of the two deceased but that he grabbed the gun from Manuel, and when
asked to produce the weapon, the accused declared that the same was grabbed by
his wife and was thrown into the river.^[20]
Moreover, it also appears as an unrebutted evidence
that the accused secured the services of a local diver to help him locate the
missing gun so that it could be used in his defense.^[21]
All of these factors – the accused’s desistance from
flight, peaceful surrender, spontaneous and voluntary statements to the proper
authorities before he had time to contrive a fabricated defense, and his
efforts in locating the missing gun – tend to give credence to his allegations.

The second element of self-defense, that is, reasonable necessity
for the means employed in repelling the unlawful aggression, is likewise
present.  Here, We have an unarmed man
assaulted by two armed brothers determined to exact payment for the insult and
injury earlier caused by the accused to the younger brother.  To require him to flee or to manifest peace,
as would the respondent court require of the accused, would, respectively,
require him to run the risk of exposing his back to danger or would force upon
him an act that may be repugnant to his sense of values.  As it happened, accused chose to stand his
ground and moved to take the offensive by attempting to wrest the better weapon
from one of his assailants.  Having
successfully grabbed the gun from Manuel, there was reasonable necessity for
the accused to use the gun to disable his assailants because the gun was his
only means of defense against two aggressors who by their decidedly aggressive
attitude were manifestly determined to consummate their desire to cause injury
to the accused.  It is not true that
after the accused was able to wrest the gun from Manuel, he was no longer in
peril of his life because even after Manuel was disarmed, he picked up what the
accused thought to be was an iron gear and proceeded to charge against the
accused, thus imperiling his life while the other brother was behind ready to
attack him.  Even at the moment that the
accused was repelling the attack of Manuel, the accused was likewise exposed to
the danger posed by Felizardo who was behind him and
armed with a knife.  Necessarily, he had
to disable Manuel in order to cope with Felizardo.  Neither is it true that after Felizardo lost his knife because he was hit by the accused
on the right arm, Felizardo desisted from his attack
so that the accused was not justified in killing him.  From the facts testified to by the accused, Feli­zardo even when wounded tried to retrieve the knife
and the accused fired the fatal shots only when Felizardo
made a move to stand up disregarding the accused’s
warning to release the knife.  If through
the various stages of the fight, the accused desisted from using the gun, the
result of the combat would have been very different; perhaps, the accused,
instead of being the slayer, would himself have been killed.  Certainly, the accused was not in duty bound
to expose himself to such a contingency, and while the attacks continued, and,
consequently, the danger to his person or to his life subsisted, he had a
perfect and indisputable right to repel such danger by wounding his
adversaries, if necessary, as from the circumstances of the case it was,
without any doubt whatever, and even to disable them completely so that they
may not continue the assault.^[22]

The location of the gunshot wounds found on the bodies of Manuel
and Felizardo and the trajectories of the bullets
confirm, rather than belie, the theory of the defense.  According to Dr. Manuel Cueva,
Jr., the following gunshot wounds were found:

(1) On Manuel –

(a)  
Wound No. 1 with entrance hole, 1.6 x 1.5 cm.,
oval in shape lo­cated at lower armpit region; so that the point of entrance of
this gunshot wound was located at a region behind the axillary
or the left armpit; it hit the victim at the left axillary
bone and travels inside the body going to the front and slightly downwards from
left to the right side of the body producing a point of exit at the right
chest; that assuming that the victim was standing in upright position, the
appellant must probably be in a higher elevation behind and to the left side of
the victim at the moment of the infliction of the wound.

(b)  
Wound No. 2 consists of an entrance wound
located at the left side of the chest of an oval shape with a direction from
the left to the right side of the body going slightly downwards to the front,
and the bullet traveled blindly beneath the skin and in the front portion of
the right chest; that there was no point of exit.

(c)  
Wound No. 3 which is minor in nature at the left
arm on the medial aspect that took a short route underneath the skin producing
an exit wound on the same armpit very near the same point of entry.

(2) On Felizardo –

(a)  
Wound No. 1 with an entrance hole of 2.0 x 1.6
cm., roughly oval in shape, located at the right posterior axillary
fold near the armpit which has a valid track directed from the right to the
left side of the body going slightly downwards, going to the front where they
extracted a .45 caliber bullet at the left arm; that the bullet perforated and
lacerated at the right lung, the egg (sic) blood vessels of the heart and the
left lung before it ended at the muscle of the right forearm; that if the
victim and appellant were in standing position at the same elevation, the
appellant must have shot the victim while the appellant was slightly at the
back to the right side with the muzzle of the gun at a considerable distance
from the point of entrance of the gunshot wound; and that assuming that the
appellant and the victim were not on the same level and that the appellant was
on a higher level, the latter would also be at the back or behind at an
elevated level with the muzzle of the gun aimed downwards.

(b)  
Wound No. 2 with the point of entry at the back
of the chest below the right border blade presenting an oval appearance with a
diameter of that of a .45 caliber gun wound and it assumed a tract inside the
body from the left side of the body pointing from right to left going upwards
and to the front indicating that the gun man was directly behind to the right
side of the victim, with the victim in a standing position when he sustained
the gunshot wound.

(c)  
Wound No. 3 found behind the right arm, the bone
on the right arm that travels downwards where the bullet was recovered at the
middle portion of the right forearm, underneath the skin, and the bullet
recovered here was a .45 caliber bullet; that the wound must have been
inflicted from behind, as it was located at the back of the right arm.

The wound found behind Manuel’s left
armpit particularly assumes decisive importance in pointing out which of the
conflicting versions is true.  Aforestated in this decision is the physical impossibility
for Manuel to have sustained this wound if the testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution would be believed as they put the accused and Manuel facing
each other at the time Manuel was shot. 
On the other hand, this particular wound finds a plausible explanation
in the version of the defense that the accused shot Manuel when he saw him
picked up something from the ground and then proceeded to charge towards him in
a half-crouching position.  Manuel must
have sustained this particular wound at the very act of picking up what the
accused thought to be was an iron gear because then, Manuel, who was slumped against
the toilet wall, must have twisted his body towards the right as one is wont to
do when one looks for something on the right, and must have stooped a little
bit as he picked it up from the ground, leaving therefore the back of his left
shoulder exposed as a possible target for the accused who was in front standing
over him.  The other two gunshot wounds
must have been sustained when Manuel proceeded to charge towards the accused as
these wounds indicate a frontal confrontation. 
Moreover, all of these gunshot wounds show a track of left to right,
going downwards to the front, indicating that the assailant stood on a higher
elevation than the victim, confirming, therefore, the version of the
accused.  The bullets could not have had
these trajectories if the accused were down by the outriggers of his boat
moored by the river which, on the night in question, was a lower level than Calle Pescador as testified to by
prosecution witness Pablito Aquino.

Again, the location of the wounds sustained by Felizardo confirms the version of the defense.  The location of the wound at the back of his
right arm (wound no. 3) verified the fact that Felizardo
was shot by the accused immediately after evading, by stepping backwards, the
thrust of Felizardo’s knife, thereby putting the
accused behind and to the right side of Felizardo who
would not yet have been able to check his forward momentum caused by the force
of his thrust.  This particular wound
also sustained the explanation offered by the defense as to why the knife was
released by Felizardo and thrown beneath the rear
portion of the truck.  Those wounds
described as wound no.  1 and wound no. 2
admittedly inflicted from behind do not necessarily negate the plea of
self-defense because the accused all along insisted that he followed Felizardo who retrieved the knife from beneath the rear
portion of the truck.  Wound no. 1
specifically indicated that the assailant was on a higher elevation with the
muzzle of the gun aimed downwards.  Wound
no. 2 indicated that the victim was in a standing position when he sustained
the wound.  These exactly jibed with the
defense that the accused fired the fatal shots during the few seconds that took
the victim to retrieve the knife in what would naturally be a bending position
(wound no. 1) and then straighten up (wound no. 2) in order to continue his
attack.

It is also of record that the investigating authorities found a
nickel plated dagger on the ground lying near the right hip of the body of Felizardo.^[23]
This fact strongly confirmed that Felizardo had the
knife with him when shot and precluded all doubts as to the veracity of the
defense evidence.

That leaves Us to the last question of whether or not the accused
did not give sufficient provocation for the unlawful aggression.  The respondent court maintained, thus,
“(T)here was a fist fight between the appellant and the victim Felizardo in which the appellant bested Felizardo
by boxing him at the mouth.  This
provocation, to Our mind, is sufficient to stir Felizardo
into returning to even up the score.” (CA decision, p. 5).  This stance is obviously erroneous.  The defense alone presented evidence as to
the circumstances leading to the fist fight between the accused and Felizardo.  It
remains, therefore, unrebutted, and thus from the
facts narrated by the witnesses for the defense, Felizardo
apparently insulted by the accused’s refusal to give
him fish immediately and that he should wait until the fish falling from the
“canastro” be all gathered, as manifested
in his following remarks, “(A)nong palagay mo sa akin, aso?”, he struck the first blow which was however
evaded by the accused who in turn successfully landed a blow on him.  Even at this stage, it was Felizardo who initiated the fight and if he was bested, it
would be preposterous to say that he had a right to return and “even up
the score” because such a pronouncement erroneously sanctions aggression
in return for an insult brought by Felizardo upon
himself alone.  Moreover, even if We were
to disregard the testimonies of the defense witnesses that it was Felizardo who struck the first blow, We would still be
convinced that that would be the case because in the nature of the order of
things, the person who was deeply offended by the insult was the one who
believed he had a right to demand explanation of the perpetrator of that
insult, and the one who also struck the first blow when he was not satisfied
with the explanation offered.^[24]

To Our mind, the first altercation between Felizardo
and the accused ended when the former left but not without first uttering a
threat “May araw ka rin.”
This showed that Felizardo had no intention to
continue the fight but would wait for a more opportune time.  In fact, Felizardo
returned to the group with whom he was previously conversing with.  It was only upon the order of his older brother,
who, it must be noted, arrived only minutes later, that both returned to where
the accused was.  In other words, We have
reason to believe that if Manuel had not arrived right there and then, Felizardo would not have returned alone to make good his
threat.  Therefore, there were two fights
that took place:  one, the altercation
between the accused and Felizardo, and second, the
assault on the accused by both Felizardo and
Manuel.  Because of the circumstances
above discussed, there was no continuity in the fights despite the lapse of
only ten minutes so that even if We were to admit, which We do not, that the
accused gave sufficient provocation, such provocation was not proximate nor
imme­diate to the aggression and, therefore, should still be disregarded.^[25]

The last factor which We took into consideration in finding that
the plea of self-defense is more credible is the lack of motive of the accused
in attacking and killing the two deceased. 
We have stated in a recent case^[26]
that although it is the general rule that the presence of motive in the killing
of a person is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the identity
of the assailant is duly established by other competent evidence or is not
disputed, as in this case, nonetheless, the absence of such motive is important
in ascertaining the truth as between two antagonistic theories or versions of
the killing.  Herein, it was the two
victims who had reason to harm the accused. 
After the altercation between the accused and Felizardo
where in the ensuing fistfight the accused bested Felizardo,
the latter uttered a threat, “(M)ay araw ka rin.” It is natural to assume that Felizardo
felt humiliated not only in losing the fight which Felizardo
himself had started to the accused but also for having been refused his demand
for fish and having been told to wait until all the fish falling from the
“canastro” shall have been gathered for
which he felt that he was treated like a dog. 
The opportunity for retaliation arose when his older brother, Manuel,
arrived and insisted that they confront the accused.

After a painstaking review of the whole record of the case, We
are convinced that all the elements of self?defense are present.  The evidence for the defense has proven
clearly that the accused acted reasonably according to his instinct of
self-preservation.  The necessity of the
killings committed by him exempts him from liability thereon.  Upon the other hand, the evi­dence for the
prosecution falls short of that requisite sufficiency and certainty which can
persuade the human mind to agree with the conclusion of guilt.^[27]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed and set
aside and another one is entered acquitting the accused, Carlos Castañares, of all the charges against him, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, (Chairman), J., in the result.

Makasiar, J., no part.

^[1] Gancayco, J., ponente; Concepcion, J. and Serrano, J., concurring.

^[2]
People v. Boholst-Caballero, 61 SCRA 180, citing Guillermo B. Guevarra’s
Penal Science and Criminal Law, 1974 ed., p. 82.

^[3]
People v. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772; People v.
Llamera, 51 SCRA 48; People
v. Solana, 6 SCRA 60; People v. Davis,
1 SCRA 473; U.S. v. Coronel,
30 Phil. 112; People v. Berio, 59 Phil. 533;
People v. Talabac, Jr., 30 SCRA
87; People v. Bauden, 77 Phil. 105.

^[4]
According to the version of the defense, the accused was by the rear portion of
the truck supervising the loading of the fish on the truck, and not on his
fishing boat as claimed by the prosecution.

^[5] Viada, 5th ed., 173, p. 3725.

^[6] U.S.  v. Guysayco,
13 Phil. 292; U.S.
v. Banzuela, 31 Phil. 565; U.S.
v. Santos, 17 Phil. 87.

^[7]
People v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366.

^[8]
Francisco’s Evidence, Vol. VII, Part 1, p. 68, citing Underhill’s Criminal
Evidence, 5th edition, Vol. 1, pp. 2-3.

^[9] TSN, Dec. 19,
1967, direct.

^[10] TSN, Feb. 21, 1968,
cross-examination.

^[11] TSN, June 24, 1968,
direct.

^[12] TSN, April 16,
1968.

^[13] TSN, April 16,
1968, cross.

^[14] Ibid.,
p. 50.

^[15] Exh. F-7, picture of the fishtruck.

^[16]
People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342, citing Daggers v.
Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eq. 130, 132.

^[17] TSN, Romeo Santiago, July 15, 1969, direct.

^[18] TSNs, Telesforo Andrade, Dec. 16, 1969, direct; Salvador del Mundo, Aug. 26,
1970, direct; and Carlos Castañares, Sept. 6, 1971, direct.

^[19]
People v. Dorico, 54 SCRA
172; People v. Constantino, 20 SCRA 940.

^[20] TSN, Captain Vicente Gonzales, July 2, 1968, cross-examination.

^[21] TSN, Jose Lopez, Feb.
4, 1969, direct.

^[22] U.S.
v. Molina, 17 Phil. 227 (1911).

^[23] TSN, Jose Lopez, Feb.
4, 1969, direct; Exhibits 1 and 1-A (dagger and tag).

^[24] U.S.
v. Laurel, 22 Phil. 252.

^[25] U.S.
v. Laurel, supra.

^[26]
People v. Boholst-Caballero, supra; See
also People v. Ramponit, 62 Phil. 284; People v.
Macabenta, 106 Phil. 77.

^[27]
People v. Maliwanag, 58 SCRA
323.