THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. PASCUAL SILVA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal interposed by the State against the order of dismissal of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in case entitled “The People of the
Philippines vs. Pascual Silva”.

On July 29, 1957, at Meycauayan, Bulacan, a “La Mallorca” passenger bus
bearing Plate No. TPU-13006, 1957 Bataan, driven by Pascual Silva collided with
another “La Mallorca” passenger bus (TPU-21836, 1957, Pampanga). As a result of
the accident, Felix Lazaro died. Emilia Estrella and Francisco Sarmiento
sustained serious physical injuries, while Policarpio Sarmiento, Eulalio
Sarmiento and Dolores Gimeno suffered slight physical injuries.

Under date of October 25, 1957, an information charging Pascual Silva with
Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence was presented with the Justice
of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan. After a trial on the merits was
conducted, the accused Silva was acquitted in a decision dated November 20,
1958, on the following grounds: (1) prescription of the offense; (2) no positive
identity as to which “La Mallorca” Bus caused the accident; and (3) the
injuries suffered by Dolores Gimeno can not be the result of the negligent act
of Pascual Silva.

On the same date the information was filed with the JP court (Oct. 25, 1957),
other information charging Silva of Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence was presented with the CFI of Bulacan. On April 20, 1959,
counsel for Silva moved to quash the information (with the CFI), on the ground
of double jeopardy, alleging that the acquittal in the JP case, which arose from
the same act for which he stood charged before the CFI, constituted a bar for
his further prosecution. The motion was denied on May 2, 1959. On May 22, 1959,
however, Silva asked for a reconsideration of the denial, on two grounds: (1)
The denial is not in consonance with the decisions of the Supreme Court; and (2)
The order will serve to encourage drivers to commit graver offenses. The fiscal
opposed the motion, claiming that slight physical injuries being only a light
offense, cannot be complexed with homicide or serious physical injuries as
provided for in Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and
dismissed the case, holding:—

“* * * The court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of
double jeopardy enunciated in People vs. Belga, 100 Phil., 996; 53 Off. Gaz.,
(10) 3081. In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical
injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobile driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint
having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints
were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same
collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No.
95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and
another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case
No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two
complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were
acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his
acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by
the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was
denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to
property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles
involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preluninary
investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of
First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon
motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to
quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in the following language:

“The question for determination is whether the acquittal off Jose Belga in
the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent
prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence’.

In the case of People vs. F. Diaz, 94 Phil., 714 the accused was charged in
the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving tinder see. 52 of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ‘fast and
reckless manner * * * thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had
pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ‘for failure of the
Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused
with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was
alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and
on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there
said through Mr. Justice Montemayor—

‘The next question to detemine is the relation between the first offense of
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal
Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in
the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is
whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule
113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove
the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if
proven, would have, been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa;
or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other (16 C. J. 264 quoted in
People vs. Martinez, 55 Phil. 9).

‘It is clear that in the present case the second charge of Damage to Property
thru Reckless Imprudence includes the first charge of reckless driving, that the
facts alleged in the information on damage to property thru reckless driving, if
proven, would have been sufficient to support the first charge of reckless
driving, and finally, that the offense of reckless driving is an ingredient of
the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence all for the simple
reason that the basic element in both offenses if reckless driving. Thus it is evident that we have here a ease of double jeopardy. And there is no explanation
why when Diaz was first charge with a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law because
of reckless driving, the damage to property was not included. A defendant should
not be harassed with various prosecutions based on the same act by splitting the
same into various charges, all emanating from the same law violation, when the
prosecution could easily and well embody them in a single information.

The above pronouncements apply to the case now before us. But it is contended
that in the present case the acquittal of the appellee by the justice of the
peace did not constitute a bar to his subsequent prosecution, first, because the
complaint under which he was acquitted was void for falling to name the
passengers injured and describe the nature and extent of their injuries, as well
as to name the owner of the property damaged and specify the amount of the
damage, and second, because the amount of the damage to the property put the
case beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court, since the said
damage amounted to P850.00 and the fine prescribed in such case is beyond the
authority of the justice of the peace court to impose.

We find no merit in this contention. It may be admitted that the complaint
under which the appellee was acquitted was fatally defective for want of certain
essential allegations. But conviction or acquittal under such a complaint ife
not necessarily void when no objection appears to have been raised at the trial
and the fatal defect could have been supplied by competent proof (U.S. vs. Ball,
163 U.S. 662, Kepner vs. U. S. 195 U. S. 100; U. S. vs. Estraña 16 Phil. 520).
And as to the claim that the case was beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace court for the reasons stated, suffice it to say that the complaint in
question did not allege the value of the damage to the property and until that
defect was cured no one could say that the case was beyond the cognizance of the
court trying it.

Moreover as was said in the case of People vb. Besa, 74 Phil., 75, ‘either
under sec. 26 of the Code of Crim. Procedure or under sec 9, Rule 113, of the
Rules of Court, whether or not the court had jurisdiction to try the greater
offense is completely immaterial. The only test to determine the identity of the
two offenses was, under the former procedure, whether or not ‘the evidence which
proves the one would also prove the other’ (U.S. vs. Arcos, 11 Phil., 551, 661;
People vs. Alvarez 45 Phil., 472; People vs. Martinez, 55 Phil., 69), or under
the new Rules of Court whether the second offense ‘necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.’ If the facts of a particular case satisfy the requirements of this
test, there is double jeopardy regardless of whether the court trying the first
charge has no jurisdiction to try the second offense.’

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention
of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of
the provisions of Art 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged
to first prosecute the accused for, slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is
not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of
the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.

In view of the foregoing considerations, this case is not maintainable and
the same shall be, as it is hereby, dismissed with costs de oficio, and
the cancellation of the bond filed by the defendant for his provisional
release.”

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the
case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the
accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence.
In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts
of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case (supra), upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor
General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain
considerations, for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We
find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in
the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the
present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand,
there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has
reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap
vs. Hon. Lutero, etc. L-12669, April 30, 1959.

In view of all the foregoing, We find that the appeal of the State is without
merit and the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed,
without costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.