G.R. No. L-1662. September 27, 1949
THE BACOLOD-MURCIA PLANTERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE CHUA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
REYES, J.:
of Occidental Negros dismissing the above-entitled case without costs. The
appeal is directed not against the dismissal of the case, but solely against the
court’s refusal to adjudge costs.
It appears that the said case was initiated with a complaint
filed by the Bacolod-Murcia Planters’ Association, Inc., as sole plaintiff, for
the recovery of P2,373 which defendant had deducted from the purchase price of
sugar alleged to have been bought by him from plaintiff, the deduction having
been made on the supposition that defendant was to pay the export duties levied
by the city of Bacolod on said sugar, but which export duties were later annuled
by the courts with the result that the amount paid therefor by defendant was
supposedly refunded to him later. On the strength of said complaint and the
allegation that defendant was about to dispose of his properties for the purpose
of defrauding his creditors, plaintiff was able to garnish defendants deposit in
the Philippine National Bank to the extent necessary to insure payment of
plaintiff’s claim. Alleging that plaintiff had no cause of action against him
because the sugar mentioned in the complaint was bought by him directly from the
individual planters and not from the plaintiff association, defendant moved for
the lifting of the garnishment as well as for the dismissal of the complaint;
but as a counter-move counsel for plaintiff filed an amended complaint joining
the individual planters as plaintiffs and reducing the total claim against
defendant, including that of the planters’ association, to P1,121.98. In view of
the facts revealed by the amended complaint, the court’ lifted the garnishment.
The court also refused to admit the amended complaint on the ground that, while
the total amount sought to be recovered came under the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance, the individual claims of the planters and of the association,
none of which amounted to P200, were each within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court. Thereafter, on motion of the
defendant, and with the conformity of counsel for plaintiff, the court ordered
the dismissal of the case but without costs. A motion to reconsider the said
order having been denied, defendant has appealed to this Court.
The only question presented is whether, on the facts above
stated, the lower court committed a reversible error when it denied costs to
defendant.
Although costs are generally allowed to the prevailing party as
a matter of course, courts are nevertheless empowered, for special reasons, “to
adjudge that either party shall pay the costs of an action or that the same be
divided, as may be equitable.” (Sec. 1, Rule 31, Rules of Court.) In practice
this power has been translated into the proposition that “payment of costs is a
matter that rests entirely upon the discretion of courts.” (III Moran, Rules of
Court, 2nd Rev. ed., p. 845, citing Roque et al. vs. Vda. de Cogan, 40 Off. Gaz.
[10th Supp.], 55.) An appeal would hardly lie whose purpose is to interfere with
that discretion. And there is high authority to support this view for in the
case of Newton vs. Consolidated Gas Co., 265 U. S., 78, the Supreme Court of the
United States said:
“The rule forbidding appeals from decrees for the costs only is
easily deducible from the discretion vested in thd trial court in fixing them,
and the better opportunity of that court to exercise that discretion from its
greater intimacy with details of the pleadings, hearings, and orders in the
case. * * *.”
Plaintiff contends that he should have been awarded costs for
having been subjected to a vexatious suit and to an unjust garnishment of his
bank deposit through a misrepresentation of facts as shown by the difference
between the original and the amended complaint. The contention lacks force when
viewed in the light of what really took place.
The reason for the lower court’s action in denying costs to
plaintiff is stated in its order of August 16, 1947, as follows:
“Encontrando, sin embargo, que el auto de sobreseimiento de
esta causa, cuya reconsideracion se pide, se ha dictado previa la conformidad de
la entidad demandante dada en estrados, lo cual, a juicio del Juzgado, es una
razon especial para que no se hiciera ningun pronunciamiento especial en cuanto
a las costas, se deniega la mocion de reconsideracion.”
In addition, the pleadings disclose a valid cause of action
against the defendant, who, on the facts alleged, is legally under obligation to
refund certain sums to which he is not entitled. A mistake was, however,
committed when counsel at first asserted the cause of action in favor of the
planters’ association alone without naming the individual planters as
co-plaintiffs or pleading facts sufficient to show that the action was being
brought in the name of all the real parties in interest. In the circumstances,
we are not disposed to hold that the lower court committed an error or abused
its discretion in refusing a judgment for costs. On the contrary, some members
of this Court even consider the appeal as frivolous and are for imposing double
costs on the appellant. The majority, however, are of the opinion that the ends
of justice will be sufficiently served if ordinary costs are imposed.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against the appellant.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla,
Tuason, Montemayor, and Torres, JJ., concur.