G.R. No. L-16381. December 30, 1961
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO FAUSTO Y TOMAS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
BARRERA, J.:
Instance of Manila (in Crim. Case No. 40937), convicting him of murder
(qualified by evident premeditation) for the killing of Dr. Antonio Casal, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the
deceased’s heirs in the sum of P5,000.00; and to pay the costs.
The undisputed facts of the case are: At around 11:00 o’clock in the morning
of August 7, 1957, Fernando Gonzales, while working as a bodeguero at the
Pujalte Warehouse, situated at Pelaez and Balmes Streets, Manila, heard someone
moaning. Thinking that it came from inside the warehouse, he looked for it
there, but found nothing. He then went outside and there saw appellant stabbing
Dr. Antonio Casal, who was lying with face up on the ground. Being unarmed,
Gonzales rushed inside the bodega to get his night stick. At about the same
time, Detective Benito Carasco of the Manila Police Department, who was then
investigating one M. Santiago at St. Joseph Hospital located nearby, heard a nun
calling for a policeman, at the same time pointing to the hospital’s entrance.
Responding to the call, he rushed out to the entrance and there saw appellant
armed with a knife (Exh. G), shouting “Napatay ko siya” (referring to Dr.
Antonio Casal). Drawing his pistol, Detective Garasco ordered appellant to drop
the knife. After shouting once more napatay ko siya”, appellant dropped the
knife. Detective Carasco then approached appellant, arrested him, and picked up
the knife. The victim, Dr. Casal, was sprawled on the ground, covered with
blood.
Detective Carasco then told the nun to call a doctor, while he took appellant
behind the hospital driveway, there they waited until an MPD mobile patrol car
arrived. Thereafter, Detective Villarta, who investigated him by question and
answer method (See Exh. E). Later, appellant was taken to the scene of the
incident. There, with the aid of police officers, he re-enacted the commission
of the crime. He pointed to the place (near a post at Balmes St.) where he sat
waiting for Dr. Casal (Exh. F). He also demonstrated his position when he
approached the victim, as the latter walked towards his car (Exh. F-2), as well
as his position and that of the victim, after the latter fell to the ground
(Exh. F-1).
The autopsy report (Exh. A) of Dr. Mariano B. de Lara, Chief MPD Medical
Examiner, discloses that the deceased sustained 18 stab wounds, the fatal ones
being those described in Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of said report and shown in the
sketch (Exh. B) and the photographs (Exhs. D and D-1). According to the report,
death was due to “profuse exsanguinating hemorrhage” and “shock due to multiple
slashing stab wounds.”
At the trial, the defense owned appellant’s authorship of the crime. It
claimed, however, that criminal liability, because before and on the occasion of
the execution of the crime, he was insane. To establish insanity, the defense
presented evidence showing that appellant was confined at the National Mental
Hospital from June 27 to July 9, 1956, i.e., 1 year and 1 month before the crime
was committed, during which period, he was observed and diagnosed as suffering
from schizophrenia of the paranoid type (See Exhs. 1 to 3), but treatment was
stopped when appellant was discharged against the advice of hospital
authorities.
On October 28, 1958, the trial court, upon the defense’s motion, ordered
appellant’s confinement at the National Mental Hospital, for observation and
diagnosis. Appellant stayed in said hospital until March 9, 1959. Dr. Carlos
Vicente, who attended to appellant in said hospital reported that appellant was
suffering from schizophrenia with brain syndrome, and that said illness existed
prior to, and after the commission of the crime in question (See Exh. 6).
The defense also presented the testimony of Fr. George Haggenburg,
parish priest of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, regarding his impressions of appellant’s
mental condition, when the latter was employed as laborer by him in 1956, as
well as the reasons for his letter (Exh. 5) sent to Dr. Francisco Santos of the
Bureau of Hospitals.
Inasmuch as the defense is insanity, the only question to be determined in
this appeal is, whether or not appellant was insane at the time of the
commission of the crime charge.
As a rule, when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of
mental incapacity, the burden of establishing such fact rests upon him (U.S. vs.
Martinez, 34 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Hontiveros, 18 Phil. 62; people vs. Bascos, 44
Phil. 204). The legal presumption is that a person who commits a crime is in his
right mind (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; U.S. vs. Zamora,
32 Phil. 218), because the law presumes all acts and omissions punishable by law
to be voluntary (Arts. 1 and 4[1]. Revised Penal Code), and if there is no
sufficient or satisfactory evidence that the accused was mentally incapacitated
when he committed the crime, the conclusion of fact must be the same presumption
established by law, i.e.., that he was in his right mind, and the conclusion of
law must be that he is criminally liable. The primary inquiry is, whether there
has been presented sufficient convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to
a degree that satisfies the judicial mind insane at the time of the perpetration
of the offense. In order to ascertain a person’s mental condition at the time of
the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a
reasonable period both before and after that time (People vs. Bonoan,
64 Phil. 87).
After a careful and thorough examination and review of all the evidence
presented in this case, we find, as did the trial court, that appellant was not
mentally incapacitated when he committed the crime in question and is,
therefore, criminally liable for the offense committed by him.
(1) It appears that appellant was confined at the National Mental Hospital,
for a period of 13 days, from June 27 to July 9, 1956 (1 year, 1 month, and 2
days prior to the commission of the crime). He was not insane during said
confinement. On this point, the trial judge made the following findings, to
which we fully agree:
“Examining the evidence of record, we find first that the defendant had been
confined in the National Mental Hospital for a period of 13 days from June 27 to
July 9, 1956. According to the defense witnesses, the defendant was found then
to be suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type. It is alleged that the
defendant claimed hearing voices and having hallucinations. It will be observed
that the defense witnesses presented to substantiate the alleged insanity are
not alienists but psychiatrists. The Court, without the least intention of
casting doubt on the knowledge or integrity of the witnesses who testified in
this case, is inclined to doubt the diagnosis. Within such a limited period of
13 days, the Court doubts that proper and accurate diagnosis could have been
arrived at, considering that in the case of mental disease, constant observation
of the symptoms and behavior of the patient are necessary. That the patient
claimed to have heard voices or having had hallucinations is certainly a
difficult matter to ascertain or verify. One could easily feign moodiness,
isolate himself from the other patients or inmates, and claim having heard
voices or seeing people. On the other hand, the defense witness Dr. Leonida
Mariano affirmed that in her first interview of the patient (the accused), the
latter, not only gave his full name, but also, the place where he came from, his
civil status, and his employment at San Miguel Brewery, and that he was neat in
appearance and coherent in his answers. In the second interview, the patient
gave the full name of his wife and his children and his parents. He gave
information about his age, the town and province of his birth, street and number
of his residence in Manila, and gave the further statement that while there had
been no tragic eyents in his family, he was, however, worried by the fact that
his wage of P6.50 was not sufficient to feed and maintain his seven (7)
children. The witness Dr. Mariano also affirmed that the answer given by the
patient to her questions were coherent and relevant, showing that he was
intelligent; that he greeted and recognized his wife on the several occasions
that she visited him, and even asked her to secure his immediate discharge; and
that he attended to his own physical needs. Considering the above testimony of
Dr. Mariano, the Court is of the opinion that the accused, at the time of his
first confinement in the National Mental Hospital, was not insane. In fact, in
his statement, Exhibit E, the defendant, relating his first confinement,
revealed that he did not want to go, but finally consented, because he was not
Mentally ill. If the accused was insane then, it can hardly be expected of him
to remember what had transpired then. The defense, to bolster its theory, also
presented the testimony of Fr. George Haggenburg, parish priest of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija. The witness affirmed that sometime in 1957, the defendant handed him a
letter wherein he promised to give P30,000.00 if the witness would pray for him;
that one day the defendant went to see him and told him a story that at first
was unintelligible, but which during his conversation with the defendant, turned
out that he wished to return to his job and needed a certificate. The fact that
the defendant had promised P30,000.00, if the good father would pray for him, is
not and cannot be considered, either by itself alone, or in conjunction with the
fact of the confinement, as sufficiently indicative of the allegedly impaired
mental condition of the defendant. The latter may have made such promise in a
moment of religious excitement or fervor. And as to his story that at first was
not understood by the priest, the latter himself admitted that it was due to the
attempt of the defendant to convey his ideas in English, of which language, the
defendant is not conversant. It should be borne in mind, that from the time the
defendant was released from the National Mental Hospital in July 9, 1956, up to
the date of the commission of the crime, he must have been in contact with many
persons. Aside from the testimony of Fr. George Haggenburg, however, there is no
other evidence in record showing that during that interval of time, the
defendant had acted as one deprived of his reason. If he had been mentally
deranged, certainly such a condition could not have escaped the persons, friends
and strangers alike, his wife and members of his family.”
(2) The findings of Dr. Carlos Vicente, who attended the appellantduring his
second confinement (by court order) at the National Mental Hospital, On October
31, 1958 (1 year, 2 months, and 24 days after the commission of the crime ), do
not indicate the defensant was deprived of reason. The trial court correctly
observed:
“The defense also relies on the testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente who took
charge of the accused when he was confined in the National Mental Hospital on
October 31, 1958, upon order of this court. But even accepting the findings of
Dr. Vicente on their face value, the court is of the opinion that they do not
support the theory of the defense that at the time of the commission of the
crime, the accused was deprived of his reason. Aside from the fact that the
findings of Dr. Vicente were made more than one year after the commission of the
crime, it will be remembered that the accused has always been detained. During
that period, was practically without contact with friends and relatives, he was
troubled by his conscience and the realization of the gravity of the offense
committed by him, plus the thought of the bleak future of his children. All
these may have produced in the defendant morbid disposition and moodiness, that
could have been interpreted as signs of mental illness. But the very report of
Dr. Vicente clearly indicate that the accused was not mentally deranged. In
fact, the two psychiatrists, Dr. Vicente and Dr. Mariano, affirmed that
defendant’s illness affected only his personality but not this
brain.”
(3) Appellant’s signed statement (Exh. E, pp. 49-51, Records) taken by
Detective Nemesio Villarta, barely 3 hours after the killing, clearly shows that
appellint was mentally sound. In said statement, he narrated in detail how,
after waiting for more than one year after his separation from his work at the
San Miguel Brewery plant, he made up his mind the day before the killing to see
the victim (Dr. Casal) once more, this time either to get the certification
(that he was mentally sane) or to kill him. He narrated how the following
morning, he boarded a Pantranco ‘ Bus from Guimba, Nueva Ecija; that once in
Manila, he boarded a taxi to the St. Joseph Hospital, where he knew the victim
would be at the time visiting his patients; that he saw the victim’s car parked
and waited for the latter to come out; that as soon as the victim came out of
the building, he approached him (victim) and made a last appeal that he be given
the certification; that when the doctor refused and became angry with him, he
decided then to kill him on the shoulder, pulling him towards himself
(appellant), at the same time thrusting at him with the knife (Exh. G).
(4) Appellant’s re-enactment of the crime at its scene only a few hours after
he committed it, leaves no room for doubt as to his sanity, both during and
after its (the crime) execution.
(5) Appellant had a strong motive to kill the deceased Dr. Casal, as he did.
He was a laborer at the Magnolia Power Plant of the San Miguel Brewery, earning
P6.50 a day. This was the sole support of his wife and 7 children. Then suddenly
he found himself out of work and committed to the National Mental Hospital on
June 27, 1956, at the instance of the deceased, Dr. Casal. Several entrieties by
appellant after his release from said Hospital on July 9, 1956, and convince
said deceased that he was well, and to give him the necessary certification
pre-requisite to re-employment at said company, proved unavailing and futile.
He, therefore, decided to liquidate the deceased whom he believed was the cause
of his unemployment.
In the circumstances, we find appellant guilty, as did the trial court, of
the crime of murder, qualified by evident premeditation (as he reflected or
meditated on, and planned the killing, and pursued) his plan to a successful
conclusion).[1] The Aggravating
circumstance of treachery was present in the commission of the crime, as the
attack on the deceased, although frontal, was too sudden and unexpected, giving
the latter no chance to offer any defense whatsoever (People vs.
Noble, 77 Phil. 93), but this is offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender (People vs. Fontabla, 61 Phil. 589) and, therefore, cannot
be taken into account for the purposes of aggravation or increase of the
penalty.
Wherefore, the judgement of the court a quo is hereby affirmed
in toto, with costs againsts the defendant-appellant.
So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
[1] People vs. Dosal, 92 Phil., 877.