PHILIPPINE AMERICAN CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY WORKERS INDEPENDENT UNION (NLU), PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE AMERICAN CIGAR & CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING CO., INC., RESPONDENT.

Appeal by certiorari of petitioner Philippine American Cigar & Cigarette
Workers Independent Union (NLU), from a decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations dismissing a complaint of said petitioner for unfair labor, practice,
and ordering respondent Philippine American Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing
Co., Inc. to reinstate Apolonio San Jose, within five (5) days from notice of
said decision, without backpay. The pertinent facts are set forth in said
decision from which we quote:

“Paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (a) of the complaint states:—

‘a. That sometime on October 23, 1958, Apolonio San Jose’s brother, Francisco
San Jose, who is also a regular worker of the respondent and a member of the
complainant union, filed a charge for unfair labor practice against herein
respondent docketed as Case No. 1857—ULP of this Court, which case is still
pending.

‘b. That subsequent to the filing of the said charge, or on about November
29, 1958 and also on or about December 11, 1958, the respondent herein, by its
manager Chue Yiong, summoned and advised union president Lazaro Peralta that if
Francisco San Jose will not withdraw his charge against the company (Case No.
1857-ULP), the company will also dismiss his brother Apolonio San Jose, to which
the union president replied that should not be the attitude of the company
because Apolonio has nothing to do with his brother’s case.

‘c. That on or about January 24, 1959, respondent, by its
officers and agents, did dismiss Apolonio San Jose without just and valid cause
and in gross violation of the operative collective bargaining agreement between
the complainant union and respondent corporation,’

“The allegations in said sub-paragraph (a), (b) and (c) of the
complaint were substantiated by the oral testimony of complainants’ witnesses,
but the Court finds that such allegations do not constitute unfair labor
practice acts on the part of respondent. In sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the
Court finds no interference, coercion and restraint against the employees in the
exercise of their guaranteed rights to self-organization and discrimination
against complainant Apolonio San Jose in regard to hire or tenure of his
employment. In short, the complainants’ charge is that if Francisco San Jose
would not withdraw his unfair labor practice charge against respondent company,
the manager of the latter would dismiss Apolonio San Jose, the brother cf
Francisco. In fact, said manager dismissed Apolonio San Jose. This may be an
illegal or improper dismissal, but certainly, it does not constitute an unfair
labor practice.

“The Court further finds that in sub-paragraph (c), complainants
allege that the dismissal of Apolonio San Jose was in gross violation of the
collective bargaining agreement between complainant union and respondent
corporation.”

The Court of Industrial
Relations found “that the moving cause of Apolonio’s dismissal was the refusal
of his brother Francisco San Jose, to withdraw his charge of unfair labor
practice against the company. But “—it added—” be that is it may, it cannot
constitute an actionable offense under the Act”. Seemingly believing that, since
the one dismissed by reason of said charge of unfair labor practice was, not the
complainant therein, Francisco San Jose, but his brother Apolonio San Jose, the
latter’s dismissal does not constitute another unfair labor practice under
Section 4 (a) (5) of Republic Act No. 875, which provides that:

“(a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an
employer:

* * * * * * *
“(5) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise
prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having filed charges or for
having given or being about to give testimony under this Act.”

the lower court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to
entertain the claim of petitioner herein. This conclusion is untenable.

Although subdivision (5) of paragraph (a) of said Section 4
would seem to refer only to the discharge of the one who preferred charges
against the company as constituting unfair labor practice, the aforementioned
subdivision (5) should be construed in line with the spirit and purpose of said
Section 4 and of the legislation of which it forms part— namely, to assure
absolute freedom of the employees and laborers to establish labor organizations
and unions, as well as to prefer charges before the proper organs of the
Government for violations of our labor laws. Now, then, if the dismissal of an
employee due to the filing by him of said charges would be and is an undue
restraint upon said freedom, the dismissal of his brother owing to the
non-withdrawal of the charges of the former, would be and constitute as much a
restraint upon the same freedom. In fact, it may be greater and more effective
restraint thereto. Indeed, a complainant may be willing to risk the hazards of a
possible and even probable retaliatory action by the employer in the form of a
dismissal or another discriminatory act against him personally, considering that
nobody is perfect, that everybody commits mistakes and that there is always a
possibility that the employer may find in the records of any employee,
particularly if he has long been in the service, some act or omission
constituting a fault or negligence which may be an excuse for such dismissal or
discrimination. Yet, such complainant may not withstand the pressure that would
result if his brother or another member of his immediate family were threatened
with such action unless the charges in question were withdrawn.

In fact, it is a well settled rule of law that what is
prohibited to be done directly shall not be allowed to be accomplished
indirectly. Thus in the Matter of Quidnick Dye Works Inc. and Federation of
Dyers, Finishers, Printers and Bleachers of America (2 NLRB 963) it was held
that the dismissal of a laborer on account of union activities of his brother
constituted an unfair labor practice. To the same effect, substantially, are the
decisions In the Matter of the Fashion Piece Dye Works Inc. and Federation of
Silk and Rayon Dyers and Finishers of America, 6 NLRB p. 274, In the Matter of
Ford Motor Company and H.C. McGarity, 26 NLRB, p. 322 which refers to the union
activities of the wife of the discharged employee), and Union Asbestos &
Rubber Co. and United Textile Workers of America, AFL, 98 NLRB p. 1055
(involving the dismissal of a female employee, due to the union activities of
her husband). Hence, Teller in his work on Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining (Vol. 2, p. 859), says:

“The discharge of relatives of an employee who has himself been
discriminately discharged, for no other reason than the relation, is itself a
discriminatory discharge, in violation of Sec. 8(3). of the Act. An illustration
is Memphis Furniture Co. (3 NLRB 26 [1937], enforced 2 F2d 1018 [CCA 6, 1938],
cert. den. 305 US 627, 59 S Ct 91, 83 L. Ed. 402 [1938]) where the evidence
indicated that the sole reason for the dismissal of a female employee was that
she was the wife of an employee who has been discharged. It was held that the
discharge under the circumstances was discriminatory and a violation of the Act,
even though discharged female employee was not herself a member of any union.
The Board said: ‘The respondent thus made union membership and activities bar to
the employment not only of the union member himself but of members of his family
as well. A more effective mode of discouraging of union affiliation could hardly
be found than the knowledge that such activities put not merely the union
member’s employment but that of those closely related to him in jeopardy. The
direct cause of Mrs. Barmer’s discharge was tho fact that her husband had been
discharged, but the indirect and antecedent cause was discrimination against
union members in regard to hire and tenure of employment with intent to
discourage membership in the Union’. So also fhe Board has held that the
discharge of discriminatingly discharged employees’ wives for the reason that
the employer did not desire the employees to continue to live in the employer’s
house, which they would do so long as their wives remained employed, in itself a
discrimination discharge in violation of the Act. (Mexia Textile Mills, 11 NLRB
1167 [1939], enforced 110 F2d 565 [CCA 5, 1940]). In Mansfield Mills, Inc. (3
NLRB 901 [1937] the respondent alleged that the wife of an employee who had been
discharged allegedly in violation of the Act was herself discharged in
consequence of a company rule requiring the dismissal of all members of the
family when the head of the family is discharged. The Board saicl: ‘Assuming
thisi as the reason for Mrs. Sutton’s discharge, we would necessarily find that
she was the victim of discrimination in violation of the Act, if we determined
that Sutton was discharged as the result of his union affiliation.’

“In the usual case, It is the wife who is the sufferer because of the
husband’s union affiliation. In I. Youlin and Company (22 NLRB No. 65 [1940],
the husband was discharged for failure to secure his wife’s resignation from the
union. This was held violative of Section 8(3) of the Act.”

In addition to violating Section 4(a) (5) of Republic Act. No.
875, the discharge of Apolonio San Jose is, therefore, an unfair labor practice
under subdivision (4) of said Section 4(a), which is the counterpart of Section
8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of the United States.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed,
insofar as it dismisses the complaint of petitioner herein, and another one
shall be entered finding respondent Philippine American Cigar & Cigarette
Manufacturing Co., Inc. guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering said
respondent to reinstate Apolonio San Jose, immediately after this decision shall
have become final, with backpay. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.