BARANGAY MATICTIC, MUNICIPALITY OF NORZAGARAY, PROVINCE OF BULACAN, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE J. M. ELBINIAS AS DISTRICT JUDGE, CFI OF BULACAN, BRANCH V AND SPOUSES JOSE SERAPIO…

Subject of the petition is the Order dated May 12, 1978 of the
then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V,
dismissing without prejudice, Civil Case No. SM-234, entitled
“Municipality of
Norzagaray vs. Jose Serapio, et. al.“. 
Civil Case No. SM-234 is
an expropriation proceeding filed by the Municipality of Norzagaray which the public respondent Judge dismissed on
the ground that at the time the original complaint was filed, the plaintiff
municipality had not yet obtained the requisite authority from the Department
Head or Office of the President, as required in Section 2245 of the Revised
Administrative Code.  Respondent Judge held that
—

“x x x since the
filing of the amended complaint to cure this fatal defect, by submitting the
requisite authority from the Office of the President as required by Section 2245
of the Revised Administrative Code, did not vest jurisdiction with this Court
which it never had acquired even from the very filing of the original complaint
– – x x x orders this case
dismissed without prejudice.” (Rollo, p. 19).

For municipalities, the municipal council shall exercise the right
of eminent domain with the approval of the President [Sec. 2245 (h), Revised
Administrative Code].

The factual and procedural antecedents which led to the filing of
this petition are as follows:

1. On December 7, 1968,
   petitioner (then called Barrio Matictic) filed with
   the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V,
   an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
   SM-210, entitled Barrio Matictic vs. Zosimo Serapio, et al., praying therein that the
   defendants (who are the private respondents in the instant case) be
   enjoined from placing obstructions and closing the barrio road and to
   allow plaintiff barrio to remove the obstructions and repair the barrio road
   (the Poblacion-Tomana-Canyakan barrio road) so as “to
   enable the people and motorized vehicles the free use thereof and convenient
   passage through it.”;

2. On January 28, 1969, Barrio Matictic filed a
   motion to dismiss the case on the ground that an expropriation proceeding, not
   an injunction, is the better remedy and on the same date, the Court, Judge Ambrosio M. Geraldez then
   presiding, issued the corresponding order dismissing the
   case;

3. However, and also on January 28, 1969, a complaint for Eminent
   Domain was filed by the Municipality of Norzagaray
   with the same court, docketed as Civil Case No. SM-234, CFI, Branch I, Bulacan, and entitled
   “Municipality of
   Norzagaray vs. Jose Serapio,
   et al.” Said case involves the same property of the aforestated defendants that was the subject of Civil Case
   No. SM-210 hereinabove referred to;

4. The defendants in Civil Case No. SM-234, Jose Serapio and Gregoria Pacida, on Februry 5, 1979, filed
   a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action;
   that the complaint states no cause of action; and that plaintiff (municipality
   of Norzagaray) has no capacity to sue;

5. On February 11,
   1969, upon motion of plaintiff, the Court issued an order allowing
   plaintiff to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation
   proceedings upon deposit of the sum of P2,682.00;

6. On February 14, 1969,
   defendants Felicitas Serapio-Merced and Eustaquio
   Merced filed through counsel a Motion to Dismiss the
   expropriation case on several grounds.  Their principal contention
   is that the plaintiff municipality, in the absence of an approval from the
   Office of the President, may not properly file the subject expropriation
   case;

7. On March 14, 1969,
   plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging therein that it had obtained
   authority from the Office of the President to institute expropriation
   proceedings.  Private respondents, Jose Serapio and Gregoria Pacida, in turn, filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss,
   dated March 19, 1969, reiterating therein plaintiff’s lack of cause of action
   and that a subsequent authorization, even if obtained, would not cure the
   jurisdictional defect attaching to the plaintiff’s complaint when the subject
   case was initially filed;

8. On August 18 and 19, 1969, the Court issued orders requiring
   plaintiff municipality to submit plans of the land to be expropriated, duly
   approved by the Bureau of Lands;

9. On January 22, 1970, for
   failure of the plaintiff to comply with the orders of August 18 and 19, 1969,
   the Court issued an order dismissing said Civil Case No. SM-234 for failure of
   plaintiff to take the necessary steps to prosecute its
   case;

10. Said order of dismissal, however, upon appeal by the municipality, was
    reversed by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated January 5, 1973.  The Court of First
    Instance of Bulacan was ordered to proceed with the
    expropriation case pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 67 of the Rules of
    Court;

11. The case went back to the court a quo, with Judge J.M.
    Elbinias presiding (now Associate Justice of the Court
    of Appeals).  But at this point of time the municipal mayor of
    Norzagaray displayed reluctance to prosecute the
    said case for eminent domain.  In fact, he
    requested the Municipal Council to withdraw the expropriation
    proceedings.  The Municipal Council, however, refused to accede to
    the wishes of the mayor; (Rollo, pp.
    98-99)

12. It appear then that a motion to dismiss dated April 3,
    1978 was once more filed by the defendants
    (private respondents herein) who reiterated their challenge to the
    jurisdiction of the said trial court based on their argument that the initial
    lack of jurisdiction of a court cannot be cured by the filing of an amended
    complaint;

13. Petitioner herein, Barangay Matictic, chagrined and confronted by the attitude of
    its mayor, and on its averment that the result of the expropriation
    case will greatly affect the social and economic development of the
    area in and around Barangay Matictic, filed on January 26, 1978 a Motion for Intervention in Civil Case
    No. SM-234.  Respondent Judge issued an
    order taking notice of the Motion for Intervention and denied the motion to
    dismiss filed by the defendants until the motion for intervention shall have
    been considered by the trial court;

14. On May 12, 1978, respondent Judge, without taking any further action on
    petitioner’s motion for intervention, issued an order dismissing, but without
    prejudice, the expropriation case — Civil Case No. SM-234, on the
    singular reason that at the time the expropriation case was initially filed
    there was no showing of any prior Presidential approval — a requisite that
    should have been first complied with, pursuant to Section 2245 of
    the Revised Administrative Code.  A motion for reconsideration of
    this decision was filed by plaintiff municipality.  It
    insisted that presidential approval was, after all, secured and that this
    fact was alleged in the plaintiff’s amended complaint.  Said
    motion for reconsideration was, however, denied in the order of the court below,
    dated January
    15, 1978.  This order
    closed the case for the plaintiff
    municipality of Norzagaray inasmuch as it no
    longer appealed said order of dismissal.

Petitioner, Barangay Matictic, in this certiorari and mandamus case
before us, simply complains that in “x x x these orders, dated May 12, 1978 and June 15, 1978
(Annexes CC and DD) no resolution or ruling was made by respondent Judge with
respect to its motion for intervention which was mentioned in the order dated
January 26, 1978 (Annex AA) leaving
petitioner (Barangay) no personality to take part in the case (Rollo, p. 9).  Consequently, it filed
the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel
respondent Judge to allow and admit its complaint in intervention.

This petition was given due course, under the resolution of this
Court, dated January 15, 1979 (Rollo, p. 153)
and on February 2, 1979, a temporary restraining order was issued enjoining
respondents from exacting, charging and collecting toll fees for the use of the
feeder road, subject of the expropriation proceedings until further orders from
this Court (Rollo, p. 158).

The petition of Barangay Matictic is manifestly untenable.

Regarding the annulment and setting aside of the May 12, 1978 and
June 15, 1979 orders of the public respondent, dismissing the expropriation
proceedings, the proper party to appeal the same or seek a review of such
dismissal, would be the Municipality of Norzagaray.  Petitioner Barrio Matictic, which is a different political entity, and
although a part and parcel of the aforesaid municipality, has no legal
personality to question the aforestated orders because
by itself, it may not continue the expropriation case. 
It must be considered that the subject orders of the court a quo
were not appealed by the Municipality
of Norzagaray.  The
dismissal of the expropriation case, insofar as said municipality is concerned,
became final.  The expropriation case ceased to exist and there is
consequently no more proceeding wherein Barangay Matictic may possibly intervene.

An intervention has been regarded as merely “collateral or
accessory or ancillary to the principal action and not an independent
proceeding; an interlocutory proceeding dependent on and subsidiary to, the case
between the original parties”.  (Francisco, Rules of Court,
Vol. I, p. 721).  With the final dismissal of the
original action, the complaint in intervention can no longer be acted
upon.  In the case of Clareza vs. Rosales, 2 SCRA 455, 457-458,
it was stated that:

“That right of the intervenor should
merely be in aid of the right of the original party, like the plaintiffs in this
case.  As this right of the plaintiffs had ceased to exist,
there is nothing to aid or fight for.  So the right of
intervention has ceased to exist.”

Consequently, it will be illogical and of no useful purpose to
grant or even consider further herein petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus to compel the lower court to allow and admit the
petitioner’s complaint in intervention.  The dismissal of the
expropriation case has no less the inherent effect of also dismissing the motion
for intervention which is but the unavoidable consequence.

We are constrained to reject petitioner’s averment
that public respondent Judge “acted with grave and manifest abuse of
discretion.” Firstly, nothing is lost to the petitioner.  If at all
petitioner can rightfully establish that it is allowed by law to institute a
separate and independent action of its own, then there would be no necessity for
it to intervene in the case initiated by the
Municipality of Norzagaray which is
now apparently no longer interested in continuing the expropriation
proceedings.  The dismissal of the expropriation case was without
prejudice.  The
municipality of Norzagaray, Bulacan can revive its action.  There is no
need for the proposed intervention of Barrio Matictic.  What it may do is to urge the
municipality to file its case anew.  If the Barangay has obtained authority for itself to pursue the
action of eminent domain, then the more reason there is to refuse its
intervention.

“Approximately, if the rights of the party seeking to intervene will
not be prejudiced by any judgment in the case at bar and that it may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding in court, then the exercise of judicial
discretion in denying a motion for intervention is deemed correctly made.” (See Pflieder vs. de
Britanica, L-19077, October 20, 1964, cited in 51 SCRA
368).

Considering the foregoing discussion indicating the lack of merit
of the petition for certiorari, it will follow that the writ of
mandamus prayed for by petitioner cannot be granted for lack of legal
basis.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.  The temporary restraining order earlier
issued in this case by the Court, dated February 2, 1979, is hereby lifted and dissolved.

No costs.

SO
ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.