G.R. No. L-23942. March 28, 1969
CARMEN DEVEZA, DOROTEA CABRERA AND FELINO CABRERA, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. HON. JUAN B. MONTECILLO, AS JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF TIAONG, QUEZON AND PATERNO CHUMACERA, RESPONDE…
SANCHEZ, J.:
Challenged in this appeal is the lower court’s order dismissing
petitioners’ mandamus suit to compel respondent Justice of the Peace (now
Municipal Judge) to hear and determine their complaint for unlawful detainer which said respondent refused to take cognizance
of for lack of court jurisdiction.
The background facts are these:
On February 5, 1960,
petitioners lodged with the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Tiaong, Quezon, a suit labeled
“Unlawful Detainer” against private
respondent Paterno Chumacera.[1]
The complaint avers that petitioners are owners of a parcel of rice-land
situate at San Isidro (Bana), Tiaong,
Quezon, with an area of 57,418 square meters, more or
less, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title 4467 of the Land Records of Quezon Province; that respondent, upon the other hand, is
the owner of a piece of land, described in Plan Psu-87360, which adjoins the
northwest portion of petitioners’ land; that on or about June 16, 1959, in the
course of a relocation survey on petitioners’ behalf by a duly licensed private
surveyor, it was “discovered and definitely established” that Chumacera had been occupying, knowingly or unknowingly,
about 3, 000 square meters of the northwest portion of petitioners’ land; that
petitioners then informed Chumacera of his unlawful
possession, asked him to vacate and turn over said portion to petitioners; that
Chumacera refused.
The prayer of the complaint was for respondent to vacate and turn over
possession to petitioners and pay them P1,000 a year as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation thereof, plus attorneys’ fees, expenses
of litigation, and the costs.
On March 3, 1960,
respondent Paterno Chumacera
moved to dismiss, upon the ground that respondent court had no jurisdiction to
hear the case. He alleged that he
“had been in the peaceful, public, notorious occupation and possession and
in the concept of owner, either through himself or through his predecessor-in-interests
for a period of sixty (60) years, more or less, on the land in dispute and had
been paying the corresponding taxes therefor.”
He also alleged that the land he owned, surveyed in accordance with Plan
Psu-87360, was the subject of an application for land registration under LRC
Record 574 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
On March 21, 1960,
respondent Judge Juan B. Montecillo, after hearing
the parties on oral arguments on the motion to dismiss and before trial on the
merits, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. He perfunctorily denied the motion for reconsideration.
On May 5, 1960,
petitioners commenced the present petition for mandamus in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon,[2]
to compel respondent judge to hear and decide, on the merits, the case for the
possession of the disputed land of 3,000 square meters, more or less.
On October 2, 1964, following a pre-trial, the lower court found
that respondent judge “acted properly” and, consequently, dismissed
the mandamus petition, with costs against petitioners.
Petitioners appealed direct to this Court.
The case calls for the application of Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court,[3]
which in part reads:
“SECTION 1. Who may
institute proceedings, and when.- Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession
of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth,
or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied,
or the legal representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee,
or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. x x x.”
Since jurisdiction of courts of limited jurisdiction – and
municipal courts are amongst them – is to be interpreted in strictissimi Luria,
ours is the duty to examine whether petitioners’ case fits into the legal
precept just transcribed. It does not.
First. Averment there is none in the complaint that petitioners
were deprived of possession of the disputed land “by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth”, which would bring their case within the
definition of forcible entry.[4]
Nor is there an allegation that respondent withholds possession of the land
“after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.” In fact, the complaint
itself states that Chumacera “has, knowingly
or unknowingly, been occupying and in possession of” the controverted portion of land.
There is thus no way of knowing, upon the averments of the
complaint, how defendant’s (respondent Chumacera’s)
possession started or continued. The
complaint, accordingly, does not show facts which would give the municipal
court of Tiaong jurisdiction to entertain this case,
either as forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
Second. Section 1 of Rule 70 aforesaid specifies a time
limit – “within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession” – within which an action may be brought in the inferior
court. The one-year period is thus to be
counted from illegality of possession.
If any meaning is to be given to the complaint, it is this: the illegal
nature of the possession in question coincided with the start of the
possession.
The complaint is conspicuously silent as to the time when
defendant entered into or took possession of the land. Plaintiffs contented themselves by stating in
their complaint that on or about June 16, 1959, upon a relocation survey,
“it was discovered and definitely established that defendant has,
knowingly or unknowingly, been occupying and in possession of about three
thousand (3,000) square meters of the northwestern portion of plaintiffs’ afore
-said parcel of land.”
Implicit in this averment is that defendant’s occupancy in
possession dates back to a time prior to June 16, 1959.
Definitely when, the complaint does not tell us. That possession could well have started more
than one year before June 16, 1959,
or, for that matter, before the complaint here was filed on February 5, 1960. Or, as private respondent alleged, he and his
predecessor were in possession for some 60 years prior to the time the complaint
was filed. Indeed, respondent Chumacera, on page 11 of his brief, made a categorical
statement that in the course of oral arguments, on the motion to dismiss in the
justice of the peace court, petitioners made an admission that said
respondent had been in possession for more than one year prior to the
institution of the complaint. Such
statement is but a repetition of paragraph 11 of respondent’s answer to the
petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Quezon.[5]
This in turn was a substantial reproduction of paragraph 2 of respondent’s
opposition to petitioners’ motion to reconsider the dismissal order of the
justice of the peace court.[6]
Petitioners did not controvert said averment of fact.
Because jurisdiction hinges on the one year period “after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession” and the period of
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession does not clearly
appear on the face of the complaint, and, for the reason that
petitioners have admitted that private respondent was in the land for more than
one year prior to the time the complaint was lodged in court, this case should
be dismissed.
Third. Proceedings under Rule 70 are essentially summary
in nature. They are intended to provide
an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of
property.[7]
The present case does not fit into the summary nature of the
remedies envisioned in Rule 70.
Petitioners and their predecessors have held Torrens
title to this property – since 1914.
Yet, the complaint does not as much as
intimate that plaintiffs had ever been in the
possession of the disputed property, or that
plaintiffs knew of the illegality of defendant’s possession but merely
tolerated the same. It was only in the
relocation survey in 1959 that they allegedly “discovered” that
defendant was – knowingly or unknowingly – in possession
of an alleged portion of that titled property.
Easily to be inferred from the averments of the complaint is that if
defendant is in possession of the portion of land in question, it is because he
either claims ownership thereof or has been usurping the land for quite
sometime. These facts, if anything,
underscore the remedy. It certainly is
not a summary action to vindicate a wrong – disturbance of possession – of
recent origin. Rather, it would seem to
us that in the situation here presented, a full-blown inquiry to determine who
has the better right to possession or ownership is in order.
A choice of remedies is thus afforded petitioners: either accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria.[8]
Or, should it so happen that the property is included in respondent’s Plan
Psu-87360, an opposition to the land registration proceeding.
As we recently declared in one case,[9]
an inferior court should reject a complaint for forcible entry and detainer “right at the outset”, if it is already
clear that that court has no jurisdiction thereon.
For the reasons given, the appealed order of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon of October 2, 1964 dismissing the petition for mandamus is
hereby affirmed.
Costs against petitioners-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Civil Case 108, Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Tiaong, Quezon, entitled
“Carmen Deveza, Dorotea
Cabrera and Felin Cabrera, Plaintiffs, versus Paterno Chumacera,
Defendant.”
[2]
Civil Case 6315, Court of First Instance of Quezon (Lucena City),
entitled “Carmen Deveza, Dorotea.
Cabrera, and Felino Cabrera, Petitioners, versus
Hon. Juan B. Montecillo, as Justice of the Peace of Tiaong, Quezon, and Paterno Chumacera, Respondents.”
[3]
Section 1, Rule 72 of the old Rules of Court.
[4] Tenorio vs. Gomba, 81
Phil. 54, 57; Dikit vs. Ycasiano,
89 Phil. 44, 48-49.
[5]
Record below, p. 13.
[6]
Record below, p. 72.
[7]
Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines,
1964 ed., p. 604.
[8]
Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291; Masallo
vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134, 136-138.
[9] Abbain vs. Chua, L-24241, February 26, 1968.