THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CESAR TAYAO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

A pure question of law is before this Court in this appeal from an order of dismissal
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija sustaining a motion to quash filed by defendants, now
appellees Cesar Tayao,
Pablo Piadoso, Alberto Valencia and Gerardo Daquez, who were accused of the offense of grave
coercion.  Such an order of dismissal was
predicated by the lower court on its belief that the offense charged was
outside its jurisdiction inasmuch as exclusive
cognizance of the same is vested in the municipal court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija.  The authoritative answer to such a question
is supplied by Esperat v. Avila.^[1]
In that case, the contention that a court of first instance is devoid of
competence, the jurisdiction of the muni­cipal court being originally
exclusive, was considered and rejected by us. 
Hence, this appeal by the provincial fiscal from the above order of
dismissal must prosper.

The accused were indicted
in an information filed on January 13, 1966 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Sto.
Domingo Branch, for the crime of grave coercion allegedly committed by
compelling the offended party to do something against her will.  Thereafter, on August 25, 1966, the accused sought to have the above information quashed on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
lower court their contention being that the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to try such offense is lodged in the municipal court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, the site of the
alleged commission thereof.  An
opposition to such motion notwithstanding, the lower court, in its order of August 4,
1966, upheld
such motion to quash, its view being that the matter was within the original jurisdiction of the appropriate
municipal court, and dismissed the same. 
On the 17th of the same month, a notice of appeal direct to this Court, the
question being one of law, was filed by
the provincial fiscal.

The appeal, as set forth
at the outset, is meritorious.  The
jurisdiction of the offense in question may be exercised both by the lower
court and the municipal court of San
Jose, Nueva
Ecija. 
Whatever doubt might have existed was dissipated entirely by our
categorical ruling, as above noted, in the Esperat
decision.  As therein
explicitly stated by us: “Since the crime of grave coercion is punishable
with arresto mayor (imprisonment from one month and one day to six
months) and fine not exceeding P500.00, said offense comes within the area of
concurrent jurisdiction of municipal or city courts and court of first
instance.  Hence, the sentence of
the City Court of Cotabato convicting herein
petitioner was in fact appealable to the Court of
Appeals and not to the Court of First Instance.”^[2]

We had occasion to
reiterate the above doctrine in People v. Dalton,^[3] decided barely eight months later.  Thus: “The orders under appeal are
erroneous.  The Court has repeatedly held
that because section 44 of the Judiciary Act, (vesting in Courts of First Instance
original jurisdiction over offenses
penalized by law with imprisonment in excess of 6 months
imprisonment or fine more than P200.00) has been left un­altered, the enlargement of the former jurisdiction of
Municipal Courts by R. A. 3828 as above stated, has resulted in concurrent
jurisdiction of both Courts over crimes penalized with imprisonment in excess
of six months but not beyond 3 years, and fine exceeding P200.00 but not more
than P3,000.00.  Since the fine for grave
coercion is not over P500.00, the crime is within such concurrent jurisdiction
and the filing of the information in the Court of First Instance gave authority
to that Court to retain and try the same.”^[4]

Nothing can be clearer,
therefore, than that the decision of the lower court sustaining the motion to
quash under its mistaken assumption that the matter was within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, is not in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the order of August 4, 1966 is set aside, and the case remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings in accordance with law.  Without pronouncement as to
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., no part.

^[1]
L-25922, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596.

^[2]
Ibid., p. 602.

^[3]
L-23539, February 22, 1968, 22 SCRA 673.

^[4]
Ibid., p. 674.