REMEDIOS DE LA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 8TH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 15, THRU HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, YOLANDA U. DAGANDAN, AND ERZON SONGAHID, RESPONDE…
INGLES, G. T., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] filed by petitioner assailing the Orders[2] issued by Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 of Burauen, Leyte in a case for Partition with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and TRO with Damages.
THE PARTIES
Petitioner Remedios De La Cruz is of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Aguadas St., Burauen, Leyte. Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 2010-01-CR-13, for Judicial Partition.[3]
Private Respondent Erzon Songahid is of legal age, single, and a resident of San Ramon, Burauen, Leyte and is the plaintiff in the above-cited case[4].
The Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 15, Burauen, Leyte through Hon. Presiding Judge Yolanda U. Dagandan is impleaded as a Public Respondent and is sued in its official capacity for issuing the questioned orders. It may be served with notices and other processes at 2/F LF&V Fatima Bldg., Real St., Tacloban City.
THE ANTECEDENTS
Sometime in the first quarter of 2004, private respondent Erzon instituted a case for Unlawful Detainer against petitioner Remedios for allegedly encroaching on the 393.5 square meter portion of his property.[5] The subject property is described as follows:
“A parcel of land located in Aguadas St., Burauen, Leyte consisting of 403 square meters identified as lot no. 5115 of the Burauen Cadastre bounded on the Northeast by lot no. 516, on the Southeast by lot no. 988 on the Southwest by Sta. Ana St., and on the Northwest by Santiago St., covered by Original Certificate of Title No. T-15115 to the names of Liborio Rebana and Eugenia Coral and declared for taxation purposes in the names of the same owners in Tax Declaration No. R12 05-08-005-00101”[6]
The case was however dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte (MTC)[7] upon showing that no proper delineation and partition of the properties has been conducted to determine the specific area owned by plaintiff and defendant over Lot 5115.[8] On Appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 of Burauen, Leyte (RTC) affirmed the decision of the MTC and denied plaintiff’s prayer of evicting defendant from the subject property.[9]
To delineate his right over Lot 5115, private respondent filed a Complaint for Partition with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and a Temporary Restraining Order with Damages.[10] Thereafter, the case for Partition was docketed as Civil Case No. B-08-07-613.
On May 25, 2012, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision[11] finding in favor of private respondent and ordering the partition of the subject property. It ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. In view thereof, the Court orders the partition of the subject property segregating or setting aside 9.6 square meters and award the said portion to the defendant while the remaining portion in the subject property should be given to the plaintiff after the estate taxes shall have been paid. The partition shall be executed in a manner that the defendant is least disturbed from her possession if that is possible. The counterclaim is ordered DISMISSED.[12]
Prevailing in his purpose, on July 11, 2012, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment[13].
On July 16, 2012, an Entry of Judgment was issued by the respondent Court certifying that the May 25, 2012 Decision in Civil Case No. B-08-07-613 has become final and executory on July 6, 2012. An Opposition/Comment[14] thereto dated August 22, 2012 was filed by petitioner.
On September 4, 2012, an Order was issued by the respondent Court granting the Motion for Execution. In its ratio, the Lower Court noted that a period of fifteen (15) days has lapsed from the time of defendants’ receipt of the judgment. From the time thereon, neither a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by private respondent nor an appeal was pursued. Hence, it disposed:
WHEREFORE, over the opposition/comment made by the defendant through counsel, the Court grants the Motion for Execution. Let a Writ of Execution be issued.[15]
On September 11, 2012, a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Quashal of Order/Writ of Execution[16] was filed by private respondent. Petitioner raised the following issues as grounds for the granting of her motion: 1.) That the judgment may not be carried out without the appointment of Commissioners pursuant to Section 3 Rule 69 of the Rules of Court; 2.) That the property sought to be executed is defendant’s family home and is therefore exempt from execution; 3.) That the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac011k or excess of jurisdiction when it granted an Order/Writ of Execution of a Judgment which is not final and executory.[17]
On October 4, 2012, the respondent Court resolved the Motion for Reconsideration filed and ruled for its denial. It held:
WHEREFORE, for want of any factual and legal bases (sic) the motion for reconsideration and/or quashal of order/writ of execution is DENIED. Xxx [18]
Petitioner now files the instant petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Court. In justifying the granting of her petition, Remedios cites the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION:
1) When it granted the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution outright in open court on September 4, 2012 Hearing without taking into consideration the written and oral opposition set up by the defendant;
2) When it issued the corresponding Writ of Execution the day following the September 4, 2012 Hearing and commanded the sheriff to forthwith execute and enforce the same on September 6, 2012, well within the 15-day period before said order becomes final;
3) When it granted the motion for issuance of writ of execution without complying with the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court;
4) When it granted an order/writ of execution of a judgment which is not final and executory;
5) When it denied the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Quashal of the Writ of Execution despite the indubitable existence of the additional ground that the subject thereof is a family home, hence exempt from execution.[19]
Petitioner argues that the respondent judge acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and despotically when (September 4, 2012 Order) it denied outright petitioner’s opposition to the motion for execution on the sole ground that the subject judgment is already final and executory.
Petitioner further expounds that the respondent court blatantly disregarded the rule that any order, resolution, or decision may not be enforced within the reglementary period of 15 days.[20] Worse, the court a quo issued the corresponding writ the following day, September 5, 2012, and commanded the sheriff to execute the same.[21]
With regard to the dispositive portion of the decision, the Court required for the partition to be executed in such a manner that she shall be least disturbed of her possession if the same is possible. Petitioner submits that the sheriff, by the nature of his profession, lacks the competence to make the partition himself. Also, the sheriff could not forthwith enforce the judgment since there is yet not partition to speak of that would enable him to deliver the corresponding portion belonging to the parties.[22] Thus, the appointment of three (3) competent, disinterested commissioners is necessary to enforce the partition. Hence, the issuance of the writ of execution of the judgment is premature, capricious and arbitrary.[23]
Petitioner likewise raises the fact that the Decision in Civil Case No. B-08-07-613 recognizes the issue of legal redemption raised. The private respondent is but a mere stranger and not an heir of the primitive owners of the subject property. However, the respondent Court declined to resolve the issue.
Petitioner contends that private respondent’s right of redemption whether resolved in the partition case or in another action will indispensably affect plaintiff’s right to demand partition.[24] Remedios adds, the judgment was silent with respect to the disposition of the residential house of the defendant standing as an improvement on the lot subject of partition which covers an area of 124.8 square meters, more or less. For these reasons, petitioner submits, the judgment cannot become final and therefore may not be the subject of execution.[25]
Petitioner also interposes, not all the heirs of the decedent were impleaded as indispensable parties. By virtue of their non-participation, the judgment of the court cannot attain finality.[26]
Finally, petitioner interjects that the house on which the subject property is constituted is a family home and therefore exempt from execution.[27]
From the foregoing, petitioner prays that the order granting the Motion for Execution be reconsidered or set aside and/or the writ itself be quashed.[28]
In a Resolution[29] dated February 5, 2013, We required private respondent to file Comment on the petition. The Judicial Records Division of this Court however reported that none was filed despite the directive of this Court.[30] Having waived his right to file the appropriate pleading, We declared the instant case submitted for decision.[31]
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders;
THE COURT’S RULING
Before we delve into the matters at hand, this Court shall clarify the nature of the present petition in order to avoid anyfuture confusion that may arise. On February 5, 2013, this Court issued a Resolution denominating the present petition as “Petition for Review under Rule 42”. A perusal of the records however reveal that indeed the instant petition is a Petition for Certiorari.
From the records, petitioner foreclosed her right to appeal the Decision of the Court a quo when she neglected to file a Motion for Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal.
In an attempt to rectify the procedural lapse committed, petitioner now files the instant Petition for Certiorari.
A petition for certiorari is not
a substitute for a lost appeal.
It is elementary in remedial law that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is cause for dismissal of the petition for certiorari. Likewise, it has been repeatedly stressed that a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.[32]
A special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal… Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.[33]
This is due to the nature of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari which lies only where there is “no appeal,” and “no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [34]
Nevertheless, this salutary rule has been disregarded on occasion by the Supreme Court in instances where valid and compelling circumstances warrant.[35] The Supreme Court ruled in Spouses Leynes vs. Court of Appeals:[36]
We bear in mind that the acceptance of a petition for certiorari, as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The provisions of the Rules of Court, which are technical rules, may be relaxed in certain exceptional situations. Where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, it is within our power to suspend the rules or exempt a particular case from its operation.
A relaxation of technical rules
may be made when the broader
interest of justice so requires.
Thus, while a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
Under the circumstances, this Court finds that a relaxation of the procedural rules must be made in consideration of broader interest of justice. Hence, exercising this Court’s discretion, We shall entertain the Petition for Certiorari filed.
Preliminarily, this Court notes that the grounds raised by petitioner are the very same issues cited in the Opposition/Comment to prevent the execution of the May 25, 2012 Decision.
Having filed a Petition for Certiorari to assail the Orders issued, this Court shall limit Our discussion within the ambit allowed by its nature. It should be noted that as a legal recourse, certiorari is a limited form of review. It is restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not errors of judgment.[37]
It is well-settled that a petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.
The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.[38]
The issuance of a Writ of Execution
becomes a ministerial duty of the Court
when a judgment has attained finality.
Petitioner’s first ground is founded on the contention that the May 25, 2012 Decision has not attained finality. Consequently, the Writ of Execution issued is unwarranted.
We find the contention indefensible. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible.[39] It is well settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of judgment becomes an established fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal, if no appeal is perfected or motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed.[40]
In the case at bar, petitioner has admitted to ignorance of the rules and failure to confer with her lawyer within the period provided by law to file the requisite Motion for Reconsideration or Notice of Appeal from the May 25, 2012 Judgment.[41]
As a matter of law, once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a Writ of Execution as mandated by Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997[42] Rules of Civil Procedure.
The rule, however, admits of exceptions:
(1) when facts and circumstances later
transpire that would render execution
inequitable or unjust; or (2) when there
is a change in the situation of the parties
that may warrant an injunctive relief.
The rule is clear that it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has become executory.[43] The rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as the following: (1) when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust; or (2) when there is a change in the situation of the parties that may warrant an injunctive relief.[44]
Applied in this case, notwithstanding the failure of petitioner to file the Motion for Reconsideration within the fifteen (15) day period and attaining finality of the judgment, We find the issuance of the Writ of Execution to be improper.
The facts and circumstances of the case at bar calls for an application of the exception to the general rule. To our mind, executing the May 25, 2012 Decision would cause injustice to petitioner and indispensable parties not impleaded in the present case.
In partition proceedings, reference to commissioners
is required as a procedural step in the action
and is not discretionary on the part of the court.
For one, We take exception of the ruling of the respondent Court in its Order dated October 4, 2012 in holding that non-referral of the partition in the instant case to not more than three (3) commissioners as mandated in Section 3, Rule 69 does not go into the merits of the judgment. In ruling such, the respondent Court rationalized that the absence of the procedure does not in any way affect the legality and regularity of the decision.[45]
There are two ways in which a partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2, and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached under Sections 3 to 6.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 69 provide:
SECTION 2. Order for partition, and partition by agreement thereunder. — If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the partition of the real estate among all the parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated. (2a)
x x x
SECTION 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree. — If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct. (Emphasis Original)[46]
In the case at bar, the respondent Court deviated from the procedure espoused in Rule 69. The records fail to disclose that the respondent Court, in enforcing the judgment, required the parties to submit a project of partition in compliance with Section 2 to demonstrate efforts of amicable settlement between the parties. Likewise, it is admitted by the trial court that it deemed inessential to refer the matter to appointed commissioners.
The Supreme Court has held in a number of cases that if the parties are unable to agree on a partition, the trial court should order the appointment of commissioners. In partition proceedings, reference to commissioners is required as a procedural step in the action and is not discretionary on the part of the court.[47] The respondent Court may not therefore impose the manner of distribution of the subject property. Thus, in immediately dispensing the referral to the Commissioners without any consultation with parties involved, the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion.
In an action for partition of real estate,
it is the plaintiff who is mandated by the Rules
to implead all the indispensable parties.
The respondent Court likewise shot down the argument of petitioner that the judgment is null and void for failing to implead all the heirs of Liborio Rebana as indispensable parties. The RTC declared petitioner to have waived her right to question the validity of the complaint when she failed to do interpose the same through a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.[48]
Respondent Court is mistaken.
In the case of Ely Quilatan Vs. Heirs of Lorenzo Quilatan[49] the Supreme Court declared no fault on the part of the defendant for failing to raise the issue in their Answer.
The same ruling is made in Moldes v. Villanueva.[50] In the said case, the High tribunal stressed that, “The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.”
In ruling such, the Supreme Court supported the conclusion by resolving that in an action for partition of real estate, it is the plaintiff who is mandated by the Rules to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[51]
From these pronouncements, petitioner may not be faulted for failing to raise the issue in a Motion to Dismiss or in an Answer before the Lower Court. Accordingly, petitioner may not likewise be considered to have waived her right to question private respondent’s failure to implead the indispensable parties.
As a consequence of private respondents’ omission of impleading the indispensable parties, the questioned judgment and the succeeding orders relevant to the judgment has been rendered null and void.
One who is a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court, otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. Without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. The failure of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as parties(-plaintiffs) constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court’s… exercise of judicial power over the said case, and rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity.[52] Hence, the trial court should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.[53]
With the nullity of the questioned orders, We find the issue of the family home moot. As such, We find no reason to discuss the same.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Orders dated September 4, 2012 and October 4, 2012 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 of Burauen, Leyte in Civil Case No. B-08-07-613 are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Maxino, P.A.A., and *Lagura-Yap, M.B., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, page 4.
[2] Ibid. pages 24-25.
* Acting Junior Member in lieu of J. Renato C. Francisco’s leave of absence as per Office Order No. 29-14-GTI dated 22 December 2014.
[3] Id., pages 6-7.
[4] Id., page 7.
[5] Id., page 9.
[6] Id., page 52.
[7] Id., page 78.
[8] Id., page 67.
[9] Id., page 53.
[10] Id., page 90.
[11] Id., page 52.
[12] Id., page 63.
[13] Id., page 27.
[14] Id., page 31.
[15] Id., page 23.
[16] Id., page 43.
[17] Id.
[18] Id., page 26.
[19] Id., pages 11-12.
[20] Id., page 13.
[21] Id., page 14.
[22] Id., page 16.
[23] Id., pages 15-16.
[24] Supra Note 21.
[25] Id., page 17.
[26] Id., page 18.
[27] Id., page 19.
[28] Id., pages 19- 20.
[29] Id., page 112.
[30] Backpage of page 128.
[31] Id., page 129.
[32] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65, Section 1; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 81 (2000);Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 413 (1997).
[33] Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 783, 791 (2002).
[34] Supra, Note 31.
[35] Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone, 349 SCRA 240 (2001); Santo Tomas University Hospital vs. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 (1998).
[36] G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011.
[37] Isabel N. Guzman vs. Aniana N. Guzman, G.R. No. 172588, March 13, 2013.
[38] Office of the Ombudsman v. Magno, G.R. No. 178923, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 272, 286-287 citing Microsoft Corporation v. Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, 438 Phil. 408, 414 (2002); Suliguin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166046, 23 March 2006, 485 SCRA 219, 233; Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 1, 19-20 (2002); Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Goimco, Sr., 512 Phil. 729, 733-734 (2005) citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 786 (2003); Duero v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12, 20 (2002) citing Cuison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128540, 15 April 1998, 289 SCRA 159, 171.
[39] Rivelisa Realty, Inc., represented by Ricardo P. Venturina v. First Sta. Clara Builders Corporation, G.R. No. 189618. January 15, 2014.
[40] Leticia A. Cadena vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191412, January 17, 2012.
[41] Id., page 10.
[42] Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. —
Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
[43] Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163286, August 22, 2012.
[44] Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 483 (1998).
[45] Id., page 25.
[46] Felicidad Dadizon vs. Socorro Bernadas, G.R. No. 172367, June 5, 2009 .
[47] Id., citing REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, VOL. I, 849 (2005).
[48] Id., page 25.
[49] G.R. No. 183059, August 28, 2009.
[50] G.R. No. 161955, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 697, 707-708.
[51] Sepulveda v. Pelaez, 490 Phil. 710, 722 (2005).
[52] Lozano v. Ballesteros, 195 SCRA 681 (1991).
[53] Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20 (1997).