THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CRISPIN LAWAS, AGUSTIN OSORIO AND CLEMENTE OSORIO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

In G.R. No. L-7618 (Crim, Case No. 180, Court of First Instance of Lanao),
Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio, Clemente Osorio, Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio
and Agapito Gumisad have appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
finding each of them guilty of the crime of robbery, and sentencing each to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from two months and one day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to three years, eight months and one day of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party Manaronsong
Lomangcolob, in the following manner; Crispin Lawas and Agapito Gumisad, P50.00
each; Clemente Osorio, Felipe Si-it and Generoso Osorio, P266.00 each; and
Agustin Osorio, P500.00, and in case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment. The appeal of Agapito Gumisad has, however, been
dismissed for failure on his part to file a brief. This appeal in this Court,
therefore, only refers to the others.

In G.R. No. L-7613 (Crim. Case No. 444, Court of First Instance of Lanao),
Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio and Clemente Osorio hava appealed from a judgment
of tha Court of First Instance of Lanao, finding them guilty of multiple murder
and sentencing each of them to suffer tha indeterminate penalty of from ten
years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years four
months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum of P2,000,
and to pay the costs.

In G.R. No. L-7620 (Crim. Case No. 373, Court of First Instance of Lanao),
Hermenegildo Tabacon, Felipe Si-it, Agapito Gumisad, Generoso Osorio and
Patricio Pinos were also found guilty of tha crime of multiple murder and
sentenced to the same penalty imposed upon Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio and
Clemente Osorio in Criminal Case No. 444. They have also appealed from the
decision. But the appeals of Agapito Gumisad and Hermenegildo Tabacon have been
dismissed for failure on their part to file briefs. The case now proceeds on
appeal only as to Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio and Patrocinio Pinos.

The evidence shows that on July 3, 1042 various Moros (Maranaos) from Barrio
Baris, Municipality of Kolambugan, province of Lanao, raided the barrio of
Malingao, killing 11 Christian residents including men and women, wounding two
of them, and, thereafter, robbing them of their belongings. This incident was
reported to the home guards, an organization composed of ex-Philippine
Constabulary soldiers and civilians whose duty it was to preserve peace and
order among the inhabit ants, protect them, and prevent the infiltration of the
Japanese in their communities. The report was made to appellant Crispin Lawas,
head of the home guards in Balimbing and to Sgt. Benaojan, also head of home
guards in Salong. Upon learning of the incident, Lawas and Benaojan and some
home guards proceeded to the barrio of Malingao to check up the report. There
they found the asad bodies of the Christian Filipinos killed by the Maranaos and
learned that the Maranaos who had committed the act came from the barrio of
Baris. So they proceeded to the barrio of Baris in the afternoon of July 10.
Upon reaching Baris, they divided themselves into two groups, one headed by Sgt.
Benaojan and the other by Crispin Lawas. That headed by Sgt. Benaojan gathered
the Maranaos around the place of ex-Mayor Gunti, while that headed by Crispin
Lawas, those that live around the house of Datu Lomangcolob. Some seventy of
them, including Manaronsong Lomangcolob. school teacher, Datu Lomangcolob
Sumala, his wife and children, Gunti Ampaso, his wife and children, Pasintao,
his wife and four children, Laito, his wife and four children, Pacpac, his wife,
niece and nephew, Mainanding Lomangcolob and two children, Dibton and children,
Garagabos and wife, Rutum, his wife and children, Aboli and a child, Adki’s
children, and others were brought by the home guards to the barrio of Salong,
where they arrived in the evening of July 10th, between seven and eight o’clock.
When the home guards were in the barrio of Baris, they or some of them took away
three carabaos, two horses, and many personal belongings, especially of Datu
Lomangcolob. This is the basis of the charge of robbery.

The Maranaos were confined during the night of July 10 under guard in the
house of one Restituto Requino. The next morning, Crispin Lawas and Agustin
Osorio began investigating the principal Moros. Some 15 of them were brought
down in groups of five before Lawas and Osorio. A table was set up near the rice
mill of Pedro Lacson and there Lawas and Osorio questioned them. In the course
of the investigation, and for reasons which are disputed, the home guards then
on duty and present at the investigation fired at the Moros and most of them
were killed. In the course of the melee that followed, some of the home guards
and others who could not be identified, went up the house of Restituto Requino
and fired at the woman and children who were on the second floor of the house.
Some of the women and children were stabbed. No less than 35 women and children
were killed and no less than 16 of the Moros down below were also killed. Among
the killed were Datu Lomangcolob Sumala, Gunti Ampaso, Pasintao, Laito, Pacpac
and Rutum. For this killing, two charges of multiple murder were filed, one
against Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio and Clemente Osorio, and another against
Hermenegildo Tabacon, Felipe Si-it, Agapito Gumisad, Generoso Osorio and
Patricio Pinos.

Insofar as the crime of robbery is concerned, principal witness Manaronsong
Lomangcolob, son of. Datu Lomangcolob. Sumala, declared that the Home guards who
gathered them in . the barrio of Baris and later brought them to the barrio .
of. Salong took from them (the Maranaos) 3 carabaos worth P800, 2 horses worth
P100, and jewelry and other personal belongings worth P500. The animals were
taken away by the following home guards: Lawas, 1 horse; Agapito Gumisad, 1
horse; and Clemente Osorio, Felipe Si-it and Generoso Osorio, one carabao each.
Of the accused, the following were seen coming down from the houses of the
Maranaos, bringing with them malongs, bracelets and other personal
belongings: Generoso Osorio, Felipe Si-it, Hermenegildo Tabacon, Agustin Osorio,
Clemente Osorio and Agapito Gumisad.

Of the above-named accused, only Lawas testified, but he made no denial of
the taking by him of one of the horses. None of the briefs or memoranda filed on
behalf of the appellant claims or mentions grounds why appellants should not be
held guilty of robbery, although certain discrepancies appear in Lomangcolob’s
testimony as to the manner in which the said horses and carabaos ware taken.
Admitting that there are discrepancies in tho said testimony as to the details
of the taking, the evidence conclusively shows that the accused designated above
took the animals and properties in question. No denial of this fact was ever
made. There is insinuation that some of the animals may have been some of those
taken at the raid of Malingao, but no satisfactory evidence exists on which a
finding to that effect can be predicated. The evidence also shows that the
accused were armed at the time of the taking of the animals and other personal
properties. The finding of the trial court that the accused are guilty of
robbery as above-indicated is fully supported by the evidence. There is no
evidence, however, of the existence of any conspiracy among the accused in the
commission of tha acts of robbery and each one must respond for his own
individual act.

As to the charge of multiple murder, tha death of about fifty of the
Maranaos, including fifteen men, twenty five women and ten children is not
questioned; but the circumstances under which their death took place are the
object of conflicting evidence. The three witnesses for the prosecution claim
that the Moros were fired at when Datu Lomangcolob refused to be tied at the
hands, while the defense claims that they were fired at because they attempted
to grab the arms of the home guards. The evidence submitted by both sides on
this issue may be summarized as follows:

Manaronsong Lomangcolob testified that while he and four of his companions
namely, Gunti Ampaso, lacpac and Datu Lomangcolob ware in front of the table
before which Crispin Lawas and Agustin Osorio were making the investigation,
Lawas first asked them to sign blank papers, and that they, the Maranaos,
refused; but they were beaten with rifles and boxed, so Datu Lomangcolob
enjoined him and his companions to sign the blank papers as demanded by the
investigators; that afterwards Crispin Lawas informed the Maranaos that they
would be brought to Captain Morgan at Balimbing and for this purpose their hands
were to be tied; that for the purpose of tying their hands, Hermenegildo
Tabacon, one of the home guards, brought some pieces of split rattan; that as
Datu Lomangcolob was approached to have his hands tied, he refused and,
thereupon, Crispin Lawas fired his revolver at him and ordered the guards to
fire; that following instructions, the home guards fired at the Moros and many
of them fell down dead; that those Moros who tried to escape were also fired at;
and that after a short time Crispin Lawas ordered his men to “cease fire”, and
the firing stopped.;

Pedro Lacson, a resident of Barrio Salong, corroborated tha principal parts
of the above testimony of Manaronsong Lomangcolob, declaring that he (Lacson)
was under the eaves of his house observing the investigation that Lawas and
Osorio were conducting; that he noticed Lawas ordering the men to be brought
down from the house of Restituto Requino; that in the course of the
investigation, Lawas said that the Moros would be brought to Balimbing where
Captain Morgan was and that the Moros were to have their hands tied; that Datu
Lomangoolob expressed willingness to go to Captain Morgan, but that he was not
willing to have his hands tied; and that then a commotion ensued and then
Crispin Lawas gave his men the order to fire. In connection with the massacre of
the women in the second floor of the house of Restituto Requino, it is very
clear that in the course of the shooting two persons, not companions of Lawas,
went up the house of Requino and, perhaps, helped in boloing the 15 women and
children in said house.

A third witness corroborated the most important details of the above
testimonies. Manking Aguam, claiming to be 11 years old when the incident took
place, testified as follows: That he was with the women and children in the
upper floor of the house of Restituto Requino before the investigation began;
that he saw some of the accused as they brought down the male Maranaos for the
purpose of investigation; that the firing was caused by the refusal of the
Maranaos to accede to have their hands tied as ordered by Crispin Lawas: that in
the course of the shooting, Agapito Gumisad, Felipe Si-it, Clemente Osorio, Tito
Requino and Patricio Pinos shot at the women and children and stabbed them with
boloes; and that Gumisad was trying to stab him and what he did was to jump down
and run away.

Only two of the accused took the witness stand, namely, Crispin Lawas and
Agustin Osorio. Other witnesses testified for them, but their testimonies are of
no material value insofar as the main issue is concerned. Crispin Lawas
testified that upon the receipt of the report of the raid on the Christian
Filipinos by the Maranaos on July 9, he met with Captain Morgan, the head of the
home guards and tha PC; that thereupon Captain Morgan instructed him to
accompany Sgt, Benaojan and proceed to Barrio Malingao to investigate the
incident; that in pursuance of said order, he and Sgt. Banaojan went to Barrio
Malingao and saw the dead persons there; that he found out after investigation
that some of the Moros who made the raid came from Barrio Baris, so he and Sgt,
Benaojan and their men proceeded to Baris; that the people of that place were
gathered together in the afternoon of July 10 and that they took them along to
Barrio Salong; that when they reached that place, Sgt. Benaojan ordered the
Moros to stay in the house of Restituto Requino and that this was done; that at
dawn the following day, Lawas went to Captain Morgan to make a report, and that
Captain Morgan ordered him to investigate the leaders of the Moros and,
afterwards, send the result of his investigation to him; that he returned to the
barrio of Salong the following morning; that at about 8:00 o’clock in the
morning of the following day (July 11), he ordered a table to be placed on the
ground and that the investigation of the Moros be conducted; that the
investigation took place in the following order: first Mayor Gunti, Datu
Lomangcolob, Datu Pacpac and Manaronsong Lomangcolob together; that as said
investigation proceeded, the Moros suddenly rushed at the home guards to grab
their guns and so a commotion arose; that he and Agustin Osorio did not know
what had happened and upon hearing gun fire he stood astounded; that because of
the presence of the women and children, he ordered his guards to cease fire,
which was done; that throughout the time of the firing, he could not do anything
but stand up; that his companion Agustin Osorio in the meanwhile lied flat on
the ground; and that afterwards he went to the middle of the place where the
gathering was and found out that many Moros were dead.

For his part, accused Agustin Osorio testified that on July 10, he was
ordered by Sgt. Benaojan to go to Camp 5 with 4 soldiers to investigate the
maltreatment of a Christian Filipino; that on their way back from the
investigation, they heard shots coming from Barrio Malingao and so they went to
that barrio and upon arriving there they found 11 Christian Filipinos dead and 2
wounded; that he received information about the incident from one, Piano
Taborada, who said that the ones who made the raid were from Barrio Baris; that
when he returned to Barrio Salong, he reported the incident to Sgt. Benaojan;
that he accompanied Sgt. Benaojan and Crispin Lawas on July 10 to Barrio
Malingao where they saw 11 Christians dead and 2 wounded; that after the
investigation conducted in Barrio Malingao, they went to Barrio Baris where they
arrived at five o’clock in the afternoon; that upon reaching Barrio Baris, Mayor
Gunti sounded the “agong” and the people of the barrio swarmed around them; that
they brought some of the men to the barrio of Salong and there they were ordered
to sleep in the house of Restituto Requino; that after breakfast the following
morning, July 11, an investigation was to be made and after the male Moros were
brought down he and Lawas began investigating them; that after investigating 6
of the Moros, and while investigating the 7th, he immediately noticed a
commotion among the Moros and the soldiers because of the fact that the former
were grabbing the firearms of the latter; that in the course of the struggle the
guns of the soldiers were exploded; that because of the noise Lawas could not
give any order so he and Lawas laid themselves down flat on the ground and after
one minute in this position, Lawas ordered that the guards cease firing and the
firing stopped; that he could not tell where the firing started because at the
time when it began Lawas was dictating to him and he was writing down what Lawas
dictated; and that after the firing had ceased, ha looked around and found many
teoros. dead, while the soldiers (home guards) had run away.

There is no question that before Lawas fired at Datu Lomangcolob and the home
guards also fired at the other Monos, there was a sort of commotion, evidently
produced by the announcement made by Lawas that the Moros were to be brought to
Captain Morgan at Balimbing and that their hands were to be tied. The existence
of this commotion is admitted by Pedro Lacson, eye witness to the incident, who
said “But then the Moros refused that they will go there with the Christian
and immediately a commotion started and because of that, Crispin Lawas
ordered them to be fired at.” The issue lies on the cause or origin of said
commotion, for while the prosecution contends that this was produced by the
refusal of Datu Lomangcolob to have his hands tied, the defense claims that the
commotion was produced by the Moros suddenly rushing at the soldiers to grab
their firearms, arid so they were fired at. The theory of the defense is not
warranted by the facts and circumstances proved and admitted. Had the Moros
actually rushed at the soldiers to grapple with these for the possession of the
firearms, they would have mixed up with the soldiers in body struggles and it
would have been impossible for the soldiers to fire at them without hitting
their own companions. Had there been a free for all struggle for the arms of the
soldiers, the latter could not have fired at and hit the Moros without hitting
others or their own companions. But only one of the home guards was wounded by a
stray bullet; no others received any injury in the course of the commotion.
Besides, a volley of shots appeared to have been fired immediately when the
commotion started, as a result of which many Moros fell down dead. This would
not have been the case had real grappling for the possession of the guns taken
place as claimed by the defense. If a struggle for the possession df the
firearms had taken place, the shots would have come intermittently. If there
were shots made after the first volley had been fired they were aimed at the
escaping Moros. All the above circumstances belie the claim of the defense that
the Moros tried to grab the firearms of the solders, and that the latter fired
at them as a consequence of the said attempt.

On the other hand, neither can the theory of the prosecution that upon
refusal of Datu Lomangcolob to have his hands tied, Lawas gave the order to fire
at the Moros, be admitted on its face value. Witness Pedro Lacson, who appears
to be the most impartial of the witnesses, admits that there was a commotion,
although he did not specify the nature and character thereof. If any commotion
ever existed at all, it must have bean caused by the announcement that the Moros
were to be tied. This announcement must have angered the Morors, who must have
protested the act; theretofore, they had submitted themselves to the arrest
without protest or resistance. The most reasonable inference is that upon
hearing that their hands were to be tied and as the leader was going to have his
hands tied and he refused or resisted, the Maranaos must have angrily protested,
showing an attitude of hostility or resistance; and this attitude must have been
interpretted by Lawas and the soldiers as a determination to resist and even to
fight, Perhaps, this belief also must have produced the impression upon the mind
of Lawas that the Moros were bent on something like the use of force, such as
the grabbing of the firearms of the soldiers, and perhaps it may have been in an
attempt to forestall such a frantic and unexpected attack that Lawas gave the
order to fire and that he himself fired at Datu Lomangcolob. We think that this
must have happened; that Lawas believed that the Moros were about to resist and
even attempt to fight for the arms, so he gave the order to fire.

There can not, therefore, be any circumstance that would qualify the killing
of the Maranaos as murder; there was no evident premeditation; neither was there
treachery because the Moros were face to face with the soldiers; and neither
could there be abuse of superior strength because the soldiers did not expressly
take advantage of their arms to commit the offense.

On the other hand, there is no circumstance present in the killing which may
sufficiently serve to mitigate the offense that has been committed. It is
possible that an attitude of hostility accompanied the refusal of Datu
Lomangcolob to have his hands tied, which attitude must have been shared by his
companions; and it is also possible that the fear of well-known Moro
ferociousness could have made Lawas and his companions believe that the Moros
were bent on refusing to be tied. But there is no evidence that they went beyond
showing their refusal or hostility, or an apparent act on their part such as
would induce a reasonable belief that the Maranaos were about to begin an
aggression against their captors. Their peaceful conduct at the time of their
arrest and before the investigation showed that they were submissive and
obedient. No circumstance, therefore, can sufficiently justify a finding that
the offense was committed with any mitigating circumstance. The offense
committed is plain, simple homicide, with respect to Crispin Lawas and Agustin
Osorio, as it is also with respect to thos3 soldiers who fired at the Moros at
the time the commotion arose.

But with respect to the killing of the women and children in the upper story
of the house of Restituto Requino, the killing is plainly attended by the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The women and children were
defenseless; there is no evidence that they showed any act of defiance or
hostility, and while the soldiers were given an order to fire at the Moros then
on the ground, said order could not imply or include an order to go up the house
and massacre the innocent and defenseless women and children therein. Persons
who participated in the killing of the women should be made to suffer the
penalty commensurate with the degree of perversity which attended this act.
While evident premeditation may not be assumed, because the massacre of the
women and children was part of the impulse that resulted in the killing of the
Moros on the ground, yet the women and children were defenseless and could offer
no resistance at all. Their defenseless condition should be considered as
included in the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not as an
independent circumstance of treachery. We find, therefore, that only one
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, or the killing of
the women and children, and that is tha abuse of superior strength, which
aggravating circumstance raises the offense to that of murder.

The question which still has to be considered is tha determination from among
the appellants of those who may be convicted of the murder of the women and
children.in the house of Restituto Requino. Witness Pedro Lacson declared that
he saw two men armed with bolos going up the house as the shooting of the Moros
on the ground was in progress, but he asserted that these did not belong to the
group of home guards led by Crispin Lawas. But Manking Aguam identified Agapito
Gumisad, Felipa Si-it, Clemente Osorio, Pedro Benaojan, Tito Requino and
Patricio Pinos as among those who went up and shot or stabbed the women and
children in the house. The identification is not contradicted nor denied by the
defense, but except as to Gumisad, who was well known to the witness before the
incident, the identification is not as positive and certain as to amount to
proof of their identities beyond reasonable doubt. Thus witness identified Tito
Requino as one of the assailants; but Requino was never known before that time
by the witness. He also identified another as Benaojan, but the other evidence
submitted by the State itself shows that Benaojan was not present at the time of
the incident. In another part of his testimony, the witness said that Tabacon,
Pinos and Generoso Osorio were among those who brought down the Moros; while in
tha same testimony, he asserts it was one old man, Mauricio Macasarte, who also
went up. There was no corroboration offered by any more competent and
disinterested witness. This vacillating and doubtful identification, coupled
with tha fact that the witness was only eleven years of age at tha time of the
incident and made tho identification seven years later, and that he had an
interest in the conviction of the accused, can not serve as legal basis for a
finding that the persons pointed out at tha trial were in fact the very persons
who committed the murder of the women and children, With the exeeption of
Agapito Gumisad and Hermenegildo Tabacon, whose appeals have been dismissed, the
other appellants Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio and Patricio Pinos can not,
therefore, be found guilty of murder.

As to whether Crispin Lawas and .Agustin Osorio can be held responsible
therefor, it is true that the authors of the murder were home guards under their
immediata command. But the evidence submitted fails to disclose any previous
common design to massacre all the Moros under detention, including the women and
children. The evidence is to the effect that the women and the children were not
arrested or taken into custody, but that they only accompanied their husbands
and relatives who were brought for investigation. There was no evidence of a
previous conspiracy by reason of which Crispin Lawas and Agustin Osorio, as
leaders, may be held for the murder of the women and children.

May they be held guilty of murder by induction on the basis of the order
given by Lawas to fire at the Moros as the commotion started? It is true that
Lawas was the leader of the home guards in Balimbing among whom were Agapito
Gumisad, Felipe Si-it, Hermenegildo Tabacon and Patricio Pinos. But the order
given was to fire at the Moros (on the ground), and nothing else; the order was
to fire at the Moros who showed resistance or protest against his order that
they be tied. The order could not have been interpreted to mean that the women
and children in the house, who did not appear to have shown any resistance or
hostility at all, should also be fired at. Lawas clearly did not intend that the
women and children inside the house should also be fired at. He can not be held
guilty of the crime committed, as it has been held that in order to make the
inducer responsible for the crime committed, it is necessary that the inducement
is material land precedes the commission of the act, and that such inducement
was the determining cause thereof.

“xxx, it may be stated as a general proposition that, where the inducement
offered by the accused is of such a nature and made in such a way that it become
the determining cause of the crime, and such inducement was offered with the
intention of producing that result, then the accused is guilty by inducement of
the crime committed by the person so induced. The inducement to the crime must
be intentional on the part of the inducer and must be made directly for the
purpose in view.

“The verb ‘induce’ is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases
where there exists on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and
the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with
the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation,
as well as words or acts which are merely the result of indiscretion or lack of
reflection and which carry with them, inherently, almost nothing of inducement
or temptation. A chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of
a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought
of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent
reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the
act having any expectation, that his suggestion would be followed or any real
intention that it produces a result. In such case, while the expression was
imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of
the crime committed. Therefore, in applying the principles laid down to concrete
cases it is necessary to remember only that the inducement must be made directly
with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such
inducement must be the determining cause of the crime.” (U. S. vs.
Indanan, 24 Phil. 203, 218)

Neither Crisipin Lawas nor Agustin Osorio may, therefore, be held responsible
for the crime of murder in connection with the massacre of the women and
children by inducement, and they must be acquitted of the charge of murder.

One last question involves the determination of the number or crimes for
which each of the appellants may be found guilty, whether each one should be
considered as having committed as many crimes as there were persons who were
killed, or only for one complex crime of multiple homicide. The information is
for multiple murder, and no inference can be made therefrom, that the accused
are being charged of as many offenses as there were victims. Then the evidence
positively shows that the killing was the result of a single impulse, which was
induced by the order of the leader to fire, and continued with the intention to
comply therewith, as the firing stopped as soon as the leader gave the order to
that effect. There was no intent on the part of the apellants either to fire at
each and everyone of the victims as separately and distinctly from each other.
It has been held that if the act or acts complained of resulted from a single
criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense (Article 43 of the Revised
Penal Code; People vs. Acosta, 60 Phil. 158). So also it has been held that the
act of taking two roosters belonging to two different persons in the same place
and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent
existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor
two intentions that characterize two separate crimes (People vs. De
Leon, 49 Phil. 237, citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November
2, 1898 and October 4, 1905). And in the case of People vs. Guillem, 47
0.G. No. 7, 3433, a single act, that of throwing a highly explosive hand grenade
at President Roxas, resulting in the death of one victim and in physical
injuries on others was considered as a single act, also falling under the first
part of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It may be added that there is
absolutely no evidence as to the number of persons killed by each and every one
of the appellants, so even if we were induced to hold each appellant responsible
for each and every death caused by him, it is imposible to carry that desire
into effect as it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by
each and everyone. We are, therefore, forced to find the appellants guilty of
only one offense, that of multiple homicide for which the penalty to be imposed
should be in the maximum period.

Wherefore, in G.R. No. 7618, for robbery, the judgment of conviction appealed
from is hereby affirmed, but the maximum of the penalty imposed is hereby raised
to 6 years 10 months and 1 day of prision mayor, in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of superior strength in the commission of the offense.
The individual liabilities of each of the persons sentenced for said crime are
hereby also affirmed. In G.R. Nos. 7619 and 7620, the appellants Crispin Lawas,
Clemente Osorio, Agustin Osorio, Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio and Patricio
Pinos are each found guilty of the crime of multiple homicide and each sentenced
to suffer the penalty of not less than 15 years 6 months and 21 days nor more
than 18 years 2 months and 21 days, both of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased, jointly and severally, in the
amount of P3,000.00, and to pay the costs proportionately.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.