G.R. No. L-27602. October 15, 1983
VICENTE CAOILE, SANTOS CAOILE AND FELIPE CAOILE, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VS. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, AS ACTING COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU…
PLANA, J.:
These three related
immigration cases – involving five aliens who have wrongfully
managed to enter and remain in the Philippines since 1961 – exhibit the same
factual background already delineated in Commissioner of Immigration vs.
Fernandez, L-22696, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 184 and Commissioner of Immigration
vs. Garcia, L-28082, decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 603. The decision in the
latter case is the subject of a motion for reconsideration which will now be
decided jointly with L-27602 and L-27603.
For convenience, a
narration of the common background of these cases is in order.
On May 30, 1961, Samson
T. Sabalones, the Philippine consul at Hongkong, issued five certificates of registration and
identity containing the following data (Exh. A to
A-4):
(1) Teban Caoile, employee, born on November 4, 1932 in Amoy, Fukien, China.
(2) Jose Caoile,
private tutor, born on June 25, 1934 in Amoy,
Fukien, China.
(3) Felipe Caoile,
private tutor, born on December 5, 1935 in Amoy, Fukien,
China.
(4) Vicente Caoile,
private tutor, born on August 20, 1937 in Amoy, Fukien,
China.
(5) Santos Caoile, student, born on July
29, 1938 in Amoy, Fukien, China.
The
certificates were issued to enable the above-named persons to travel directly
to the Philippines from Hongkong allegedly as
children of Antonio Caoile, a Philippine citizen.
The five persons arrived from Hongkong on board a
Cathay Pacific Airways plane at the Manila International Airport. Teban Caoile and Vicente Caoile arrived on June 7, 1961; Santos Caoile and Felipe Caoile arrived on June 11, 1961; and Jose Caoile arrived on June 20, 1961.
They sought admission as Filipino citizens on the basis of the
said certificates. The airport immigration officer referred their admission to
the board of special inquiry “to determine filiation
and paternity to a Filipino citizen”. He observed that the certificate
“is not conclusive evidence to establish the claim to Philippine citizenship”
(Exh. B and B-2).
At the investigation conducted by the board, Teban,
Santos, Jose, Vicente and Felipe, all surnamed Caoile,
and their alleged father, Antonio Caoile, testified.
The board, composed of Edgardo R. Hojilla, Gerundio Umengan and Tomas G. Montesines,
in its decisions of June 23, and 26, 1961, concluded that those five persons
are Filipino citizens, being the children of Antonio Caoile,
a Filipino.
The board found that
Antonio Caoile was born on July 3, 1913 in Urdaneta, Pangasinan as the
illegitimate child of Maria Caoile and an unnamed
Chinese father; that he is a Filipino citizen because he followed the
citizenship of his Filipino mother; that his Chinese natural father brought him
to China when he was four years old; that his Chinese father returned to the
Philippines and died here in 1920; that Antonio returned to this country in
1929; that he returned to China in 1931 and married a Chinese woman named Ong Siu Ty;
that he cohabited with her up to 1938, and that out of their union, five
children, all boys, were born in Chi Bi, Amoy, China, namely: Teban,
Jose, Felipe, Vicente and Santos.
The board allowed the
admission into this country of the five alleged Caoile
brothers on the assumption that they are Filipinos under the principle of jus
sanguinis.
The two decisions were submitted to the individual members of the
Board of Commissioners of Immigration. On July 7, 1961 Commissioner Emilio L. Galang wrote on the two decisions the word
“Exclude” while Associate Commissioner Francisco de la Rosa wrote the
word “Noted”. Associate Commissioner Felix Talabis
wrote on June 30, 1961 on the decision of June 23, 1961 the word
“Noted”. He wrote the same word on July 3, 1961 on the decision dated
June 26, 1961.
Three days later, or on July 10, 1961, the alien registration
supervisor of the Bureau of Immigration issued to the five alleged Caoile brothers identification certificates wherein it was
stated that they were admitted as Filipino citizens on the basis of the
decisions of the board of special inquiry “duly affirmed by the majority
members of the Board of Commissioners”.
On January 24, 1962 the Secretary of Justice, acting in the
public interest, pursuant to section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code,
issued Memorandum Order No. 9. In that order, he directed that, in view of the
fact that “for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of
Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the
cases coming before it”,
“all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on appeal from, or on review motu
proprio of, decisions of the board of special inquiry” were “set
aside”.
The Secretary instructed the Board of Commissioners to review
“all decisions of the board of special inquiry admitting entry of aliens
into this country and give preference to all cases where entry has been
permitted on the ground that the entrant is a citizen of the Philippines.”
He advised the board to apply the rule that the alien has the onus
probandi of establishing that he is not subject
to exclusion and that, since “citizenship is a status of privilege, power
and honor of inestimable value”, any doubt concerning its grant
“should be resolved in favor of the Government and against the
claimant” (Arocha vs. Vivo, L-24844, October 26,
1967, 21 SCRA 532; Neria vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 806).
In compliance with the Secretary’s directive, the Commissioner
of Immigration ordered an immigration officer to study and review the
proceeding and the evidence as to the admission of Teban,
Felipe, Vicente and Santos, all surnamed Caoile.
The immigration officer
conducted an ex parte investigation
without notice to the said immigrants and without hearing them. He recommended
the reversal of the decision of the board of special inquiry dated June 23,
1961 (referring to Teban, Felipe, Santos and Vicente,
all surnamed Caoile.)
Another immigration
officer, designated to review the case of Jose Caoile,
failed to render a report. No further action was taken on Jose Caoile’s case (covered by the decision of June 26, 1961).
At the meeting on June
21, 1962 (within one year from the rendition of the decisions of the board of
special inquiry), a new Board of Immigration Commissioners (composed of Martiniano P. Vivo, Marcial O. Rañola and Virgilio N. Gaston)
acted on the report of the investigating officer. The Commissioners resolved to
exclude from this country Teban, Santos, Vicente and
Felipe, all surnamed Caoile. Two days later, or on June
23, the Commissioners promulgated their decision, reversing the said decision
of the board of special inquiry and ordering the deportation of the aforenamed four persons.
The Board of
Commissioners found that the said persons were aliens not properly documented
for admission pursuant to section 29(a)(17) of the Immigration Law because they
had not proven that they are the children of Antonio Caoile.
The Commissioners, in refuting the conclusion of the board of special inquiry,
said:
“Records of investigation show that although the claim to
Philippine citizenship of Antonio Caoile, alleged
father of applicants, is well-founded (his
birth and baptismal certificates show that he is the illegitimate child
of Maria Caoile, Filipino), there is nothing in the same
records to indicate strongly and definitely that subjects are the real children
of the former.
“The board of special inquiry relied so much on the blood
tests of applicants and their alleged father; the income tax returns of the
supposed father for the years 1953, 1958, 1959 and 1960; the statutory
declaration of one Chan Wah Hing;
and their own oral testimony.
“In cases of similar nature, it has been held that blood tests
are not conclusive proof of relationship unless they are negative and
derogatory; income tax returns are self-serving and unreliable; statutory
declarations are in most cases biased and the declarant
is not available to be tested for credibility;
and oral testimonies of applicants are similarly biased and self-serving.”
(Exh. E-1).
On that same date, June
23, the Commissioner issued a warrant of exclusion against Teban, Felipe, Vicente and Santos, all allegedly surnamed Caoile (Exh. F). Felipe, Vicente
and Santos were never served with the warrant of exclusion.
On July 30, 1962 a copy of
the Commissioners’ decision, attached to a covering letter, was sent by
ordinary mail to the said
persons at 2735 M. Hizon Street,
Sta. Cruz Manila, their address on record. The letter was returned unclaimed.
On March 10, 1964 the
warrant of exclusion was served on Teban Caoile. He was arrested and detained at Camp Crame. Through Juan Garcia, Teban
Caoile filed a petition for habeas corpus in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
At the trial of that
case, Antonio Caoile, the supposed father of Teban, Santos, Felipe, Vicente and Jose, categorically testified that “he does not know Teban Caoile“; that it “was only in the hearing of the case
that he saw Teban Caoile“,
and that he (Antonio) was married only about five years prior to 1964.
On March 24, 1964 the
trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It found that Teban Caoile
was legally detained.
Juan Garcia appealed to
the Court of Appeals where he renewed his motion for Teban
Caoile’s release on bail which had been
denied by the trial court. The Commissioner of Immigration opposed the motion.
The Court of Appeals allowed Teban Caoile’s release upon posting bail in the
sum of P5,000.
The Commissioner filed in
this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein he assailed
the resolution allowing the release on bail of Teban Caoile. The petition was dismissed (Commissioner of
Immigration vs. Fernandez, L-22696, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 184).
Later, the Court of Appeals in its decision on the merits nullified the warrant of exclusion, granted
the writ of habeas corpus and
made permanent the provisional liberty of Teban Caoile (Garcia vs. Vivo, CA-G.R. No. 33826-R, September 8,
1967).
The Commissioner appealed
to this Court. The Second Division of this Court reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and affirmed that of the trial court sustaining the June
23, 1962 decision of the board of Immigration Commissioners declaring the
documentation in support of Teban’s claim of
Philippine citizenship (as well as those of his three brothers on the basis of the same evidence) to be inadequate, and ordering the expulsion of all four from the
Philippines. (Commissioner of Immigration vs. Garcia, L-28082, June 28, 1974,
57 SCRA 603). As stated at the outset, that decision is pending
reconsideration.
In the meanwhile, Santos Caoile, Vicente Caoile and Felipe
Caoile, in order to avoid being arrested like Teban Caoile, filed on June 8, 1964 in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari, to enjoin the Commissioner of Immigration
and the deportation officer from deporting them. They assailed the Commissioner’s
decision of June 23, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion.
On the following day, June 9, Jose Caoile filed in the same court a certiorari petition
similar to the one filed by Felipe, Santos and Vicente. The trial of the two cases was held jointly.
The lower court in its
decision of November 24, 1966 held that Vicente, Santos, Felipe and Jose, all surnamed Caoile, were
entitled to remain in this country as Filipino citizens. It ruled that the Commissioner’s decision was void because
it was rendered beyond the statutory one-year period for reviewing the decision
of the board of special inquiry and because the petitioners were denied due
process of law. The Commissioners and the deportation officer appealed.
Case of Jose Caoile (L-27603). –
The trial court found that the decision
of the board of special inquiry dated June 26, 1961, admitting Jose Caoile into the Philippines as a Filipino citizen had become final because it was not set aside by the Board of
Commissioners of Immigration.
Hence, the trial court
declared that Jose Caoile is a Filipino citizen entitled to remain in this country.
That disposition of Jose Caoile’s case is erroneous. He had no
cause of action for certiorari because the Board of Commissioners did not order his exclusion.
His petition was filed on the erroneous assumption that the Board of
Commissioners had issued a warrant for
his exclusion. No such warrant had been issued. There was nothing which the courts could review or set aside in Jose Caoile’s case.
So, he cannot complain
that respondent Commissioner acted with grave abuse of discretion in his
case. Jose Caoile cannot say that he had sued the respondents
for the redress or prevention of
a wrong. If his petition were treated as one for declaratory relief as to his rights or duties under the
Immigration Law, with the object of attaining
curative or preventive justice, still it was premature and anticipatory because
in his case there was as yet no controversy which was ripe for adjudication. His petition should be
dismissed outright.
As correctly pointed out by the then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, until
the government acts under section 37 of the Immigration Law for the deportation
of Jose Caoile (Chan Shu
Lou vs. Vivo, L-22031, September 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 145), there is
nothing to annul, set aside or
enjoin in his case.
The case of Santos,
Felipe and Vicente, all surnamed Caoile, L-27602. – The Commissioners contend that the trial
court erred (1) in finding that the decision of the board of special inquiry
dated June 23, 1961 was affirmed by Commissioners De la Rosa and Talabis, when
they wrote the word “Noted” on the said decision; (2) in concluding
that the decision of Commissioners Vivo, Rañola and
Gaston was possibly prepared on
July 30, 1962 or beyond the statutory one-year period for review; (3) in ruling
that petitioners Vicente, Santos and Felipe, all surnamed Caoile,
were not given due process of law; (4)
in annulling the decision of
Commissioners Vivo, Rañola and Gaston; (5) in holding
that the petitioners are entitled to remain in this country as Filipino
citizens; and (6) in not dismissing the petition.
The main issue is whether
Commissioners Vivo, Rañola, and Gaston properly set
aside the decision of the board of special inquiry allowing Felipe Caoile, Santos Caoile and Vicente
Caoile to enter the Philippines on the assumption
that they are Filipino citizens, notwithstanding that Commissioners De la Rosa
and Talabis had written the word “Noted” on
the said decision in contrast with the word “Exclude” written by
Commissioner Galang.
The ultimate issue is
whether the said persons surnamed Caoile are Filipino
citizens on the basis of their claim (just like the discredited claim of their
brother, Teban) that they are the children of Antonio
Caoile, a Philippine citizen.
As to the finality of the decision of the boar of special inquiry and the prerogative of the
Board of Commissioners to reverse it motu proprio, the Immigration Law provides:
“SEC. 27. x x x x x x x x x.
“(b) A board of
special inquiry shall have authority (1) to determine whether an alien seeking
to enter or land in the Philippines shall be allowed to enter or land or shall
be excluded, and (2) to make its findings and recommendations in all the cases provided for in section twenty-nine of
this Act wherein the Commissioner of Immigration may admit an alien who is
otherwise inadmissible. For this purpose, the board or any member thereof, may
administer oaths and take evidence and in case of necessity may issue subpoena
and/or subpoena duces tecum. The hearing of all cases brought before a
board of special inquiry shall be conducted under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. The decision of any two members
of the board shall prevail and shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the
Board of Commissioners as hereafter stated, or, in the absence of an appeal,
unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu proprio of the
entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision. x x
x x
x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x.”
The trial court opined
that Associate Commissioners De la Rosa and Talabis,
in placing the word “Noted” on the decision of the board of special
inquiry dated June 23, 1961, affirmed that decision. That opinion is not
correct. To “note” is not to approve. Moreover, the three
Commissioners did not convene as a body to deliberate on what action should be
taken on the decisions of June 23 and 26, 1961.
As already pointed out,
Associate Commissioner Talabis noted the decision of
June 23, 1961 on June 30, 1961 while Associate Commissioner De la Rosa noted it
on July 7, 1961. The separate notations on different dates clearly imply that
the Commissioners never held a meeting or session to resolve whether to affirm
or reverse the board’s decision. There were no minutes of any such session or
meeting.
Section 27(b)
contemplates that the Board of Commissioners should hold a meeting or session
if that body desires to review the decision of the board of special inquiry. Of
course, if the board’s decision is not reversed by the Board of
Commissioners acting as such within one year from its promulgation, it is
deemed affirmed and becomes final.
In this case, the
Commissioners a wanted to take action on the decision of the board of special
inquiry. Instead of holding a meeting, they took individual actions on it. That
mode of review is procedurally wrong and, therefore, void (Arocha
vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca, 21 SCRA 532), quite
apart from Memorandum Order No. 9 of the Secretary of Justice expressly setting
it aside.
The legislative intention
is that, as members of a board, the Commissioners
“should deliberate collectively in order that their
views and ideas should be exchanged and examined before reaching a
conclusion”. The individual actions of the Commissioners on the decision
of the board of special inquiry are invalid because such disparate actions are contrary
to the purpose of constituting the Commissioners as a body to review the
board’s decisions. (Ibid.)
Consequently, the
ambiguous notation made by Commissioners De la Rosa and Talabis
on the decision of the board of special inquiry cannot be considered for
purposes of section 27(b) as an affirmance of the
board’s decision. Notwithstanding that notation, the new Board of Commissioners
could validly review, as it did review, the said decision within one year from
its promulgation and set it aside. (See Wong Woo Yiu
vs. Vivo, L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552).
The trial court speculated that the resolution of Commissioners
Vivo, Rañola and Gaston dated June 23, 1962,
reversing the decision of the board of special inquiry was possibly antedated
because a copy thereof was mailed to the petitioners only on July 30, 1962.
That speculation of the trial court is baseless and is belied by
the facts. It is a conjecture that contravenes the presumption that official
duty was regularly performed. The parties stipulated that on June 21, 1962, or
within one year from June 23, 1961 (the date of the decision of the board of
special inquiry) Commissioners Vivo, Rañola and
Gaston met and voted to exclude Teban, Felipe, Santos
and Vicente, all surnamed Caoile (Exh.
E, minutes of the meeting); that two days later, or on June 23, the Commissioners promulgated their written
decision excluding the said persons and setting aside the oft-mentioned
decision of the board of special inquiry (Exh. E-1); that, to implement that decision,
a warrant of exclusion was issued on that same date, June 23, 1962 (Exh. F); and that a copy of the decision, with a covering letter, was mailed to the
said persons on July 30, 1962.
The trial court, like the parties, was bound by the stipulated facts.
It could not substitute its conjectural surmises
for those facts. Its judgment had to be based on those facts (Cabrera vs. Lacson, 71 Phil. 182).
Moreover, this Court had already held that “the operative
date of the Commissioners’ action is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as
a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso
was prepared, written and signed” because “the decision in extenso must relate back to the day when the resolution
to exclude was actually adopted. Necessarily, the extended opinion had to be posterior to the day when the Commissioners voted and resolved to reverse the
findings of the board of special inquiry.” (Arocha
vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca, supra, cited in Neria vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-24800, May 27,
1968, 23 SCRA 806, 815; Go Oh vs. Vivo, L-24898, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA, 228,
238).
The trial court’s
observation that petitioners Caoile were denied due
process because Commissioners Vivo, Rañola and Gaston
reviewed the decision of the board of special inquiry without notice to them
and without hearing them is not well-taken.
The law does not require
notice and hearing for such a review. The petitioners were already heard when
they presented their evidence before the board of special inquiry. A review by
the Commissioners of the board’s decision is based on the evidence already
presented before the board. Hence, the immigrants seeking entry are not
entitled to another hearing. To quote Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes in Arocha vs. Vivo, supra:
“. . .In reality, the right to representation by counsel
before the Immigration Commissioners is only granted by the Immigration Law
[sec. 27(c) of C.A. 613] in cases of appeal by the alien from an adverse
decision of the Board of Inquiry. The law is as follows:
“(c) An alien excluded by a board
of special inquiry or a dissenting member thereof may appeal to the
Board of Commissioners, whose decision in the case shall be final. The
decision on appeal shall be put in writing and promulgated not less than seven
days from the time the case is submitted for
decision. In appeal cases, the alien shall have the right to be represented by
an attorney or counsel who shall have access to the record of the board of
special inquiry in the particular case on appeal.” (Com. Act 613, as
amended by Rep. Act 503). (Italics supplied).
“Plainly, the quoted provision does not by its terms apply to a review motu
proprio by the Board of Immigration
Commissioners of a decision admitting an alien, as in the case at bar, for in
such cases, the reviewing Board only passes on the sufficiency of evidence
already produced before the Board of Special Inquiry. The alien, having been
already heard by the latter is not entitled to further hearing unless the law
so provides. This is particularly true in administrative proceedings (Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 193, quoted and followed in Bischop vs. Galang, L-18365, May
31, 1963).”
The trial court
manifestly erred in nullifying the finding of Commissioners Vivo, Rañola and Gaston that the evidence presented before the
board of special inquiry was not sufficient to establish the alleged Philippine
citizenship of Teban, Santos, Felipe and Vicente, all
surnamed Caoile. In arriving at that conclusion, the
Commissioners did not act with grave abuse of discretion. There is no showing
that it was a glaringly erroneous conclusion.
In exclusion cases, like
the instant case, the court has no power to overrule the factual findings of
the immigration authorities, unless their findings are manifestly unfair or
their conclusions are arbitrary (Singh vs. Board of Commissioners of
Immigration, 111 Phil. 143, 153).
And since the
Commissioners of Immigration are under the Department of Justice and, in this
case, they followed the Secretary’s Order setting aside the individual actions
of the former Commissioners, the aggrieved parties should have exhausted their
administrative remedies by appealing to the Secretary before seeking judicial
intervention (Board of Commissioners vs. Domingo, 118 Phil. 680, 684).
L-28082 – Motion for
reconsideration filed for Teban Caoile. – The trial court found that Teban Caoile is not a Filipino
citizen because his supposed father, Antonio Caoile
(also the supposed father of Jose, Santos, Felipe and Vicente, all surnamed Caoile) testified that he (Antonio) is not the father of Teban. The Court of Appeals reversed that finding. The
Second Division of this Court in turn reversed the Court of Appeals and
affirmed the trial court’s finding.
In the instant motion for
reconsideration, filed by Juan Garcia for Teban Caoile, it is contended that the Second Division, in
effect, reversed the ruling of this Court en banc in
Commissioner of Immigration vs. Fernandez, L-22696, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 184.
In that case, it was assumed without question that Commissioners De la Rosa and
Talabis affirmed the decision of the board of special
inquiry and that Commissioners Vivo, Gaston and Rañola
could not nullify that approval given by De la Rosa and Talabis.
Movant Garcia invokes the constitutional provision that
“that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc”
(Sec. 2[3], Art. X, 1973 Constitution).
As correctly pointed out
by Solicitor General Barredo in his brief for
appellant Commissioners and as stressed in the Second Division’s decision, the ratio
decidendi of the decision in Commissioner of
Immigration vs. Fernandez, supra, is that the Court of Appeals did not
gravely abuse its discretion in granting
bail to Teban
Caoile during the pendency
of the habeas corpus case.
The dictum in the Fernandez case that Commissioners Vivo, Rañola and Gaston could no longer set aside the action
taken by Commissioners De la Rosa and Talabis was
abrogated in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca, supra, wherein this Court en banc
squarely held that the separate notations made by De la Rosa and Talabis were void and were rightfully set aside by the
Secretary of Justice and by Commissioners Vivo, Rañola
and Gaston.
The Second Division merely followed that clarificatory
ruling in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca, supra. The dictum in the Fernandez case cannot be
characterized as the law of the case (See 5B C.J.S. 199-200; 21 C.J.S. 334) especially considering that the 1964
motion for the reconsideration of the decision in that case, which motion
was filed by Solicitor General Arturo Alafriz, has
not been resolved up to this time.
WHEREFORE, in L-27602 and L-27603, the trial court’s
decision is reversed and set aside, the petitions are dismissed, and the
decision of the Board of Commissioners dated June 23, 1962 is affirmed with
costs against the petitioners.
In L-28082 the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of
merit. Costs against Juan Garcia.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
De Castro, J., on sick leave.