HEIRS OF PACIANO FERNANDEZ, NAMELY, REVELINA FERNANDEZ-PASTORES, TERESITA FERNANDEZ-APSAY, ANTONIO FERNANDEZ, REYNALDO FERNANDEZ, MOISES FERNANDEZ, LUZ FERNANDEZ-ALIMURONG, EMIL…
REYES, J.:
The pertinent facts of the case as culled from the records:
Plaintiff-appellees Revelina Fernandez-Pastores, Teresita Fernandez-Apsay, Luz Fernandez-Alimurong, Emily Fernandez-Ednacot and Antonio, Reynaldo, Moises and Paciano, Jr. all surnamed Fernandez are the children and the only surviving legal heirs of the late Paciano Fernandez who died intestate at Palauig, Zambales sometime in 1996.
During Paciano Hernandez’ lifetime, he bought a parcel of land situated at Barrio Inayranan (now Brgy. Lipay) Municipality of Palauig, Province of Zambales with an area of 9,375 square meters, more or less from a certain Ricardo P. Asis (Deed of Absolute Sale dated 21 July 1947, Exh. “K”/ “3”, pp. 192 and 245, Original Record). Paciano Fernandez and his caretaker Felicisimo Arangorin then physically occupied and took possession of the abovementioned property to the exclusion of all other persons. He religiously paid the real property taxes thereon, enclosed the same with fences and introduced improvements therein. The subject property was later on cadastrally surveyed in 1962 (Exh. “P”, Id. at p. 203) in the name of Paciano Fernandez as owner thereof without any adverse claim or protest being registered therein. After the cadastral survey, the land was later on identified as Lot No. 2618, Cad. 364-D with an area of 12,182 square meters. Paciano Fernandez was then issued the tax declarations (Exhs. “M” – “M-3”, Id. at pp. 194-197) in his favor covering Lot 2618 and since then he had been religiously paying all the realty taxes due on the subject property. (Exhs. “N”-“O-3”, Id. at pp. 198-202)
Sometime in April 1984, the defendant-appellants and/or their predecessors-in-interest began claiming ownership of the land and by means of force and intimidation, unlawfully entered the same by destroying its fences, occupying the western portion thereof and constructed thereat two (2) makeshifts or nipa huts thereby unlawfully divesting the plaintiff-appellees’ predecessors-in-interest of the possession and ownership thereof. From the time the defendant-appellants unlawfully and illegally occupied the disputed property, they had continuously appropriated for their own benefit the fruits thereof consisting of bamboo trees and other nipa products and they also prevented the plaintiff-appellees’ predecessor-in-interest from working on the other portions of the property, thereby depriving them of their right to use, enjoy and appropriate the fruits thereof as the lawful owners thereof. In view of the defendant-appellants and/or their predecessors-in-interests’ unlawful intrusion and occupation of the property, Paciano Fernandez brought the matter before the Barangay of Lipay, Palauig, Zambales; however, there was no settlement arrived at. Hence, a Certification to File Action dated April 29, 1984 was issued. (Exh. “Q”, Id. at p. 204).
In the same year (1984), Paciano Fernandez applied for a free patent titling of the subject property before the Bureau of Lands in order to protect his right as owner thereof in which the defendant-appellants and/or their predecessors-in-interest filed their protest. Likewise in 1986, Paciano Fernandez through his former counsel Atty. Jose T. Pacis filed an action for “Quieting of Title” against the defendant-appellants and/or their predecessors-in-interests before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, docketed as Civil Case No. RTC-351-I; however, on motion of Atty. Pacis that there is a pending free patent case before the Bureau of Lands, the quieting of title case was dismissed without prejudice (Order dated 30 July 1990, Id. at p. 61).
Meanwhile, after conducting the hearings on the free patent application of Paciano Fernandez, the hearing officer of the Bureau of Lands, Mr. Teofilo Murcia, then issued a Recommendation dated 05 December 1985 (Exhs. “S”-“S-4”, Id. at pp. 206-210), granting the application for free patent titling of Paciano Fernandez. Effectively, it disposed respondents’ protest (herein defendant-appellants and/or their predecessors-in-interest), imputing that the latter did not submit any documentary evidence to prove their claim while Paciano Fernandez had able to prove by preponderance of evidence his ownership over the property sought to be titled. Surprisingly, however, the Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands of San Fernando, Pampanga issued an Order dated 11 June 1986 (Exh. “T”/“2”, Id. at pp. 211 and 244) contradictory to the aforementioned Recommendation of the hearing officer – Mr. Murcia and ordered the segregation of the subject land occupied by the defendant-appellants from the application of Paciano Fernandez. A Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation thereto (Exh. “U”, Id. at p. 212) was filed by Paciano Fernandez through his former counsel which motion was treated as an appeal by the Bureau of Lands which is still pending at present.
In 1996, Paciano Fernandez died (Exh. “L”, Id. at p. 193) and was survived by his children, herein plaintiff-appellees. On 23 May 2002, the plaintiff-appellees as heirs of the late Paciano Fernandez filed the instant complaint and prayed for the recovery of moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00; actual damages in the amount of P300,000.00; reasonable amount of exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as acceptance fees and P1,000.00 per court appearance and as attorneys’ fees. (Id. at p. 5)
On the other hand, the defendant-appellants and/or their predecessors-in-interest claimed inter alia 1) that res judicata had already set in by virtue of the Order of the Bureau of Lands ordering the segregation of the parcel of land from the claim of the late Paciano Fernandez, the plaintiff-appellees’ predecessor-in-interest; 2) the Bureau of Lands acted through the Office of the President, has the sole authority to grant the titles through the free patent titles and such authority is conclusive to the courts; 3) that they are the respective owners of a portion of land which they now possess and occupy; 4) that their occupation and possession thereof had been for a long period of time without interruption and in the concept of owners and they had put up their respective houses and/or improvements thereon in good faith which has now an assessed value of P50,000.00; and 5) that the plaintiff-appellees’ cause of action if any, had already prescribed and/or had already lapsed and they are guilty of estoppel and/or laches. (Id. at pp. 56 to 57)
According to the defendant-appellants, a case for quieting of title was filed by the plaintiff-appellees’ predecessor-in-interest – the late Paciano Fernandez against the former’s predecessors-in-interests – Patricio Cristobal, et. al., which was eventually dismissed in an Order dated 30 July 1990. (Original Record, supra at p. 61)
The area which the late Paciano Fernandez, (the plaintiff-appellees’ predecessor-in-interest) claimed to have been bought from the original owner Ricardo de Asis does not cover or embrace the parcel of land which the defendant-appellants now occupy respectively as the same are outside the ownership of Ricardo de Asis pursuant to the Order dated 11 June 1986 (Exh. “T”, Id. at p. 211) issued by the Director Lands; and that from the Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Ricardo de Asis on 21 July 1947 (Exh. “K”/ “3”, Id. at pp. 192 and 245), it is crystal clear that what was sold to Paciano Fernandez is only a portion of the subject land containing an area of 9,375 square meters.
As counterclaim, the defendant-appellants prayed inter alia for the dismissal of the instant complaint and that they be awarded the sum of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 per court appearance; moral and exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; and other incidental expenses as may be warranted under the circumstances.
Pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued. Thereafter, a Decision dated 21 March 2005 was rendered by the court a quo, the decretal text of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
- Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the disputed western portion of Lot No. 2618 of the Palauig Cadastre which they occupy and to surrender the actual possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
- Ordering the defendants to pay attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and also the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED”. (Id. at p. 337)
From the aforementioned Decision, the defendant-appellants sought the reconsideration thereof and the same was denied for lack of merit. (Order dated 10 May 2005, Id. at p. 346)
Disgruntled, the defendant-appellants sought recourse before Us, raising the following assigned errors, to wit:
I.
“THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THIS CASE OUTRIGHT CONSIDERING THAT AS ADMITTED BY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE THERE IS STILL A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REINVESTIGATION ON THE EARLIER ORDER OF THEN BUREAU OF LANDS FILED BY THE HEIRS OF PACIANO FERNANDEZ AND THEREFORE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY HAS NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED”.
II.
“THAT THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES FAILED TO ESTABLISH A REAL CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS THE FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES FAILED TO CLEARLY IDENTIFY THE PORTION OF THE LAND AND THAT THEIR EVIDENCE CLEARLY APPEARS TO BE CONTRADICTORY INSOFAR AS THE IDENTITY OF THE PORTION OF THE LAND THAT THEY ARE CLAIMING”.
III.
“THAT THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 1542 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THEREFORE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION”. (Rollo, pp. 24 to 25)
The appeal is not meritorious.
While it appears that there is a pending motion for reconsideration and reinvestigation of the Order dated 11 June 1986 of the Bureau of Lands (Original Records, pp. 211 and 244); nonetheless, the same does not divest the court a quo of its authority and jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the instant case.
Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public lands to determine the issue of physical possession in ejectment cases before inferior courts, as well as the better right of possession in accion publiciana cases before regional trial courts, both of which are basically possessory actions. This, because the actions for possession raised before the courts are proceedings discrete from the administrative disposition and alienation of public lands which should be threshed out in the Bureau of Lands. (Reynoso vs. CA, 170 SCRA 546, 554)
In the case of Solis vs. IAC, 198 SCRA 267, 272, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that the “power and authority given to the Director of Lands to alienate and dispose of public lands does not divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants against others to protect their respective possessions and occupations. (underscoring and emphasis ours) While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts.” (emphasis ours) The rationale for this ruling was given, thus:
The rationale is evident. The Bureau of lands does not have the wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of making the proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest.
It must be stressed that a judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, should never be construed as an interference with the disposition and alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if courts were to be deprived of jurisdiction over cases concerning controversies over possession, the deterrence of judicial action will be eliminated and will only embolden would be encroachers and intruders. (Id. at pp. 272-273; also cited in the case of Painaga vs. Cortes, 202 SCRA 245, 249)
Corollarily, the Lands Department does not have the means to police public lands; neither does it have the means to prevent disorders arising therefrom, or contain breaches of the peace among settlers; or to pass promptly upon conflicts of possession. Then its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in order to make proper award, the settlement of conflicts of possession which is recognized in the court herein has another ultimate purpose, i.e., the protection of actual possessors and occupants with a view to the prevention of breaches of the peace. The power to dispose and alienate could not have been intended to include the power to prevent or settle disorders or breaches of the peace among rival settlers or claimants prior to the final award. As to this, therefore, the corresponding branches of the government must continue to exercise power and jurisdiction within the limits of their respective functions. The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose, and alienate public lands, therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the government of the exercise of the respective functions or powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace by the police, the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition. (as cited in the case of David vs. Cordova, 464 SCRA 384, 406) In Pitargue, 92 Phil. 55, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public land to determine the issue of physical possession. The determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public land is, however, distinct from the determination of who has the actual physical possession or who has a better right of physical possession. The administrative disposition and alienation of public lands should be threshed out in the proper government agency (as cited in the case of Pajuyo vs. CA, 430 SCRA 492, 518).
The protest filed by the defendant-appellants’ predecessors-in-interest before the Bureau of Lands differs from the instant case (Civil Case No. RTC-1916-I, now docketed before us as CA-G.R. CV No. 85425) in terms of their nature, the causes of action upon which they rest as well as in the reliefs sought. The administrative protest boils down to the question of ownership of the area in controversy, while the court action is concerned merely with possession. (Painaga vs. Cortes, 202 SCRA supra at p. 249) (emphasis ours) That ownership and possession are two entirely different legal concepts is illustrated in the case of German Management Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, (177 SCRA 495, 499) in this wise:
“. . . It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover (or retain) such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he had in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.”
Whatever decision the trial court had rendered in the instant case (Civil Case No. RTC-1916-I) could not encroach on the primary jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands over the question of who between the defendant appellants and/or their predecessors-in-interest and the plaintiff-appellees and/or their predecessor-in-interest is entitled to the ownership of the land in question. Thus, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not find application in the case at bar. (as cited in the case of Painaga vs. Cortes, 202 SCRA supra at pp. 249-250)
Anent the second assigned error, the defendant-appellants alleged inter alia; 1) that the plaintiff-appellees failed to prove the exact identity of the disputed property; 2) that the boundaries mentioned in the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. “K”/ “3”, Id. at pp. 192 and 245) is different from the boundaries mentioned in the tax declarations (Exhs. “M” –“M-3”, Id. at pp. 194-197); and 3) that the area stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale is only 9,375 square meters while in truth and in fact, the exact area of Lot 2618 is 12, 182 square meters; hence, the plaintiff-appellees could not claim more than what they bought. (Rollo, supra at pp. 26 to 27)
We are not persuaded.
Undeniably, the defendant-appellants through their counsel – Atty. Reynaldo Tarongoy, clearly admitted in open court during the hearing held on 23 February 2005, that the land occupied by the defendant-appellants is part of Lot No. 2618, Palauig, Cadastre which is the subject of the plaintiff-appellee’s complaint. (Order dated 23 February 2005, Original Record, supra at p. 330) A judicial admission binds the client even if made by his counsel. As declared by the Honorable Supreme Court:
. . . [I]n fact, “judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made . . . for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, . . . they bind the client, whether made during, or even after the trial.” (People vs. Lacson 413 SCRA 20, 47)
By the said admission in open court, the plaintiff-appellees therefore, do not have to adduce further evidence to prove the identity of the land sought to be recovered by the plaintiff-appellees from the defendant-appellants. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. (Section 4, Rule 129, Revised Rules on Evidence)
Assuming ex gratis argumenti that such admission does not bind the herein plaintiff-appellees, we are nonetheless, convinced that the plaintiff-appellees amply proved the identity of the subject property. The testimony of their witness – Felicisimo Arangorin is very explicit, to wit:
“Q: How big is this lot, Mr. Witness?
A: 12, 182 square meters.
Q: Do you know the boundaries of this lot?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Okey. What is the boundary on the north, Mr. Witness?
A: The road and Justo Arangorin, sir.
Q: What about the south?
A: Sabina vda. De Altares.
Q: What about the east?
A: Quirina Altares and Eusebio Fallorina.
Q: What about the west?
A: Barrio road, sir”. (TSN dated 11 December 2002, pp. 2-3; Original Record, supra at pp. 131-132)
Corollarily, the phrase “9,375 square meters, more or less” stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. “K”/”3”, Id. at pp. 192 and 245) is not exact or precise. x x x by the phrase “more or less” plainly means that the land area indicated is not precise. (Republic vs. CA, 301 SCRA 366, 382) What defines a piece of titled property is not the numerical data indicated as the area of the land, but the boundaries or “metes and bounds” of the property specified in its technical description as enclosing it and showing its limits. (Republic vs. CA, 301 SCRA, Id. at pp. 383-384) Similarly, when both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared, the area covered within the boundaries of the immovable prevails over the stated area. In cases of conflict between areas and boundaries, it is the latter which should prevail. What really defines a piece of ground is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, (underscoring and emphasis ours) as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. x x x x It is not of vital consequence that a deed or contract of sale of land should disclose the area with mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is objectively indicated with sufficient precision to enable one to identify it. An error as to the superficial area is immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate object. (Dischoso vs. CA, 192 SCRA 169, 175; and Rudolf Lietz, Inc., vs. CA, G.R. No. 122463, December 19, 2005)
It must also be overly stressed that as per actual survey of the subject property (Survey Plan of Lot 2618, Exh. “P”, Original Record, supra at p. 203) it showed that the total area thereof measured according to the specific boundaries is 12,182 square meters. It is therefore ludicrous for the defendant-appellants to claim that the plaintiff-appellees have no evidence which could establish that what the latter’s predecessor-in-interest had bought has an area of 12,182 square meters.
Anent the third assigned error, while the defendant-appellants admitted that they failed to present documentary evidence which could prove their ownership over the disputed property; nonetheless, they tried to convince us that that their possession thereof is in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted and that their possession thereof including their predecessors-in-interests have been for more than fifty (50) years (Rollo, Appellant’s Brief, pp. 27-28)
The above contention does not merit our approval.
Defendant-appellants’ possession of the disputed property could not be considered to have been public, peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted. It must be recalled that the plaintiff-appellees’ predecessor-in-interest (Paciano Fernandez) had been disputing the defendant-appellants’ occupation/possession thereof since 1984, the time when the latter forcibly occupied and took possession the subject property from Paciano Fernandez. Also, in 1986, the late Paciano Fernandez filed a case for “Quieting of Title” against the defendant-appellants and/or their predecessors-in-interests although the same was dismissed without prejudice in an Order dated 30 July 1990 (Original Record, supra at p. 61) And, it is also a known fact that aside from the instant case, the free patent application of the late Paciano Fernandez and the consequent protest thereto filed by the defendant-appellants are still being pursued by the plaintiff-appellees which at present is still pending adjudication by the Bureau of Lands. Gleaned therefrom, it could be gainsaid that the plaintiff-appellees are continuously guarding their rights over the subject property and the defendant-appellants were never in peaceful, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property.
We are more inclined to believe that the plaintiff-appellees have the better right to possess the subject property. They were able to present Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. “K”/”3”, supra pp. 192 and 245) which showed that their predecessor-interest – Paciano Fernandez purchased the same from one Ricardo P. Asis on 21 July 1947; that the subject property was surveyed in favor of Paciano Fernandez and tax declarations were also issued in the latter’s name and had religiously paid the taxes due thereon and now continued by his heirs, herein plaintiff-appellees. No person in his right mind would continue paying taxes for a land which he thinks does not belong to him. (Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 112 SCRA 543, 549-550)
On the other hand, other than the defendant-appellants’ bare assertion that they possess the subject property for more than fifty years, they failed to adduce concrete and convincing evidence to support their contention. And if indeed, there is truth to their claim that they have been in possession of the subject property for more than fifty (50) years) why is it that they failed to oppose or controvert the survey made thereon in the sole name of Paciano Fernandez in 1962? They could not likewise produce any tax declarations or receipts for such property which could purportedly show that the subject property was declared for taxation purposes in their favor. Neither could the defendant-appellants claim that they had acquired possession of the subject property in good faith and with just title since they know from the time they forcibly possessed the same, the late Paciano Fernandez was in possession thereof and the latter had a pending application for free patent before the Bureau of Lands. Likewise, laches could not be appreciated in favor of the defendant-appellants since the records of the case evidently show that the plaintiff-appellees have always been asserting their right over the disputed property by filing cases for quieting of title, recovery of possession as in the instant case, and as shown by the fact that the application for free patent titling of the subject property filed by the plaintiff-appellees’ predecessor-in-interest – the late Paciano Fernandez is still being pursued by them and at present still pending adjudication before the Bureau of Lands; hence, it is inconceivable to think that the plaintiff-appellees have already abandoned their right over the disputed property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 21 March 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 70 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Jr., J. and Lanzanas, JJ., concur.