ROLANDO F. MANARANG, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. LEVITA M. MANARANG, RESPONDENT,
REYES, JR., J.C., J.:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Rolando F. Manarang and Levita Manarang as void ab initio. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, respondent shall cease using the surname of her husband having lost the right over the same and so as to avoid a misimpression that she is still the legal wife of petitioner.
x x x x x x x x x” (Rollo, p. 80).
The instant case involves a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by petitioner-appellee Rolando F. Manarang against his wife, respondent Levita M. Manarang on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On March 22, 2004, petitioner-appellee and respondent contracted marriage in Balanga, Bataan (See: Certificate of Marriage, Records, p. 1). Previous to their marriage, they already had one (1) child named Rovielyn Sheen who was born on May 27, 2001 (Records, p. 2).
The parties were both working as contract workers in Saudi Arabia when they first met. They saw each other at a party hosted by their common friend. Nothing much has transpired at their first meeting as they were busy mingling with acquaintances. Their relationship began when petitioner-appellee got a call from respondent the following day. They only talked briefly since petitioner-appellee was on duty. But since then, they would constantly talk on the phone whenever they got a chance to do so. Eventually they grew closer until such time when petitioner-appellee decided to court respondent. They later became sweethearts. Seven months in their relationship, respondent decided to consult her employer regarding a vacation she wanted to take. Her request was denied but in exchange, she was allowed to meet petitioner-appellee almost everyday. Often, they would engage in pre-marital sex and this inevitably led to respondent’s pregnancy.
When respondent gave birth, she gave the baby to petitioner-appellee’s mother because she had to go back and finish her contract. For two years, she endured the absence of her child but nonetheless comforted by the presence of petitioner-appellee, who she saw not so often because the laws of Saudi Arabia does not permit cohabitation of unmarried couples. In those few times that they had opportunity to be intimate, respondent got herself pregnant again. Luckily this time, she was almost through with her employment contract. The parties then decided to come home (after respondent’s contract expired) in order to meet their first child.
Due to the insistence of their respective families to contract marriage for the sake of their child, the parties eventually tied the knot on March 22, 2004 in Balanga, Bataan. With renewed inspiration to work harder for their growing family, petitioner-appellee went back to Saudi Arabia to work. The parties would regularly communicate through letters and overseas calls. It went well for them despite some petty misunderstandings along the way. Things changed, however, when petitioner-appellee learned that respondent had their second child aborted. Worse, respondent lied to him as to her reasons for inducing the abortion. He suspected that the child was not his and respondent was afraid that this ugly truth would be revealed once she gives birth. Since then, the parties grew cold to each other until they eventually decided to separate. Petitioner-appellee thought he could not continue living with his wife under a cloud of suspicion. He had so many notions as to why his wife committed such sin against the unborn fetus.
Petitioner-appellee finally decided to file a case for nullity of their marriage on the ground of respondent’s psychological incapacity. To support his ground of psychological incapacity, petitioner consulted a psychiatrist by the name of Dr. Ma. Victoria V. Briguela. The psychiatrist testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation on the parties to determine their fitness to assume their basic marital obligations to each other. Towards this purpose, she used several established psychological tests such as (1) Draw a Person Test; (2) Sack’s Sentence Completion Test; (3) Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; (4) Luscher Colour Test. The results of these tests, when taken and interpreted together, revealed the following findings and conclusions:
- That the petitioner Rolando F. Manarang has Partner Relational Problem. That this started after he learned about the “miscarriage” of the respondent, so much so that his love and respect to the respondent were lost. Thus, it has contributed to the failure of their marriage.
- That the respondent Levita Manarang suffers from Antisocial Personality Disorder due to her maladaptive behavior of impulsivity, one who ignores the safety of self and others, and who commits act such as taking a “drug” that can abort pregnancy and one who can’t plan ahead. This maladaptive behavior of respondent has impaired her relations with her husband the petitioner.
- That the findings on the respondent, renders her psychologically incapacitated to handle her marital obligations. This maladaptive behavior of the respondent led petitioner to lose his mutual love and respect to her for he believed that he intentionally aborted her pregnancy. Their lost mutual trust cannot anymore recovered (sic).
- That this maladaptive behavior of the respondent is present not only now but will persist and continue whoever will be her partner. Her disorder is permanent, serious and incurable.
- That this may have started to exist even prior to their marriage and must have started to develop in her childhood days.
- The petitioner having Relational Problem contributed to the failure of their marriage, having lost mutual love and respect towards the respondent.(See: Psychiatry Report dated February 6, 2010, Records, p. 6).
With the foregoing findings, Dr. Briguela recommended to the RTC that the subject marriage between the parties be declared a nullity.
After trial on the merits, the RTC is satisfied that indeed, respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations, which in turn caused the eventual breakdown of the parties’ marriage. Thus, the RTC ruled that the marriage between the parties is void ab initio.
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s decision, oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines filed an appeal with this Court on the lone ground that –
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE DESPITE PETITIONER-APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO SHOW BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE RESPONDENT’S ALLEGED “ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER”.
At the outset, petitioner-appellee’s Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (Records, pp. 3-8) was originally anchored on two grounds: Article 35 (3) of the Family Code on the absence of a valid marriage license and Article 36 of the same law on psychological incapacity. However, in petitioner-appellee’s Pre-Trial Brief (Records, pp. 21-22) submitted with the RTC, he simplified the issue to include only the question on whether or not the marriage is void under Article 36. As with the RTC, We need not delve on the issue of the absence of marriage license and its effect on the parties’ marriage as petitioner-appellee no longer continues establishing the same.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as one of the grounds of declaring a marriage void, provides:
“ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
As explained by the Supreme Court, psychological incapacity as per the afore-quoted provision contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality (See: Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013; Republic v. Court of Appeals and De Quintos, 685 SCRA 33, 41 [2012]).
In Santos v. Court of Appeals (240 SCRA 20, 34 [1995]), psychological incapacity was referred to as a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and was characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In other words, to qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of marriage, a person’s psychological affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, must be incurable and must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply with the essential objects of marriage.
To settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, the Supreme Court then laid down the following guidelines in its subsequent ruling in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. . . .
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(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. . . .xxx xxx xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. . . .xxx xxx xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. . . .xxx xxx xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. . . .xxx xxx xxx
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. . . . .
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(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. . . . .
Contrary to some views, the Molina doctrine, up to now, remains to be the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. The Supreme Court however emphasized that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of apriori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts (Aurelio vs. Aurelio, 560 SCRA 561, 571 [2011]). Thus, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity (Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De Quintos, Jr., 685 SCRA 33, 44 [2012]).
In the instant case and using the above-mentioned Molina doctrine as guidelines, this Court finds the totality of evidence as insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
While the Supreme Court in Bier v. Bier (547 SCRA 123 [2008]) pronounced that it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code, this is only true if the totality of evidence clearly established the existence of psychological incapacity and that the same is grave, incurable and existing prior to marriage. The totality of evidence in this case comprised merely of the testimony of petitioner-appellee and that of the psychiatrist as well as the latter’s Psychiatric Report.
However, We find petitioner-appellee’s testimony insufficient to help build his case on respondent’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner-appellee narrated how respondent upset him so much when the latter intentionally caused the abortion of their second child by taking a drug. Petitioner-appellee felt disgusted and disappointed especially when respondent offered no reason for committing such an act. Ever since said incident, the parties became cold and distant until they decided to part ways. According to petitioner-appellee, this particular act and omission of respondent readily show her failure to comply with essential marital obligations such as companionship, respect, mutual help and support that the law requires. Apart from the fact that petitioner-appellee’s testimony is one-sided and uncorroborated, this Court can’t easily accept if the said single act of respondent (of aborting their child) is translatable to that so-called psychological incapacity that warrants the dissolution of a marriage. In the course of his testimony, petitioner-appellee only mentioned of that serious yet isolated act committed by respondent that caused the breakdown of their marital relationship but he did not mention of some other peculiar personality traits or significant occurring events that can be traced to an incapacity already existing at the time of the marriage. To our mind, this alleged particular maladaptive behavior committed by respondent can only be traced to that period of time after their marriage and not to its inception, indicating a mere refusal on the part of respondent to take an additional marital responsibility. As held by the Supreme Court:
“It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor — an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations — must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness x x x” (Sauzo v. Sauzo, 615 SCRA 154, 174-175 [2010]).
Finding as insufficient the testimony of petitioner-appellee, this Court is constrained to turn on the testimony of the expert witness which could also be relied upon to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. A closer perusal of the testimony of the said expert witness would reveal that it likewise failed to bolster petitioner-appellee’s case. Dr. Briguela clinically identified and characterized respondent’s behavior as one afflicted with an Antisocial Personality Disorder. As she explained, said disorder was brought about by respondent’s alleged impulsivity, one who ignores the safety of self and that of others and one who commits an act such as taking a drug that can abort pregnancy and one who can’t plan ahead. According to Dr. Briguela, this maladaptive behavior of respondent has impaired her relationship with her husband. But then again, this conclusion was reached based on the isolated incident that was narrated by petitioner-appellee whose bias in favor of his cause is doubtful. In relying on the narration of petitioner-appellee, the good doctor failed to consider that said narration may have been slanted and inaccurate. As held by the Supreme Court:
“x x x the Court considered the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions to be insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the finding of respondent’s psychological incapacity because the facts, on which the conclusions were based, were all derived from the petitioner’s statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be discounted. In another case, x x x the Court declared that while the various tests administered on the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement could not be made with respect to the respondent-husband’s psychological condition. To our mind, conclusions and generalizations about Teresita’s psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. “(Toring vs. Toring, 626 SCRA 389 [2010]; all cited cases omitted).
As with the Supreme Court, this Court has also been negatively critical in considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage. In saying this, the Supreme Court does not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement (Sauzo vs. Sauzo, 615 SCRA 154 [2010]) for it may turn out to be impractical given the estranged relationship of the parties. For a determination of a party’s complete personality profile, information coming from persons intimately related to them (such as the parties’ close relatives and friends) may be helpful (ibid.).
There is therefore no reason for the expert witness to readily conclude that respondent was suffering from Antisocial Personality Disorder on the basis alone of a single act of respondent of committing an intentional abortion, assuming that this is true. Indeed, her findings and conclusion that this is sufficient indicia of psychological incapacity lacks depth and suffers from basic flaws in the light of her failure to explain its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. While she mentioned these important words in her report, we found the same to be vague, too general and sorely lacking in details.
There is no showing that respondent’s alleged disorder was existing even prior to her marriage with petitioner-appellee. As pointed out by the oppositor-appellant, Dr. Briguela made no effort to look into, and testify on, respondent’s past life, attitudes, habits and character to explain her alleged psychological incapacity. In fact, no mention was made with regard to the conduct and condition of respondent before the marriage, what events led to respondent’s alleged maladaptive behavior and how her condition manifested itself during the marriage. She just stated that it may have started even prior to marriage and must have started to develop during her childhood days. As it is, nothing was presented that would tackle respondent’s early life, her developmental years and family background and thereafter the subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the marriage. As held by the Supreme Court, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial (Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De Quintos, Jr., 685 SCRA 33 [2012]).
There was also utter failure on the part of the expert witness to state that respondent’s alleged disorder was shown to be of a serious nature, “a supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effective incapacitates” the respondent from “really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage” (See: Bier vs. Bier, 547 SCRA 123, 135 [2008]). True, there was a clinical finding that respondent is suffering from Antisocial Personality Disorder, however it was not clearly established how said illness is grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In short, the expert witness failed to establish that substantial link between respondent’s maladaptive behavior to his alleged psychological incapacity. Then again, it is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself (Marable v. Marable, 639 SCRA 557, 567 [2011]).
And lastly, Dr. Briguela mentioned that there are some forms of therapy that are available, not necessarily to cure but merely diminish the disorder’s manifestation. But in the case of respondent, she explained that the incurable nature of her incapacity is dependent on her willingness to submit herself to treatment. Her explanation implies that said psychological disorders are not permanent in nature as they can be subject to treatment. This effectively negates the requirements of the law that the psychological incapacity must be incurable. As held by the Supreme Court, it is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume (Aspillaga v. Apillaga, 604 SCRA 444, 451 [2009]).
The Supreme Court emphasized that the burden falls upon petitioner-appellee, not just to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders her (respondent) truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. In fine, the totality of evidence presented by petitioner-appellee merely showed an apparent marital discord demonstrated by petitioner-appellee’s disappointment towards his wife caused by the latter’s single act (of taking a drug resulting to her miscarriage) which was not proven to be rooted in some debilitating illness or disorder. To solve the problem, they can resort to counseling or therapy, but not necessarily to dissolve the marital ties that binds them. Thus, there was no sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the parties’ marriage should be nullified on the ground of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity.
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State and any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity (Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013). The parties’ marriage may have failed and appeared to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage (Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013). While we commiserate with the predicament of petitioner-appellee, still this Court is bound by juridical precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements necessary to establish psychological incapacity cases.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated June 21, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. 4406-11 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Lopez, M.V., and Inting, S.B., JJ., concur.