ELISEO FLORA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. VICENTE OXIMANA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Vicente Oximana is the president of the Benquet-Balatoc Workers’
Union (BBWU), having been elected to said position on June 20, 1960,
pursuant to the provisions of the constitution and by-laws of said
union. Since 1948, when the union was organized, Oximana has been
elected continuously as such president and has performed the duties and
functions of said office without interruption in accordance with the
provisions of said constitution and by-laws.

In 1926, Oximana was convicted of the crime of abusos deshonestos
for which he was sentenced to 3 years 6 months and 25 days of
imprisonment which he served until December 4, 1930. As a consequence,
a complaint was lodged against him before the Court of Industrial
Relations on February 2, 1961 by a prosecutor of said court seeking to
disqualify him as president of the union on the strength of the
provisions of Section 17 (e) of Republic Act 875. In this complaint,
the union was made party respondent because of complainant’s desire to
restrain Oximana from performing the duties and functions of his office
as president and to have a new election held for the purpose of
electing a new qualified president.

In answer to the complaint, respondents alleged that it fails to
state a cause of action for it does not show that it bears the sanction
of at least 10% of the entire membership of the union of which Oximana
was president, and that assuming that it does and Oximina was convicted
of the offense which involves moral turpitude, the same is not however
one of the offenses contemplated by Section 17 (e) of Republic Act 875.
In any event, respondent contend that the aforesaid legal provision,
being penal in character, does not apply to Oximana for he has been an
official of good standing long before the effectivity of Republic Act
875.

When the case was called for hearing, the parties submitted a
stipulation of facts wherein, among otter things, it was agreed that on
April 1, 1961 the President of the Philippines granted Oximana full,
absolute and plenary pardon for the crime he had committed in 1926,
thereby restoring him to the full enjoyment of his civil and political
rights, one of which is the holding of the position now disputed by
complainants.

On November 29, 1961, Judge Amado C. Bugayong who heard the case,
issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. He said
that were it not for the absolute pardon granted to Oximana he would
have been disqualified. But said pardon has erased all the ill effects
of his conviction and had restored to him all his rights and privileges
as a citizen as if he had not committed the crime at all. One of such
rights is to hold an office in any labor organization as the one now
being held by respondent Oximana.

This order was affirmed by the court en banc. Hence the present petition for review.

Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875 provides as follows:

“No person who has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude shall be eligible for election to any office
in a legitimate labor organization or for appointment to any position
involving the collection, custody, management, control or disbursement
of its funds, and any such person shall be disqualified from continuing
to hold any office or such position in the organization.”

If the case of respondent Oximana should be considered in the light
of what is provided for in the section above-quoted there would be no
doubt that he would be disqualified from holding the position of
president which is now being disputed by complainants for the crime for
which he was convicted in 1926 is one which involves moral turpitude
because the purpose of the law is indeed to disqualify one who, because
of gross misconduct, has rendered himself unfit to hold any office in a
legitimate labor organization. But here the situation of respondent.
Oximana has changed since his conviction. It appears that since the
time of his conviction in 1926 up to the time the complaint for
disqualification was lodged against him in 1961, a long period of time
has passed, and, in the meantime, he may have reformed himself and
become a new and repentant man. In fact, when he organized the
Benguet-Balatoc Worker’s Union in 1948, he became its president and
had been reelected as such continously up to the present time without
any indication that throughout his actuation as such official he has
ever committed any misconduct or act unbecoming his office that may
disqualify him to continue deserving the confidence of the union and
its members. It is perhaps for this reason that on April 1, 1961 the
President of the Philippines granted him full, absolute and plenary
pardon which restored to him the full enjoyment of his civil and
political rights, one of which is the right to hold any office in any
legitimate labor organization. We believe that the effect of this
pardon is as the President of the Philippines has stated: the
restoration in full of Oximana’s civil and political rights, the effect
of which is to blot out any evil consequence of the crime he has
committed. Authorities abound supporting this view.

Thus, it has been held that “A full and complete pardon, granted
after conviction, removes all penalties and legal disabilities, and
restores the defendant to all his civil rights.” Continuing, the court
went on to say that “pardon completely destroys the effect of the
judgment * * * (and) ‘obliterates, in legal contemplation, the offense
itself; and hence its effect is to make the offender a new man’ ”
(Stephens vs. State of ex rel. Goldsberry, 11 Okl. 262, 239
P. 450). In a similar vein, this Court, thru Mr. Justice Laurel, stated
that “an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when
granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon
removes all that is left of the consequences of the conviction”
(Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil., 441). And in an earlier case, this
Court, thru the same Justice, also stated:

“* * * An absolute pardon not only blots out the
crime committed, but removes all1 disabilities resulting from the
conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of
conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification
from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law
imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and
resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to
such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has
expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences
of conviction. In ‘the present case, while the pardon extended to
respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that ‘he will be eligible
for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature involving no money or property responsibility,’ it is absolute
insofar as it ‘restores the respondent to full civil and political
rights.'” (Cristobal vs. Labrador, et al., 71 Phil., 34, 38)

We are, therefore, persuaded to affirm the views expressed by the court a quo in its order of November 29, 1961.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.