CELSO VALERA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION), ADORACION VALERA DE BRINGAS AND ROMEO R. BRINGAS, RESPONDENTS.

The only issue for determination in this appeal by certiorari
is whether or not the Court of Appeals has erred in dismissing the appeal of
petitioner Celso Valera,
upon the ground of “failure of the record on appeal to show on its face
that the appeal was per­fected” within the reglementary
period, in violation of Section 6 of Rule 41 in relation to Section 1(a), Rule
50, of the Rules of Court.

It appears that, on November
12, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Abra
rendered a decision, in Civil Case No. 374 of said Court, declaring “that
plaintiff Adoracion Valera
de Bringas is the acknowledged natural child of
Francisco Valera” and direct­ing the defendants
in said case – Virgilio Valera,
Celso Valera and Mercedes Angco Vda. de Valera
– to “recognize” said Adora­cion Valera de Bringas as such
acknowledged natural child of Francisco Valera, as
well as dismissing, for lack of merit, the counterclaim and cross-claim of
defendants Virgilio and Celso
Valera, without special pronouncements as to
costs.  Copy of said decision was, on
November 15, 1965, served upon defendants Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera, who, on December 14, 1965, filed his notice of
appeal and appeal bond and asked for an extension of thirty (30) days within
which to file his record on appeal, which was granted on January 14, 1966.  The lower court ordered Celso
Valera on March
18, 1966, to amend his record on appeal, and, on June 28, 1966, approved the amended
record on appeal.

Being silent on the date on which the original record on appeal had
been filed, the amended record on appeal does not show on its face that said
original record on appeal was filed within the extension of time granted by the
trial court on January 14, 1966, and, accordingly, that the appeal had been
perfected within the reglementary period,
considering, particularly, that the order directing the amendment of said
record on appeal was not issued until March 18, 1966.  On December 20, 1967, the plaintiffs-appellees filed, therefore, with the Court of Appeals, a
motion for dismissal of the appeal upon this ground, which was denied in a
resolution of the Fourth Division of said Court, dated January 11, 1968, which
directed, however, that the issue thus raised be considered when the case shall
be taken up, for decision on the merits, by the Division to which it may
thereafter be assigned therefor.  A motion for reconsideration of said reso­lution
was denied on March 7, 1968,
by a special division of the Court of Appeals. 
However, by a resolution, dated July 16, 1968, the Fifth Division of the
same Court – to which the case had, pre­sumably, been assigned for decision on
the merits – the appeal was eventually dismissed, “pursuant to Rule 50,
section 1, para­graph (a), in relation to Rule 41, section 6, of the Rules of
Court x x x.” Hence
this petition of Celso Valera
for review by certiorari of said resolution of July 16, 1968.

Petitioner maintains that the failure of his Amended Record on
Appeal to state the date of the filing of his Original Record on Appeal does
not justify the dismissal of his appeal inasmuch as:  (1) “the date of filing (of the original
record on appeal) being a posterior act, the same is not required to be stated
in the record on appeal which is prepared before it is filed,” and (2) the
date of the filing of the original record on appeal is stamped thereon.

The first ground might have a semblance of validity had the
record on appeal approved by the lower court and certified to the Court of
Appeals been the Original Record on Appeal, for the date on which it was
filed would appear stamped thereon.  In
the case at bar, the Court of Appeals had no more than the Amended Rec­ord
on Appeal, which was submitted subsequently to the Original Record on
Appeal.  The date of the filing thereof
does not appear in the records of the Court of Appeals.  Moreover, said date could have and should
have been stated in the Amended Record on Appeal.  The certification by the Clerk of the trial
court, to the effect that the original record on appeal had been filed on January 7, 1966, is not sufficient to
cure the defect of the amended record on appeal.

In a resolution dated October
19, 1965, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.),
had occasion to say:

“There is no showing, therefore, in any way in the records of
appeal that the notices of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal were filed
within 30 days from no­tice of the appealed order, after deducting the period
during which the motions for reconsideration were pend­ing, as required by Rule
41, section 3.

“The deficiencies pointed out are fatal.  For the reason that in ordinary appeals the
original record is not forwarded to the appellate court, and because the dates
when an applicant received the notice of the pertinent.  orders or judgment under appeal, and of the
denial of his motions for reconsideration or new trial, are facts within the
exclusive knowledge of said applicant, the Revised Rules of Court
place upon the appellant the bur­den of showing that his appeal is timely,
and for that purpose prescribe (Rule 41, sec. 6) that the record of appeal
shall include ‘such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.’ This
requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional, for unless appeal is perfected
on time the appellate court acquires no jurisdic­tion over the
appealed case, and has power only to dis­miss the appeal (Bello vs. Fernando, L-16970, Jan. 30, 1962; Caisip
vs. Cabangon, L-14684, August 26, 1960; Espartero vs. Ladaw, 49 Off. Gaz. 1439).  x x x. “^[1]

This view was reiterated in Araneta v.
Madrigal^[2],
in which the Court added:

“In this connection, it should be noted that, prior to the
promulgation of the Rules of Court now in force, the first sentence of Section
6 of Rule 41, was as follows:

‘The full names of all the parties to the
proceed­ing shall be stated in the caption of the record on appeal, and it
shall include the order or judg­ment from which the appeal is taken, and, in
chronological order, copies of all pleadings, petitions, motions and all
interlocutory orders relating to the appealed order or judgment.’

“This Court noticed, however, that issues were often raised in
appellate courts on whether the appeal had been perfected on time or not, owing
to the fact that the data pertinent thereto were not set forth in the record on
appeal. Inasmuch as the records of trial courts, in cases appealed by record on
appeal, are not forwarded to appel­late courts, the latter had no means of
checking or verify­ing the conflicting allegations of fact made, either in the
briefs, or in the motion to dismiss the appeal and the op­position thereto,
filed by the parties.  As a consequence,
appellate courts had to examine such evidence as the par­ties may have
submitted thereto, in support of their res­pective contentions.  This entailed additional work and unnecessary
waste of time, that contributed to the delay in the final determination of
appealed cases.  To elimi­nate
such obstacles to the speedy administration of jus­tice, this Court
deemed it best, not only to rephrase the first sentence of said Section 6, so
as to read:

‘The full names of all the parties to the
proceed­ings shall be stated in the caption of the record on appeal and it
shall include the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken, and, in
chronolo­gical order, copies of only such pleadings, peti­tions, motions and
all interlocutory orders as are related to the appealed order or judgment and
ne­cessary for the proper understanding of the issue involved.’

but, also, to add, at the end thereof, the
‘clause:

‘together with such data as will show
that the ap­peal was perfected on time.’

“Obviously, this amendment would become useless and its
purpose completely defeated, if we gave thereto the interpretation advocated by
the main respondent here­in.  In
other words, we would have the same issues and the same waste of time that
were sought to be eliminated by the amendment.  Hence, our ruling in Government vs. Antonio
(supra), which, it should be noted, was made, not in a decision, but, in a
resolution, so that the public may know immediately – instead of waiting for
the deci­sion on the merits, which might require more time – the effect of said
amendment, and the injurious conse­quences of a failure to grasp its full
import could thus be minimized.”3

We have consistently reaffirmed and stressed the mandatory and
jurisdictional nature of the requirements contained in Sec. 6 of Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court4
and find no reason to change our view thereon.

It may not be amiss to point out that, in making the amendment
adverted to above, We have not overlooked the fact that oftentimes the record
on appeal is approved without any objection on the part of the ap­pellee, who, it has, sometimes, been urged, should be
deemed to be in estoppel, in consequence of his
aforementioned failure to question the appeal. 
This notwithstanding, We have deemed and still deem it best to maintain
the aforementioned view, not only because the theory of estoppel
cannot apply when all of the parties concerned are aware of the relevant facts
– and the appellant as well as the trial court are sup­posed to know whether or
not the requisite steps for the perfection of an appeal have been seasonably
taken – but, also, because, otherwise, the decision or final order complained
of becomes final and executory, so that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to sanction an appeal therefrom
and the appellate court is devoid of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.  Well-settled is the rule that the
jurisdiction over a case or matter may be questioned at any stage of the
proceedings.  In the language of
Government v. Antonio5, “the certification of the
record on appeal by the trial court, after expiration of the period to appeal cannot
restore the jurisdiction which has been lost.“6

Petitioner, likewise, raises, in his brief, a number of other
ques­tions mainly affecting the merits of the case; but, in view of our conclu­sion
on the subject of dismissal of his appeal, a determination of said other
questions is unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the resolution appealed from should be as it is
hereby affirmed, with costs against herein petitioner-appellant, Celso Valera.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Government v. Antonio, L-23736, Oct. 19, 1965.  Underscoring
ours.

^[2]
L-26227-28, Oct. 25, 1966.

3 All underscoring supplied.

4 DBP v. Santos, L-26387,
Sept. 27, 1966; Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp. v.
Progressive Labor Asso., L-27125, Sept. 15,
1967; Jocson v. Robles, L-23433, Feb. 10, 1968;
Cadiz v. Sec. of National Defense, et al., L-25150, Sept. 30, 1968.

5 Supra.

6 Underscoring ours. 
Citing Alvero v. De la Rosa, 76
Phil. 428, 433.