REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda street, the
Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction with
Mendiola street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To
carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of approximately 6,000
square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden de PP.
Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns
the San Beda College, a private educational institution situated on
Mendiola street. Not having been able to reach an agreement on the
matter with the owner, the Government instituted the present
expropriation proceedings.

On May 27, 1957 the trial court,
upon application of the Government—hereinafter referred to as
appellant—issued an order fixing the provisional value of the property
in question at P270,000.00 and authorizing appellant to take immediate
possession thereof upon depositing said amount. The deposit having been
made with the City Treasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the
corresponding order directing the Sheriff of Manila to place appellant
in possession of the property aforesaid.

On June 8, 1957, as
directed by the Rules of Court, the herein appellee, in lieu of an
answer, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the following
grounds:

“I. That the property sought to be
expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is not
subject to expropriation.

“II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation.

“III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a
different site which would entail less expense to the Government and
which would not necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated
to education.

“IV. That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant is discriminatory.

“V. That the herein plaintiff does not count-with sufficient funds
through its project of constructing the proposed Azcarraga Extension
and to allow the plaintiff to expropriate defendant’s property at this
time would be only to needlessly deprive the latter of the use of its
property.”

The government filed a written opposition to the motion to dismiss
(Record on Appeal, pp. 30-37) while appellee filed a reply thereto (Id.
pp. 38-48). On July 29, 1957, without receiving evidence upon the
questions of facts arising from the complaint, the motion to dismiss
and the opposition thereto filed, the trial court issued the appealed
order dismissing the case.

The appealed ordered shows that
the trial court limited itself to deciding the point of whether or not
the expropriation of the property in question is necessary (Rec. on
Ap., p. 50) and, having arrived at the conclusion that such
expropriation was not of extreme necessity, dismissed the proceedings.

It is to be observed that paragraph IV of the complaint expressly
alleges that appellant needs, among other properties, the portion of
appellee’s property in question for the purpose of constructing the
Azcarraga street extension, and that paragraph VII of the same
complaint expressly alleges that, in accordance with Section 64(b) of
the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines had
authorized the acquisition, thru condemnation proceedings, of the
aforesaid parcel of land belonging to appellee, as evidenced by the
third indorsement dated May 15, 1957 of the Executive Secretary, Office
of the President of the Philippines, a copy of which was attached to
the complaint as Annex “C” and made an integral part thereof. In denial
of these allegations appellee’s motion to dismiss alleged that “there
is no necessity for the proposed expropriation”. Thus; the question of
fact decisive of the whole case arose

It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use
and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private
property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a
genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the
courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of
the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a
genuine necessity therefor (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil., 349; Manila Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 Off. Gaz. 1957).

Upon the other hand, it does not need extended argument to show that
whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga extension is a
necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on
Legarda St., is a question of fact dependent not only upon the facts of
which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also upon
other factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be
established by means of evidence. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that the parties should have been given an opportunity to present their
respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of
direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact
involved, namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to
ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street.

Wherefore, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the present
case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision.

Without costs.

Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Paredes, JJ., concur.