EDGARDO D. AREOLA (A.K.A. MOHAMMAD KAHDAFFY), COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE BAYANI Y. ILANO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 71, ANTIPOLO CITY, RESPONDENT.

Areola versus Ilano

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Edgardo D. Areola, also known as Mohammad Kahdaffy, against Judge Bayani Y. Ilano of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 71. The complainant was an accused in a murder case and charged the judge with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the New Code of Judicial Conduct, gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, frequent unjustified absences without leave, and habitual tardiness. The case matters because it draws the line between a judge's adjudicative acts, which are shielded from discipline however erroneous, and a judge's administrative duties, which are not — and because it tells us what happens to an administrative complaint when the respondent judge dies while it is pending.

Procedural History

The complaint was filed with the Supreme Court as an original administrative matter. The Court required the respondent judge to comment, but he never did, despite receiving the notices. The Court later issued a show cause order, which he also ignored, and he was fined two thousand pesos for that failure. The records show that Judge Ilano passed away on March 25, 2008, while the case was still pending. The Office of the Court Administrator then submitted a memorandum clarifying that the death of the respondent does not render the case moot and academic, and the Court resolved the complaint on the merits.

Facts

Edgardo Areola, together with Police Officer 3 Manuel Bayaga and Antonio Bayaga, was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. The case passed through several branches as presiding judges retired or inhibited themselves. Judge Mauricio Rivera denied the accused's motions for bail. Judge Francisco Querubin later granted bail to the two Bayagas only, fixing it at one hundred thousand pesos each. Areola then filed a manifestation claiming he should likewise be granted bail, and upon his motion Judge Querubin recused himself. The case was assigned to Branch 71, presided over by Judge Bayani Y. Ilano.

Judge Ilano himself expressed that he was inhibiting from the case, but a memorandum from the Office of the Court Administrator compelled him to handle it because the pairing judge of the heinous crimes court had earlier inhibited. Areola then filed an urgent motion to resolve the motion for reconsideration of Judge Rivera's order denying bail, followed by a second urgent motion and another manifestation and motion, all reiterating his prayer to be admitted to bail. Judge Ilano issued an order transferring Areola from the Rizal Provincial Jail to the Antipolo City Jail, and later issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration.

Feeling aggrieved, Areola filed this administrative complaint. Judge Ilano never filed a comment despite the notices and the show cause order, and he passed away during the pendency of the case.

Issues

• Whether or not Judge Ilano is administratively liable for the orders he issued that were adverse to the complainant.
• Whether or not Judge Ilano is administratively liable for failing to resolve the pending motion for reconsideration with dispatch.
• Whether or not Judge Ilano is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the resolutions of the Court requiring him to comment on the complaint.
• Whether or not the death of the respondent judge during the pendency of the case renders the administrative complaint moot and academic.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

A judge shall administer justice without delay and shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

This rule bears on the charge that the respondent judge failed to resolve the pending motion for reconsideration with dispatch.

The Constitution, as cited in the decision, provides:

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

This provision grounds the Court's authority to discipline judges and to continue exercising jurisdiction over the complaint even after the respondent's death.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the charges without basis. The orders adverse to the complainant pertained to the adjudicative function of the respondent judge. As a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. The administrative complaint was obviously resorted to when the complainant failed to obtain the favorable action he wanted from the court. The filing of an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the order was issued with ill motive. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. There was no proof that the respondent judge was moved by bad faith, and bare allegations of bias and partiality will not suffice.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent judge was remiss in his duty for his failure to resolve the pending motion for reconsideration with dispatch. Under the Constitution, trial judges are given only ninety days from the filing of the last pleading within which to resolve the matter. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise enunciates that judges should administer justice without delay and dispose of the court's business promptly within the period prescribed by law. When the respondent judge took over the case, the motion for reconsideration had already been long pending, and several motions were filed for its urgent resolution. He acted on the motion only after five months from the time the case was assigned to him, and his explanation on the matter was wanting because he failed to file any comment.

On the third issue, the Court held that the resolutions requiring a comment on an administrative complaint are not mere requests from the Court. They are not to be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondents in administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations against them because it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. The Court will not tolerate indifference of respondents to administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints. Every officer or employee in the Judiciary is duty bound to obey the orders and processes of the Court without the least delay and to exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism. A judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of the Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the death of the respondent during the pendency of the case does not render the case moot and academic. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. If innocent, the respondent merits vindication of his name and integrity; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and penalty proper and imposable under the situation.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Second, an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the order was issued with ill motive. Third, bare allegations of bias and partiality will not suffice; there must be clear and convincing proof to overcome the presumption that the judge dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without fear or favor. Fourth, judges must resolve pending matters within ninety days from the filing of the last pleading, as required by the Constitution and by Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Fifth, a judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of the Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination. Sixth, the death of the respondent during the pendency of an administrative case does not render the case moot and academic; the Court retains jurisdiction either to exonerate or to declare the respondent guilty.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent judge remiss in his duties and imposed on him a fine of twenty thousand pesos, chargeable to his retirement benefits.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a judge's adjudicative acts are shielded from discipline however erroneous, so long as he acts in good faith, but his administrative duties — prompt resolution and obedience to the Court's directives — are not. Examiners like to use this case on the distinction between judicial and administrative liability, on the impropriety of an administrative complaint as a substitute for judicial remedies, and on the rule that death does not moot an administrative case against a judge.