G.R. No. L-46439. April 24, 1984
ANDREA M. MOSCOSO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MAXIMINA L. MORON, RESPONDENTS.
GUERRERO, J.:
(now the Intermediate Appellate Court) in C.A.-G.R. No. 52187-B
entitled “Application for Land Registration Under Act No. 496 – Andrea
M. Moscoso, applicant-appellant versus Maximina L. Moron, et. al.,
oppositors-appellees” which affirmed the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Tacloban City in Land Registration Case No. N-134.
Sometime on March 22, 1966, petitioner applied for land registration of a
1,147 square meters residential lot situated in the poblacion of the
municipality of Palo, province of Leyte, bounded and described in Survey
Plan Psu-54699 of the then General Land Registration Office as verified
and approved under date June 16, 1927. Her application substantially
stated that petitioner is the owner in fee simple of the land and
improvements thereon as her acquisition by inheritance from her father,
the late Pascual Monge y Vigera who died on June 9, 1950, and that the
same parcel of land is her share in a partial partition of estate she
and her brothers and sisters executed on May 22, 1964 at Palo, Leyte
(Exhibit “K”); that she and her predecessors in interest have been in
continuous, public, actual and adverse possession of the land applied
for since time immemorial until the present; that at the last assessment
for taxation, said lot was assessed in her name under Tax Declaration
No. 28260 dated May 24, 1964 (Exhibit “H”) and that the taxes are fully
paid up to the current year; that to the best of her knowledge and
belief, there is no incumbrance or any kind whatsoever affecting said
land nor any other person having interest therein, legal or equitable,
in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy; and that the land is
now being rented by lessees of the applicant, namely, Angel Encenares,
Olanda Bribe, Timoteo Noblejas, Felisa Adre, Celestina Solana, Baltazar
Collado, all of Palo, Leyte.
After due publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing of the petition
in the Official Gazette, Vol. 62, Nos. 46 and 47, issues dated November
14 and 21, 1966 (Exhibit “C”), only the Highway District Engineer of
Leyte as public oppositors, and Concordia Lanuncia, Flaviano L.
Marchadesch, Jr., and herein private respondent Maximina L. Moron as
private oppositors appeared for the initial hearing before the trial
court.
The trial court summarily dismissed the opposition of the Highway
District Engineer who merely sought to secure a reservation for a road
right-of-way in favor of the national government in view of petitioner’s
willingness to annotate the same on the certificate of title which
might issue. The opposition of the private parties thus remained.
The written opposition substantially allege that they, including one
Mrs. Apolonia L. Marchadesch who died in 1963 and survived by her only
issue, oppositor Flaviano L. Marchadesch, are the illegitimate children
of the late Zenona Lanuncia and the recognized natural children of the
late Pascual Monge who died in 1950 and father of applicant Andrea M.
Moscoso; that the Late Zenona Lanuncia, from the age of three, became a
protegee of the late spouses, Saturnino Monge and Isidra Vigera Monge,
legitimate parents of Pascual Monge and Juan Monge, now deceased; that
Isidra Vigera Monge was the original owner of the parcel of land applied
for; that Isidra Monge, long before she died on April 15, 1915, and
after Pascual Monge legally got married to the mother of the applicant
and brother and sisters, and in order to provide a home and subsistence
to the oppositors, their sister and mother, all of which are girls,
effected a verbal partition of her lands with her sons, Pascual, Juan
and with the herein oppositor, who were already at their teens, which,
by virtue of said partition, the land herein applied for registration
passed to the hands of the oppositors for their home; that the
oppositors have no knowledge that this parcel of land forms part of the
inheritance of the applicant and of a partial partition among the
applicant and her brother and sisters; that the oppositors have, if not
legal, an equitable title to the land as judged from the circumstances
surrounding the oppositors’ case; they deny the allegation that
applicant and her predecessors in interest have been in continuous,
public, actual and adverse possession of the land from time immemorial,
the truth being that the oppositors exercised exclusive dominion over
the land and are in actual and continuous possession over it from time
immemorial to the present and that should the verbal partition effected
before the death of Isidra Vigera Monge in 1915 being insufficient to
pass title to the oppositor, then by virtue of acquisitive prescription
caused by the open, continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse
possession in favor of oppositors, they are entitled to the land
invoking the benefits of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141.[2]
Upon the termination of the hearings on the merits, the Hon. Jesus N.
Borromeo, then Presiding Judge of the CFI, Tacloban City, rendered his
decision dated December 22, 1971, directing that the title over the land
should not be registered exclusively in the name of the applicant since
“it has been overwhelmingly established by them (the private
oppositors) that they and their sister Apolonia, who died in 1963, are
the children of Zenona Lanuncia and Pascual Monge resulting from the
relations between the two prior to the marriage of the latter with
Guadalupe Oliver, mother of herein petitioner and her brothers, Elpidio,
Salvador, Remedios, Ruperto, and Abelardo (deceased), all surnamed
Monge.”[3] Hence, the judgment decreed:
“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the registration of title over the parcel of land situated in
the poblacion of the municipality of Palo, Province of Leyte, as
described in the Plan Psu-54699, Exhibit “E”, and the technical
description Exhibit “F”, in the name of the co-ownership of: (1) Andrea
M. Moscoso, Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Salvador
Moscoso, with postal address at Bugasong, Antique, for three-fourth
(3/4) share; (2) Concordia Lanuncia, Filipino citizen, of legal age,
single, and a resident of Palo, Leyte, for one-twelfth (1/12) share; (3)
Maximina L. Moron, Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, and a
resident of Palo, Leyte, for 1/12) share; and, (4) Flaviano L.
Marchadesch, Jr., son of the late Apolonia L. Marchadesch, for
one-twelfth (1/12) share, subject to a reservation of a road
right-of-way in favor of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.After this judgment shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.”[4]
The trial court ruled that the verbal donation made by Isidra Vigera
Vda. de Monge in favor of Zenona Lanuncia and the latter’s daughters by
Pascual Monge because they are of the weaker sex, was ineffectual to
transmit title of ownership over the land in question add that their
adverse claim of ownership even under extraordinary prescription of over
thirty years could not favor them because such claim is disputable due
to their failure to declare the property for tax purposes in their name
after the death of Isidra Monge.
The trial court, however, gave significant weight to the carbon copy of a
power of attorney executed and signed by the late Pascual Monge on
February 11, 1945 (Exhibit “2,” “2-A” to “2-C) in favor of Maximina L.
Moron wherein he stated that Maximina is his daughter and appointed her
as his Attorney-in-Fact to transact with the United States Armed Forces
in the Philippines in his behalf for the collection of rentals and other
war damage claims due and payable to him. The court ruled that the
power of attorney was an authentic writing wherein Maximina Lanuncia was
voluntarily recognized as the daughter of Pascual Monge. As found by
the trial court thus,
“Precisely, it would appear that, in his power of attorney
executed on February 11, 1945 in favor of Maximina L. Moron, Exhibit
“2”, Pascual Monge stated that Maximina is his daughter. The contention
of petitioner that said power of attorney was fraudulently altered in
order to insert therein the words ‘my daughter…’ does not seem to be
well-taken because, from an examination of the document, the Court does
not notice concrete indications of alteration having been made in order
to suit the ends of the herein oppositors.“Thus, the Court is of the view that the late Pascual Monge, who
had no impediment to marry Zenona Lanuncia when Maximina was conceived
(Art. 119, Old Civil Code; Art. 269, New Civil Code) had voluntarily
recognized Maximina Lanuncia Moron as his child when in his power of
attorney executed on February 11, 1945, he mentioned her as his
daughter. x x x.”[5]
Petitioner assailed the Court’s decision in his motion for
reconsideration, contending that the disposition of the estate should be
governed by the Old Civil Code (Spanish Civil Code of 1889) since he
died on June 9, 1950 while the New Civil Code took effect only on
August, 1950; that assuming that the New Civil Code applies in the case
at bar, the power of attorney (Exhibit “2”) is not an authentic document
to support voluntary recognition because the words “my daughter”
reveals a clear sign of erasure and is a product of falsification as
presented in the rebuttal testimony of her brother Elpidio Monge and
that said document is not even a public document because it was merely
acknowledged by the Municipal Mayor of Palo, Leyte who had no authority
to authenticate writings as public documents which could be done only by
a notary public.
Acting upon the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the Court modified
its decision in the Order dated May 25, 1972 with the following
dispositive portion:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of December 22, 1971 is
hereby amended in the sense that the Court hereby orders the
registration of title over the parcel of land situated in the poblacion
of the municipality of Palo, Province of Leyte, as described in the Plan
Psu-54699, Exhibit “E”, and the technical description Exhibit “F” in
the name of the co-ownership of (1) Andrea M. Moscoso, Filipino citizen,
of legal age, married to Salvador Moscoso, with postal address at
Bugasong, Antique, for 13/14 share; and (2) Maximina L. Moron for 1/14
share, subject to the reservation of a road right-of-way in favor of the
Government of the Philippines.After this judgment shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.”
Not satisfied with the amended judgment, petitioner elevated the case to
the defunct Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the lower
court. Hence, the instant petition before Us.
Petitioner assigns practically the same errors allegedly committed by
the trial court which were presented before the respondent Court of
Appeals, to wit:
I. The lower court erred in holding that Pascual Monge
voluntarily recognized Maximina Lanuncia Moron as his natural child by
virtue of the power of attorney (Exhibit “2”) executed by him in favor
of the latter.II. The lower court erred in holding that said power of
attorney (Exhibit “2”) is not materially altered when in fact it was
erased to suit the ends of the oppositors.III. The lower court erred in appreciating said power of attorney (Exhibit “2”) as a public document.
IV. The lower court erred in making judicial pronouncements that
Maximina Lanuncia Moron as the acknowledged natural child of Pascual
Monge conferring upon her legal right to inherit from the whole estate
of the late Pascual Monge who died on June 9, 1950 when her claim over
the land subject of this land registration proceeding is that it was
given to their mother Zenona Lanuncia by Isidra Vigera and for their
long continuous possession acquired the same by acquisitive
prescription.V. The lower court erred in making judicial pronouncement of
recognition without a formal complaint, a hearing on the merit and
neither has Maximina Lanuncia Moron the status of a continuous
possession of a natural child.VI. The lower court erred in ordering the registration of the
land applied for registration in favor of the applicant, Andrea M.
Moscoso, only 13/14 share and to oppositor Maximina Lanuncia Moron 1/14
share in co-ownership.
The principal or decisive issue to be resolved herein is whether or not
oppositor-appellee Maximina L. Moron had been acknowledged by her
illegitimate father, Pascual Monge (now deceased) in view of which, as
held by the trial court and affirmed by the respondent appellate court,
being an acknowledged natural daughter, she would be entitled to 1/14
share in the land in question as her inheritance. In resolving this
issue, We are guided and must comply with the well-established rule that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals may not be reviewed by the
Supreme Court in an appeal by certiorari where such findings are ably supported by substantial evidence on record, the same being binding, final and conclusive.[6]
Hence, the finding of the appellate court that the power of attorney,
Exhibit “2”, was not materially altered before the same was presented to
the court below; that it is “more likely that a mistake was committed
in the preparation thereof; that the person who typed the document had
to make a slight erasure and correction in typing correctly the word
“daughter”; and that the power of attorney, as corrected, was then given
to Pascual Monge and Maximina L. Moron for their signature. As such,
the correction cannot be considered a deliberate alteration or
falsification as depicted by appellant”, is a finding of fact which
cannot be disturbed. We agree with the court that said power of
attorney is an authentic writing wherein the father, Pascual Monge,
voluntarily recognized Maximina L. Moron as his daughter, and since
Pascual Monge had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of
the conception, Maximina is a natural child, entitled to share in the
inheritance of the property in question.
It may be so as argued by the petitioner that where the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, a minute
scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order and resort to the duly proven
evidence becomes necessary, citing Gonzales vs. CA, G.R. No. 37453, May
25, 1979, 90 SCRA 183 and cases cited therein. We have in fact noted
that the trial court found no alteration in the power of attorney,
Exhibit “2”, when it ruled that “from an examination of the document,
the court does not notice concrete indication of alteration having been
made therein in order to suit the ends of the herein oppositor”
(Decision, pp. 21-22, Record on Appeal), whereas respondent appellate
court held that “(w)e find it more likely that a mistake was committed
in the preparation of the power of attorney that the person who typed
the document had to make a slight erasure and correction in typing
correctly the word “daughter” and that the power of attorney, as
corrected, was then given to Pascual Monge and Maximina L. Moron for
their signature. As such, correction cannot be considered a deliberate
falsification, as depicted by appellant.” (CA Decision, p. 8)
We have indeed scrutinized minutely the documentary evidence in
question, Exhibit “2”, as We have ordered the elevation of the original
records before Us. We affirm the holding of the appellate court that
“What clearly appears to be the case, upon clear examination, is that
there is no erasure of the portion whereon “my” was typed. If, really,
such 14-letter word was erased and in lieu thereof the word “daughter”
was typed or superimposed, the erasure would be very noticeable and
visible as the word “daughter”, which is shorter by six letters, cannot
fully cover the space occupied by “administratrix”. This could be
easily seen by the naked eye when the document, as in the instant case,
was executed more than 25 years ago and has turned yellow with age. But
this is not the case.” There is no inconsistency between the two
findings of the trial and appellate courts. Both support the
authenticity of the document in ruling that there was no deliberate
falsification, which We uphold.
Petitioner’s contention that the Court of First Instance, acting as a
land registration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue
whether the oppositor is the acknowledged natural child of Pascual
Monge, is untenable. We have a number of cases that answer petitioner’s
position. Thus, in the case of Florentino vs. Encarnacion, G.R. No.
L-27697, Sept. 30, 1977, 79 SCRA 193, 204-205, We ruled:
“Petitioner-appellants’ third assignment of error is not
well-taken. Firstly, the otherwise rigid rule that the jurisdiction of
the Land Registration Court, being special and limited in character and
proceedings thereon summary in nature, does not extend to cases
involving issues properly litigable in other independent suits or
ordinary civil actions, has time and again been relaxed in special and
exceptional circumstances. (See Government of P.I. vs. Serafica, 61
Phil. 93 (1934); Caoibes vs. Sison, 102 Phil. 19 (1957); Luna vs.
Santos, 102 Phil. 588 (1957); Cruz vs. Tan, 93 Phil. 348 (1953); Gurbax
Singh Pabla and Co. vs. Reyes, 92 Phil. 177 (1952)). From these cases,
it may be gleaned and gathered that the peculiarity of the exceptions is
based not alone on the fact that the Land Registration Courts are
likewise the same Courts of First Instance, but also the following
premises: (1) Mutual consent of the parties or their acquiescence in
submitting the aforesaid issues for the determination by the court in
the registration proceedings; (2) Full opportunity given to the parties
in the presentation of their respective sides of the issues and of the
evidence in support thereto; (3) Consideration by the court that the
evidence already of record is sufficient and adequate for rendering a
decision upon these issues. (Aglipay vs. De Los Reyes, L-12776, March
21, 1960) x x x.”
Upon a scrutiny of the proceedings in the trial court, We find that
petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration wherein
she assailed the ruling of the trial court that based upon Exhibit “2”,
the power of attorney, the oppositor was an acknowledged natural child
of the late Pascual Monge and entitled to a portion of the land subject
of the land registration proceedings. She claimed that the document was
not authentic and not a public document. In effect, petitioner
acquiesced in submitting the issue as to the status of the oppositor as
an acknowledged natural child entitled to successional rights and had
the full opportunity to dispute the authenticity of the document in
question as in fact, applicant’s brother, Elpidio Monge, gave rebuttal
testimony to support petitioner’s theory that the document was a product
of a falsification, which the trial court did not believe. Moreover,
the court considered and deemed the evidence already of record
sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon the issue thus
raised. In doing so, We find no abuse of discretion committed by the
trial court.
In addition, considerations of speedy justice and avoidance of
multiplicity of suits impel Us to hold and rule that under the facts of
the case at bar, the trial court, acting as a land registration court,
may adjudicate the land sought to be registered to either or both of the
applicant and oppositor, in whole or in part, based on evidence
submitted to the court showing that the party has proper title for
registration. (Section 37, Act 496).
In any event, as the Supreme Court said in Nicanor T. Santos vs. Rosa
Ganayo, L-31854, Sept. 9, 1982, 116 SCRA 431, “Whether a particular
matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise
of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special
court (Probate, Land Registration, etc.) is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question
involving a mode of practice which may be waived.” In meeting the issue
raised by the oppositor as to her status as an acknowledged natural
child as a result of her voluntary recognition appearing in Exhibit “2”,
the oppositor (now the petitioner herein) had waived the procedural
question and she may not be allowed to raise the same in the present
petition.
The proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens
system is an action in rem, not in personam, hence, personal notice to
all claimants of the res is not necessary to give the court jurisdiction
to deal with and dispose of the res, and neither may lack of such
personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a
registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land
situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a
proceeding in rem or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall
be binding upon all persons, known or unknown. (City of Manila vs. Lack
et al., 19 Phil. 324, 337; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of
Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120; Aguilar
vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661).
Under the above doctrine, petitioner’s assailment that “(t)he judicial
pronouncement (referring to the holding that the oppositor Maximina L.
Moron is the acknowledged natural child of Pascual Monge) which will
become conclusive and far-reaching and in effect binds the other heirs
of Pascual Monge consisting of the brothers and sisters as well as the
nephews and nieces of the petitioner who are not parties in this
proceeding,” is untenable.
Earlier, We have affirmed the ruling of the appellate court that Exhibit
“2” which is the power of attorney is an authentic writing wherein the
father, Pascual Monge, voluntarily recognized Maximina L. Moron as his
daughter, applying the provisions of Article 278, New Civil Code, which
provides that recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. We
apply Article 278, New Civil Code retroactively to the case of Maximina
L. Moron although she was born before the effectivity of the New Civil
Code in view of the provisions of Article 2260 of the New Civil Code
which states:
“Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall
take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the
effectivity of this body of laws.”
The reason for giving retroactive effect to Article 2260 is indicated in
the Report of the Code Commission, page 169, thus: “The liberalized
mode of recognition is in harmony with the aim of the proposed code to
do justice to illegitimate children. Hence, its retroactive effect.”
(See Civil Code Annotated by Padilla, Vol. VII, 1975 Ed., p. 709).
In Caridad Cruz Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals and Jose Pedro
Reynaldo Sy-Quia, G. R. No. 62283, Nov. 25, 1983, the Supreme Court
squarely held:
“x x x Article 2260 of (the Civil Code of the Philippines)
provides that ‘the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take
place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the
effectivity of this body of laws’ or before August 30, 1950. Hence,
Article 278 may be given retroactive effect (p. 169, Report of the Code
Commission, 7 Padilla, Civil Code, 1975 Ed., p. 709).”
Under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, an acknowledged natural child is
entitled to x x x “3. To receive the hereditary portion determined by
this Code.” (Article 134). This hereditary portion is fixed under
Article 840 which states:
“Art. 840. When the testator leaves legitimate children or
descendants, and also natural children, legally acknowledged, each of
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the portion pertaining to
each of the legitimate children who have not received any betterment,
provided that it may be included within the freely disposable portion,
from which it must be taken, after the burial and funeral expenses have
been paid.”
The same share which is one-half of the legitime of each of the
legitimate children or descendants is given to each of the acknowledged
natural children under Article 895 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
“Art. 895. The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural
children and each of the natural children by legal fiction shall consist
of one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate children or
descendants.”
The final adjudication made by the trial court in its Order dated May
25, 1975 (affirmed by the Court of Appeals) directed the registration of
the land in question in the name of the co-ownership of petitioner
Andrea M. Moscoso for 13/14 share and Maximina L. Moron, the oppositor,
for 1/14 share in view of the court’s realization that no documentary
evidence was presented to prove that the other oppositors, Concordia
Lanuncia and Apolonia Lanuncia (deceased) and mother of oppositor
Flaviano Marchadesch, Jr. were acknowledged by Pascual Monge. In the
interest of justice, We must modify the above sharing in order to give
the legal share of the oppositor as an acknowledged natural child.
Since there are six (6) legitimate children including the petitioner
Andrea M. Moscoso who had previously acquired the shares of her five (5)
co-heirs, and one (1) acknowledged natural child, the oppositor
Maximina L. Moron, herein private respondent who is entitled to one-half
(1/2) the share of each of the legitimate children (Article 840,
Spanish Civil Code; Article 895, New Civil Code), the proper sharing
should be 12/13 to Andrea M. Moscoso and 1/13 to Maximina L. Moron.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
hereby MODIFIED in the sense that the adjudication of the land subject
of the land registration proceedings shall be in the co-ownership of
petitioner-applicant Andrea M. Moscoso for 12/13 share and to oppositor
private respondent Maximina L. Moron for 1/13 share. In all other
aspects, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., see concurring opinion.
Abad Santos, J., no part.
[1] Fifth Division, penned by Domondon, J. and concurred by Reyes, L.B. and Gutierrez, H., JJ.
[2] Original Record on Appeal, pp. 2-5.
[3] Original Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13.
[4] Ibid., pp. 15-16.
[5] Original Record on Appeal, p. 13.
[6] Lucero vs. Loot, 25 SCRA
687; Ramirez Tel. Corp. vs. Bank of America, 29 SCRA 191; Chan vs. CA,
33 SCRA 737; Perido vs. Perido, 63 SCRA 97; Spouses Dalida vs. CA, 117
SCRA 480.
CONCURRING OPINION
AQUINO, J.:
I concur. The land involved was acquired by Isidra Vigera Vda. de Monge
in 1907. She died in 1915, survived by her child, Pascual Monge, who
married Guadalupe Oliver. Guadalupe died in 1941 while Pascual died on
June 9, 1950 or before the effectivity of the Civil Code. He was
survived by six children named Salvacion, Elpidio, Remedios, Ruperta,
Abelardo (deceased) and Andrea, the petitioner herein.
Andrea Monge Moscoso claimed the land as her own because her brother and sisters transferred their shares to her (Exh. K).
Before his marriage to Guadalupe, Pascual had sexual relations with
Zenona Lanuncia. He begot with her three children named Maximina,
Concordia and Apolonia (survived by Flaviano L. Marchadesch, Jr.).
Only Maximina Lanuncia Moron can be considered Pascual’s acknowledged
natural child because of the power of attorney which he had executed in
1945 in her favor. It is a “documento publico” within the meaning of
article 131 of the old Code.
Pascual M. Monge’s estate is governed by articles 840 and 942 of the old
Civil Code under which each acknowledged natural child is entitled to a
one-half portion pertaining to each of the legitimate children who have
not received any betterment.
Hence, Andrea Monge Moscoso is entitled to 12/13 and Maximina Lanuncia Moron to 1/13 of the land.