REGINO G. AQUIZAP, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. EUGENIO BASILIO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Aquizap versus Basilio

The Case

This is a civil action for the recovery of damages, brought by Regino Aquizap against Eugenio Basilio and later against the latter's heirs. Aquizap claimed that Basilio unlawfully stayed on his land and harvested palay from it during three agricultural years, and he asked for the value of that harvest plus other damages. The case matters to a reviewee because the Supreme Court never reached the merits at all. It stopped at a threshold question of jurisdiction and procedure, and in doing so it gives us two firm rules: jurisdiction is fixed by the statute in force when the action is filed, and a dismissal "without prejudice" is still a final order that ends the case and does not make a later suit a mere continuation of it.

Procedural History

The story begins in the justice of the peace court of San Marcelino, Zambales, where Aquizap sued Basilio and Santiago Amos for detentacion, that is, for recovery of possession. Judgment was rendered in September 1943 in Aquizap's favor, ordering the defendant to vacate and restore possession of the land and to pay damages and costs. When Basilio did not leave, a writ of execution issued in October 1946, and the deputy sheriff of Zambales placed Aquizap in possession in November 1946.

Aquizap then filed a complaint for money and damages with the Court of First Instance of Zambales in December 1946. That complaint was dismissed in July 1953 because Aquizap failed to appear when the case was called for hearing, and the dismissal was made without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint. In November 1953 Aquizap filed the present action with the same Court of First Instance. After Basilio answered, he died, and his heirs were substituted as defendants. Aquizap filed an amended complaint reproducing the original allegations and prayer, adding only that the heirs were being made parties by substitution.

The heirs moved to dismiss on three grounds: that the amended complaint states no cause of action, that no cause of action accrues against them, and that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. The lower court dismissed the amended complaint on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Aquizap's motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals. Because only questions of law were involved, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Facts

In 1943 Aquizap won a detentacion case before the justice of the peace court of San Marcelino, Zambales, against Basilio and Amos. The judgment ordered the defendant to vacate the land and restore possession to Aquizap, and to pay damages and costs. Basilio received a copy of the decision but remained in possession. He planted the land to palay in 1944, 1945 and 1946, and according to Aquizap he reaped and harvested for himself exclusively sixteen cavanes of palay each agricultural year, or forty eight cavanes in all.

In November 1946 the deputy sheriff of Zambales, acting on a writ of execution issued by the justice of the peace court in October 1946, placed Aquizap in possession of the land. Aquizap then filed a complaint for money and damages with the Court of First Instance of Zambales in December 1946. That case was dismissed in July 1953 for his failure to appear, without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint.

In November 1953 Aquizap filed the present action with the same court, claiming forty eight cavanes of palay at eleven pesos per cavan, or five hundred twenty eight pesos, plus two hundred pesos in other damages, with legal interest and costs. Basilio died after answering, and his heirs were substituted. The heirs moved to dismiss, and the lower court dismissed the amended complaint as barred by the statute of limitations.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Zambales had jurisdiction over the present action filed in November 1953, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 had taken effect in June 1948 and placed demands not exceeding two thousand pesos within the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts.
• Whether or not the reservation in the July 1953 order of dismissal, made without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint, made the present action a continuation of the earlier case so that the jurisdiction acquired in 1946 was retained.
• Whether or not the Supreme Court may review the case on appeal when the amount demanded falls below the minimum jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

Applicable Provisions

Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as it stood when the present action was filed, defines the jurisdiction of inferior courts and provides:

The jurisdiction of inferior courts has been increased to P10,000 by Republic Act 3828, June 22, 1963.

This provision bears on the case because it fixes the boundary between inferior court and Court of First Instance jurisdiction, and the Court reads it to place demands not exceeding two thousand pesos within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior courts.

The Court also refers to the rule on dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to appear, then Rule 30, section 3, now Rule 17, section 3, which provides that such a dismissal is equivalent to:

an adjudication on the merits [with prejudice] unless otherwise provided by the court,

This provision bears on the case because the phrase "without prejudice" in the July 1953 order was meant only to avoid this default effect, and the Court holds that it did not make the order any less final.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action. It is true that when Aquizap filed his complaint in 1946, the old law, Act 136, placed cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs, amounted to six hundred pesos or more within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of first instance. But the present action was filed in 1953, and by then the Judiciary Act of 1948 governed. Under that Act, inferior courts had exclusive original jurisdiction where the amount of the demand does not exceed two thousand pesos, exclusive of interest and costs. Since the totality of the demands in the amended complaint was way below two thousand pesos, the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the present action.

On the second issue, the Court held that the reservation did not make the present action a continuation of the dismissed case. The notation that the dismissal was without prejudice was intended merely to avoid the effects of the rule that dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to appear is equivalent to an adjudication on the merits unless otherwise provided by the court. It did not render the order any less final. The Court distinguished the order from the sin perjuicio decision condemned as a nullity in Director of Lands versus Sanz, because that decision did not contain a statement of the facts essential to a clear understanding of the issues. The order of dismissal here was complete in all details and, though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. The result is that the jurisdiction which the Court of First Instance of Zambales had acquired in 1946 under Act 136 was fully discharged and terminated, and the present action was a completely new action that should have taken into account the law in force at the time of its filing.

On the third issue, the Court held that since the totality of the demands was plainly below the minimum jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance under section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Supreme Court was without appellate jurisdiction to review the case. Having reached this conclusion, the Court deemed it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised by the parties.

Doctrine

First, jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action, not by the statute in force when an earlier related action was filed. A new action must take into account the law in force at the time of its own filing.

Second, a dismissal without prejudice is a final order. The phrase "without prejudice" merely avoids the default effect of the rule that dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to appear is equivalent to an adjudication on the merits unless otherwise provided by the court. It does not make the dismissed case a continuing one, and it does not preserve the jurisdiction acquired in that case. A later suit is a completely new action.

Third, where the amount demanded falls below the minimum jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance under section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction to review the case.

Disposition

The appeal was dismissed and the proceedings in the lower court were set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action, and a dismissal without prejudice is still final and does not make a later suit a continuation of the earlier one. Examiners use this case to test the jurisdictional amount under the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the effect of a without prejudice dismissal on the continuity of an action.