LOURDES MARCELO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE “KANEBO LABORATORY”, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH III O…

Marcelo versus De Guzman

The Case

This is the case of Marcelo versus De Guzman. Lourdes Marcelo, doing business under the name and style Kanebo Laboratory, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against Judge Jose C. de Guzman of the City Court of Quezon City, together with the officials of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, after the judge refused to quash a search warrant and to return the goods seized under it. The case matters because it fixes two rules every reviewee must carry: an order denying a motion to quash a search warrant is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, and yet certiorari and mandamus will lie against it when the warrant is a patent nullity and appeal would be neither speedy nor adequate.

Procedural History

Sergeant Alejandro Quirante applied for a search warrant before Judge de Guzman, presiding judge of Branch III of the City Court of Quezon City. The judge issued the warrant, and the agents of the agency seized goods and documents from the premises of Kanebo Laboratory. Lourdes Marcelo moved to quash the warrant and to recover the seized articles. Judge de Guzman denied the motion in a minute order, and he likewise denied her motion for reconsideration.

Marcelo then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The trial court gave the petition due course, and after the answer was filed it resolved the case on the pleadings and memoranda. The trial court set aside the search warrant, declared it null and void, and ordered the return of the seized properties, holding that the warrant had been issued without a determination of probable cause in connection with one specific offense and that the requirements on inventory and delivery of the seized property had not been observed.

The respondents went straight to the Supreme Court by direct appeal, perfected before the effectivity of Republic Act Number 5440. They did not dispute the findings of the trial court, nor did they challenge its conclusion that the warrant was illegally issued. Their lone assignment of error was that the trial court should not have entertained the petition, because the orders of Judge de Guzman were final and not interlocutory, so that the remedy was appeal.

Facts

At about three o'clock in the morning of June 21, 1966, Sergeant Alejandro Quirante, a Philippine Constabulary officer detailed with the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, applied to Judge de Guzman for a search warrant to search the premises of Kanebo Laboratory at Number 55 Times Street, Quezon City. The application was filed in connection with a criminal case in which, curiously enough, the Kanebo Laboratory itself was named as the accused. Attached to the application were the affidavits of two witnesses, and the judge forthwith issued the warrant.

Armed with the warrant, the agents proceeded to the premises owned by Lourdes Marcelo and seized perfumes, essences, pomades, demi-johns, drums, and packages of various sizes containing bottles of perfume and pomade. They also seized commercial documents and papers.

Marcelo moved to quash the warrant and to recover the seized articles and documents. When her motion and her motion for reconsideration were both denied, she went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The trial court found that the affidavits did not clearly draw the offense supposed to have been violated nor describe and identify the things to be seized, that the warrant was issued without ascertaining probable cause in connection with one specific offense, and that the required inventory and delivery of the seized property to the issuing judge had not been shown. It therefore declared the warrant null and void and ordered the return of the properties.

Issues

• Whether or not the order of the city court denying the motion to quash the search warrant and to return the seized properties is final and appealable, or merely interlocutory.
• Whether or not certiorari and mandamus may be entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal. - Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal. No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.

This is the rule of practice that the appellants invoked, and the Court used it to test whether the denial of the motion to quash could be appealed at all.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

This is the general rule on certiorari, which the Court applied in allowing the petition despite the remedy of appeal.

Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

The Court held that Judge de Guzman ignored this explicit mandate, and that this disregard rendered the warrant absolutely null and void.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the order denying the motion to quash was interlocutory, not final. A final order is one that disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. An order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. Tested against this criterion, the search warrant issued in the criminal case was indisputably of interlocutory character, because it left something more to be done in that case, namely, the determination of the guilt of the accused. The Court added that an interlocutory order is not appealable until judgment on the merits, and that the reason for the rule is to avoid a multiplicity of appeals in a single action.

On the second issue, the Court held that certiorari and mandamus were properly entertained. Certiorari is available where a tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the light of the findings of the trial court, which the appellants did not dispute, Judge de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the warrant. He acted whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3 of Rule 126, and the utter disregard of its requirements rendered the warrant absolutely null and void. The Court held that where the order complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal. Moreover, an appeal would neither be adequate nor speedy, because the seizure had resulted in the total paralysis of Marcelo's business, and recourse in appeal would have unduly delayed the recovery of the articles and documents improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari is allowed to prevent irreparable damage and injury.

Doctrine

First, an order denying a motion to quash a search warrant and to return the properties seized under it is interlocutory and not appealable, because it leaves something more to be done in the criminal case, namely, the determination of the guilt of the accused. This follows from Section 2 of Rule 41, which subjects only final judgments or orders to appeal.

Second, the general rule that certiorari lies only where there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, admits of the exception that where the order complained of is a patent nullity, certiorari and mandamus may be entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal. The same is true where appeal cannot afford adequate and expeditious relief, as where the seizure has paralyzed the petitioner's business.

Third, a search warrant issued without probable cause in connection with one specific offense, and without a particular description of the things to be seized, violates Section 3 of Rule 126 and is absolutely null and void. The disregard of these requirements amounts to grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court, with no costs.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that an order denying a motion to quash a search warrant is interlocutory and not appealable, but certiorari and mandamus will lie where the warrant is a patent nullity and appeal is not an adequate or speedy remedy. Examiners use this case to test the final versus interlocutory distinction, the exceptions to the rule on certiorari, and the requisites of a valid search warrant under Section 3 of Rule 126.