LAURETO A. TALAROC, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. ALEJANDRO D. UY, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

The election of Alejandro D. Uy to the office of municipal
mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental, on November 13, 1951, brought the instant
action of quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of that province. The
petitioner was Laureto A. Talaroc, one of the defeated candidates for the same
office, and the grounds of the petition were that the respondent is a Chinese
national and therefore ineligible. The court below found the petition well
founded and declared the position in question vacant.

The personal circumstances of the respondent as found by the
court are not in dispute. They are as follows:

“Estan establecidas por las pruebas, y admitidas por las
partes, que Alejandro D. Uy nacio en enero 28, 1912, en el municipio de Iligan,
provincia de Lanao (Exhibito A), de padre chino, Uy Piangco, y de raadre
Filipina, Ursula Diabo, cuando convivian estos como marido y mujer, pero despues
contrajeron matrimonio eclesiastico el marzo 3, 1914, en dicho pueblo (Exhibito
9). Tuvieron siete hijos, siendo el recurrido Alejandro D. Uy el 5.° hijo. Uy
Piangeo nativo de Chuitao, Amoy, China, nunca se ausent6 desde que llego hacia
1893 6 1895, en Filipinas hasta su fallecimiento el febrero 17, 1917, en Iligan,
Lanao, donde estuvo residiendo continuamente. Ursula Diabo sin contraer nuevo
matrimonio, murio con posterioridad, el agosto 29, 1949, en el munieipio de
Mantieao, Misamis Oriental (Exhibito 3). Aparece tambien que el recurrido
Alejandro D. Uy nunca fue a China y ha votado en las anteriores elecciones
verificadas en el pals, y ha desempefiado empleos como Inspector del “Bureau of
Plant Industry” en 1943 (Exh. 4), en los arios 1935, 1946 y 1947, maestro bajo
el Bureaa of Public Schools, en Manticao District (Exhs. 5 y 50); filing clerk
en ia Tesoreria Municipal de Initao, en 1935 al 1945 (Exh. 4); y acting
Municipal Treasurer de Lagait, en 1942 a 1943 (Exh. 6); ademas de haber servido
al 120th Infantry Regiment de la guerrila, y algun tiempo ‘tax collector’ del
gobierno de ocupacion japonesa, en esta provincia de Misamis
Oriental.”

These facts also appear uncontroverted in evidence: One of the
respondent’s brothers, Pedro D. Uy, before the war and up to this time has been
occupying the position of income tax examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
His other brother, Jose D. Uy, is a practicing certified public accountant, and
before the war was the accountant of the National Abaca and Fiber Corporation
(NAFCO). His other brother, Dr. Victorio D. Uy, is a practising physician, and,
before the war, was charity physician in Initao and later a physician in the
provincial hospital. During the war, Dr. Uy was a captain in the Philippine
Army. His younger brother was a lieutenant in the 120th Infantry Regiment of the
guerrillas. All his brothers married Filipino girls and they were never
identified with any Chinese political or social organization. Respondent’s
father acquired properties in Lugait. His mother, who never remarried,
campaigned for woman suffrage in 1935 and voted in the subsequent elections.

The respondent’s contentions, which the court below rejected,
were that his father was a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899 by virtue of
Article 17 of the Civil Code; that his mother ipso facto reacquired her Filipino
citizenship upon the death of her husband on February 17, 1917, and the child
followed her citizenship; and that the respondent is a citizen of the
Philippines by the mere fact of his birth therein. His Honor the Judge noted
that, while under the Roa doctrine (Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 23
Phil., 315), Alejandro D. Uy would be a Filipino citizen regardless of the
nationality of his parents, yet, he said, this doctrine was abandoned in Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, (79 Phil, 249), Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of
the Philippines, (79 Phil., 249), decided with Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor
and Villahermosa vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, 80 Phil., 541.

It may be recalled that in the case of Roa vs. Insular
Collector of Customs, supra, the petitioner was born in lawful wedlock in the
Philippines on July 6, 1899, his father being a native of China and his mother a
Filipina. His father was domiciled in this country up to the year 1895 when he
went to China and never returned, dying there about 1900. In May, 1901, Roa, who
was then a minor, was sent to China by his widowed mother for the sole purpose
of studying, and returned in October, 1910, being then about 21 years and 3
months of age. He was denied admission by the board of special inquiry, whose
decision was affirmed by the Court of First Instance in habeas corpus
proceedings.

This Court held that Article 17 of the Civil Code “is
sufficient to show that the first paragraph affirms and recognizes the principle
of nationality by place of birth, jus soli.” Citing various decisions,
authorities, and opinions of the United States Attorney General, it found that
the decided weight of authority was to the effect that the marriage of an
American woman with an alien conferred his nationality upon her during
coverture; that upon the dissolution of the marriage by death of the husband,
the wife reverted, ipso facto, to her former status, unless her conduct or acts
showed that she elected to retain the nationality of her husband, and that where
the widowed mother herself thus reacquired her former nationality, her children,
she being their natural guardian, should follow her nationality with the proviso
that they may elect for themselves upon reaching majority.

The Roa decision, promulgated on October 30, 1912, set a
precedent that was uniformly followed in numerous cases. This long line of
decisions applied the principle of jus soli up to September 16, 1947, when that
principle was renounced in the cases of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor and
Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines cited in the appealed
decision.

These two decisions are not, in our opinion, controlling in
this case.

Article IV, entitled “Citizenship,” of the Constitution
provides:

“SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.

On the strength of the Roa doctrine, Alejandro D. Uy
undoubtedly was considered a full-pledged Philippine citizen on the date of the
adoption of the Constitution, when jus soli had been the prevailing doctrine.
“With it,” as Mr. Justice Laurel said in Ramon Torres et al. vs. Tan Chin, 69
Phil., 519, “the bench and the bar were familiar. The members of the
Constitutional Convention were also aware of this rule, and in abrogating the
doctrine laid down in the Roa case, by making the jus sanguinis the
predominating principle in the determination of Philippine citizenship, they did
not intend to exclude those who, in the situation of Tranquilino Roa, were
citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution.” “This,” the Court went on to say, “is apparent from the
following excerpt of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention when
Article IV of the Constitution was discussed:

“Delegate Aruego.—Mr. President, may I just have one question?
May I ask Mr. Roxas if, under this proposition that you have, al children born
in the Philippines before the adoption of the Constitution was included?

“Delegate Roxas.—No, sir: that is to say, if they are citizens
in accordance with the present law, they will be citizens.

“Delegate Aruego.—But as I have said they are citizens by
judicial decisions.

“Delegate Roxas.—If they are citizens now by judicial
decisions, they will be citizens.

“Delegate Aruego.—I should like to make it clear that we are
voting on the proposition so that it will include all those born in the
Philippines, regardless of their parentage, because I have heard some objections
here to the incorporation in toto of the doctrine of jus soli. There are many
who do not want to include, as citizens, children of Chinese parents, but they
are included in the proposition we are voting upon * * *.

“I should like to find out from the gentleman from Capiz if
that proposition would make Filipino citizens of children of Chinese parents
born last year or this year.

“Delegate Roxas.—No, because by the laws of the Philippine
Islands, they are not Filipino citizens now.” (Record of the Proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention, Session of November 26, 1934.)

Unlike the Tan Chong case, the herein appellant Uy had attained
the age of majority when the Constitution went into effect, and had been allowed
to exercise the right of suffrage, to hold public offices, and to take the oath
of allegiance to the Commonwealth Government or Republic of the Philipines.

The Tan Chong decision itself makes this express reservation:
“Needless to say, this decision is not intended or designed to deprive, as it
can not divest, of their Filipino citizenship, those who have been declared to
be Filipino citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred by the
courts because of the doctrine or principle of res adjudicata.” Certainly, it
would neither be fair nor good policy to hold the respondent an alien after he
had exercised the privileges of citizenship and the Government had confirmed his
Philippine citizenship on the faith of legal principles that had the force of
law. On several occasions the Secretary of Justice had declared as Filipino
citizens persons similarly circumstanced as the herein respondent. (Opinion 40,
series of 1940, of the Secretary of Justice. See also Opinion No. 18, series of
1942, of the Commissioner of Justice, 1942 Off. Gaz., September.)

Cut out of the same pattern and deserving of the same
consideration is the proposition that Alejandro D. Uy became a Philippine
citizen at least upon his father’s death.

It has been seen that, according to the rule of the Roa case, a
Filipino woman married to Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship
upon her husband’s demise and that thereafter her minor children’s nationality
automatically followed that of the mother’s: This rule was not changed by the
adoption of the jus sanguinis doctrine, and was in force until Commonwealth Act
No. 63 went into effect in 1936, by which the legislature, for the first time,
provided a method for regainirg Philippine citizenship by Filipino women in such
cases. It is to be noted that when Commonwealth Act No. 63 was passed Ursula
Diabo had been a widow for 39 years and Alejandro D. Uy had been of age three
years, and that the new law carries no provision giving it retroactive effect.

These conclusions make superfluous consideration of the rest of
the several assignments of error by the appellant upon which we refrain to
express on opinion.

The decision of the lower court is reversed and the respondent
and appellant declared a Filipino citizen and eligible to the office of
municipal mayor. The petitioner and appellee will pay the costs of both
instances.

Bengzon, Montemayor, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Paras, C. J., concurs in the result.

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PABLO, M.:

Opino que Alejandro D. Uy nacio como ciudadano filipino en 28
de enero de 1912 en Iligan, Lanao, porque su madre Ursula Diabo no estaba casada
legalmente con Uy Piangco, pues el hijo natural sigue la ciudadania de su madre
(Serra contra Republica de Filipinas, G. R. No. L-4223, mayo 12, 1952) ; pero al
casarse ella con Uy Piangco en 3 de marzo de 1914, Alejandro D. Uy quedo
legitimado por subsiguiente matrimonio (Art. 120, Cod. Civ. Esp.); ipso facto se
habia hecho ciudadano chino porque como menor de edad, tenia que seguir la
nacionalidad de su padre legitimo (Art. IS. Cod. Civ. Esp.), como Ursula siguio
la de su marido (Art. 22, Cod. Civ. Esp.).

Al fallecimiento de Uy Piangco en 17 de febrero de 1917, Ursula
Diabo no se hizo automaticamente ciudadana filipina, pues el articulo 22 del
Codigo Civil Espanol entonces vigente dispone que la espanola (filipina) que
casare con extranjero podra, disuelto el matrimonio, recobrar la nacionalidad
espanola (filipina) llenando los requisites expresados en el articulo anterior,
y estos requisites son: (a) volviendo la viuda al Reino (repatriacion); (b)
declarando su voluntad de recobrar la ciudadania filipina; y (c) renunciando la
proteccion del pabellon del pais de su marido. La primera condicion esta
practicamente cumplida porque Diabo no salio nunca de Filipinas; pero no esta
probado que hubiese declarado ante el registrador civil de su residencia que era
su intencion recobrar la ciudadania filipina, ni que hubiese renunciado la
proteccion de la bandera china. Desde el 26 de noviembre de 1930 en que se
establecio el registro civil en Filipinas, siendo registrador civil local el
tesorero municipal, hasta el 28 de agosto de 1949 en que fallecio—mas de
dieciocho anos—Ursula Diabo tenia amplia oportunidad de hacer la declaracion
que exige el articulo 21 delCodigo Civil, pero no lo ha hecho; su silencio da
lugar a la presuncion de que deseo continuar gozando de la ciudadania de su
marido. Para recobrar la ciudadania filipina, la viuda de un extranjero debe
ejecutar ciertos actos que demuestren su deseo indubitable de readquirir su
antigua ciudadania y perder la de su finado marido; por tanto, Alejandro D. Uy
tampoco readquirio la ciudadania filipina por el mero hecho de haber quedado
viuda su madre.

Es principio universalmente aceptado que la expatriation es
derecho inherente a todos. Los hijos de un extranjero nacidos en Filipinas deben
manifestar al encargado del Registro Civil dentro del ano siguiente a su mayor
edad o emancipacion, si desean optar por la ciudadania de su pais natal (Art.
19, Cod. Civ. Esp.) Aunque no aparece que ha hecho tal manifestacion al
registrador civil, Alejandro D. Uy ejercito, sin embargo, el derecho de sufragio
“en las anteriores elecciones verificadas en el pais” al tener edad competente
para votar. Con ello demostro que queria adoptar la ciudadania del pais de su
nacimiento, prefiriendola a la de su padre. Cuando en 1935 Alejandro D. Uy
sirvio al gobierno como maestro de escuela bajo el Departamento de Instruccion
Publica, despues escribiente en la tesoreria municipal de Initao en 1937, y mas
tarde tesorero de Lugait en 1942 a 1943, y cuando, conexposicion de su vida,
ingreso en las filas del 120.°. Regimiento de Infanteria de las guerrillas,
demostro de una manera clara e inequivoca que preferia ser ciudadano filipino a
ser ciudadano chino.

Alejandro D. Uy, de acuerdo con el Codigo Civil antiguo, es
ciudadano filipino porque opto serlo al Ilegar a mayor edad. Tambien es
ciudadano filipino por disposicion constitucional. Al votar en las elecciones
verificadas en el pais al Ilegar a la mayor edad, demostro que quiso abrazar la
ciudadania filipina. La Constitution dice asi: “Son ciudadanos filipinos: * * *
(4) los que, siendo hijos de madres de ciudadania filipina, optaren por esta al
Ilegar a la mayor edad.” (Art. 4, Titulo IV, Constitucion). Bueno es hacer
constar que existe error en esta disposicion: debe decirse “madres de
nacionalidad filipina” y no “madres de ciudadania filipina.” La filipina que se
casa con un extranjero sigue la ciudadania de su marido; por el simple hecho del
matrimonio pierde la ciudadania filipina y se hace extranjera: no puede
continuar en ta condicion de ciudadana filipina por expresa disposicion de la
ley, pero no pierde la naeionalidad filipina.

Por las razones expuestas, y no por otras, Alejandro D. Uy
adquirio la ciudadania filipina.

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PADILLA, J.:

I would rest the judgment in this case on the undisputed fact
that the respondent was born out of wedlock in Iligan, Lanao, on 28 January 1912
of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father who were married on 3 March 1914 and
that his father died on 17 February 1917. He was a Filipino citizen, became
Chinese citizen when his father and mother were married, and reacquired his
original citizenship on the death of his father, because being under age he
followed the citizenship of his mother who reacquired her Filipino citizenship
upon the death of her husband and never remarried.

I do not agree to the proposition that persons born in this
country of alien parentage or whose father is an alien must be deemed Filipino
citizens under and by virtue of the doctrine laid down in the case of Roa vs.
Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 315. Precisely, the judgment in the cases of Tan
Chong vs. The Secretary of Labor and Lam Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the
Philippines, 45 Off. Gaz., 1269, holds that as the doctrine laid down in the
case of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, is in conflict with the law in
force at the time it must be abandoned. Jose Tan Chong invoked also the benefit
of the doctrine in the Roa vs. Collector of Customs case. There is only an
exception to the rule laid down in the cases of Tan Chong vs. The Secretary of
Labor and Lam Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines, supra.

Labrador, J., concurs.