LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION – EIGHTH DIVISION (FORMERLY FIFTH DIVISION), CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, LABOR ARBI…
LOPEZ, J.:
The Factual Antecedents:
Culled from the records of the case, the facts are:
Petitioner is an agricultural corporation engaged in the planting, raising, and production of Cavendish bananas as grower for Del Monte Fresh Produce International Inc., while private respondents were its plantation and farm workers. In 2006 onwards, petitioner was confronted with financial reverses attributed to several factors such as, but not limited to, very low productivity, onslaught of banana diseases, adverse effects brought about by the imposition of the aerial spray ban, reduction of lease areas as a result of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, refusal of landowners to renew their lease contracts, remarkable increase in the production costs, and the extraordinary fluctuation in the foreign exchange. To address its financial predicament, petitioner resorted to cost-saving measures which included the (i) prioritization of capital expenditures to only those certified urgent and absolutely necessary; (ii) suspension of trainings and attendance to seminars; (iii) reduction of travel, fuel and representation expenses by fifty percent (50%); (iv) reduction by twenty percent (20%) of staff allocation for the 2007 budget of all departments; and (v) the suspension of the budget for donations.[4]
Notwithstanding the cost-saving measures instituted by petitioner, its financial condition continued to deteriorate. Consequently, the management of petitioner conducted a series of intensive meetings with all its departments until the hard decision was reached, to wit: (i) the closure of Farms 1 and 2 and Packing House 56 in petitioner’s Plantation Operations consisting of about two hundred five (205) hectares; (ii) the abandonment and non-renewal of lease contracts for identified unproductive areas in all plantation operations; and (iii) the retrenchment of workers in all plantation operations to prevent losses. Prior to the actual implementation of the retrenchment program, petitioner through the Human Resource and Administrative Group, conducted various meetings with the union officers of all the affected plantations, wherein the features of the retrenchment program and schedule dates for the implementation thereof were consulted, explained and discussed. With the approval of the union officials, petitioner effected payment of separation pay, as follows: (i) half month pay (1/2) per year of service for workers with length of service of 15 years or below and for those who will be rehired; (ii) 75% of the monthly salary per year of service for workers with length of service of more than 15 years but less than 20 years; (iii) one month pay per year of service for workers with length of service of over 20 years and for those who will no longer be rehired.[5]
Sometime in December 2007, petitioner filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) the corresponding notice of retrenchment. On January 4, 2008, the affected employees were furnished with notice of retrenchment which would take effect on February 4, 2008. Of the 589 personnel, 455 received their respective notices while 134 opposed the retrenchment program and refused receipt of notice, which constrained petitioner to send the notices by registered mail.[6]
In February 2008, private respondents filed against petitioner and its officers complaints for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, money claims and damages.[7]
On August 15, 2008, Labor Arbiter Henry F. Te (Labor Arbiter Te for brevity) dismissed the aforesaid complaints, declared the retrenchment valid but ordered petitioner to pay private respondents their separation pay amounting to P8,286,174.53.[8] Private respondents appealed to the NLRC.
On September 22, 2009, the NLRC rendered its Resolution reversing Labor Arbiter Te’s finding. The NLRC found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal and consequently ordered petitioner to reinstate private respondents with full backwages reckoned from the time they were dismissed until their actual reinstatement, plus 10% attorney’s fees of the total monetary award, subject to computation by the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin during the execution proceedings.[9]
Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied. This prompted petitioner to elevate its case to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief docketed as CA-G.R. Sp No. 03588. In such action, petitioner sought the reversal of the NLRC’s September 22, 2009 resolution, and the reinstatement of Labor Arbiter Te’s August 15, 2008 ruling.[10]
On July 30, 2009, Labor Arbiter Larida rendered a decision in another case against petitioner declaring the dismissal of Presco Fuentes and Brian Taub as illegal, thereby ordering their reinstatement with full backwages. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which subsequently affirmed the labor arbiter’s finding. Thus, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief docketed as CA-G.R. Sp No. 04646. Since both CA-G.R. Sp No. 03588 and CA-G.R. Sp No. 04646 substantially involved the same parties and issues, the Court of Appeals ordered those cases consolidated per its resolution of March 13, 2012.
On May 21, 2010, private respondents moved for the execution of the NLRC’s resolution of September 22, 2009 which ordered petitioner to reinstate private respondents and pay them full backwages plus 10% attorney’s fees of the total monetary award. Petitioner opposed this and sought the deferment of the execution proceedings pending appeal contending, among others, that the same would pre-empt or render moot the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Sp No. 03588 and CA-G.R. Sp No. 04646.
On June 29, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered its Consolidated Decision[11] (CA consolidated decision for brevity) in CA-G.R. Sp No. 03588 and CA-G.R. Sp No. 04646 penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, the decretal portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated Petitions are GRANTED.
“In CA-G.R. No. 03588: the National Labor Relations Commission, 8th Division’s (NLRC) Resolution promulgated on September 22, 2009 and February 12, 2010 are SET ASIDE. The Decision of Labor Arbiter Henry F. Te promulgated on August 15, 2008 is hereby REINSTATED.
“In CA-G.R. No. 04646: the National Labor Relations Commission, 8th Division’s (NLRC) Decision promulgated on July 29, 2011 and the Resolution promulgated on October 26, 2011 are SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the instant Complaint for lack of merit. Let this case be remanded to the arbitration branch of origin for the computation of private respondents’ separation pay to be based on each private respondent’s number of years of service.
SO ORDERED.”[12]
(Emphasis in the Original)
Per verification from the Judicial Records Division-Special Proceedings (JRD-SP), the aforesaid CA consolidated decision is now pending appeal before the Supreme Court.[13]
Meantime, the DOLE through its Regional Arbitration Branch of origin, Davao City, rendered its Report of Computation dated July 19, 2010 relative to the monetary award due the private respondents per directive of the NLRC, stating an award computation totaling P40,226,823.38.[14] Thereafter, the parties were directed to file comment on the said computation.
On October 7, 2010, petitioner filed its comment contending that the said computation has no sufficient factual and legal bases, considering that it was made on a straight basis without accounting for absences, tardiness and the like.[15] On October 4, 2010, private respondents filed a manifestation and motion reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the NLRC’s resolution of September 22, 2009.[16]
On November 4, 2010, Labor Arbiter Larida approved the aforesaid computation and set the case for pre-execution conference on November 23, 2010.[17] On November 9, 2010, the said labor arbiter issued another order directing the reinstatement of private respondents.[18]
On November 23, 2010, petitioner appealed to the NLRC relative to Labor Arbiter Larida’s approval of the computation of the monetary award.[19]
On December 10, 2010, Labor Arbiter Larida issued a Writ of Execution[20] for the enforcement of the reinstatement aspect of her Order dated November 9, 2010.[21]
On February 11, 2011, the NLRC issued a Resolution[22] dismissing for lack of merit petitioner’s appeal from the Order dated November 4, 2010 of Labor Arbiter Larida approving the computation of the award of backwages for private respondents in the total amount of P40,226,823.38, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration treated as an appeal is DISMISSED not only for being a frivolous appeal, but also for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”[23]
(Emphasis in the Original)
Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied per NLRC Decision[24] dated May 27, 2011, the fallo of which states:
“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. However, [petitioner] Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation is ordered to pay the complainants their separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service apart from their full backwages, including attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the aggregate monetary awards, subject to further computation by the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin during the execution proceedings using the guidelines stated above.
SO ORDERED.”
(Emphasis in the Original)
Aggrieved, petitioner came to Us via the instant petition questioning the propriety of the NLRC’s affirmance of the DOLE’s computation of monetary award for the private respondents, as well as the consequent issuance by Labor Arbiter Larida of the writ of execution pending appeal for the enforcement of the reinstatement aspect of her Order[25] dated November 9, 2010 (or in lieu thereof the payment of separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service as ordered by the NLRC per its Decision[26] dated May 27, 2011), alleging this lone:
Assignment of Error:
“THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED DURING THE EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS THAT [PETITIONER] SHOULD PAY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS (i) SEPARATION PAY, IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT, EQUIVALENT TO ONE MONTH PAY FOR EVERY YEAR OF SERVICE FROM THE DATES THEY WERE ENGAGED UNTIL THE PROMULGATION OF THE DECISION; (ii) BACKWAGES COMPUTED FROM FEBRUARY 5, 2008 UNTIL PROMULGATION OF THE DECISION BASED ON WAGE RATES PREVAILING AT THE TIME OF THEIR DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT ON FEBRUARY 4, 2008; and (iii) ATTORNEY’S FEES EQUIVALENT TO 10% OF THE AGGREGATE MONETARY AWARDS.”[27]
In essence, petitioner contends that the DOLE’s computation of the monetary award amounting to P40,226,823.38 which was approved by Labor Arbiter Larida and affirmed by the NLRC, is without sufficient factual and legal bases, not only because the said figure was arrived at as a result of a mere “desk assessment” without accounting for absences, tardiness and the like, but also because the same had been rendered ineffectual by the rendition of the CA consolidated decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 03588-MIN and CA-G.R. SP No. 04646 which dismissed the labor complaints of private respondents against petitioner and set aside the questioned resolutions of the NLRC sought to be enforced.[28]
On the other hand, private respondents countered in the main that since the CA consolidated decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 03588-MIN and CA-G.R. SP No. 04646 in favor of petitioner has not yet attained finality as the same is still pending appeal before the Supreme Court, and considering that no TRO or Injunction was issued to stay the execution of the September 22, 2009 NLRC resolution finding petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal and consequently ordering it to reinstate private respondents with full backwages which had long become final and executory pursuant to the NLRC New Rules of Procedure, the issuance of the writ of execution by Labor Arbiter Larida became her ministerial duty. Thus, there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to speak of on the part of the NLRC nor Labor Arbiter Larida.[29]
The ultimate issue for resolution in this case is whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (a) in issuing its Resolution[30] dated February 11, 2011 dismissing petitioner’s appeal from the Order dated November 4, 2010 of Labor Arbiter Larida, approving the computation of the monetary award; and (b) in affirming the consequent issuance by Labor Arbiter Larida of the writ of execution pending appeal for the enforcement of the reinstatement aspect of the Order[31] dated November 9, 2010.
Our Ruling:
In a petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that the NLRC patently and grossly abused its discretion and that such abuse amounted to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.[32] “Grave abuse of discretion” means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.[33]
Needless to say that in cases of this nature, the only function required of the Court of Appeals is to determine whether or not the findings of the NLRC are supported by substantial evidence.[34] “Substantial evidence” is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[35] If the answer is “Yes”, the petition will fail since there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to speak of. Otherwise, the petition will prosper and the assailed resolution will be nullified and set aside.
As to the dismissal by the NLRC of petitioner’s appeal:
In its challenged Resolution[36] dated February 11, 2011, the NLRC dismissed petitioner’s appeal from the Order dated November 4, 2010 of Labor Arbiter Larida, approving the DOLE’s computation of the monetary award (consisting of backwages and attorney’s fees) due the private respondents in the total amount of P40,226,823.38. The said computation was/ derived using the private respondents’ actual rates received at the time of their dismissal using this formula[37]:
*Backwages (Feb. 4,2008– July 9, 2010 = 29.19 mos.):
For daily paid employees:
a-1. Basic Pay (latest salary x 26 days x 29.19 mos.)
a-2. 13th Month Pay (latest salary x 26 days x 29.19 mos./12 mos.)
a-3. Vacation Leave (latest salary x 29.19 mos./12 mos. X 18 days)
a-4. Sick Leave (latest salary x 29.19 mos./12 mos. X 17 days)
a-5. Housing & Light Allowance (P450.00/mo. X 29.19 mos.)
For monthly paid employees:
a-1. Basic Pay (latest salary x 29.19 mos.)
a-2. 13th Month Pay (latest salary x 29.19 mos./12 mos.)
a-3. Vacation Leave (latest salary/30 days x 29.19 mos./12 mos. x 18 days)
a-4. Sick Leave (latest salary/30 days x 29.19 mos./12 mos. x 17 days)
a-5. Housing & Light Allowance (P450.00/mo. X 29.19 mos.)*Attorney’s Fees: 10% of the awarded backwages.
Petitioner contends that the above computation was arrived at without sufficient factual basis, considering that the same was the result of a mere “desk assessment” without accounting for the private respondents’ absences, tardiness and the like.
In dismissing the appeal, the NLRC concurred with the labor arbiter’s ratiocination as follows:
| x x x |
x x x
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x x x
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“‘[Petitioner] Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation had opposed the basis of Ms. Manreal in computing the backwages due the complainants, that is, by using the latter’s old rates or the rates complainants were actually receiving at the time of their dismissal as it is ‘on straight basis [without] accounting for absences, tardiness and the like, making said computation without factual, much less, legal basis.’
“‘Besides, [petitioner] had merely opposed the computation on a sweeping allegation that it has no factual and/or legal basis instead of presenting evidentiary documents that will justify modifications to the assailed computation. It is a fact that [petitioner] is in possession of the employment records of the complainants and thus it is incumbent upon them to submit the same for consideration. But [petitioner] had not presented an iota of evidence to support its allegations. This Office therefore has no basis to cause any modification to the computation made by Ms. Manreal.’”[38]
| x x x |
x x x
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x x x
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(Emphasis added)
Essentially, the dismissal of the appeal was predicated on the fact that the petitioner failed to present any evidence (such as the daily time records of the private respondents) to substantiate its allegation that the aforesaid computation was arrived at without sufficient basis. The DOLE came up with said computation based on private respondents’ prevailing wages at the time they were dismissed. The same was approved by the Labor Arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.
At this juncture, We take judicial notice that the records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing the alleged absences and tardiness of the private respondents which would justify deductions from their actual wages at that time. Necessarily, the absence of such evidence meant that the petitioner was not able to substantiate its claim that the DOLE’s computation was baseless.
Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that the factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial officers or agencies which have acquired expertise on matters within their respective fields are generally accorded great respect and even finality when supported by substantial evidence.[39] Thus, We give full faith and credence to the Labor Arbiter’s finding approving the DOLE’s computation of the monetary award, which was affirmed by the NLRC.
It appearing that the NLRC had adequate basis or justification in dismissing petitioner’s appeal, no abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction could be attributed to it. “Grave abuse of discretion” exists only when the NLRC has acted in an arbitrary or despotic manner amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. In this case, the NLRC acted within its jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal since it had adequate legal justification to do so. Besides, there is no despotism or arbitrariness to speak of since the dismissal of the appeal was in accord with the evidence on record (or the lack of it on the part of petitioner).
The question now arises as to the effect of the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the NLRC Resolution dated September 22, 2009 which held the petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal and consequently ordered the reinstatement of the private respondents per CA consolidated Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 03588-MIN and CA-G.R. SP No. 04646 penned by CA Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and promulgated on June 29, 2012.
In Islriz v. Capada[40] (2011), it was held that the prevailing rule in this jurisdiction in case an order of reinstatement is reversed on appeal by the higher court or tribunal is that, the employer is still obliged to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee (either actually or in the payroll only) upon order of reinstatement. If there is delay in his reinstatement pending appeal, the employer is required to pay the dismissed employee his accrued salaries until reversal of the order of reinstatement. The payment of accrued salaries may only be excused upon concurrence of these two requisites (denominated as the “Two-Fold Test”: (1) that there must be actual delay in the execution of the reinstatement order during the pendency of the appeal; and (2) that the delay must not be due to the employer’s unjustified act or omission. Otherwise, the employer is liable to pay the accrued salaries of the dismissed employee even if the order of reinstatement is later reversed by the higher court or tribunal.
In this case, records show that the petitioner failed to reinstate the private respondents (either actually or in the payroll only) until this date. Clearly, it is beyond cavil that there was delay in the execution of the NLRC’s reinstatement order dated September 22, 2009 during the pendency of petitioner’s appeal before the Court of Appeals, despite the “immediately executory” nature of a reinstatement order. That being said, the only issue left for determination is whether petitioner’s delay in the reinstatement of the private respondents was excusable or not.
In Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (2009),[41] the PAL as the employer was excused from the delay in the execution of the reinstatement order because it underwent a corporate rehabilitation which was the reason why it was not able to immediately comply with the order to reinstate the dismissed employees. PAL’s corporate rehabilitation was considered a “special circumstance” that excused or justified PAL from immediate compliance with the order of reinstatement.
No such special circumstance or any analogous situation exists in this case that would justify the petitioner in delaying the execution of private respondents’ reinstatement pending appeal. Here, the petitioner simply did nothing during the pendency of its appeal before the Court of Appeals. Hence, the conclusion is that, the delay in the execution of private respondents’ reinstatement was due to petitioner’s unjustified refusal to effect the same.
Thus, applying the pronouncement in Islriz v. Capada[42] to this case, We rule that the private respondents are entitled to accrued salaries reckoned from September 22, 2009 when the NLRC ordered their reinstatement until June 28, 2012 prior to the CA’s reversal of the NLRC ruling on June 29, 2012. This is so since the reckoning period for the computation of the accrued salaries is the date of the order of reinstatement until its reversal.
Further, Article 2208 of the New Civil Code enumerates the legal grounds which justify or warrant the grant of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, among which is when the court deems it “just and equitable” to grant the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, provided that in any case the amount of the award is reasonable.
We take judicial notice of the undeniable reality that litigations generally entail expenses. Thus, it would not be just and equitable to automatically deny private respondents the award of attorney’s fees just because they failed to furnish Us the required receipts for such expenses, knowing fully well that litigations, whether in judicial courts or in quasi-judicial bodies, are indeed costly especially so since they are represented by a private counsel.
In this case, there is no showing that such counsel handles their case pro bono as a charity case to foreclose the award of attorney’s fees in the form of litigation expenses. Thus, for reasons of equity, We conservatively fix the award of attorney’s fees at five percent (5%) of the accrued salaries for each of the private respondents. We deem such award reasonable to both parties. This is so since the ten percent (10%) attorney’s fees imposed by the NLRC in its challenged ruling may be considered too much to the petitioner considering the number of private respondents to whom such award is due.
As to the NLRC’s affirmance of the consequent issuance by Labor Arbiter Larida of the writ of execution pending appeal for the enforcement of the reinstatement aspect of the Order[43] dated November 9, 2010:
Neither had the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the consequent issuance of the writ of execution[44] by Labor Arbiter Larida for the enforcement of the reinstatement aspect of her Order[45] dated November 9, 2010. This is so since an order of reinstatement of a dismissed employee is immediately executory as already discussed above. Such being the case, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and issue the writ of execution as a matter of course upon motion, unless a TRO or Injunction has been issued to stay the execution of the order of reinstatement.[46] Consequently, the employer is required to comply therewith.
Records of this case disclose that no TRO or Injunction had been issued to stay the execution of the labor arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal. Neither has the CA consolidated decision attained finality since the private respondents had seasonably appealed the same before the Supreme Court. That being so, there is no grave abuse of discretion that could be ascribed to the NLRC in affirming the labor arbiter’s issuance of the subject writ of execution which is authorized by law in the first place absent any TRO or Injunction staying the execution of the order of reinstatement.
THE FORGOING CONSIDERED, the instant petition is DENIED and, thus, ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.
However, the amount of monetary award is necessarily MODIFIED in view of Our disquisition above. The monetary award includes:
(1) Accrued salaries reckoned from September 22, 2009 until June 28, 2012; and
(2) Attorney’s Fees at five percent (5%) of the accrued salaries for each of the private respondents.
The public respondent is directed to remand the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin and thru the appropriate DOLE agency to do the re-computation of the monetary award as herein adjudged.
SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Carmello, J., Ch., and Inting, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-29.
[2] Rollo, pp. 77-78.
[3] Rollo, pp. 97-101.
[4] Rollo, pp. 210-212.
[5] Rollo, pp. 212-213.
[6] Rollo, p. 213.
[7] Rollo, p. 213.
[8] Rollo, p. 238.
[9] Rollo, p. 214.
[10] Rollo, pp. 235-236.
[11] Rollo, pp. 235-248.
[12] Rollo, p. 247.
[13] Rollo, p. 270, dorsal portion.
[14] Rollo, pp. 45-47.
[15] Rollo, pp. 55-56.
[16] Rollo, 48-51.
[17] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
[18] Rollo, pp. 62-64.
[19] Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[20] Rollo, pp. 72-75.
[21] Rollo, pp. 62-64.
[22] Rollo, pp. 77-79.
[23] Rollo, p. 78.
[24] Rollo, pp. 97-100.
[25] Rollo, pp. 62-64.
[26] Rollo, pp. 97-100.
[27] Rollon, p. 13.
[28] Rollo, pp. 227-228.
[29] Rollo, pp. 262.266.
[30] Rollo, pp. 77-78.
[31] Rollo, pp. 62-64.
[32] Manubay vs. DAR Secretary, G.R. No. 140717, April 16, 2009.
[33] Julie’s Franchise Corp. v. Judge Ruiz, G.R. No. 180988, August 28, 2009.
[34] Reyes vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 140164, September 6, 2002.
[35] Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court; Ingusan vs. C.A., G.R. No. 111388, August 31, 2005.
[36] Rollo, pp. 77-78.
[37] Rollo, p. 47.
[38] Rollo, p. 78.
[39] Cootauco vs. MMS Phil. Mrtitime Services, Inc. G.R. No. 184722, March 15, 2010.
[40] G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011.
[41] G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009.
[42] Supra.
[43] Rollo, pp. 62-64.
[44] Rollo, pp. 72-75.
[45] Rollo, pp. 62-64.
[46] ISLRIZ Trading v. Capada, G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011.