STA. CECILIA SAWMILLS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND TAGKAWAYAN LABOR UNION, RESPONDENTS.

In a complaint dated August 28, 1957 the Chief Prosecutor of the
Court of Industrial Relations charged the petitioner herein, the Sta.
Cecilia Sawmills, Inc., and the National Labor Union, with unfair labor
practice, for having committed the following acts: (1) trying to
persuade the members of the respondent Tagkawayan Labor Union to join
the National Labor Union; (2) threatening them with discharge if they
become or remain members of the Tagkawayan Labor Union; (3) discharging
many members for having affiliated with the Tagkawayan Labor Union; (4)
refusing to bargain with respondent labor union on wages,
transportation facilities, hours of work, etc., etc.

On February 25, 1958 petitioner Sta. Cecilia Sawmills, Inc. answered
the complaint (1) denying the charge that it had tried to persuade the
respondent laborers to join the National Labor Union, and alleging that
on March, 1, 1954 it entered into a bargaining agreement with the
National Labor Union and thereupon informed the laborers of its said
agreement and the closed-shop provision thereof; (2) that the laborers
said to have been dismissed or separated were either separated because
of seasonal lay-off, temporary lay-off due to business reverses,
operation of closed-shop agreement, or because they were merely
independent contractors, etc.

The Court of Industrial Relations after trial found that the
respondent union early in March, 1954 had been making demands of
different kinds, such as better working conditions, abolition of vales
or chips, and refund of percentage deductions, free transportation
facilities from poblacion to logging area, non-compulsion in purchases
of tickets for popularity contests, etc. The petitioner company
answered these demands on March 19 alleging that it had entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with the National Labor Union. So the
court held that the company entered into an agreement with the National
Labor Union to silence the demands of respondent union members. It also
held that the existence of the contract did not authorize the company
to dismiss the old employees, but should refer only to future
employment.

It also held that the strike that was made by respondent labor union
was valid because it was preceded by various demands, like improvement
of working conditions, vacation leaves, grievance committee and
previous notice. The court dismissed the claim that complainants left
their jobs; and ordered the reinstatement of 113 employees with back
wages from their dismissal to their re-instatement, etc.

The decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is dated April 18, 1961, and is affirmed by the court en banc
on May 24, 1961. On June 29, 1961 the petitioner company filed a motion
for new trial, alleging that after the company had presented its
evidence and in 1959 the company ceased operating all its three
sawmills, thereby laying off all its employees and laborers in said
sawmills, and In 1960 it operated only one sawmill. Reason given for
closing was the drop in prices; that it owes P76,832.46 as accrued
wages. This motion for new trial was denied.

The company appeals from the judgment and from the order denying the motion for new trial, raising same questions on the appeal.

It is first contended that there was no investigation conducted by
the prosecutor before the charges were filed against petitioner. The
record shows that on March 19, 1954 the Tagkawayan Labor Union, thru
its officers, filed the complaint with the Court of Industrial
Relations, charging petitioner with preventing them from union
activities, requiring the members to join the National Labor Union,
discrimination against its members, etc. (Exh. A, Petition). A motion
to dismiss was filed against the petition, on the ground that the
persons who committed the acts were not officers of the company (Exh. B, Id.). The motion was denied (Exh. C, Id.).
On March 4, the company answered denying the charges (Exh. D). The
charges were set for hearing, and at said hearing another motion to
dismiss was again filed on September 14, 1954. Action on the case was
first suspended but later, on March 15, 1957, the court ordered the
case referred to the Prosecution Division for investigation with the
instruction that since the evidence already adduced at previous hearing
establish a prima facie case to warrant the filing of a
complaint, the chief prosecutor is directed to file the complaint with
said evidence (Exh. I, March 23, 1957). Thereupon the Prosecutor filed
the complaint. We held that the previous hearing conducted by the court
itself was a sufficient investigation to support the information.

It is next contended that the court below erred in dismissing the
case against the National Labor Union; that such dismissal amounted to
admitting the validity of the agreement with the National Labor Union.
The argument is without merit. Admitting that the agreement with the
National Labor Union for a closed-shop is valid, the said closed-shop
agreement cannot affect the laborers already employed, like the members
of the Tagkawayan Labor Union. This is the ruling laid down in a series
of decisions of this Court, starting with the case of Local 7, Press
& Printing Free Workers (FFW), et al. vs. Hon. Judge Emiliano Tabigne, etc., et al., 110 Phil., 276.

In the case of Freeman Shirt Manufacturing Co., Inc. et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G. R. No. L-16561, Jan. 28, 1961, We held:

“The closed-shop agreement authorized under Sec. 4
subsec. a (4) of the Industrial Peace Act above quoted should however,
apply only to persons to be hired or to employees who are not yet
members of any labor organization. It is inapplicable to those already
in the service who are members of another union. To hold otherwise,
i.e., that the employees in a company who are members of a minority
union may be compelled to disaffiliate from their union and join the
majority or contracting union, would render nugatory the right of all
employees to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
organization of their own choosing, a right guaranteed by the
Industrial Peace Act (Sec. 3, Rep. Act No. 875) as well as by the
Constitution (Art. III, sec. 1[6].”

The next error imputed to the court a quo is its finding that the
company committed an unfair labor practice because the National Labor
Union was not certified by the Court of Industrial Relations. The
import of the decision is that since the National Labor Union was not
chosen by all the employees of the company in a certification election,
its agreement was not binding on the members of the Tagkawayan Labor
Union. We find no error in this ruling. The claim that the National
Labor Union was designated by the majority of the members is without
proof or foundation, because the members of the Tagkawayan Labor Union
were not in any manner consulted before the closed-shop agreement was
entered into.

Still insisting on the validity of the closed-shop agreement with
the National Labor Union the petitioner argues that the provision of
the agreement to the effect that non-members of the National Labor
Union are given two months from the signing of the contract to become
members is valid. The provision compels all laborers, especially the
members of the Tagkawayan Labor Union, to join the National Labor
Union. Precisely such provision destroys the freedom of the laborers to
choose the union that will represent them and this constitutes unfair
labor practice.

It is also contended that the ruling of the court finding the strike
valid, is erroneous. We find that the strike is legal, even if resorted
to only because the members of the Tagkawayan Labor Union were being
forced to join the rival Union (National Labor Union). Furthermore, the
strike was preceded by various demands which were not granted.

We next come to the supposed error in not granting a new trial.
While We agree with the court below that the facts alleged in the said
motion for new trial could not affect the findings of the court and its
ruling on the existence of an unfair labor practice and the further
finding that the strike was valid, the facts presented therein could
very well justify a modification of the decision insofar as said
decision orders the reinstatement without limitation as to time. In
the motion for new trial, which is verified it is stated that the
sawmills of petitioner stopped its operation from July, 1954 and did
not re-open until January, 1957. We can not agree to the insinuation of
the court that the sawmill business of petitioner was profitable. The
closing of the mills shows that the petitioner had been losing as it is
impossible to believe that the business would close for two years if it
had not suffered loses. With the fact of the closing of the sawmills in
mind, the court should have modified its decision as to the period of
time during which the respondent members of the union should be allowed
to receive back wages. The court could not in justice, for example,
order payment of wages up to the date of the decision en banc
on May 24, 1961. If the decision were to be enforced the respondents
would be receiving back wages from March, 1954 until May, 1961, inspite
of the closing of the mills, which we believe to be unjust.

On the subject of how long the order for back wages should be
received, we believe that the court should fix a reasonable period,
especially as the sawmills had been closed in the same year, July,
1954. When laborers have been dismissed without any possibility of
being re-employed, as in the case at bar, they should have taken steps
to find other work for themselves; to allow them to receive back wages
during the whole time the case was pending is unjust and improper. In
all probability they must have located some other work to tide them
over, especially in this case since the sawmills closed in July, 1954,
or a few months after their separation, and recovery should be limited
to said period of time.

A ruling that would permit a dismissed laborer to earn back wages
for all time, or for a very long period of time, is not only unjust to
the employer but the same would foster indolence on the part of the
laborers. The laborer is not supposed to be relying on a court judgment
for his support, but should do everything a reasonable man would do; he
should find employment as soon as employment has been lost, especially
when the employment has to depend on a litigation. He should try to
minimize the loss that may be caused to the employer by looking for
other work in which he can be employed.

In consonance with this view We hold that a period of three months
should be enough time for a laborer to locate another work different
from that from which he was separated. Consequent with this opinion,
the back wages that should be awarded respondents laborers should be
limited to three months, and not for an indefinite period as the
decision seems to imply.

One more point need be taken up and that is in connection with the
ruling of the respondent court that the 288 strikers be admitted back
to work and given back wages. From the statement of counsel as well as
from the decision of the court, it does not appear that the supposed
strikers were actually working at the time of the strike and were
dismissed from their work. In a motion for reconsideration of the
decision it is claimed that of the 288 alleged strikers only 10 were
actually working at the time of the strike. These ten must have been
included among the 113 dismissed employees. It is difficult to
understand how the court has gone to the extent of ordering the
re-instatement of the 288 strikers when they were not actually employed
at the time of the strike. Our understanding is that they were mere
contract workers; independent workers, not actually employed at the
time of the strike, who sympathized with the dismissed laborers and
therefore joined the strike. We are inclined to believe that their
joining the strike was to show their sympathy for the fate of the
dismissed employees. The court itself did not find that they were
actually dismissed. Those that were actually dismissed must be included
in the 113 who had already been declared entitled to receive pay for a
period of three months from the time of their dismissal. As they were
merely strikers without having been actually discharged from employment
there is no reason why they should be entitled to be readmitted to work
from which they had not been dismissed. The portion of the decision
ordering that the 288 strikers be reinstated is, therefore, set aside.

Wherefore the judgment ordering reinstatement with back wages is
affirmed but it is modified as to the length of time for their payment
to only three months back wages.

So ordered.

Bengzon C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepción, Reyes, J. B.
L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.