THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. MARIO M. BUNDALIAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

On June 11, 1964,
Hon. Gaudencio E. Antonino,
then a Member of the Philippine Senate, filed a sworn complaint with the Office
of the City Fiscal of Manila charging herein defend­ant-appellee
with the crime of libel.  After the
requisite preliminary investigation was conducted, an
Information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by then
Assistant Fiscal, now Court of
Appeals Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, charging herein
defendant-appellee with libel reading as follows:

“‘That on or about the 5th day of June, 1964, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with the malicious purpose of impeaching
and besmirching the virtue, character and reputation of Senator Gaudencio E. Antonino, both as
man and as public official, and with the evident intent of causing him dishonor
and exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously write, publish and/or
distribute or cause to be written, published and/or distributed a memorandum
containing statements, in­nuendos and imputations which are highly libelous and
defamatory as they maliciously and publicly impute to Senator Gaudencio E. Antonino, some vice
or defect, the pertinent portion of said memorandum containing the following:

‘x x x questions were raised on the floor
by his colleagues as to the objectivity of his so-called answer, and so asinine
as to sustain rather than disprove the statements contained in my aforesaid
Memorandum, yet I am constrained to debunk the Senator’s disparaging statements
about me lest they might unjustly arouse in the public mind a misconception of
my integrity and true worth especially of those who might be called upon to
pass swift judgment, or form a superior conclusion thereupon, as well as those
who may be tempted by a silence on my part to accept as sober and hysterical
tantrums so gibberishly pronounced.’

xxx                                 xxx                               xxx

‘I can find no justification, and no reason except collapse of
sanity, for the demonstrated bitterness of Senator Antonino
against me, x x x.’

‘As to “pigments of egotistical delusion of a man with ill
motives and questionable intention”, not only did the Senator fail or
forget, to establish any part of his smoke-screening invention but that it
would appear from the journals of the Senate that the description Sen. Antonino would apply to me fits him instead.

‘For is it not egotism to acknowledge on the floor a fancied
appointment to the National Economic Council especially just after a proposal
to that effect was overtly withdrawn by the Majority Floor Leader?  Is it not delusion to consider himself
qualified as minority representative to the NEC when he does not belong to the
minority party as pointed out by Sen. Padilla? 
Is it not ill motive for the Senator to evade availing of the services
of an advisor on Public Works, whose competence and technological honesty has
been proven time and again during a performance of some fourteen years of
public works consultation and has been used by him on at least two occasions to
prepare speeches for him on public works matters, as the records will show?  Is it not questionable intention for a
Chairman of an important Committee, suffering from a congenital defect, to
harness exclusively the untested services of crude, inexperienced technicians
of doubtful qualification to prepare a Committee Report of unusual magnitude
and delicate impact in pre­ference to the seasoned perception, objectivity, and
experience of the Advisor on Public Works who, it must be admitted, had simply
refused, on occasions, to lend fawning support to out­landish and demagogic postures?’

x x
x                   x
x x                             x x x

‘x x x Besides, I do not accept that I
can be exploited like timber in part reservations.’  that by said Memorandum the said accused
meant and wanted to convey, as in fact he did mean to convey, false, malicious
and damaging insinuations against said Senator Gaudencio
E. Antonino, which imputations and insinuations, as
the said accused well knew were absolutely false and untrue and without any
foundation in fact whatsoever, highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the
good name, character and reputa­tion of said Gaudencio
E. Antonino and that the said memorandum was falsely
prepared, written, published and/or distributed for no other purpose than to
impeach and besmirch the good name, character and reputation of the said Senator
Gau­dencio E. Antonino in
order to expose him, as in fact he was so exposed to dishonor, discredit,
public hatred, contempt and ridicule.’ ” (pp.
1-2, Record.)

Senator Gaudencio E. Antonino made no reservation to file an independent civil
action nor did he file a separate civil action.

Sometime in November 1967, Senator Antonino
died.  He died before he testified in the
libel case in question.

On September 2, 1968,
Bundalian filed a motion to quash alleging two (2)
grounds, namely:  (a) “The charge of
libel does not survive the offended party who is now deceased; and (b) the
facts alleged in the information do not constitute a crime of libel, or if they
do, it is justified.”

In an order dated October
26, 1968, the trial court granted the motion to quash and dismissed
the case on the first ground.  Hence, this appeal by the People.  The only issue raised in this appeal is the
legal question of whether or not the death of the offended party in a criminal
case for libel or defamation extinguishes the criminal liability of the
accused.

We answer this question in the negative and accordingly REVERSE
the ruling of the court a quo.

The causes for extinguishment of criminal liability are enume­rated
in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. 
The death of the offended party is not one of them.  Neither is such an event listed among the
grounds of a motion to quash a criminal complaint or information as provided in
Section 2, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court. 
No Philippine decision was cited to support the view espoused by the
defendant-appellee. 
It is not even likely that there will be such a jurisprudence, inasmuch
as to so hold that the death of the offended party in a libel case will abate
the criminal action against the of­fender would be contrary to the existing
statutory dispositions, if not repugnant to the system of criminal procedure
applied in this jurisdic­tion.

The reasons given by the trial judge in dismissing the inform­ation
for libel on account of the death of the offended party are that the affront suffered
by Senator Antonino was personal to him; that Senator
Antonino was not able to testify before he died; and
that a supposed majority of American jurisprudence supports the view that a
case for slander or libel does not survive the death of either the wrongdoer or
the person injured.  (citing
1 Am. Jur., Sec. 122, p. 87.)

Elaborating on the grounds relied upon by the trial court, defendant-appellee argues
in his brief that inasmuch as Senator Antonino died
before he was able to testify, the defendant-appellee
was denied the right to be confronted at the trial by, and to cross-examine the
witnesses against him.  (Sec. 1(f), Rule 115, Rules of Court.) He further contends that
the right of an offended party to file a complaint does not survive after his death
and may not be exercised by his heirs or legal representatives.  (citing Guevarra vs. del Rosario, 77 Phil. 615.)

We find the arguments adduced by both the court a quo
and defendant-appellee to be devoid of merit.  It is true that Senator Antonino
who was the person supposedly libeled died during the pendency
of the libel case filed against the defendant-appellee.  This fact, however, does not mean that the
death of the victim extinguished the criminal liability for the offense
committed against him.  If these were so,
no one may be prosecuted for homicide or murder, or convicted of any crime
wherein the offended party had died at any time before final judgment in the
case had been rendered.  It is a truism
that a criminal offense is prosecuted not because of the injury or harm
inflicted on the offended party, but because a crime is supposed to be an
outrage to the sovereignty of the State. 
(City of Manila
vs. Rizal, 27 Phil. 50.)

It is correct to state that, as a general rule, if the offended
party shall die before he was able to file a complaint for the crime
committed against him, his heirs or legal representatives do not have the right
to file the complaint for the said crime, as was held in the cited case of Guevarra vs. del Rosario.  However, the complaint in this case was not
filed by the heirs or legal representatives of Senator Antonino.  As stated earlier, it was Senator Antonino himself who filed the complaint and his death
occurred after such filing.  No rule or
jurisprudence prescribes that the death of the offended party under such a
circumstance would invalidate the complaint previously filed by the offended
party himself.

The circumstance that the crime charged against defendant-appellee is libel does not create sufficient legal basis to
recognize an exception from the general principles as to the effect of the
death of the offended party on the criminal liability of the offender.  No such exception is prescribed in the
applicable provisions, nor justified by logic or reason.  Even if Senator Antonino
died before he filed the complaint in question, the criminal action is not
abated, inasmuch as the libel charged in the information is not one which
cannot be “brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by
the offended party”, there being no imputation of an offense which cannot
be prosecuted de oficio.  (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court.)

We find no decisive significance in the circumstance that Senator
Antonino died before he was able to testify.  The right of confrontation and cross-examination
as guaranteed by Sec. 1(f), Rule 115, of the Rules of Court and Sec. 19,
Article IV, of the Constitution, does not mean that the offended party should
testify in the case.  Indeed, there is no
requirement that the offended party in a criminal case must take the witness
stand even if he were not dead.  Clearly,
neither may such obligation be imposed where the offended party is already
dead.  The right of confrontation and
cross-examination is guaranteed to an accused with respect to any witness who
may testify against him, but not in respect of those who are not made to
testify.  As regards the latter, no harm
or prejudice is caused the accused against which he needed to be protected.

The reliance on a passage lifted from American Jurisprudence is
misdirected.  The view expressed therein,
as can be readily seen from the context thereof, is based on the statutes
involved in the cases cited in support thereof, which statutes are not even
uniform as was expressly indicated therein. 
As earlier observed, there is no law, rule or jurisprudence in this
jurisdiction that prescribes or holds that the death of the offended party in a
pending case for libel or defamation shall extinguish the criminal liability of
the offender.  On the contrary, the existing
provisions suggest by clear implication that such an event is no cause to
discontinue a pending criminal prosecution for libel or defamation.

WHEREFORE, the order granting the motion to quash is
hereby SET ASIDE.  The trial court is
ordered to try the case on the merits and to render the corresponding judgment
thereon.  Costs against
the defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Relova, and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman), in the result.