LINO G. DAVID, SERAFIN DAVID, ORLANDO DAVID, VICTOR PAS­CUAL, JAIME REYES, TROADIO ESPINOSA, JOSE JUNTADO, CAS­TOR SARMIENTO, ANTONIO LICU, GREGORIO DIMATALO, EVARISTO INES, MAR…

In this original action for certiorari and prohibition, we hold
that the filing of a complaint for alleged violation of the Revised Election
Code with the Court of First Instance which is vested with the exclusive
jurisdiction to conduct the pre­liminary investigation thereof properly
interrupts the period of prescription.

Petitioner Lino David and private
respondent Jose Geronimo were official candidates of their respective political parties for mayor of the Municipality
of Tarlac,
Province of Tarlac, in the local
elections of November 12, 1963, which resulted in the pro­clamation of said petitioner as the victor.

Aside from the election protest filed in early January, 1964
against petitioner Lino David, respondent filed on
January 25, 1964 with respondent Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
a criminal complaint against said petitioner and his co-petitioners for alleged
violation of the provisions of Section
49 of the Revised Election Code on unlawful expenditures, penalized by Sections
183 and 185 thereof and allegedly committed in the Municipality of Tarlac dur­ing the campaign before the said elections of November 12, 1963.

Respondent Court scheduled the preliminary investigation of the
complaint on February 5, 1964,
on which date it received evidence for the complainant-respondent, after
denying an urgent motion for postponement filed by petitioners on the preceding
day.

At the resumption of the preliminary investigation scheduled on February 12, 1964, petitioners orally
moved for dismissal of the complaint, later formalized by them pursuant to the
Court’s order in their written motion for dismissal of March 7, 1964. 
Petitioners contended that respondent was not an “offended
party”, nor was he legally authorized under Rule 110, section 2 of the
Rules of Court to file the complaint. 
Petitioners did not set their motion for hearing and respondent filed
his opposition thereto a year later on March
19, 1965.  Respondent Court,
in its Order of February 6, 1966 denied the motion to dismiss, ruling in favor
of the personal­ity of
respondent as offended party to file the complaint and point­ing out that the
complaint was “still in the process of preliminary investigation where the
Court is precisely called upon to determine whether or not there exists
reasonable ground to believe that the respondents (petitioners at bar) have
committed the offense charged and
whether or not the case should be referred to the Fiscal for the filing of the
corresponding information.” It accordingly scheduled the continuation of
the preliminary investigation for Feb­ruary 26, and March 5, 1966.

On February 26, 1966,
petitioners again orally moved for dismissal of the complaint, asserting the
additional ground of prescription of the offense charged.  Petitioners contended that the State had lost
the right to prosecute them for alleged violation of Section 49 of the Revised
Election Code, due to the superven­tion of
prescription of the offense as the two-year prescriptive period under Section
188 of the Revised Election Code had lapsed without any valid information
against them having been filed by the Fiscal in the name of the People, and
that the preliminary investigation proceedings to determine the existence of a
prima facie case against them had therefore become moot and futile, with the
consequent loss of jurisdiction of respondent court over the same.  Respondent Court ordered the parties to
present in written form their arguments and continued with the reception of
respondent’s evidence.

After receipt of petitioners’ second motion to dismiss of
February 28, 1966 and respondent’s reply to March 6, 1966, it issued its Order
of March 23, 1966 denying petitioners’ prayer to reconsider its first Order of
February 6, 1966 and rejecting petitioners’ claim of prescription, as follows:

“Hence, the proceedings against the accused respon­dents were
initiated and have commenced from January
25, 1964 when the criminal complaint was filed with this
Court.   From said date, the Court acquired jurisdiction
of the case and the running of the prescriptive period was then ipso facto
interrupted.  Such jurisdiction of the
case continues to be lodged with this Court because, under Section 187 of the
Revised Election Code, its jurisdiction over elec­tion cases is exclusive and a
continuing one from the stage of preliminary investigation to the trial of the
merits.  Hence, it follows as a corollary
that the prescriptive period did not also commence to run again.”

xx x x x

“In the case at bar, the complainant initiated the proceedings
by filing a formal criminal complaint with this Court, which is the proper
court to conduct the preliminary investigation, to issue warrants of arrest,
and to try and decide the case, and not merely by lodging a denuncia
in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal.”

Respondent Court also explained in its said order the delays
entailed in the preliminary investigation proceedings thus: “that the
preliminary investigation was partially commenced on February 5, 1964; and that
the continuation thereof had to take some­time due to the transfer of the
former Presiding Judge of this Court, Hon. Simeon Gopengco,
the long period of time during which there was no permanent Presiding Judge,
and the clogged docket of this Court resulting from the lack of a regular
Presiding Judge.”

Petitioners, after their motion for reconsideration of March 31, 1966 was turned down by
respondent Court in its order of April
12, 1966, then filed on July 28, 1966 their present petition
of certiorari and prohibition praying for judgment to annul the questioned
orders and to declare instead that the offense imputed to them has prescribed.

The petition must fail. 
The offense imputed to petitioners has not prescribed.  By virtue of the filing on January 25, 1964 by respondent of the
criminal complaint against petitioners, respondent Court acquired jurisdiction
of the case and the two-year pres­criptive period provided by Section 188 of
the Revised Election Code was interrupted and remains tolled pending
termination of the pro­ceedings
pursuant to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

“ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquit­ted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not im­putable
to him. x x x “

Contrary to the fallacious contention of petitioners that Arti­cle
91 of the Revised Penal Code should not be applicable to election offenses, on
the ground that Section 188 of the Election Code does not contain any express
provision for interruption of the prescriptive per­iod, said Article 91 of the
Penal Code on interruption of the prescrip­tive period precisely supplements
the Election Code, as the latter Code does not specially provide the contrary
and Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that “(T)his
Code shall be supplementary to (special) laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.” Assuming said Article 91 to be
inapplicable, then Section 2 of Act 3326 (1926) establishing periods of prescription for violations of special
laws, which provides that “(T)he prescrip­tion
shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin
to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy” would govern and likewise ordain the tolling of the prescriptive
period in question.

The aversion of the Election Code against the period of
prescription just running out is shown from the special provision in Section
188 thereof that “if the discovery of such (election) offenses be made in
election contest proceedings, the period of such prescription shall commence on
the date on which the judgment in such proceedings becomes final.” As the
late Justice Laurel observed, this special provision prevents a guilty person
from evading a well-deserved punishment, even if the trial of the election
contest, during which the commission of the offense is incidentally disco­vered,
is protracted for several years. 
Similarly, under the supplementary provisions of Article 91 of the Penal
Code, the in­terruption of the two-year prescriptive period for the offense
charged from the date of filing of
the complaint with respondent Court, preserves the right of the State to
prosecute and punish the guilty, even if the preliminary investigation thereof
has been pro­tracted for many years, as in the case at bar.

The main thrust of the petition is that the jurisdiction acquired
by respondent Court through the filing of the complaint by the pri­vate
respondent as offended party was only “legally effective for Purposes of
preliminary investigation but not for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction to
try the criminal action”, i.e., that it was a mere denuncia
of a private party and that
the only complaint or information that could properly interrupt the prescriptive
period is that filed by the Fiscal with the proper Court for and in behalf  and in the name of the People.  Petitioners contend that as no such information was
filed by the Fiscal after the lapse of the two-year prescriptive period, the
preliminary investigation proceedings should have been dismissed by respondent
Court by virtue of the supervening prescription of the offense charged, citing
the 1963 case of People vs. Coquia.^[1]

The Coquia case supporting this
line of reasoning has been expressly overruled by the Court in the second People
vs. Olarte case^[2]
decided in 1967 after submittal of the case at bar by the parties.  The Court speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, there specifically noted that “Analysis of the precedents on the
issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines of decisions following
differing criteria in determining whether prescription of crimes has been
interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with
the justice of the peace (or munici­pal judge) does interrupt the course of the
prescriptive term:  People vs. Olarte,
L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba,
L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68
Phil. 588, 590.  Another series of
decisions declares that to produce interruption the complaint or information
must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case
on its merits:  People vs. Del Rosario,
L-15140, December 29, 1960;
People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.” (19
SCRA, pp. 499-500)

The Court then restated the true and prevailing doctrine, which
it hereby reaffirms as follows:  “In
view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for
Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information can not try the case on its merits.  Several reasons buttress this conclusion:
first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the
period of prescription ‘shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information’
without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for
preliminary exami­nation or investigation merely, or for action on the
merits.  Second, even if the Court where the complaint or information
is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already
present the initial step of the proceedings against the offender.  Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured
party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control.  All that the
victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file
the requisite complaint.

“And it is no argument that Article 91 also express­es that the
interrupted prescription ‘shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted’, thereby indicating that the court in which the
complaint or information is filed must have power to acquit or convict the
accused.  Precisely, the trial on the
merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise.  But it is in the court con­ducting a preliminary
investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or
acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie
case has
been shown.

“Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the doctrine of the
cases of People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; and People vs. Coquia,
L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963.”^[3]

Aside from the three reasons above given for the prevailing Olarte doctrine, there is a fourth and
Overriding reason that calls for the dismissal of the present case, to wit,
that it involves an election offense and Section 187 of the Revised Election Code vests
Courts of First Instance, such as respondent Court, with “exclusive
original jurisdiction to make preliminary investigations, issue war­rants of
arrest and try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of
this Code.“  The complaint was
therefore filed with respondent Court as the proper Court with exclusive
jurisdic­tion to try the case on its merits, and under either line of precedents discussed in the Olarte case, supra,
the prescriptive period was unquestionably tolled.

The complaint for an election offense could be filed only with
respondent Court, which was thereby called upon exclusive­ly to conduct the
preliminary investigation as an essential part of the criminal process.^[4]
Respondent Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction over the case was thus
vested and the run­ning of the
prescriptive period ipso facto interrupted.  The case does not present the complication of
the initial complaint for an ordinary offense being filed with the municipal
court or the fiscal’s office which have no
jurisdiction to try the case on its merits, giving rise to the two lines of
precedents discussed in the Olarte case, supra,
with the Court finally sustaining one line and setting the doctrine that the
filing of the complaint in the municipal court even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination
or investigation interrupts the
period of prescription, although such inferior court could not try the case on
its merits, over the discarded line that to produce interruption, the complaint
should be filed in the proper court with jurisdiction to try the case on its
merits.

The ensuing trial by respondent Court, should it determine from
the evidence adduced by the parties at the preliminary investigation that there
exists reasonable ground to believe that petitioners have committed the election offense
charged, is but a continuation of the criminal process in the exercise of its
exclusive jurisdiction.  Should it
determine otherwise, however, the proceedings would then terminate without
conviction or acquittal as respondent court would then dismiss the complaint,
and the prescriptive period would thereupon commence to run again, as provided
in Article 91 of the Penal Code.

ACCORDINGLY, the
petition and the writ prayed for therein are denied, with costs jointly and
severally against petitioners.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, and
Villamor, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro and Barredo, JJ., no part.

^[1]
Prom. June
29, 1963 ( 8 SCRA 349).

^[2]
Prom. February 28, 1967 (19 SCRA
494).

^[3]
Emphasis supplied. To the writer’s mind, these reasons logically call with
equal force, for the express overruling also of the doctrine in People vs. Tayco, 73
Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or denuncia
by the offended party with the City Fiscal’s Office
which is required by law to conduct the preliminary investi­gation does not
interrupt the period of prescription. In chartered cities, criminal prosecution
is generally initiated by the filing of the complaint or denuncia
with the city fiscal for preliminary
investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals, besides being empowered like
municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of municipal
judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of
First Instance. The Court, however, makes no pronouncement on the matter, as it is not involved in the
issues of the case at bar.

^[4]
The procedure for the conduct of such preliminary investigation by the Judge of
First Instance is found in Rule 112, sec. 13, providing that “should he
find reason­able ground to believe that the defendant has committed the offense charged, he shall issue a
warrant for (defendant’s) arrest, and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal
for the filing of the corresponding informa­tion.”