FELICISIMO RONQUILLO, DECEASED, SUBSTITUTED BY ANTONIA DE GUZMAN VDA. DE RONQUILLO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. FRANCISCO MARASIGAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On December 1, 1941, Felicisimo Ronquillo and Francisco Marasigan,
verbally entered into a contract of lease for Ten (10) years, over a
parcel of nipa-land, more particularly described under paragraph 3 of
the complaint. Pursuant to said contract, the nipa-land was delivered
and Ronquillo took possession thereof until September 1, 1942, when
Marasigan, in conspiracy with the laborers and men under the employ of
Ronquillo, invaded and took over possession of the land. As a result of
the dispossession, Ronquillo filed with the CFI of Bulacan, Civil Case
No. 80, against Marasigan and on May 19, 1943, he included as
defendants 14 others, praying that judigment be rendered, ordering the
return of the nipa-land to him, so that he may continue his lease right
over it for 9 years and 3 months more and that defendants be ordered,
jointly and severally, to pay him P24,000.00 as yearly income from
September 1, 1942 until the land has actually been delivered. The lower
court, on September 1, 1947, rendered judgment, to wit–

“That the defendant deliver immediately the
possession of the land described in the amended complaint to the
plaintiff Ronquillo; that the defendant Marasigan execute a contract of
lease covering the said land for a period of 10 years in favor of the
plaintiff Ronquillo, as of December 1, 1941, by excluding therefrom the
five years period from September 1, 1942 to August 31, 1947, inclusive,
with a consideration of P14,000.00 minus the amounts of P1,200.00,
P1,277.70 and P600.00, the amount of P1,277.70 being additional
advances received by the defendant Marasigan and the last amount of
P600.00 being a reserve fund for the payment of the land taxes; and
that the defendant Marasigan will assume his former position as
assistant manager with a compensation of P60.00 monthly.”

Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals, on April 10, 1950, rendered judgment in the following manner–

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
modified in the sense that defendant Marasigan shall not be compelled
to assume iiis former position as assistant manager in the business of
the plaintiff unless he be willing to serve as such, with compensation
at the rate of P60.00 per month. The decision is affirmed in all other
respects, with the understanding, however, that defendant Marasigan
shall pay to the plaintiff the damages that the latter may prove to
have suffered if the provision regarding the execution of a new
contract of lease of said land could not be carried out for any legal
impediment. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.”

Upon the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 80, as modified
by the Court of Appeals, the case was remanded to the lower court for
the execution of the judgment. Ronquillo deposited the amount adjudged
for him to pay in the amount of P10,922.31, as full payment of the
rentals of the land for 10 years. A writ of execution was ordered
served on Marasigan by the Provincial Sheriff on September 13, 1950. On
September 19, 1950, Marasigan thru counsel informed the Sheriff that
delivery of the land to Ronquillo could not be undertaken because the
co-defendants of Marasigan were holding the same as lessees and told
said Sheriff that Ronquillo can avail of the alternative provided for
in the modified decision of the Court of Appeals, that is, to prove his
damages due to failure to deliver the land.

On October 3, 1950, Ronquillo presented a motion praying the Court
to order (1) the immediate delivery of the land in question and the
Sheriff to place Ronquillo in possession; (2) defendant Marasigan to
execute the deed of lease as provided for in the decision of the CFI;
and (3) that upon failure of Marasigan to comply, to order his arrest
for contempt.

An opposition to the above motion was presented and on November 10, 1950, the following order was promulgated:

“The Court is of the opinion, and so hold that the
opposition is groundless so that the Provincial Sheriff is hereby
ordered to place immediately the plaintiff in the possession of the
property in question, and that in view of the deposit made by the
plaintiff of the sum of P10,927.30 as consideration of the lease, said
defendant Francisco Marasigan is hereby ordered to execute said deed of
lease in the precise terms specified in the dispositive part of the
decision within (10) days from the receipt of a copy hereof, otherwise,
and in pursuance of Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the
Clerk of Court, Mr. Leopoldo C. Palad, is hereby authorized to execute
said deed of lease in the precise terms as specified in the said
decision.”

Under date of November 13, 1950, possession of the land was
delivered to Ronquillo. A motion for reconsideration filed by Marasigan
on November 17, 1950 was denied on the same date.

A manifestation, with a proposed deed of lease, as called for in the
decision of the Court of Appeals, was filed on November 27, 1950. On
December 4, 1950, Marasigan filed a motion asking for authority to
withdraw the P10,922.30 deposited by Ronquillo, since plaintiff has
already been placed in possession of the land in litigation. Plaintiff
interposed no objection to the withdrawal, and on December 12, 1950,
defendant Marasigan collected the amount.

An approval of the deed of lease proposed by Marasigan submitted on
November 27 was urged by said Marasigan, in a motion of December 19,
1950. An objection was interposed by plaintiff Ronquillo. Instead, he
asked that Clerk of Court Palad be directed to execute the deed of
lease, which he (plaintiff) attached to the opposition as Annex A,
inserting verbatim the dispositive part of the decision
rendered in Civil Case No. 80. The lower court, under date of January
18, 1950, issued the following order:

“The Court is of the opinion, and so hold, that the
judgment provides a deduction of five (5) years from the ten (10) year
contract of tease beginning from December 1, 1941, and that the five
years should be counted from September 1, 1942 to August 31, 1947.
Therefore, the period of lease should be, according to the said
dispositive part of the judgment, ten years from the date of the
plaintiff was recently placed in possession of the land excluding the
period from December 1, 1941 to August 31, 1942 or nine (9) months. It
is clear and just that these five years, which was not enjoyed by the
lessee, must be discounted and added to the period of lease which is to
be executed now when the lessee will continue enjoying his right of the
lease. * * *.”

Wherefore, said contract of lease filed by the defendant is hereby
disapproved and the form of contract of lease prepared by the Clerk of
Court as authorized in the order dated November 10, 1950, and filed by
the plaintiff, attached to his opposition, may be approved by this
Court, it being in conformity with the dispositive part of the
judgment.” (Exh. “F”; Rec. on Appeal, pp. 9-11).

Pursuant to the above order, Clerk of Court Palad and plaintiff
Ronquillo executed, on January 22, 1951, the deed of lease in the terms
prescribed by the said order and by Urgent Motion of the same date,
plaintiff prayed for the approval of the same. Defendant opposed the
urgent motion anchoring his objection on the allegation that the
proposed deed leaves the end or termination of the period of lease
subject to further ‘interpretation of the parties, and that the order,
instead of settling an issue, leaves the matter open to further
litigation. On March 13, 1951, the lower court handed down the
following order:
–

“Wherefore, the order of January 18, 1951 is hereby
modified in the sense that the draft of the contract of lease therein
approved should provide that, in accordance with the terms of the
dispositive part of the decision of this Court, said lease should be
for a period of ten (10) years, starting from December 1, 1941, and
running through and including August 31 1942, and start to run again
from September 1, 1947 up to and ending on December 1, 1956. * * *.”

A motion for a reconsideration of the above order, was denied on
April 19, 1951. On appeal, the Court of Appeals on May 13, 1952,
rendered judgment, to wit:

“Wherefore, the orders of March 13, and April 19,
1951, are hereby set aside and the defendant Francisco Marasigan is
hereby ordsred to execute a contract of lease embodying the conditions
set forth in the decision of the lower court, with the understanding
that the contract should be for a period of nine (9) years and three
(3) months more, to begin from November 10, 1950, until said period is
covered in full. * * *.”

Defendant Marasigan in turn brought the above judgment to this Court
on certiorari (appeal), docketed as G. R. No. Lr-5810 and a judgment
was rendered, the pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder:

“The change ordered by the Court of Appeals was made
when the judgment was already being exempted; and it can not be said to
merely correct a clerical error because it provides for a contract of
lease of nine years and three months duration, from November 10, 1950,
which is different from one to ten years from Decemher 1, 1941,
excluding the period from September 1, 1942 to August 31, 1947. The
modification is however, sought to be justified by two circumstances,
namely, the withdrawal by the lessor of the amount of P10,922.30, which
amount, together with the other sums previously received, total P14,000.00, and which is the rental for a full ten years term, and the
injustice caused the lessee because he was not placed in possession
from September 1, 1947 but on November 10, 1950, when the court ordered
the execution of the judgment.

The reasons given above are not entirely without value or merit; but
while they may entitle the lessee to some remedy, the one given in the
appealed decision flies in the teeth of the procedural principle of the
finality of the judgments. When the decision of the Court of Appeals on
the first appeal was rendered, modification thereof should have been
sought by proper application to the court, in the sense that the period
to be excluded from the ten-year period of the lease (fixed by the
judgment of the court of first instance to begin on September 1, 1942
and end en August 31, 1947), be extended up to the date when the land
was to be actually placed in the possession of the lessee. This full
period should be excluded in the computation of the ten year lease
because the delay in lessee’s taking possession was attributable to the
lessor’s fault. Whether the failure of the lessee to secure this
modification in the original judgment as above indicated is due to the
oversight of the party, of the court, or of both, the omission or
mistake certainly could no longer be remedied by modification of the
judgment after it had become final and executory.

As to the acceptance by the lessor of the full amount of the price
of the lease for a full ten year period, from which acceptance the
judgment infers an acquiescence in a lease for fully ten years from
November 10, 1950 (the date when lessee was placed in possession after
judgment), it must be stated that such act of acceptance was made after
the date of the final judgment, it may not be permitted to justify its
modification, or change, or correction.

Said act of acceptance may create new rights in relation to the
judgment, but the remedy to enforce such rights is not a modification
of the judgment, or its correction, but a new suit or action in which
the new issue of its (acceptance) supposed existence and effects shall
be tried and decided.” (Exh. “I”, pp. 6-8; Rec. on Appeal, pp. 14-17).

Because of the observations of this Court in the above judgment,
Ronqnillo filed the present case (Civ. Case No. 977), against the
defendant Marasigan over the same parcel of nipa-land, subject matter
of the previous case between them (Civ. Case No. 80). He prays that
judgment be rendered:—

“(a) Under the first cause of action, declaring the
plaintiff to be entitled to a continuation of the lease now existing
between the parties over the nipa-land in litigation for a period of
three (3) years, two (2) months and nine (9) days more, and ordering
the defendant to execute the corresponding deed of lease in favor of
the plaintiff;

(b) Under the second cause of action,
sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiffs such moral, actual and
compensatory damages which may be proved in court plus reasonable
attorney’s fees and the costs of this action; and

(c) Granting unto the plaintiff any other just and equitable relief in the premises.”

Defendant Marasigan presented a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on two grounds: Lack of cause of action and res judicata,
and/or estoppel by judgment. In argument supporting the above
contention, defendant claims that the period within which the lease
should commence to run and end has squarely been decided not only by
the CFI of Bulacan, but also the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court. An opposition to the motion to dismiss was registered by
plaintiff Ronquillo, arguing that a valid cause of action exists and
the complaint was filed in view of the aforecited observations of the
Supreme Court.

With the denial of the motion to dismiss, on March 16, 1955,
defendant filed his Answer which, after the customary admissions and
denials, interposed Special Defenses and a Counterclaim, to wit:

“As Special Defenses:

1. That the complaint states no cause of action;
2. That it is barred by the statute of limitation; and
3. That the judgment in Civil Case No. 80 affirmed by the Court of Appeals
   with slight modification in CA-G.B. No. 2816-R and finally interpreted
   and decided bjj the Supreme Court in SC-G. R. No. L-5810 is res
   adjudicata between the parties to the present action, the Court having
   taken into account the rental value of the premises at the time of the
   rendition of the decision.”

After trial, the CFI of Bulacan, dismissed the complaint and counterclaim, without costs, stating—

“* * * Consequently, it is our sense that this suit
is barred by the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Case No. 80,
affirming the orders of January 18 and March 13, 1951, of this Court.

The acceptance by the defendant (lessor) of the full amount of the
lease for a full ten year period may, as held by the Supreme Court
‘create new rights in relation to the judgment.’ But as it is said,
‘the remedy to enforce such rights is not a modification of the
judgment * * *’. This suit, in effect, seeks to modify the judgment of
the Supreme Court holding that the lease shall end on December 1, 1956.
(Exh. “I”). Said court could not have in mind this suit as the ‘new
suit or action in which the new issue of its (acceptance) supposed
existence and effects shall be tried and decided.”

Plaintiff, on May 16, 1956, filed a Notice of Appeal, assailing the
above findings and conclusions. Defendant MJarasigan filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above judgment for failure to award him the
reserve fund of P600.00 claimed in his counterclaim. Plaintiff as
appellant, urges a reversal of the decision of the CFI of Bulacan on
eight (8) assignments of errors, which can be consolidated into the
following issues :

1. The interpretation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. 80 (CA-G.R. No. 2816-R, April 20, 1950, Exh. H.);
2. Whether res judicata has set in;
3. The right to damages.

It is manifest that the complaint instituted by Ronquillo in Civil
Case No. 997 was principally based upon the observation of this Court
in the Certiorari case, where We stated that the acceptance by
Marasigan of the full amount of the rentals of the land for ten (10)
years was an acquiescense that the lease should be for the whole period
of ten (10) years, which act may have created new rights in relation to
the judgment and which should be enforced by a new suit. Having
accepted the rentals for the full ten (10) year period, Marasigan is
now estopped from claiming that Ronquillo should be entitled to the
leasehold for less than the said period. Moreover, no one should enrich
himself at the expense of another. After stating that the act of
Marasigan created new rights which may be enforced in a new suit, We
can not, and should not, just cross our arms and stand aloft to the
predicament of herein appellant Ronquillo. To deny this appeal on the
principles of res judicata and/or estoppel by judgment would
be sacrificing justice to technicality. Their application to the case,
under the particular facts obtaining, would amount to denial of justice
and/or a bar to a vindication of a legitimate grievance,. In cases like
the one under consideration, a liberal interpretation of the rules
becomes imperative and technicalities should not be resorted to in
derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules—the proper and just
determination of a litigation. There is no vested right in
technicalities (Alonzo vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315). Furthermore, we
find no application of the doctrine of res judicata in this
case. At the bottom of things, the present complaint seeks merely the
implementation of the judgment in Civil Case No. 80, which ordered
appellee Marasigan to deliver the nipa-lands to Ronquillo and to
execute a deed of lease for ten (10) years in his favor, to commence
from December 1, 1941. And even if We grant, for purposes of argument,
that res judicata is applicable, “it is always in the power of the
Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it” (C, Viuda de
Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275). The fact that the decision which
made the deduction on the period of lease has become final, does not
preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even with the
finality of judgment, when its execution: becomes impossible or unjust,
as in the instant case, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the
same with justice and the facts (Ocampo vs. Sanchez, 51 Off. Gaz. 4543)
97 Phil., 472.

Wherefore, the Order dismissing the complaint and the counter-claim
in Civil Case No. 997, is hereby reversed, and the case is remanded to
the Court of origin, for further proceedings. Without special
pronouncement as to costs.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Dizon, JJ., concur,
Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur in the result.