CANUTO PAGDANGANAN, PETITIONER, VS. ELADIO GALLETA (ALIAS ALBERTO GALLETA) AND DOMINGO GALLETA, RESPONDENTS.

To the question – May the heirs of a deceased tenant be dispossessed
by the landholder, who is a civil law lessee of the owner, upon the ground that
said landholder-lessee wants to per­sonally cultivate the land himself?  – the answer of the Court of Agrarian
Relations is in the negative.  Hence, the
appeal of the landholder-lessee direct to this Court.

The facts stipulated by the parties are these:

Felix Galleta, father of herein
respondents, was the tenant of herein petitioner Canuto
Pagdanganan on a landholding situated in Barrio San
Miguel, Guimba, Nueva Ecija.  Pagdanganan, in turn, was the lessee of this landholding
which was owned by Hacienda Favis.  On November
20, 1962, Felix Galleta died.  On March
25, 1963, Galleta’s widow received from Pagdanganan a letter warning her and her children,
respondents herein, against entering the landholding, and notifying them that
he (Pagdanganan) and his sons would work the same
beginning the agricultural year 1963-1964. 
Three days thereafter, on March 28, 1963, herein respondents Eladio and Domingo Galleta went
to the Court of Agrarian Relations on petition for judgment declaring either of
them as petitioner’s lawful tenant by way of succession to their deceased
father Felix Galleta.^[1]
This petition notwithstanding, in April 1963, peti­tioner planted palay on the land by the broadcasting method.  Because of drought, however, there was no
harvest for the agricultural year 1963-1964.

Petitioner’s answer below set up the special defense of
termination of tenancy relationship upon the death of his tenant, Felix Galleta, and his (petitioner’s) right to personally till
the land.

Upon the facts thus stipulated, the Court of Agrarian Relations
rendered partial judgment as follows:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, re­spondent CANUTO PAGDANGANAN is
hereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from notice hereof within which to
exercise his right under Sec. 9, Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended, to choose
between petitioners ELADIO and DOMINGO, both surnamed GALLETA, who should
succeed their deceased father, Felix Galleta, as
tenant on the landholding in question situated at barrio San Miguel, Guimba, Nueva Ecija,
with all the rights accorded and obligations imposed by law, and thereafter,
respondent is ordered to reinstate the petitioner so chosen in the aforesaid
holding.

Upon failure of respondent to exercise his choice within the
aforesaid period, this Court hereby declares ELADIO GALLETA to be the successor
of the late Felix Galleta as tenant of respondent on
the aforesaid landhold­ing (Sec. 9, Rep. Act No. 3844, Agricultural Land Reform
Code), and the latter is ordered to reinstate him therein.

Commissioner Clemente S. Felix is
directed to set this case immediately for hearing for reception of evidence as
to respondent-landholder’s participation in the harvest for the agricultural
year 1962-63.  Com. Felix shall submit
his report, together with the record of this case, within six (6) days from
submission of the transcript of stenographic notes.

Petitioner’s claim for counsel fees is denied.”

Following a hearing, the agrarian court came out with a
supplemental decision, the dispositive part of which
reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondent:

(1)  
To reinstate Eladio
Galleta as his share tenant on the landholding in
question with all the rights and obligations prescribed by law;

(2)  
To pay him the sum of P431.25
(value of 37 1/2 cavans of palay
at the rate of P11.50 per cavan, the official buying
price of the Rice and Corn Administration), as damages for the agricultural
year 1963-1964; and,

(1)  
To continue paying him the same
amount as damages, every agricultural year thereafter until his actual
reinstatement.”

Petitioner’s move to reconsider both the original and the
supplemental decisions failed.  Hence,
the present petition for review.

1.  To be reckoned with in
the resolution of the crucial issue we have stated at the beginning is Section
9 of Republic Act 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act,
enacted on August 30, 1954.  Worth remembering at this point is that this
Section 9 was thereafter amended on June
19, 1959 by Republic Act 2263. 
The statute as thus amended controls this case.

Perhaps a clear picture of the law in its original state upon
enactment on August 30, 1954
and as amended on June 19, 1959
may aid in the proper approach to the question before us.  The two provisions, the old and the new, are
as follows:

The limited rights of the heirs of a tenant under the original
statute is quite plain.  Upon the death
of the tenant, the heirs could only “continue to work the land until the
close of the agricultural year.” After amendment, in case of the tenant’s
death, “the tenancy relationship shall continue between the
landholder and one member of the tenant’s immediate farm household who is
related to the tenant within the second degree by consanguinity and who shall
cultivate the land himself personally.” With one exception.  And that exception is couched in the
following language:  “unless the
landholder shall cultivate the land himself personally or through the
employment of mechanical farm implements, in accordance with
section fifty hereof.”

Section 50 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended by the
same Republic Act 2263, it bears emphasizing, gives the right to dispossess a
tenant solely and exclusively to “the landholder-owner or his
relative within the first degree by consanguinity.” The pertinent
provision of Section 50, as amended, reads:

“SEC. 50.  Causes
for the Dispossession of Tenant.  – Any of the following, and no other, shall
be sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:

(a) The bona fide
intention of the landholder-owner or his relative within the first degree by
con­sanguinity to cultivate the land himself personally or through the
employment of farm machinery and implements: 
x x x.”

In its original form, Section 50(a) reads:

“(a) The bona
fide intention of the land­holder to cultivate the land himself
personally or through the employment of farm machinery and implements:  x x x.”

It is true that the amended Section 9 heretofore quoted merely
uses the word “landholder” in reference to the person who may
exercise the right to personally cultivate the land­holding of the deceased
tenant.  However, congressional inten­tion
to limit the import of the term landholder to landholder-owner is
clear from a reading of Section 50(a) as amended.  And then, during the debates in Congress,
Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, who sponsored the bill
(Senate Bill 119) that became Republic Act 2263, remarked:  “The hereditary right involved
is the right to work the land.  Now, the
right to work the land is not absolute because the land still belongs
to the landowner. 
To be just to the landowner, he should have the preference to
choose among the two or three qualified members.”^[2]

Thus it is, that according to the amended Section 9, such right to
cultivate the landholding is to be exercised “in accord­ance with section
fifty” of the law.  The Section 50
referred to is Section 50 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended by
Republic Act 2263.  For, Republic Act
2263 simultaneously amended Section 9 and Section 50.  And, Section 50, as amended, specifically
gives such right solely and exclusively to a landholder-owner.  It should not escape notice that the
amendment inserted in Section 50 by Republic Act 2263 was from
“landholder” to “land­holder-owner or his relative within the
first degree by consan­guinity.” The intent of Congress is too plain for
argument.  No one who is not a
landholder-owner may dispossess the authorized successor of the deceased tenant
upon the ground that he or his relatives mentioned in the law intend to
cultivate the land per­sonally.

Statutes must be given conjoint, not discordant, effect.^[3]
Our primary duty then is to harmonize Section 9 with Section 50, both as
amended.  Thus harmonizing, we take the
word “landholder” in Section 9 to mean
“landholder-owner”.  Really, it
would be unreasonable to think that a mere lessee could rise to the level of a
landowner.  The protection afforded the
landowner to enable him to improve his own economic situation by working the
land himself does not apply to a lessee, such as is petitioner.  A lessee is much like a middleman.  He technically holds the land; but he does
not own it.

Furthermore, it is evident from a reading of Section 9, as
amended, that Congress would want to fortify the security of tenure of the
tenant.  This is reflected in the record
of the con­gressional debates, thus –

“Another important aspect of the Agricul­tural Tenancy Act is
to strengthen the security of tenure of
the tenants.  Before the
passage of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, there were many cases of ejectment for unjustified reasons.  Under Republic Act No. 1199, we have provided
that a tenant may be ejected only upon just cause.  With respect to the death of the tenants the
present law provides that the heirs may cultivate the land for one more
agricultural year, in which case the land is returned to the landholder after
one year.  In the present amendatory
bill, it is proposed that the right to till the land should be made hereditary.  The idea is not new, Mr. Pre­sident.  As a matter of fact, the idea goes back to
the time of President Quezon, who, in 1939, first
broached the idea of giving security to the tenure of the tenants and to make
the right to work the land hereditary.”^[4]

To allow a landholder-lessee to get back the possession from the
tenant is to open the door to fraudulent schemes to defeat the tenant’s
security of tenure.  We may cite an
instance:  A landowner has a tenant.  Thereafter, in order to displace the tenant’s
successor, he (the landowner) enters into a fictitious civil law lease of the
land with that other person who becomes the lessee.  The lessee ejects the tenant’s successor to
be­come the tenant of the owner.^[5]
The result would be achieving by indirection what the law proscribes.  Section 50, as amended, plugs this loophole.

Finally, the Agricultural Tenancy Act is a remedial legis­lation
in implementation of the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the
exercise of the police power of the State to promote the common weal.^[6]
Such being the case, a sensible view of the provisions of Section 9 here being
construed should lean towards the security of tenure of tenants.

We, accordingly, rule that petitioner, being a mere
landholder-lessee and not the landholder-owner, cannot exer­cise the right
granted under Section 9 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act to personally cultivate
the landholding upon the death of the tenant. 
And in consequence, we uphold respondent Eladio
Galleta’s right to till the land in question as set
forth in the judgment below.

2. Since respondents were unlawfully dispossessed of the
landholding, upon the provisions of Section 27(1) of the Agri­cultural Tenancy
Act, petitioner was adjudged liable for damages “to the extent of the
landholder’s participation in the harvest.”

No question on appeal would have arisen on this score were it not
for certain facts in this case obtaining. 
The parties had stipulated that because of drought petitioner did not
harvest in the 1963-1964 agricultural year. 
Not that petitioner was alone. 
During the hearing before the Court of Agrarian Relations, an additional
stipulation was made that the landholding adjoining petitioner also “had
no harvest due to drought.”^[7]

Because the measure of damages fixed by law is the landholder’s
share, and given the fact that for the agricultural year 1963-1964 there was no
production and no share either for the landholder or for the tenant to speak of
due to a fortuitous event, it would collide with our sense of justice to award
re­spondents damages for that agricultural year.^[8]

We, accordingly, rule that no damages should be awarded for the
agricultural year 1963-1964.  However,
damages of P431.25 per year for every succeeding agricultural year thereafter until
actual reinstatement stands; for, good faith had ceased.

Modified as just stated, the original and supplemental decisions
of the Court of Agrarian Relations are hereby affirmed in all other respects.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
CAR Case No. 1017-Gba. Br.-63 of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Second
Regional District, Sala II, Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, entitled
“Eladio Galleta (alias
Alberto Galleta) and Domingo Galleta,
Petitioners, versus Canuto Pagdanganan,
Respondent.” This court later on became Branch II, Fourth Regional
District of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

^[2]
Congressional Record (Senate), Fourth Congress, First Ses­sion, Volume I, No.
54, April 21, 1958, p. 904; emphasis supplied.

^[3]
University of the Philippines
Board of Regents vs. Auditor General, L-19617, October 31, 1969; Mangila
vs. Lantin, L-24735, October 31, 1969.

^[4]
Sponsorship speech of Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, Congressional
Record (Senate), Fourth Congress, First Session, Volume I, No. 54, April 21,
1958, p. 898; emphasis supplied.

^[5]
“Problems in Landlord-Tenant Relations” by Judge Fernando Santiago, U.P.
Law Center
Proceedings of 1966 on Fair Labor Standards and Welfare Legislations, p. 190.

^[6] Primero vs. Court of Agrarian Relations (1957), 101
Phil. 675, 680, cited in Ilusorio vs.
Court of Agrarian Relations (1966), 17 SCRA 25, 29-30.  See also:  Congressional Record (Senate), Fourth
Congress, First Session, Volume I, No. 54, April 21, 1958, pp. 897-898.

^[7] Record,
p. 58.

^[8] See:  Delfin vs.
Court of Agrarian Relations (1967), 19 SCRA 593, 594.