ANGELINA CANAYNAY ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. FELICIANO SARMIENTO, AND GUILLERMO ROMERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT OF PARAÑAQUE, RIZA…

On August 28, 1946, Feliciano Sarmiento filed against petitioners-appellees,
a complaint which reads as follows:

“Comes now the plaintiff, thru his undersigned counsels, and to this
Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:

“1. That the plaintiff is of age and residing at San Dionisio, Parañaque,
Rizal; while the defendants are also of age, with Angelina Canaynay, Prudencia
V. Asprec and Cleto Asprec having their residence and postal address at San
Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, and Pedro O. Jose residing at his postal address in
409 Real Street, Parañaque, Rizal;

“2. That plaintiff is the lawful owner of that certain parcel of unregistered
and unsurveyed residential land located at San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, and
more particularly described as follows:

” ‘A parcel of unregistered and unsurveyed residential land located at San
Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, bounded on the N by Callejon Moras, on the E by
Calle Real, on the S by Simon San Agustin and on the W by Cirilo Jaramillo,
containing an area of 161.06 square meters more or less, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 11466 of the municipality of Parañaque, Province of Rizal,
declared for taxation purposes by Feliciano Sarmiento since July 26,
1922.’

“3. That on or about January 15, 1920, the defendants, Angelina Canaynay and
her daughter, Prudencia V. Asprec, then single and now married to Cleto Asprec,
entered into a verbal contract with the herein plaintiff whereby the latter
leased to the former the land above-described under an agreed rental of P3 a
month, payable at the end of each month;

“4. That by virtue of the contract of lease referred to in the preceding
paragraph, the defendants, Angelina Canaynay and Prudencia V. Asprec, then
single, bought and acquired, on or about January 15, 1920, a residential house
erected on the said lot from a former lessee, Atty. Manuel Jose of Parañaque,
Rizal;

“5. That defendant Pedro O. Jose is presently the occupant of the house
mentioned in paragraph 4 hereof;

“6. That defendants Angelina Canaynay and Prudencia V. Asprec have so far
paid to plaintiff the amount of P130 corresponding to the rentals for the months
of January 15, 1920 to August 25, 1923, inclusive;

“7. That plaintiff has several times verbally demanded of the defendants to
pay the unpaid rentals and to vacate the premises in question, the last demand
having: been made on them personally and in writing on August 3, 1946, but they
failed and refused and still continue to fail and to refuse to pay the rentals
now amounting to P828 and to vacate the premises described above to the
prejudice of the plaintiff;

“8. That plaintiff is now in need of the premises subject of this complaint
for the construction of his own house.

“Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants:

“(a) For the restitution of the above-mentioned premises;

“(b) For the payment of the sum of P828 representing the rentals in
arrears, with legal interest thereon from the filing of this complaint;

“(c) For the immediate removal of the house from the premises at
defendant’s expense;

“(d) For costs of this suit and attorney’s fees and such other
remedies as shall be deemed just and reasonable in the premises.

“Manila, Philippines, August 28, 1946.”

Defendants answered admitting the allegations in paragraphs 1 and 5, denying
the allegations in paragraph 2, and averring lack of knowledge as to the truth
of the allegations of paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of the complaint, and as an
affirmative defense alleged that defendant Angelina Canaynay acquired ownership
of the property in question by prescription for having possessed it over a
period of twenty years.

In September, 1946, petitioners-appellees filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, a petition for a writ of certiorari, impugning the
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of Parañaque, alleging that its
jurisdiction in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases extends only within a
period of one year from and after the date of the accrual of the cause of
action, and because defendants have interposed an affirmative defense of
prescription, which necessarily involves the question of ownership of the land,
and that the petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case, but Judge
Guillermo Romero, of the justice of the peace court, denied the motion, thus
acting in excess of his jurisdiction.

On September 24, 1946, Judge Eulalio Garcia of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, required respondents to answer the petition and ordered Judge Romero to
refrain from trying the ejectment case until further orders.

On November 12, 1946, Judge Garcia rendered decision, ordering Judge Romero
of the Justice of the Peace Court of Parañaque, to desist from continuing taking
cognizance of the ejectment case in question, declaring final the writ of
preliminary injunction ordering Judge Romero to refrain from proceeding with the
case, and dismissing the complaint in the same, with costs against Feliciano
Sarmiento.

The latter appealed against the decision.

Appellant Sarmiento made five assignments of error in his brief. Appellees
choose not to file any brief. They did not even appear to argue the case at the
hearing which took place on March 21, 1947.

Two main questions are raised in this case: First, whether the complaint was
filed within the one-year period prescribed by section 1 of Rule 72, and second,
whether the defense of ownership set up by defendants had the effect of
divesting the justice of the peace court of its jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the case.

Section 1 of Rule 72 provides that the one-year period provided therein must
be reckoned from the date of the “unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession.”

In paragraph 7 of the complaint, it is alleged that plaintiff has several
times verbally demanded the defendants to pay the unpaid rents and to vacate the
premises, the last demand having been made on them personally and in writing on
August 3, 1946. Under the said paragraph, it is evident that the “unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession,” mentioned by section 1 of Rule 72,
started on August 3, 1946, when formal demand for vacating the premises was
made. This position is strengthened by the allegation in paragraph 8 of the
complaint to the effect that “plaintiff is now in need of the premises subject
of this complaint for the construction of his own house.”

The fact that it is alleged in the complaint that defendants failed to pay
the rents since after August 25, 1923, does not make unlawful defendant’s
withholding of possession of the property. Mere failure to pay rents does not
ipso facto make unlawful tenant’s possession of the premises. It is the
owner’s demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant, has failed to
pay the rents on time, and tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate, which make
unlawful withholding of possession. There is no legal obstacle for the owner to
allow a defaulting tenant to remain in the rented property one month, one year,
several years, or even decades. That consent, no matter how long it may last,
makes lawful tenant’s possession. Only when that consent is withdrawn and the
owner demands tenant to leave the property is the owner’s right of possession
asserted and the tenant’s refusal or failure to move out makes his possession
unlawful, because it is violative of the owner’s preferential right of
possession.

On the next question, it is a well-established doctrine that what determines
the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court in cases like the one at bar
is the nature of the action pleaded as appears in the allegations of the
complaint. The averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought
are the ones that must be consulted. Defendant’s claim of title acquired by
prescription cannot defeat the jurisdiction once established by what is pleaded
in the complaint. Only when, after hearing the evidence, the justice of the
peace court shall have found that what is litigated in effect between the
parties is the ownership, is when said court shall lose its jurisdiction.

For all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal is reversed. The Justice of the Peace Court of Parañaque may proceed
with the hearing and trial of the ejectment case No. 9, entitled “Feliciano
Sarmiento vs. Angelina Canaynay et al.,” until final
judgment.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and
Tuason, JJ., concur.

---

PARAS, J.:

The only actual occupant of the house standing on the lot claimed by the
respondent-appellant is one Pedro O. Jose. There is no allegation whatsoever in
the detainer complaint filed by said respondent regarding any agreement of lease
between him and said occupant or any privity between the latter and the herein
petitioners-appellees, the defendants in the detainer case. It is alleged in the
complaint that the occupancy by the appellees of the lot in question without
payment of the stipulated rent commenced in August, 1923, and that several
demands for payment of rentals and to vacate the premises had been made on the
appellees, the last one in writing on August 3, 1946.

The justice of the peace court has jurisdiction in a detainer case, if and
when the complaint is filed within one year from the date of “unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession.” A demand to vacate need not be in
writing, and inasmuch as the appellees have allegedly defaulted in paying the
agreed rentals since 1923, and several demands have admittedly been made,
without any specification that said demands were all for the default occurring
within the one-year period prior to the date of the filing of the detainer
complaint, the logical conclusion is that one or some of such demands had been
made more than one year or long before the written demand of Agust 3, 1946. From
the very allegations of the complaint, therefore, the case is not within the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court, and the appealed decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing said complaint should be
affirmed.

PABLO, M.:

Concurro con esta disidencia.