ASUNCION T. CABINTA, FOR HERSELF AND FOR HER CHILDREN, RENATO, THELMA, MARRIETA, DANILO AND MA. LORNA, ALL SURNAMED CABINTA, PETITIONERS, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION A…

Cabinta versus Workmen's Compensation Commission

The Case

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, which had reversed the award of death benefits made by the Acting Referee of Regional Office Number Four in Manila in favor of the widow and children of Jose C. Cabinta, a driver of the City of Manila. Asuncion T. Cabinta, for herself and for her children Renato, Thelma, Marrieta, Danilo and Ma. Lorna, all surnamed Cabinta, sought to recover death compensation after her husband suffered a stroke while driving a truck for the City and later died. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee must carry into the examination room: it fixes the evidentiary weight of a marriage certificate and of baptismal certificates in proving filiation, and it restates the rebuttable presumption that an illness which supervened in the course of employment arose out of that employment or was at least aggravated by it.

Procedural History

On the thirty-first of March, 1975, the widow filed a claim for compensation for the death of her husband before the Regional Office. On the fourteenth of October, 1975, the Acting Labor Referee of Regional Office Number Four in Manila rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering the City of Manila to pay death compensation in the maximum sum of six thousand pesos, plus burial expenses of two hundred pesos, and to pay the office a fee of sixty-one pesos pursuant to Section 55 of the Act, as amended. On review, the respondent Commission reversed that decision and ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action, holding that the marriage certificate and the baptismal certificates were not sufficient to establish the petitioners' filiation to the deceased. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review, which the Court treated as a special civil action by its resolution of March 19, 1976.

Facts

Jose C. Cabinta was first employed by the respondent City of Manila on January 23, 1962 as a substitute driver, until 1966 when he was made a regular driver with a salary of ten pesos a day. On July 14, 1973, while driving a truck for the City, he suddenly lost consciousness, vomited brownish partially digested food, and became paralyzed in the upper and lower extremities. His illness was diagnosed as hemiplegia secondary to a cerebrovascular accident, and the medical report showed that total permanent disability had set in not earlier than October 15, 1973, when he retired under Commonwealth Act 186.

He finally died on October 8, 1974, survived by his widow, Asuncion T. Cabinta, and their minor children, Renato, Thelma, Marrieta, Danilo and Ma. Lorna. In support of her claim, the widow presented the marriage certificate issued by the parish priest of Malasique, Pangasinan, and the baptismal certificates of her minor children to show their filiation to the deceased.

The City of Manila did not challenge those documents. It questioned only the compensability of the death and the timeliness of the filing of the claim. The Commission nonetheless dismissed the claim outright on the ground that the documents were insufficient to prove filiation.

Issues

• Whether or not the marriage certificate and the baptismal certificates are sufficient to establish the filiation of the widow and children to the deceased.
• Whether or not the Commission, instead of dismissing the claim outright, should have required the petitioners to present the proper evidence of filiation.
• Whether or not the failure to file the claim within the statutory period affects the jurisdiction of the Commission.
• Whether or not the illness of the deceased is compensable, it having supervened in the course of his employment.

Applicable Provisions

Paragraph five of Section 49 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, on the procedure on review, provides:

Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with the order entered by the referee may petition to review the same and the referee may reopen said case, or may amend or modify said order, and such amended or modified order shall be final award unless objection be made thereto by petition for review. In case said referee does not amend or modify said order, he shall refer the entire case to the Commissioner, who shall thereupon review the entire record in said case, and in his discretion, may take or order the taking of additional testimony, and shall make his findings of facts and enter his award thereon.

This empowers the Commissioner to take or order additional testimony, which is why he should have called for the proper documents rather than dismiss the claim.

Section 3 of Rule 16 of the Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission provides:

Upon receipt of an appealed case from the referee, the Chairman shall assign the case to any member of the Commission who shall thereupon review the case and he may affirm, reverse, or modify any decision, order or award as the law and facts may require, or take such other action as the interest of justice may demand.

This rule likewise obliged the Commission to require the evidence it needed in the interest of justice.

Section 5, paragraph bb, of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, on the presumption of a lawful marriage, provides:

That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.

This presumption, which the Commission ignored, supports the widow's status on the marriage certificate presented.

Section 5, paragraph cc, of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, on the presumption of legitimacy, provides:

That a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate.

This presumption, likewise disregarded, supports the legitimacy of the children shown in the baptismal certificates.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Commission erred in finding the evidence insufficient. When a marriage certificate is shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular and whatever form of the proof, the law raises a strong presumption of its legality. The presumption of legitimacy of the children was likewise disregarded. The City of Manila never challenged these documents before the Referee or before the Commission; it questioned only compensability and timeliness.

On the second issue, the Court held that if the Commission believed the documents insufficient, it should have required the presentation of the proper evidence, such as the original or certified true copy of the marriage certificate and the record of births from the local civil registrar, but not to dismiss the claim outright. The Court grounded this on the power of the Commissioner to take or order the taking of additional testimony under Section 49, and on the rule authorizing such other action as the interest of justice may demand.

On the third issue, the Court held that failure to file a claim within the statutory period does not affect the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the illness was compensable. There was no dispute that the illness which ultimately caused death took place in the course of employment. Once the illness supervened at the time of employment, a rebuttable presumption arises that it arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by it. The burden to overthrow that presumption by substantial evidence lies at the door of the employer. The claimant is relieved of the burden of proving causation, and it is sufficient to show that the hypothesis on which he bases his claim is probable. As the Court put it, the precise medical cause of the illness is not legally significant, as long as the illness supervened in the course of employment.

Doctrine

A marriage certificate, whatever its form, raises a strong presumption of the legality of the marriage, and a child born in lawful wedlock is presumed legitimate; these presumptions stand unless rebutted by the party challenging filiation. A compensation claimant is relieved of the burden of proving causation once the illness or injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment; a rebuttable presumption then arises that the illness arose out of the employment or was aggravated by it, and the burden shifts to the employer to disconnect the sickness from the employment by substantial evidence. The Commission may take or order additional testimony on review and should require the needed evidence rather than dismiss the claim outright. Failure to file the claim within the statutory period does not affect the jurisdiction of the Commission.

Disposition

The Court reversed and set aside the judgment of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and revived and reinstated the decision of the Acting Referee of Regional Office Number Four in Manila, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the precise medical cause of the illness is not legally significant, as long as the illness supervened in the course of employment. Examiners use this case to test the presumption of compensability and the shifting of the burden of proof to the employer, and to test the presumptions of lawful marriage and legitimacy under Rule 131.