ENGRACIA G. DE PONCE, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. ALICIA VASQUEZ SAGARIO, RESPONDENT. FRED RUIZ CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPIN…

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, in a petition for mandamus in which Engracia G. de Ponce
sought to compel the respondent Lt. Col. Fred Ruiz Castro, in, his capacity as
Judge Advocate General, National Defense Forces, and Lt. Col. Bernardino
Jardeleza, in his capacity as Chief of the Finance Service, National Defense
Forces, “to bring to the proper Court of First Instance by way of interpleader
proceedings the conflicting claims between the herein petitioner and the
respondent Alicia V. Sagario for the arrears in pay and allowances due the late
Lt. Genaro Ponce.” The proceedings were instituted under Republic Act No. 136
entitled “An Act providing for the immediate payment of monies due to deceased
Filipino members of the United States Army, United States Navy, Philippine
Scouts, Philippine Army, etc.”

The facts of the case, which are not in dispute, and the issues
are summarized in the appealed decision as follows:

Petitioner Engracia G. de Ponce, legitimate mother of Lt.
Genaro G. Ponce, USAFFE, who was killed in line of duty sometime in May, 1942,
at Bacolod Grande, Lanao, filed before the Recovered Personnel Division of the
Philippine Army a claim for the arrears in pay and allowances due the said
deceased Lieutenant Ponce. The claim was predicated upon the allegation that
Lieutenant Ponce was, at the time of his death, unmarried and had no legitimate
or acknowledged natural children. This claim was endorsed to the Claims Branch
of the Judge Advocate General’s Office for adjudication pursuant to Republic Act
No. 136. After the reception of the necessary proofs from petitioner, the Claims
Branch of the Judge Advocate General’s Office made an adjudication and award in
favor of petitioner in the amount of P7,200.

This amount, however, was not paid because of a claim filed by
respondent Alicia Vasquez Sagario, who alleged that she was the legal wife of
the deceased Lt. Genaro G. Ponce and had a minor daughter by him born on May 24,
1942, after his death.

Upon the conflicting claims, hearing was had before Capt. Ramon
V. Diaz, Chief of the Claims Branch of the Judge Advocate General’s Office. Both
parties presented evidence in support of their respective contentions.

Petitioner herein predicated her claim on the allegation that
the deceased Lt. Genaro G. Ponce was not married to respondent Alicia Vasquez
Sagario.

Upon the other hand, oral and circumstantial evidence was
presented tending to show that the deceased Lt. Genaro G. Ponce and Alicia
Vasquez Sagario were really married, although the marriage certificate or other
documentary proof of marriage could not be presented.

Upon the evidence presented, the Judge Advocate General held
that the alleged marriage was sufficiently established under Republic Act No.
136 and that his office would adjudicate the arrear ages to, respondent Alicia
Vasquez Sagario and her daughter, to the total exclusion of petitioner. This was
communicated to petitioner on January 6, 1948.

Section 8 of Republic Act No. 136 provides:

“Whenever a dispute arises as to who of two or more claimants
are the legal heirs of the deceased, the Judge Advocate General or his
representative shall suspend, the summary distribution of the monies until the
courts shall have finally decided the controversy in an action for interpleading
un’der Rule fourteen of the Rules of Court: Provided, however, That
complaints for interpleading presented pursuant to this section shall be exempt
from the payment of all filing fees, legal fees, and costs.”

The lower court held that there was here a dispute within the
meaning of the above provision. It said that there were conflicting claims made
to the same property; an “active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on the
part of petitioner and a denial thereof on the part of respondent Alicia Vasquez
Sagario, concerning a real question or issue.”

The respondents rely on section 3 of the aforementioned Act
which reads:

“The Judge Advocate General or his representative shall proceed
to ascertain by the best means within his power the names and residences of the
persons who are lawfully entitled to the monies referred to in this Act, and
pursuant to the evidence submitted shall summarily distribute the same to said
legal heirs as of the time of final decree of distribution in accordance with
the provisions of the Civil Code regarding succession: Provided,
however, That in the distribution of the estate under this Act, the
usufructuary rights granted to the surviving spouse by the Civil Code shall not
apply: Provided, further, That in the case of inheritance subject to
‘reserva troncal’ (art. 811, C. C.), the obligation to preserve will not be
imposed on the ‘reservista’: And provided, finally, That in order to
expedite the disposition of the monies referred to in this Act, where the
evidence does not strictly conform with the statutory requirements, subject to
the limitations imposed by section eight of this Act, the Judge Advocate General
is empowered to pass upon the sufficiency of evidence of
heirship.”

The respondents maintain that under this section the Judge
Advocate General has quasi-judicial powers. They allege that in the exercise of
these powers this officer; made an investigation and found from the evidence
that Alicia Vasquez Sagario was lawfully married to Lieutenant Ponce. It is
their contention that in the light of this finding the conflict between Sagario
and the petitioner is “apparent only” and “does not fall within the category of
a bona fide dispute” as this word is used in the above-quoted section.
It is argued that if every denial of a claim could divest the Judge Advocate
General of jurisdiction and necessitate the forwarding of the case to the court,
“the whole Republic Act No. 136 would be nullified and his (Judge Advocate
General’s) discretion a meaningless thing to be set aside by fictitious,
groundless, dilatory, expensive and malicious petitions for mandamus, thus
substituting the judgment of the court for that of the officers in whom the law
entrusted such discretion.” Referring to the evidence submitted by Alicia V.
Sagario, the respondent Judge Advocate General says that this woman’s marriage
to Lieutenant Ponce has been proved by direct testimony of two witnesses, the
widow’s mother and uncle, to the marriage. He brushes aside the absence of a
marriage certificate by observing that such “marriage certificate are things
that may be lost.” He calls attention to the fact that the wife followed
Lieutenant Ponce “through the Visayas to Mindanao, suffering moral, physical and
financial deprivations to be with him because he could not bear such separation
any longer,” and to the fact that “Lieutenant Ponce’s co-officers and superiors
knew that she was his wife and treated her as such, thus creating the
presumption of law ‘that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage’.”

We entirely agree with the trial court that a real dispute such
as that contemplated in section 8 presents itself. According to Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, cited by the respondents, “a fact is properly said to be in dispute
when it is alleged by one party and denied by the other, and by both with some
show of reason.” There is as much show of reason in the mother’s evidence,
extracted in the appealed decision, that the alleged marriage was not solemnized
as there is in Sagario’s evidence that she was the decedent’s lawful wife. At
any rate, the evidence for the latter is by no means conclusive, and it is not
denied that the mother’s claim is bona fide.

Good faith and some showing on the part of opposing claimants
are the sole test of the existence or non-existence of a dispute under Republic
Act No. 136. It is immaterial that the dispute is, in the opinion of the Judge
Advocate General, only apparent, or that he is convinced, that one claim is well
founded and others are not. The weighing of opposing evidence and a decision on
questions of law and fact when conflicting claims, like the claims in question,
are presented, requires the exercise of judgment or discretion. This function is
eminently judicial and devolves, as it should, on the courts of law.

The theory that when the Judge Advocate General is convinced
that one claim is well founded he may make the adjudication in disregard of
other claims, is clearly untenable. This theory, carried to its logical
conclusion, would place in the hands of the Judge Advocate General the power to
determine whether a case should be referred to the proper court or be decided
finally and definitely by him. Such construction finds no justification either
in the letter or the spirit of Republic Act No. 136.

The Judge Advocate General’s role under this Act is purely
administrative and ministerial. This is manifest from the language of the Act,
from the nature of his office, from the express provision of section 3 that his
power to investigate is “subject to the limitations imposed by section 8,” and
from the fact that the investigation he is authorized to make is summary. It
would be illogical to suppose that the legislature allowed the adjudication of
contentious matters involving title to monies in a proceeding devoid of
formality before an administrative officer whose decisions are final and
unappealable, according to the respondents. That would run counter to the
universal policy which secures to the parties the right to have reviewed all
judicial determinations which are to be reached only after a regular and
fair trial in which full opportunity to present evidence was given to the
litigants.

What section 3 of Republic Act No. 136 envisages is the
situation where only one or no claim is filed for monies due. In the first case,
it is the duty of the Judge Advocate General “to ascertain by the best means
within his power the names and residences of the persons who are entitled to the
monies.” In the second case, it is his duty to see that the claimant is not an
impostor or that no others have a better right to, or are entitled to share in,
the benefits.

The decision is affirmed, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.