CASTELWEB TRADING & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION – SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION PRESIDED BY HON. COMM. RAUL T. AQUINO, TOLEDO CONSTRUC…
GAERLAN, S.H., J.:
FACTS
On 24 February 2005, the NLRC rendered a Decision in the above-mentioned labor case. The case reached the Supreme Court and was decided with finality on 15 October 2007.[5]
Consequently, a writ of execution[6] was issued by the NLRC on 4 February 2009 to enforce the monetary award in favor of the employees (Toledo Construction Corporation Employees Association-Association of Democratic Labor Organization; herein private respondent). To implement said writ, the NLRC sheriffs levied upon several motor vehicles allegedly owned by Toledo Corporation. Among those levied on are two motor vehicles with plate numbers WJS 667[7] and UPU 616[8]. The levy was effected through constructive levy, i.e. by presenting the notices of levy[9] before the Land Transportation Office (LTO) for the purpose of annotating the same on the subject motor vehicles’ respective certificates of registration. The alleged constructive levy was made in March 2009[10]. Castelweb Trading and Development Corporation (petitioner) filed a third-party claim with the NLRC asserting its ownership over the subject two motor vehicles included in the levy.[11]
In support of its claim, petitioner alleged[12] that it is the owner of the subject motor vehicles as evidenced by its certificates of registration that were approved and issued by the LTO on 16 March 2009, prior to the alleged constructive levy made by the NLRC sheriffs.
On 28 May 2010 and 30 September 2010, the NLRC-Second Division, through the assailed Decision and 30 September 2010 Resolution, dismissed[13] petitioner’s third party claim.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was also denied through the 27 May 2011 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE PETITIONER’S THIRD PARTY CLAIMS AS WELL AS THE LATTER’S SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
THE COURT’S RULING
Petitioner contends that the subject levy is defective, illegal, and invalid. First, petitioner argues that the alleged constructive levy on the two motor vehicles was not in accordance with the NLRC Manual for Execution of Judgment. According to petitioner, constructive levy is applicable only with respect to real property. When personal property is involved, the levy is effected by serving the writ of execution upon the judgment debtor – and owner of the property – and thereafter, taking possession of and safekeeping the levied property. Here, the NLRC sheriffs, instead of taking possession of the subject vehicles, merely served the notice of levy with the LTO, a procedure that is neither sanctioned nor provided for in the aforementioned NLRC manual.[14]
Second, petitioner asserts that the levy was made after the applications for registrations of the subject vehicles were processed and approved by the LTO Diliman District Office. It is petitioner’s stance that the first levy made by the NLRC sheriffs on 5 March 2009 was ineffective inasmuch as the notice of levy was not accompanied by the corresponding writ of execution. The same is true anent the second levy when the notices of levy, while accompanied by a writ of execution, were erroneously served upon the LTO Office of the Assistant Secretary on 10 and 13 March 2009. It was only on 18 March 2009 that the notices of levy were officially transmitted to the LTO Diliman District Office. Hence, petitioner argues, the levy produced effect only on 18 March 2009 or two days after registration of the subject motor vehicles in the name of petitioner was approved by the LTO.[15]
Moreover, petitioner assails the NLRC’s reliance on the 30 April 2009 letter[16] from the LTO Diliman District Office, stating the cancellation of the transfer of ownership over the two motor vehicles. Petitioner points out that said letter was already set aside by a subsequent memorandum[17] dated 16 November 2009 from the above LTO office, which clarified that there was no irregularity in the approval of petitioner’s certificates of registration. According to petitioner, said memorandum is clear that the 5 March 2009 levy was defective because the notice of levy served on and received by the LTO Diliman District Office on said date has no accompanying writ of execution.[18]
In sum, petitioner insists that the subject motor vehicles are not owned by Toledo Corporation. Asserting its rights under a Deed of Sale dated 7 June 2007, petitioner argues that even if the certificates of registration under its name are cancelled on ground of irregularity, still, it retained ownership over the subject vehicles because registration is not a conferment of title, but a mere recording of such transaction. Petitioner further contends that the “registered-owner rule” finds no application in the instant case as the same is primarily aimed to identify the person upon whom liability is fixed in case of an accident.[19]
On the other hand, private respondent, in its Comment/Opposition[20], counters, in gist, that petitioner failed to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. Private respondent asserts that the questioned levy was made in accordance with law. Refuting petitioner’s arguments, private respondent posits that constructive levy is applicable, not only to real property, but to personal property as well. Levy may either be actual or constructive. The NLRC sheriff need not be in actual possession of the motor vehicles. It is sufficient that said vehicles be in placed under the control of the sheriff, which in this case was effected upon service of the notices of levy and receipt thereof by the LTO. Also, under the circumstances of the case, constructive levy is the most expedient means to levy the subject motor vehicles because of the continuing resistance of Toledo Corporation (allegedly, petitioner’s sister company) to satisfy the money judgment in favor of private respondent through the fraudulent transfers of its properties in favor of petitioner.[21]
Further, private respondent insists that the levy was made on 5 March 2009, prior to the alleged registration of the subject vehicles on 16 March 2009. There is no specific provision of law or rule on execution of judgment stating that a levy is fatally defective if the notice of levy was not accompanied by a writ of execution. Hence the levy made by the NLRC sheriff on 5 March 2009 is valid and effective. Also, private respondent imputes fraudulent acts and transactions to Toledo Corporation and petitioner in hastily effecting the en masse transfer of the properties of the former to the latter immediately after Toledo Corporation received the writ of execution issued by the NLRC.[22]
Private respondent likewise impugns the authenticity and weight of the purported 16 November 2009 memorandum from the LTO Diliman District Office that allegedly set aside the notice of cancellation of registration stated in the earlier 30 April 2009 letter. To be exact, private respondent contends that the alleged memorandum is in fact an answer to an administrative complaint against the author thereof (Rodolfo Gacelo, Chief of the LTO Diliman District Office) and cannot effectively reverse or set aside the tenor of the 30 April 2009 letter.[23]
In the main, private respondent firmly asserts that the subject motor vehicles were still owned by Toledo Corporation at the time of the constructive levy. Whatever dubious sale or transfer allegedly made previously between Toledo Corporation and petitioner involving the disputed motor vehicles does not affect the effectiveness of the levy because as to the public and the whole world, said motor vehicles were all registered to Toledo Corporation at the time of the levy.[24] Thus, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s third-party claim.
The petition fails.
At the onset, an issue which was neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time before this Court.[25] It cannot be raised for the first time in this petition for certiorari where the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.[26]
In the case at bench, the Court notes that petitioner’s challenge to the levy before the NLRC was solely grounded on its third-party claim. The issue of whether or not the levy of the subject motor vehicles is procedurally valid (i.e. done in accordance with the NLRC Manual of Execution of Judgment) was never raised by petitioner before the NLRC. In fact, the assailed NLRC Decision and the two subsequent Resolutions are conspicuously bereft of any discussion or ruling on the alleged defective levy made by the NLRC sheriffs on the subject vehicles. Indeed, if petitioner really raised said issue before the public respondent, it is rather odd that the NLRC never addressed the same in any of the three issuances subject of this petition.
Albeit petitioner avers, in its petition, that it filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision and 30 September 2010 Resolution “explaining that the questioned levy is defective, illegal and invalid because (1) it was not made in accordance with Section 1 of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment; x x x,”[27] such averment, to the mind of the Court, is purely self-serving on account of petitioner’s failure to attach – to the petition filed before this Court – a copy of its alleged motion for reconsideration. As it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to allow a party to raise a question which has not been passed upon by an administrative tribunal, it is now too late to entertain it.[28]
Further, the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment, as amended (the rules governing at the time of the questioned levy), states that the NLRC or the labor arbiter issuing the writ shall have full control and supervision over the sheriff assigned to enforce the same.[29] Hence, if there was any irregularity or illegality on how the levy was effected, petitioner should have brought said issue before the NLRC so that the same may be aptly addressed or rectified by the commission.
It is settled that any objection against the levy and sale must be addressed to the judgment of the tribunal which issued the order, because it is within its jurisdiction to correct the errors or excesses of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.[30] Thus, petitioner’s remedy is not to immediately raise, on certiorari, before this Court the alleged error or irregularity in the levy, but to bring the same to the attention of the NLRC which has jurisdiction and control over its sheriffs and legal processes.
At any rate, even if this Court entertains petitioner’s arguments on the alleged procedural infirmity of the constructive levy effected by the NLRC sheriffs, still, said arguments have no legal leg to stand on.
Contrary to the unsupported legal conclusion of petitioner, the general rule long settled in this jurisdiction is that levy upon personal property may either be actual or constructive[31], i.e. the sheriff enforcing the writ takes possession of the property, actually or constructively. Indeed, jurisprudence has recognized exceptional instances[32] where constructive levy – or levy through constructive possession – of personal property is valid and substantial compliance with the rules.
Concededly, this Court is not in the position to conclusively determine whether or not the present case falls under said exceptional instances for want of sufficient evidence on the actual circumstances surrounding the constructive levy. Nonetheless, it is significant to mention that absent any proof of the alleged irregularity committed by the sheriffs, the presumption in their favor that official functions were regularly performed must be upheld. Also, the fact that the LTO acknowledged and recognized the constructive levy effected by the NLRC sheriffs is telling that said levy is valid and regular.
Delving now on the crux of the petition, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s third-party claim. The Court rules in the negative.
Judicial review of decisions of the NLRC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as a general rule, is confined only to issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. This Court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusions.[33]
This Court, however, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this determination without looking into the evidence of the parties. Necessarily, this Court can only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation to all other evidence on record.[34]
Here, the NLRC anchored the denial of petitioner’s third-party claim on the 30 April 2009 letter from the LTO Diliman District Office stating that the recording of the transfers of ownership of several vehicles owned by Toledo Corporation are ordered cancelled. Although said letter was addressed to Dumaguete Builders and Equipment Corporation (also a transferee and, allegedly, a sister company of Toledo Construction Corporation), it must be stressed that among the vehicles enumerated therein are the subject two motor vehicles registered in the name of petitioner. The LTO, through said office, found the transfers irregular and violative of the writ of execution and notices of levy issued by the NLRC. Said letter also impliedly recognized the preferred right created by the prior constructive levy effected by the NLRC sheriffs on 10 and 13 March 2009[35] in favor of the judgment-creditor as against the right of the alleged transferees of the enumerated vehicles after the constructive levy.
In contrast, petitioner’s evidence to buttress its claim of ownership is the 16 November 2009 memorandum from the LTO Diliman District Office purportedly revoking the previous order of cancellation by the LTO. While the 30 April 2009 letter and 16 November 2009 memorandum were both signed by the LTO Diliman District Office Chief, the evidentiary weight of the former vis-à-vis that of the latter was correctly distinguished by the NLRC in resolving petitioner’s third-party claim.
As aptly found by the NLRC, the 16 November 2009 memorandum is actually an answer to a complaint against the author thereof regarding the alleged irregularity in the transfer registration of the subject vehicles. Unlike the 30 April 2009 letter, said memorandum is not an official communication asserting the position of the LTO on the matter and has no binding effect on the NLRC, or on this Court, insofar as the present petition is concerned. The NLRC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disregarding said memorandum and upheld the notice of cancellation stated in the 30 April 2009 letter from the LTO.
Verily, the prior constructive levy effected in favor of private respondent and the notice from the LTO cancelling the transfers of the subject motor vehicles to petitioner only establish that the transferor (Toledo Construction Corporation) was still the registered owner of said vehicles at the time of the constructive levy. Hence, the NLRC, likewise, committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s third-party claim.
Notably, the alleged 7 June 2007 Deed of Sale, upon which petitioner anchors its claim of ownership, was neither raised in nor appended to petitioner’s third-party claim before the NLRC. This Court cannot, for the first time, consider and pass upon the same for purposes of determining grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in denying petitioner’s third-party claim.
Let it be stressed, however, that petitioner is not left without any recourse even after the denial of its third-party claim. Petitioner may still file a proper action with a competent court to recover ownership of the property (allegedly) illegally seized by the sheriff[36], and where it could fully ventilate its rights under the alleged Deed of Sale.
On a final note, lest it be forgotten, execution is the final stage of litigation. It should not be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice and equity.[37] Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party shall not be deprived of the fruits of victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.[38]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Pizarro, N.B., Chairperson, and, *Garcia-Fernandez, M.V., JJ., concur.
* Acting Junior Member, per Office Order No. 54-15-ABR, dated February 23, 2015
[1] Rollo, pages 3-15
[2] Rollo, pages 17-39
[3] Rollo, pages 40-47 and 48-50
[4] Composing of Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino, Commissioner Teresita D. Castillon-Lora, and Commissioner Napoleon M. Menese
[5] See pages 1-4 of the assailed NLRC Decision (Rollo, pp. 17-20).
[6] Rollo, pages 133-140
[7] Particularly described as an “Izuzu Elf Carry with Canopy,” Rollo, page 68
[8] Particularly described as an “Izuzu Elf Dropside,” Rollo, page 71
[9] Rollo, pages 69-70
[10] First, on 5 March 2009, and subsequently, on 10 and 13 March 2009.
[11] See page 3 of the Petition (Rollo, page 5).
[12] See Notice of Third-Party Claim and Affidavits of Third-Party Claim (Rollo, pages 57-68).
[13] See page 20 of the NLRC Decision (Rollo, page 37) and page 6 of the 30 September 2010 Resolution (Rollo, page 45).
[14] Arguments and discussions on pages 5-7 of the Petition (Rollo, pages 7-9)
[15] Pages 7-8 of the Petition (Rollo, pages 9-10)
[16] Rollo, page 193
[17] Rollo, pages 72-74
[18] See pages 8-9 of the Petition (Rollo, pages 10-11).
[19] Pages 9-11 of the Petition (Rollo, pages 11-13)
[20] Rollo, pages 110-132
[21] See paragraphs 13-24 of the Comment/Opposition (Rollo, pages 115-121).
[22] See paragraphs 25-33 of the Comment/Opposition (Rollo, pages 121-125).
[23] See paragraphs 34-41 of the Comment/Opposition (Rollo, pages 125-128).
[24] See discussions in paragraphs 42-47 of the Comment/Opposition (Rollo, pages 128-131).
[25] San Miguel Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma and Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (G.R. No. 116172, October 10, 1996); Republic of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al. (G.R. No. 108544, May 31, 1995)
[26] Philippine National Construction Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al. (G.R. No. 112629, July 7, 1995)
[27] See page 4 of the Petition (Rollo, page 6).
[28] Ismael V. Santos, et. al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. (G.R. No. 141947, July 5, 2001)
[29] Section 7, Rule III
[30] Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Rodrigo Sy Mendoza, et. al. (G.R. No. 139912, March 31, 2005)
[31] Eligio Roque and Rodrigo G. Malonjao v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et. al. (G.R. No. L-42594, October 18, 1979); The Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Higinio Macadaeg, et. al. (G.R. No. L-14174., October 31, 1960)
[32] (1) where the personal properties involved are bulky, hefty, and not capable of manual delivery (Republic of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., supra, note no. 25); and (2) where levy through actual possession is not feasible (Eligio Roque and Rodrigo G. Malonjao v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et. al., supra, note no. 31)
[33] Bernard A. Tenazas, et. al. v. R. Villegas Taxi Transport and Romualdo Villegas (G.R. No. 192998, April 2, 2014), citing Anonas Construction and Industrial Supply Corp., et al. v. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 164052, October 17, 2008)
[34] Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. and World Marine Panama, S.A. v. Catalino U. Villamater, et. al. (G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010)
[35] Supra, note no. 16
[36] Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Rodrigo Sy Mendoza, et. al. (supra, note no. 30); See also Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et, al (G.R. No. 126322, January 16, 2002).
[37] Republic of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al. (supra, note no. 25)
[38] Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc. (G.R. No. 136221, June 25, 2001)