MAXIMO NOCNOC, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ISIDORO A. VERA, DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES NORTE AND ERNESTO MANARANG, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed on October 30, 1973,
petitioner, a claimant for death compensation benefit,
assails the order of respondent
Judge of the Court of First Instance dated September 18, 1973^[1] which enjoined the execution of the order
of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit
(WCU) Regional District No. 6,
dated March 14, 1873, directing inter alia private respondent to pay petitioner-claimant the sum of P3,910.00 for the death of his son,^[2] as well as the order of the same Court dated October 10, 1973 which denied
the motion for reconsideration of above
order of September 18, 1973.^[3] The issue raised in this petition is whether respondent court of
First Instance had jurisdiction to entertain a case impugning the validity of
an award/decision of the WCU, and, in the process, enjoin its execution.

In Our resolution of November
5, 1973, petitioner-claimant’s motion to litigate as pauper was
granted, respondent was required to file an answer to the petition ? not to move to dismiss the same ? and a temporary restraining
order was issued enjoining respondent Judge from further proceedings effective
immediately and until further orders from this Court.^[4]
On December 11, 1973,
respondent CFI Judge filed his answer,^[5]
and on January 2, 1974,
petitioner-claimant filed his reply thereto.^[6]
In a manifestation and motion filed on January
9, 1974, petitioner-claimant prayed that the case be set for oral
argument before final resolution of the same by the Court.^[7]
On January 11, 1974,
private respondent Ernesto Manarang adopted
respondent Judge Vera’s answer.^[8]

The records show that on September 19, 1972, Petitioner-claimant
filed a claim for compensation under Act 3824, i.e., the Workman’s Compensation Act, as amended, with the
Workmen’s Compensation Unit (WCU), Regional District No. 6, at Naga City, for the death of his son, Norberto Nocnoc, single, who died in an accident on June 9, 1970,
while employed as a bus conductor in the transporation
business of private respondent, Ernesto Manarang.^[9]
Private respondent received a copy of the claim on February 2, 1973.^[10]
On March 7, 1973, after the period
to controvert the claim expired, private respondent moved to dismiss the claim
on the ground that petitioner had previously entered into an amicable
settlement of the claim and that petitioner-claimant had in fact received the
sum of P2,330.00.^[11]
In its order of March 14, 1973,^[12]
the WCU through its Chief Referee, Estanislao D. Sarto, denied the motion to dismiss, and instead awarded to
petitioner-claimant the sum of P6,240.00, but deducted therefrom
the aforesaid amount of P2,330.00 which was deemed as advance and/or partial
payment on the claim.  The dispositive
portion of the award, therefore, directed private respondent Manarang –

“1. To pay to
claimant father Maximo Nocnoc
x x x the sum of P3,910 as full compensation for the death of the late Roberto Nocnoc; and,

“2.
To pay to the Workmen’s Compensation Fund x x x the sum of P61.00 as administrative fee under Section 55
of the aforesaid law.”^[13]

Respondent Manarang moved
to have the award reconsidered,^[14] but his Motion for Reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit in the WCU Order of April 24, 1973.^[15] Upon the finality of the award,
claimant-petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of execution^[16] which was opposed by res­pondent on the
ground that he already filed on May 25, 1973, a petition for certiorari with this Court,^[17] the resolution of which “is a
prejudicial question.”^[18]

The “Petition for
Review on Certiorari” adverted to was, per resolution of this Court dated June 8,
1973, considered
“NOT FILED” for failure of petitioner Manarang to pay docket and legal
fees.^[19] It does not appear that he filed a motion
for reconsideration of the said resolution, but thereafter or on July 20,
1973, the writ of
execution was issued by the WCU.^[20]

On August 4,
1973, respondent
filed a complaint, entitled “Ernesto Manarang v.
Estanislao Sarto, et
al.” Civil Case No. 2438, for injunction with the Court of First
Instance, Branch II at Camarines Norte, presided by
respondent Judge to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of execution so issued,
upon his filing of a bond, to be fixed by the Court.  On August 7, 1973 respondent Judge ordered defendants,
WCU Chief Referee and the Provincial Sheriff to “cease and desist from
further orders.” In a motion for intervention dated August 9, 1973,^[21]
petitioner-claimant moved to be allowed to intervene as “the real
party-in-interest”, with prayer that his “Motion to Dismiss”,
which he attached, predicated on lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge, be admitted.^[22] In its order of August 13, 1973, respondent Judge granted the
motion for intervention but denied the motion to dismiss.^[23]

In their answer, with
counterclaim, dated August 23, 1973^[24] defendants (Chief Referee and Provincial
Sheriff) and intervenor (petitioner-claimant) prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint.  Upon
the other hand, plaintiff ? now private respondent ? in his
reply^[25]
prayed for the dismissal of the counter­claim and that the injunction already
issued be made permanent.  The questioned orders of September 18, 1973 and October 19, 1973 were thereafter issued.^[26]
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.^[27]

As adverted to earlier, the question now before Us is whether the Court of First Instance, as a court of
general jurisdiction, can entertain
a case impugning the validity of the award of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit
and, in the process restrain the enforcement of a writ of execution issued by
its Chief Referee.

Petitioner-claiman contends that the
Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to entertain a Workmen’s
Compensation case since it has no jurisdiction whatsoever over the same.^[28] Neither can it enjoin the execution of an
award by the Workmen’s Compensation Unit, an independent administrative body
fully clothed by law with authority to adjudicate matters relative to Workmen’s
Compensation cases.^[29]

On the other hand, respondent Judge insists that “in issuing
the injunctive order in Civil Case No. 2438 (he) did so, not in the exercise of
any appellate jurisdiction over the Workmen’s Compensation Commission because
he has none, but in the exercise of his power as a court of general
jurisdiction in a case filed before him.^[30]
For according to respondent Judge, “he cannot evade his solemn duty of
giving redress to a litigant who claims that his constitutional right to a day
in court has been denied.”^[31]
Respondent Judge’s position, therefore, is that while he has no appellate
jurisdiction over the Workmen’s Compensation case, he may “x x x in the exercise of his power
as a court of general jurisdiction x x x (give) redress to a litigant who claims that his
constitutional right to a day in court has been denied”.

Respondent Judge’s position is not well-taken.  This petition is invested with merit.

1. Respondent Judge’s disclaimer of appellate jurisdiction over
Workmen’s Compensation cases is well-taken pursuant to Sec. 46, Act 3423 or the
Workmen’s Compensation Act as amended by RA 772, to wit:

“SEC. 46.  Jurisdiction.  The Work­men’s Compensation Commission
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation
under the Work­men’s Compenstion Act, subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court, in the same manner and in the same period
provided by law and by Rules of Court for appeal from the Court of Industrial
Relations to the Supreme Court.” (Underscoring supplied.)

But his assertion of jurisdiction over
private respondent Manarang’s complaint for
injunction ? arising from
proceedings before the Workmen’s Compensation Unit, on the ground that his
court “is one of general juris­diction” ? is contrary to his court’s admitted lack of jurisdiction
? whether original or
appellate ? over Workmen’s
Compensation cases.  For, in reviewing
the alleged nullity of the award and enjoining its execution, respondent Judge
assumed jurisdiction over a matter which could have been elevated from the Work­men’s
Compensation Unit to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, and, thereafter, on
appeal, to this Court.  This, he cannot
do, for “x x x the
decisions, orders and awards entered by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
are appealable to the Supreme Court.  x x x (T)he Court of First Instance is not empowered or
clothed with jurisdiction to review or modify, much less, annul an award or order
of execution issued by the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission.”^[32]

The law and jurisprudence are thus clear, unequivocal.  No further interpretation is necessary.  The proper forum to thresh out the validity
of the WCU’s award ? which is allegedly null and void because it was rendered
without giving the private respondent his constitutional right to due process, as
well as the validity of the ensuing writ of execution to enforce the same ? is the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, and, on appeal, this Court and not any other, much less
respondent’s court.  In point of fact,
respondent Manarang filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari earlier with this Court on May
25, 1973.  This, however, was
considered “NOT FILED” per this Court’s resolution of June 8, 1973 for his failure to pay
docket and legal fees.  Since he did not
pursue the said remedy by seeking the reconsideration of this Court’s
resolution and/or paying the required fees, and, instead, went to respondent
Judge’s court and filed the complaint for injunction, he may be deemed to have
abandoned the appropriate recourse of appeal to the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission and to this Court.

2. Now, as to private respondent’s claim
that he was denied his day in court.  The
WCU correctly found that the claim was not controverted
by private respondent within the period prescribed by the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended, and the Commission Rules, which require controversion of the claim within fourteen (14) days from
the date of the disability or within ten (10) days after the employer or his
representative first acquired knowledge of the disability resulting from the
accident or illness.  This finding was
not disputed by private respondent.  And,
as a matter of fact, private respondent paid petitioner-claimant P2,330.00 in an attempt to settle the case amicably.  The failure to controvert is fatal to the
defense of the claim.^[33]
The Commission Rules specifically provides that failure to controvert within
the period “may result in the issuance of an award, if warranted by
substantial evidence, without necessity of any formal hearings.”^[34]
We have recognized this right of the Labor Regional Administrator (now Chief of
Workmen’s Compensation Unit) to immediately issue an award without notice and hearing where the employer failed
to seasonably submit the employer’s report or notice of controversion
in accordance with and in the manner provided for under Sections 37 and 45 of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act.^[35]

Specifically, it has been held that after
the failure to controvert, an employer cannot raise the question of being
denied its day in court.^[36]

3. Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction over the private
respondent’s complaint in Civil Case No. 2438 on the basis of private
respondent’s claim that he was denied his day in court and on his (respondent
Judge’s) impression that as a “court of general jurisdiction“,
the Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction over the case and give the relief prayed for ? as he did.  Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that
the phrase “court of general juris­diction” is merely
descriptive of Courts of First Instance (CFI) which have original jurisdiction
over civil, criminal and other cases in contra-distinction to courts of
special, limited jurisdiction, e.g., the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR), the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the Circuit Criminal Courts (CCC), the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts (JDRC) and so forth. 
The descriptive phrase, however, does not and cannot confer CFI’s with
power to entertain an incident involving a Workmen’s Compensation case, which
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
(WCC), and of this Court, in case of an appeal. 
For jurisdiction to be properly vested in a court or body, it must be
expressly provided by law, and, in the case of Courts of First Instance, by the
Judiciary Act, as amended, not by a phrase descriptive of the extent and scope
of the Court’s competence.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the orders of respondent Judge
dated September 18 and October 10, 1973, are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.  The restraining order issued by
this Court on November 5, 1973,
is hereby MADE PERMANENT.  This decision
and the award of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit are immediately executory.

Fernando, (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino,
and Concepcion,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., concurs. Indeed, We did not have to rule on
the allegation of petitioner about denial of due process because that is a
matter deemed resolved already in the certiorari case the Court had dismissed.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 76.

^[2]
Id., p. 31.

^[3]
Id., p. 82.

^[4]
Id., p. 87.

^[5]
Id., p. 104.

^[6]
Id., p. 119.

^[7] Id.,
p. 125.

^[8]
Id., p. 128.

^[9]
Id., pp. 8-9 (Petition); See also Id., p. 31 (Order).

^[10]
Id., p. 31 (Order).

^[11]
Id., p. 29.

^[12]
Id., p. 31.

^[13]
Id., p. 34.

^[14] Id., p. 35 (Motion for
Reconsideration).

^[15]
Id., p. 39.

^[16]
Id., p. 40.

^[17]
Id., p. 43.

^[18]
Id., p. 41.

^[19]
Id., p. 49.

^[20]
Id., p. 50.

^[21]
Id., p. 61.

^[22]
Id., p. 64.

^[23]
Id., p. 68.

^[24]
Id., p. 69.

^[25]
Id., p. 74.

^[26]
See supra, notes 2 and 3.

^[27]
Id., p. 7.

^[28]
Id., p. 122 (Reply).

^[29]
Id. p. 16.

^[30]
Id., p. 111.

^[31]
Ibid.

^[32]
Sumilang v. Castillo, et al.,
L-16172, April 28, 1962, 4
SCRA 1203 1207; Emphasis
supplied.  See also Castro v. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208 (1953); Ambrosio
et al. v. Hon. Judge Serafin
Salvador et al., G.R. No. L-47651, December 11, 1978, to the
effect that a Court of First Instance has no authority to issue an injunction
against the Public Service Commission or any other court or semi-judicial body
of equal rank (Iloilo Commercial and Ice Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 56 Phil. 28; Regalado v. Prov. Constabulary Commander of Negros Occidental, 113 Phil. 490), nor
against the Social Security Commission which in exercising its quasi-judicial
functions ranks with the Court of First Instance and the defunct Public Service
Commission (Poblete Const. Co. v. Social
Security Commission 119 Phil. 264), nor against the Patent Office.  (Kabushiki Kaisha v.
San Diego, L-22756, March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 406) and the Court of Agrarian
Relations (Belleza v. Dimson
Farms, Inc. L-33355, April 11, 1972, 44 SCRA 385).

^[33]
Pampanga
Sugar Mills v. Vda. de
Espeleta, L-24073, Jan. 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 325.

^[34]
The full text of Sec. 2, Rule 9 of the Commission Rules reads:

“SEC. 2.  Failure
to Answer or Controvert May Result in the Issuance of an Award. – Failure of
the employer or carrier to file the report or answer as required under Sec. 1,
Rule 7 or to controvert with­in the period and/or in the manner provided in the
preceding rule may result in the issuance of an award, if warranted by
substantial evidence without necessity of any formal hearing.”

^[35]
Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Villanueva, et al, L-15658, August 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 995, Aboitiz
Shipping Corp. v. Oqueria, et al. L-20998, Aug. 31, 1965,
14 SCRA 1046; Natl. Dev Cp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et
al., L-20504, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 544; Mla.
Railroad Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al. L-21501, September
15, 1967, 21 SCRA 98; Mla.
Railroad Co. v.
WCC, et al., L-21901, August 10, 1967,
20 SCRA 967.

^[36]
Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al.,
L-25665, May
22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285.