BARTOLOME BARNIDO AND MELECIO BARNIDO, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. MARIANO BALANA AND MERITO C. PERFECTO, AS JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF STO. DOMINGO, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Barnido versus Balana

The Case

This is the story of two brothers, Bartolome Barnido and Melecio Barnido, who lost a small damages case before a justice of the peace court in Santo Domingo, Albay, and then lost their appeal not because they were late, but because the municipal treasurer told them the wrong amount to pay. The case is a petition for relief from judgment that the Court of First Instance of Albay dismissed, and which the Supreme Court now reviews on appeal. It matters for two reasons. First, it fixes the rule on what perfects an appeal from a justice of the peace court to the Court of First Instance. Second, and more importantly for the bar, it holds that a litigant who relies in good faith on the information of a public officer charged with collecting the fees is not answerable for that officer's mistake. The appeal is treated as substantially complied with, and the dismissal is reversed.

Procedural History

The case began as a criminal complaint for theft of firewood filed by the Chief of Police before the Justice of the Peace Court of Santo Domingo, Albay. Mariano Balana was acquitted. In its judgment of acquittal, the justice of the peace court went further and observed that the charge appeared to have been maliciously brought by Melecio Barnido and his brother Bartolome. Prompted by those remarks, Balana filed a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution in the same justice of the peace court. That court rendered judgment in Balana's favor, ordering the Barnido brothers to pay moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs. A copy of the decision was served on the defendants. The defendants then attempted to appeal to the Court of First Instance of Albay, but the justice of the peace denied the appeal for a shortage in the appellate docket fee. The defendants filed a petition for relief from judgment in the Court of First Instance of Albay. That court dismissed the petition, holding that the treasurer is not an officer of the court and that the defendants, being represented by counsel, must have acted on their counsel's advice, so the failure to pay the correct amount was neither mistake nor excusable negligence. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court in forma pauperis, and the Supreme Court reversed.

Facts

On November 24, 1959, Mariano Balana was acquitted by the Justice of the Peace Court of Santo Domingo, Albay of the theft of five bundles of firewood valued at two pesos and fifty centavos, belonging to Melecio Barnido. The court found that no one had seen the accused steal the firewood. Going beyond the acquittal, it stated that its findings led it to believe the case had been maliciously brought by Melecio Barnido and his brother Bartolome.

Prompted by those remarks, Balana filed a civil suit for damages for malicious prosecution against the two brothers in the same justice of the peace court the very next day. That court rendered judgment for Balana, ordering the brothers to pay three thousand pesos in moral damages, one thousand pesos in exemplary damages, three hundred pesos in attorney's fees, and the costs. A copy of the decision was served on the defendants on July 22, 1960.

The parties stipulated the rest of the facts. On August 2, 1960, the defendants personally went to the municipal treasurer of Santo Domingo, Albay to deposit the cash appeal bond and the appellate docket fee. The treasurer asked only twenty-four pesos as the appellate docket fee, and the defendants relied on his competence. On August 3, 1960, they filed their notice of appeal, the cash appeal bond, and the docket fee in the form of a treasurer's certification. On August 4, 1960, the justice of the peace issued an order denying the appeal because of a shortage of sixteen pesos in the docket fee, but stating that the appeal could be admitted once the proper fees were filed. At that time, two days remained within which to perfect the appeal. The order was sent by registered mail to the defendants' counsel, who received it only on August 16, 1960, although he was verbally informed of it on August 13, 1960. Two days after that verbal notice, on August 15, 1960, counsel caused the defendants to pay the additional sixteen pesos. By then, the fifteen-day period to perfect the appeal had expired, the last day having fallen on August 6, 1960.

Issues

• Whether or not the failure of the defendants to pay the correct appellate docket fee, caused by their reliance on the erroneous information of the municipal treasurer, constitutes mistake or excusable negligence entitling them to relief from judgment.
• Whether or not the defendants substantially complied with the requirements of the law for perfecting an appeal from the justice of the peace court to the Court of First Instance.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 40, Sections 2 and 3, on appeal from a justice of the peace court, provides:

The rule requires that to perfect an appeal from a decision of a justice of the peace court, besides filing a notice of appeal and giving a bond within the period of fifteen days, he must pay the docket fee of P10.00 (in the case at bar P40.00) to the municipal treasurer (Sections 2 and 3, Rule 40).

This is the provision the Court applies in measuring whether the defendants did what the law required to perfect their appeal, and it is the basis for the ruling that the totality of the fees must be deposited within the fifteen-day period.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the failure to deposit the correct amount was due to the mistake of the municipal treasurer and not to the fault of the defendants. The Court relied on its earlier ruling in Tagulao versus Padlanmundok, where the appellant, likewise represented by counsel, was told by the municipal treasurer to deposit only thirty pesos when the totality of the fees required was thirty-five pesos. The Court there said:

Apparently, the failure of appellant to pay the required docket fee is due to the mistake of the municipal treasurer and not to the fault of appellant for he merely relied on the information given him by said official. For this mistake, appellant should not be made answerable, for he acted in good faith relying upon the word of the municipal treasurer who because of the nature of his duties is in a position to know the correct amount of the fees needed to perfect an appeal. To hold otherwise would be unfair and unjust and would amount to a miscarriage of justice.

The Court reinforced this with the rule that every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, and that to penalize such a citizen for relying upon that officer in good faith is repugnant to justice. The fact that the defendants were represented by counsel did not change the result, because the mistake was the treasurer's, not counsel's.

On the second issue, the Court held that the defendants had substantially complied with the requirements of the law for perfecting an appeal from the inferior court to the Court of First Instance. The notice of appeal, the bond, and the docket fee had all been filed within the period, and the shortage was promptly cured once the defendants learned of it. The appeal should therefore have been given due course.

Doctrine

First, to perfect an appeal from a justice of the peace court to the Court of First Instance, the appellant must, within the fifteen-day period, file a notice of appeal, give a bond, and pay the docket fee to the municipal treasurer. Second, a litigant who in good faith relies on the information of the municipal treasurer as to the correct amount of the fees acts in good faith and is not answerable for the treasurer's mistake. Every citizen has the right to assume that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows and performs them according to law, and to penalize that reliance is repugnant to justice. Third, where the appellant has done everything required within the period and the only defect is a shortage caused by the officer's error, there is substantial compliance and the appeal should be admitted. These rules tie directly to the requirement in Rule 40, Sections 2 and 3, that the docket fee be paid to the municipal treasurer within the fifteen-day period.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay and ordered the municipal judge of Santo Domingo, Albay to transmit to the Court of First Instance of Albay all the original papers and the rest of the record of the civil case for further proceedings, with no costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a citizen may trust that a public officer charged by law with a duty knows and performs it, and cannot be penalized for relying on that officer in good faith. Examiners use this case on the perfection of appeals from justice of the peace courts, on substantial compliance with the docket fee requirement, and on the doctrine that the mistake of the municipal treasurer is not the fault of the appellant.