DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ SR. PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINIS­TRATION), WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND/OR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, RESPOND…

Petition for review on certiorari filed on May 18, 1978 of
the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) dated December 9,
1975, absolving respondent Republic (National Irrigation Administration, or
NIA) from liability, and reversing the decision dated January 27, 1975 of
Acting Referee Benjamin R. Perez of Regional Office No. 4, Workmen’s
Compensation Unit, Manila, which granted petitioner disability benefits and
allowed him reimbursement for medical expenses.

On August 15, 1978,
respondent Secretary, now Minister, of Labor Bias F. Ople,^[1]
after extension, filed his Comment^[2]
thru Ministry counsel Lydia Arada-Navarro.  Acting Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza,^[3]
also after extentions, filed his Comment^[4]
on October 20, 1978.  On November
3, 1978, petitioner filed his Reply.^[5]
Per resolution of March 7, 1979,^[6]
the Court – with the end in view of a speedy disposition of this petition
considering that it is a workman’s compensation case – resolved to consider (a)
respondents’ comments as answer to the petition, and (b) the case submitted for
decision.

The undisputed factual and procedural antecedents of the case
follow.  Petitioner Domingo C. Enriquez
Sr. entered the government service on September
18, 1952 as a carpenter in the then Bureau of Public Works.  Later he be­came a supervising security
guard.  About twelve years thereafter, or
on October 12, 1964, he
transferred to the National Irrigation Administration as Senior Security
Guard.  He held the same position until
February 19, 1973 when he suffered a stroke due to hypertension which,
according to the Certification^[7]
of Dr. Romulo G. Guevara, Jr., his attending
physician at the Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center where
he was confined, resulted in:  (a) paralyzation of the right side of his body (he was found to
have only 20% motor power of the right upper and lower extremities), (b)
slurring of speech (dysarthria) and (c) total
incapacity for work.  It also appears
from the same certification that petitioner is also afflicted with diabetes
mellitus, and that “he has been advised against working again as this may
aggravate his condition and possibly precipitate another cerebral stroke.”

At the time of his incapacity and eventual retirement in 1973,
petitioner, then 58 years old, was receiving an annual salary of P3,612.00.

On July 5, 1973,
petitioner filed a Notice of Injury or Sickness and Claim for Compensation with
the Workmen’s Compensation Unit, Regional Office No. 4, Manila.^[8]
The Solicitor General controverted the claim on August 27, 1973.  On January
27, 1975, the Acting Referee, Benjamin R. Perez, rendered a
decision^[9]
in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

“Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of claimant and against respondent, ordering the latter:

1.      
To pay claimant the sum of
P6,000.00 for disability benefits; and the additional sum of P2,078.52 for
reimbursement of medical expenses incurred;

2.      
To pay direct to this Office the
sum of P61.00 pursuant to Section 55 of the Act.”

On March 3, 1975,
the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
decision.  Said motion was denied by the
Acting Referee in an order dated April
29, 1975, whereupon he elevated the records of the case to the
Workmen’s Compensa­tion Commission for review.

On December 9, 1975, the Commission^[10]
rendered a decision^[11]
reversing the decision of the Acting Referee and absolving respondent Republic
from liability on the ground that petitioner’s main illness, hypertension, and
the accompanying diabetes mellitus “are not disabling ailments, because
they are caused by a degenerative changes due to ageing process, which could be
cured by proper food and medication” (sic).

Hence this petition, petitioner insisting on the compensability
of his ailment and praying for the reversal of the Commission’s decision and
reinstatement of the Acting Referee’s decision.

On the other hand, the Commission and/or the Minister of Labor
alleges in his Comment that “hypertension is an ordinary disease of life
to which the general public is exposed, and may be contracted anywhere . .
.” The Acting Solicitor General in his Comment also contends that
“(H)yper­tension is an ordinary and common
ailment to which the general public is exposed and the same ailment may be
contracted anytime and anywhere, but not necessarily contracted because of the
nature of petitioner’s work, or that the nature of his work aggravated his
hypertension.” He adds further that “if he (petitioner) had the
stroke on February 23, 1973,
the same was not due to the nature of his work as a security guard, as he had
been accustomed to said work for the past twenty years, ‘but due to his
hypertensive condition.  Disability
resulting from a pre-existing hypertension, which has nothing to do with
petitioner’s employment, is not within the beneficient
provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.”

From the foregoing discussions, the principal issue to be
resolved in this petition is whether or not petitioner’s disability due to
hypertension is compensable.

We find merit in this petition and hold that petitioner’s
disability due to hypertension is compensable.

1. The statutory presumption of compensability of the claim is
applicable in this case. Section 44, paragraph (1) of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act as amended provides:

x        x          x

“SEC. 44. 
Presumption.  In any proceeding
for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under this Act, it shall be
presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary –

1. That the claim comes within the provisions of this Act;”

x        x          x

Petitioner’s allegation that “when
(he) started working with respondent NIA (in 1964), he was of good and sound
health, free from any kind of disease, as a condition precedent for his
employment”^[12]
is not disputed by respondents.  It is also
admitted that petitioner’s symptoms of hypertension appeared only sometime in
January 1970.^[13]
Hence, it can be correctly said that petitioner’s hypertension supervened in
the course of his employment, and in accordance with the aforequoted
Section 44 (1) in relation to Section 2,^[14]
it is presumed that petitioner’s hypertension was service-connected, and
therefore compensable.  This, We have
consistently held in a number of cases^[15]
and the burden of proof is shifted to the employer to show by substantial evidence
that while the illness subject of the claim supervened in the course of
employment, it does not necessarily follow that it also arose from such
employment or was at least aggravated by it.^[16]
Here, respondents failed to discharge that burden.  As aforestated, the
Commission and/or the Minister of Labor merely claims that ”hypertension is an
ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed and may be
contracted anywhere x x x”
while the Acting Solicitor General alleges that “(H)ypertension
is an ordinary and common ailment to which the general public is exposed and
the same ailment may be contracted anytime and anywhere, but not necessarily
contracted because of the nature of petitioner’s work, or that the nature of
his work aggravated his hypertension.” 
These bare assertions are inadequate to destroy the statutory
presumption of compensability of the claim. 
It has been held that the evidence necessary to destroy this presumption
must do more than create a doubt.  It
should be such as a reasonable mind must accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.^[17]
Here no attempt was made to show that petitioner’s hypertension was not
service-connected, or that it has not been aggravated by the nature of the
work.  Hence, the pesumption
of compensability prevails.

2. Even assuming that petitioner’s hypertension was not
service-connected, still, under the rule of aggravation enunciated in Belmonte vs. WCC^[18]
petitioner’s disability is compensable.  In
that case, the referee made the following findings and conclusion:

x        x          x

“There is no dispute over the medical testimony that
deceased’s cerebro-vascular hemorrhage was directly
caused by hypertension- not by his work; that the hypertension was not traceable
to the nature of his employment but by causes which may be personal and
unrelated to work.  The question now is: since
deceased had a case of pre-existing hypertension …, was the same possibly
aggravated by the nature of his job as to have precipitated the fatal condition
of cerebro-vascular hemorrhage? On this score, we
have to rule in the affirmative taking into consideration the nature and extent
of his duties which we have already decided as bordering on the rigorous
category.”

x        x          x

This Court, thru Mr. Justice Teehankee, affirmed the referee’s conclusion thus:

x        x          x

“… even though the illness of hypertension which caused the
fatal stroke of the deceased may not have been directly caused by his
employment nor the nature thereof, still it has been sufficiently shown that
said illness was aggravated by his employment of 24 years performing the
duties (many times simultaneously) of letter-carrier and acting postmaster of
the Barotac Nuevo post office…”

x        x          x

The same is true in this case, where peti­tioner’s hypertension
can be said to have been aggravated by the nature of his work.  As claimed by petitioner in his Reply,
“(S)ymptons of his ailments began to manifest
sometime in January, 1970. 
Notwithstanding the physical predicament imposed upon him by his
ailment, temporarily relieved only by administration of prescribed medicines,
he continued the regular performance of his official tasks which required him
to be always on alert in protection and preservation not only of the properties
of the National Irrigation Administration from pilferage but also the lives of
persons within the premises of said government agency.  The strain of his work was compounded when
he had been assigned frequent night duty which thus exposed him to greater
risks of his life and of his health. 
The nature of his work which caused him worries, apprehension, fear and
threats from unwelcomed (sic) elements instigated
(sic) his physical and emotional instability which finally predisposed him to
his cerebro-vascular attack (CVA, cerebral thrombosis)
on February 19, 1973, causing his right-sided paralysis.”  In view of the foregoing, We are convinced,
as enunciated in Belmonte case, that
petitioner’s illness “falls within the rule of aggravation provided
in Section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act” because “(A)ll that the Act requires to entitle claimants to its
benefits is a showing that the nature of the deceased’s work and duties did
aggravate his illness as in this case.”^[19]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission dated December 9, 1973 absolving respondent Republic (NIA) from
liability is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the former award made by the
Acting Referee Benjamin R. Perez in favor of petitioner REVIVED and REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Aquino, Concepcion,
Jr., and Abad
Santos, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., (Chairman), concurs in a separate opinion.

Antonio, J., dissents from the
well-written opinion of Mr. Justice G. S. Santos. Votes for the affirmance of the WCC’s decision.

^[1]
The Secretary, now Minister, of Labor was made a party respondent because the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) was abolished by PD 442 (Labor Code),
effective as of March 31, 1976 and all cases and matters not resolved upon its
abolition were transferred to and assumed by the Department, now Ministry, of
Labor (See Petition, Rollo, p. 2, and Article
297, PD 442).

^[2] Rollo, p. 35.

^[3]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio
Raquel-Santos and Solicitor Salvador C. Jacob.

^[4] Rollo, p. 61.

^[5] Id.,
p. 69.

^[6] Id.,
p. 78.

^[7] Id.,
p. 17, Petition, Annex “O”.

^[8]
This case, therefore, filed before March
31, 1975 with the WCU, Regional Office No. IV, shall be processed
and adjudicated in accordance with the law, rules and pro­cedure, existing
prior to the effectivity of the Employees’
Compensation and State Insurance Fund. 
See Art. 300, par. 2, Labor Code, as amended, specifically by PD
626.  Cf, Lizardo vs. WCC et al, L-42995, March 14, 1979, fn. 5.

^[9] Id.,
p. 13, Petition, Annex “B”.

^[10]
Composed of Associate Commissioners Eugenio I. Sagmit Jr. and Herminia Castelo Sotto.

^[11] Rollo, p. 12, Petition, Annex “A”.

^[12] Id.,
Petition, p. 5.

^[13] Id.,
Petition, p. 5; Comment, WCC and/or Minister of Labor, p. 37; Comment, Acting
Solicitor General, p. 65.

^[14]
“SECTION 2.  Grounds for
Compensation.  – When an employee suffers
personal injury from any, accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such
employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such
employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons
hereinafter specified.”

^[15]
Central Azucarera Don Pedro vs. Agno and WCC, 12 SCRA 178; Abana vs.
Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278; Legason
vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 213; Baterna vs. WCC,
75 SCRA 409; Vda. de Galang
vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 679; Guevara vs. Republic, 77 SCRA 292; Caling vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 311; Evangelista vs. WCC,
77 SCRA 497; Pillsbury Mindanao Flour Milling Co., Inc. vs. Murillo, 81
SCRA 307; Lamco vs. WCC, L-43575, July 31,
1978; Saril vs. WCC, L-43204, July 31, 1978.

^[16] Lizardo vs. WCC, L-42995, March 14,.1979.  See also: 
Justiniano vs. WCC, 18 SCRA 677; Magalona vs. WCC, 21 SCRA 1199; Belmonte
vs. WCC, 58 SCRA 138, Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60
SCRA 228; Ruelan vs. RP 70 SCRA 615.

^[17] Lizardo vs. WCC, supra.

^[18] Supra,
fn. 16.

^[19]
See fn. 14.

150
Clean
Clean

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