UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, CAMILO PEÑA AND DOMINGO CAJIPE, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal by certiorari from the Court of Appeals decision
(CA-G. R. No. 29903 -R) affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Manila in Special Civil Case No. 45953, enjoining res­pondents therein, the
President of the University of the Philippines (hereinafter termed UP), the
Board of Regents and the Director of the Philippine Gen­eral Hospital, from
dismissing the petitioners Camilo V. Peña and Domingo Cajipe, respondents
herein, from the service as classified civil service employees of the
Philippine General Hospital (here­inafter called the PGH).

The Petition for Injunction in Special Civil Case No. 45953 filed
by Messrs. Camilo V. Peña and Domingo Cajipe with the Court of First Instance
of Manila on 4 January 1961 arose when said petitioners, as Assistant Cashier
and Special Disbursing Officer and Collection Officer, respectively, of the
PGH, were administratively charged and investi­gated (with seven others) by a
UP -PGH Investigating Committee for “grave misconduct and dishonesty”
and “infidelity in the custody of public documents”. After fifty-nine hearings, excluding
executive sessions, the Committee submitted its report to the authorities of the
University of the Philippines, on the basis of which the Board of Regents
adopted a resolution approving the report and fixing the penalties, which, with
respect to respondents herein, was dismissal. With the filing of the Petition for Injunction, petitioners therein sought to restrain the UP President from
dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not
be dismissed from the PGH by the UP President but by the Civil Service
Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals under
Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959; to
declare petitioners who are classified civil service employees as governed by
Republic Act No. 2260 and not by the UP Charter in so far as removal, dismissal
or separation from the govern­ment service are concerned; and to nullify the
findings of the Investigating Committee.

On 9 January 1961, the trial court issued an order restraining
the petitioner herein from carrying out the acts complained of, and on 14
January 1961, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the said
court. On 6 February 1961, Peña and
Cajipe filed a supplemental petition for injunction, impleading the Board of
Regents of the UP and the Director of the PGH as additional respondents. On 10 July 1961, after trial on the merits,
the trial court rendered a decision granting both the original and supplemental
petitions for injunction, and making permanent the preliminary writ restraining
respondents therein from dismissing petitioners Peña and Cajipe. A motion to have the decision reconsidered
was denied. On 15 September 1961,
petitioner herein appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in its decision of 29
August 1967, sustained the trial court’s judgment. A motion for reconsideration was also filed, but the same was
denied. Hence, this instant petition
for Review by Certiorari with this Court.

The sole issue raised by petitioner in this appeal is whether the
dis­missal of respondents by the Board of Regents is final, or requires further
action by the Civil Service Commission.

From its inception, under the Civil Commission of the
Philippines, down to the inauguration of the Philippine Republic^[1] the Civil Service
laws have conferred upon the Director (later Commissioner) of Civil Service
exclusive charge of all formal investigations against civil service employees,
and his decision or recommendation regarding discipline, removal, separation
and suspension of civil service employees was, and is, made final, subject only
to appeal first to the Chief Executive or later
to the Civil Service Board of Appeals.^[2] This authority of the Civil Service
Commission was applied to the employees of the Philippine General Hospital,
that from 1936 to 1947 was under the administrative jurisdiction of the Office
of the President, with the power of removal over the personnel thereof being
exercised by the Commissioner of Civil Service.

However, Republic Act No. 51, enacted on 4 October 1946, and
entitled “An Act Authorizing the President of the Philippines to
Reorganize Within one year the different Executive Departments, Bureaus,
Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities of the Government, including the
Corpora­tions owned or controlled by it”, provides that -?

“SECTION 1. In order
to meet the exi­gencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and
independent Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, and for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and
efficiency in its operation, the President of the Philippines is authorized to
effect by executive order from time to time, for a period not exceeding one
year from the date of the approval of this Act, and within the limits of the
total authorized appropriation for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and
forty-seven, such reforms and changes in the different executive departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentali­ties of the Government,
including the corporations owned or controlled by the Government, as he may
deem necessary, with the power to diminish, add to or abolish those existing
and create new ones; consolidate related undertakings; transfer functions,
appropriations, equipment, property, records, and personnel from one
department, bureau office, agency or instrumentality to another eliminate
duplicated ser­vices or authorize new ones not provided for, classify, combine,
split or abolish positions; standardize sa­laries; and do whatever is necessary
and desirable to effect economy and promote efficiency in the govern­ment
service.”

Pursuant to the authority thus granted, the President, by
Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947, section 158, prescribed as follows:

“The Philippine General Hospital is hereby transferred from
the Office of the President to the University of the Philippines, together with
its personnel, powers, functions,
duties, records, equipment, supplies and unexpended balance of
appropriations. The appropriations for
the Philippine General Hospital shall continue to be itemized in the annual
general appropriations act.”

It is the contention of private respondents herein (petitioners
below) that, despite the transfer of the Hospital to the U. P., the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commissioner over them, as civil service
employees, in matters affecting administrative discipline, suspension, and removal,
as provided in the various Civil Service laws, remained unimpaired and did not
pass to the University authorities.

Petitioner University, upon the other hand, invokes disciplinary
power over the private respondents on the basis of the express words of Section
6 (e) of the University Charter (Act No. 1870, as amended) couched in the
following terms:

“To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of the
University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the
University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties
and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them in its discretion leave of
absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other pro­visions of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after
investigation and hearing shall have been had. (Act No. 1870, as amended by Act No. 2759, 23 February 1918, and
Act No. 3745, 24 November 1930). (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Hospital employees, Peña and Cajipe, in support of their
position, stress the provisions of Section 695 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended, to the effect that – –

“SEC. 695. Administrative
discipline of subordinate officers and employees. — The Commissioner of
Civil Service shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the removal, separation
and sus­pension of subordinate officers and employees in the Civil Service and
over all other matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of
such subordinate officers and employees, and shall have exclusive charge of all
formal administrative investigations against them. He may, for neglect of duty or violation of reasonable office
regula­tions, or in the interest of the public service, remove any subordinate
officer or employee from the service, suspend him without pay for not
more than two months, reduce his salary or compensation, or deduct therefrom
any sum not exceeding one month’s pay. From any decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service on administrative
investigations, an appeal may be taken by the officer or employee concerned to
the Civil Service Board of Appeals within thirty days after receipt by him of
the decision.”

The employees’ contention, that the Civil Service Commissioner’s
statutory jurisdiction excludes that of the UP authorities, would be cogent and
tenable were it not for the fact that the Legislature itself has established
specific exceptions to the exclusive authority of the Civil Service
Commissioner, by lodging in various entities administrative disciplinary power
over their employees. One instance is
that of the UP Charter, Section 6(e), heretofore quoted. Another exception is found in Section 14 of
the Central Bank Charter (Republic Act No. 265) which this Court has ruled to
vest in the Monetary Board the power of investigation and removal of Central
Bank officials (except the Bank Governor), “though they be subject to the
Civil Service Law and Regulations in other
respects” as declared in Castillo vs. Bayona, 106 Phil. 1121. The existence of these exceptions to the general
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Com­missioner is confirmed by the Civil
Service Law of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260), which in its Section 16, defining
and enumerating the Com­missioner’s powers, specified that —

“(i)  Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all permanent
officers and employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, dis­cipline, and efficiency
of such officers, and employees; and to prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the
administration of discipline;”

(Emphasis
supplied)

Since it must be presumed that the President was cognizant of the
administrative disciplinary powers, particularly that of removal, vested by law
(the UP Charter) upon its Board of Regents and President, the act of the Chief
Executive in transferring the Philippine General Hospital from the Office of the President to the
University of the Philippines clearly evinced the intention to place the
Hospital employees under the adminis­trative power of the University in matters
of their discipline, suspension or removal, on a par with the other employees
of the University. Had the intent been
otherwise, the 1947 Executive Order No. 94 would have ex­cepted or reserved the
disciplinary power of the Commissioner of the Civil Service over the
transferred employees, in the same manner that said Executive Order specified
that the appropriations for the Hospital “shall continue to be itemized in
the annual general appropriations acts” (Executive Order No. 94, Section
158, supra). In this connection,
the previous uncontested acts of the Civil Service authorities in endorsing to
the University for action the administrative cases of Hospital employees
Fernandez and Gorospe, and declaring that “the Bureau had no disciplinary
jurisdiction over said employees in view of the provisions of the University
charter”, constitutes con­temporary executive interpretation of highly
persuasive character.

Since the Hospital is intended to serve, and does serve, the
academic, training, and research requirements of the students enrolled in the
UP College of Medicine, which College is part of the UP and under the administrative control of the University
President and Board of Regents, the requisite harmony and cooperation between
the Medical College and the Hospital would be greatly impeded by subjecting the
two units to different administrative controllers, with one governed by the UP
Presi­dent and Board of Regents and the other by the Civil Service Commissioner
and the Civil Service Board of Appeals. The simplicity, economy and efficiency sought to be attained by Republic
Act No. 51 in authorizing the reorganization of the Executive branch of the
Government would not be achieved by such division of authority; and the
maintenance of the dichotomy (which would invite obnoxious comparisons and
friction between two sets of employees) is not to be implied, absent solid
evidence of the existence of any such purpose on the part of the Legislature or
the President of the Philippines. We
have found no such evidence to exist.

Ultimately, what is important is that the provisions of Article
XII, Section 4, of the Constitution, that “no officer or employee in the
Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law”, as well as the due process clause of the Bill of Rights, should be
fully observed and implemented; and the record
is clear that in the case of herein respondents Peña and Cajipe, no deficiency exists on this score. Pursuant to the express precept in
the University charter [in its Section
6 (e)] that its employees be removed only “for cause after in­vestigation
and hearing shall have been had”, the herein respondents were investigated
by a committee of the University and the committee recommended their dismissal
after mature deliberation. Before the
pro­ceedings were closed, these respondents manifested that they had no
complaints regarding the procedure adopted, and were satisfied with the way the
investigation was conducted; and the Court of Appeals ex­plicitly stated in its
decision that:

” x x x we find that the petitioners-appellees had a fair
hearing and full opportunity to defend them­selves, and that their substantive
right to due process was not violated by the action of the University
authorities in adopting the report and recommendation of the UP-PGH
investigating committee for the dismis­sal of petitioners-appellees.”

Under the circumstances, provided due process is observed, who is
to have the final say on the dismissal of these respondents actually becomes of
secondary importance. The
Constitutional provisions on the Civil Service (Article XII) are silent on the
point, thus emphasizing its trifling weight. Whether the final decision should be made by the Civil Service
Commissioner, and on appeal by the Civil Service Board of Appeals (as they
contend), or by the President of the University and its Board of Regents, does
not in any way impair any of the substantial rights of these respondents. But the autonomy necessary to the
fulfillment of the educational and academic mission of the University demands that the administrative decision
of its authorities be made final as to its employees, there being no statutory
or ad­ministrative provision to the contrary.

The considerations adopted by this Court in the Castillo vs. Bayona case (ante) in support of
the administrative and disciplinary authority of the Monetary Board of the
Central Bank over its civil service employees apply, mutatis mutandis,
to the President and Board of Regent of the University of the Philippines:

” x x x In other words; the Civil Service Law is the general
legal provision for the investigation, suspension or removal of civil service
employees, whereas Section 14 is a special provision of law which must govern
the investigation, suspension or removal of employees of the Central Bank,
though they be subject to the Civil Service Law and regulations in other
respects. We must not lose sight of the
fact that the Central Bank is called upon to administer the monetary and
banking business in the country (Section 2,
Republic Act No. 265); and its powers and functions are exercised by the
Monetary Board. So, it is but just and reasonable
that in order to perform the functions assigned to it by law, it be given broad
powers in issuing such rules and
regulations as it considers necessary to direct and effect the operation and
administration of the Central Bank, and with the recommendation of the Governor,
the authority to appoint, fix the remunerations, and remove all officials and
employees of the Central Bank with the exception of the Governor, which power
to remove naturally includes the authority to inves­tigate.”

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we rule that the President and Board of
Regents of the University of the Philippines possess full and final authority
in the disciplining, suspension and removal of the civil service employees of
the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital,
independently of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board
of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari
applied for is granted, and the
decisions under appeal are reversed and set aside. Costs against private
respondents Camilo Peña and Domingo Cajipe.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., no part.

^[1]
Act 1407 of the Philippine Legislature, of 29 October 1905; Execu­tive Order
No. 5, dated 9 January 1909; Executive Order No. 39, 23 June 1936; Adm. Code,
section 695, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 177 (section 23), and
Commonwealth Act No. 598.

^[2]
Executive Order No. 39 (23 June 1936),
section 4; Republic Act No. 2260.