DR. WILSON B. TAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ANTONIO T. ESTOCONING, RESPONDENT.

Tan versus Estoconing

The Case

This is an administrative case in which a private litigant, Dr. Wilson B. Tan, charged a municipal trial judge, Judge Antonio T. Estoconing of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Dumaguete City, with undue delay in rendering judgment, misdeclaration of monthly reports, gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The case matters because it draws the line every judge and every examinee must know: delay in deciding cases and false statistical reports are disciplinable offenses, but an erroneous acquittal, however strange its reasoning, is not an administrative offense absent bad faith, dishonesty, or malice.

Procedural History

The matter began as three separate complaints filed with the Supreme Court and referred to the Office of the Court Administrator, which conducted the review and submitted its report and recommendation on each. The complaints were redocketed as regular administrative matters, and the Court consolidated them. Both parties then manifested that they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the pleadings, and the Court resolved the consolidated cases directly as an original administrative action.

Facts

Dr. Tan was the private complainant in several estafa cases pending before the sala of Judge Estoconing. In the first criminal case, the case was submitted for decision on November 5, 2001, yet the decision came only on November 18, 2002. In two other criminal cases, the cases were submitted for decision on April 9, 2002, but the decisions were promulgated only on November 18, 2002. In each instance, the judge rendered judgment well beyond the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution, and he never asked the Supreme Court for an extension of time.

Dr. Tan also alleged that the judge falsely declared in his monthly reports of cases that these cases were still undergoing trial, when in truth they had long been submitted for decision. Verification with the Court Management Office showed that the three cases were not listed under the item for cases submitted for decision but not yet decided in the monthly reports for several months of 2002.

In a fourth criminal case, the judge originally considered the case submitted for decision, but upon motion of the accused he admitted the defense memorandum of exhibits and gave the prosecution time to comment. He then issued a final order submitting the case for decision on February 4, 2003, and rendered judgment on May 5, 2003. Dr. Tan also complained that the judge showed gross ignorance of the law and partiality in acquitting all the accused and in failing to rule on their civil liability.

Issues

• Whether or not Judge Estoconing is administratively liable for undue delay in rendering judgment in the four criminal cases.
• Whether or not Judge Estoconing is administratively liable for misdeclaration of his monthly reports of cases.
• Whether or not Judge Estoconing is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and for knowingly rendering unjust judgments.
• Whether or not Judge Estoconing is administratively liable for manifest partiality and evident bad faith in violation of Section 3, paragraph e of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Applicable Provisions

Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 15. (1) All courts shall decide or resolve cases or matters within three months from the time the case or matter is submitted for decision or resolution.

This fixes the ninety-day reglementary period whose breach is the core of the delay charge.

Section 3, paragraph e of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

This is the provision under which Dr. Tan sought to hold the judge liable for partiality.

Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution abundantly failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

This governs the form of an acquittal and bears on the complaint that the judge failed to rule on civil liability.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held the judge guilty of undue delay in three of the four cases. The cases were submitted for decision and decided far beyond the ninety-day period, and the judge never sought an extension. The Court stressed that while extensions are generally granted for good reason, a judge who fails to decide on time without any order of extension is liable for gross inefficiency. His excuse that he wanted to promulgate the decisions simultaneously was rejected, since the Office of the Court Administrator had denied that request. As to the fourth case, however, the Court found no delay, because the ninety-day period should be reckoned from the final order of February 4, 2003, and the decision of May 5, 2003 fell within the period.

On the second issue, the Court held the judge liable for misdeclaration of monthly reports. The three cases were not reflected in the required list of cases submitted for decision, in violation of the administrative circular requiring judges to certify the correctness of the monthly report. Erroneous statistical accomplishment is equivalent to submission of an inaccurate report and is a ground for disciplinary action.

On the third issue, the Court ruled that the judge cannot be held administratively liable for his decisions. It conceded that his reasoning left much to be desired, but held that a judge may not be administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision; the error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate, or in bad faith. No such bad faith was shown, and a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect was the proper remedy.

On the fourth issue, the Court found no sufficient evidence of manifest partiality or evident bad faith. The complainant bears the burden of proving his charges by substantial evidence, and mere suspicion of partiality is not enough; there must be hard evidence of bias from an extrajudicial source. The fact of acquittal does not by itself indicate partiality.

Doctrine

A judge must decide cases within the three-month period fixed by Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, counted from submission for decision; failure to do so without an extension granted by the Court is gross inefficiency and merits administrative sanction. A judge who misdeclares his monthly report of cases, omitting cases already submitted for decision, is guilty of an inaccurate report and is disciplinable. But a judge is not administratively liable for every erroneous order or decision; liability attaches only where the error is gross or patent, malicious, deliberate, or in bad faith. Finally, a charge of manifest partiality under Section 3, paragraph e of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act must be proved by substantial evidence, and mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice.

Disposition

The Court found Judge Estoconing guilty of gross misconduct for undue delay and misdeclaration of monthly reports, fined him forty thousand pesos with a stern warning, and exonerated him in the case involving the fourth criminal case.

Remember This

Memorize the line: justice delayed is justice denied, and a judge who decides beyond the ninety-day period without an extension is administratively liable. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between disciplinable delay and misdeclaration on one hand, and non-actionable erroneous judgment on the other.