THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. RICARDO AQUINO Y ABALOS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal by the city fiscal from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Manila dismissing an information. The court ruled on a
motion to dismiss that the facts alleged in the information did not constitute a
violation, as charged, of section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by Republic Act No. 4.
The information reads:

“That on or about the 31st day of August, 1946, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession and under his control and custody one .45
caliber automatic pistol, serial No. 968445, with one clip containing seven
rounds of ammunition, without having first secured the necessary license
therefor.”

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4, the last amendment, makes it
unlawful to manufacture, dispose, sell, acquire, possess, etc. firearms and
ammunition. This provision was qualified by section 2 which is as follows:

“SEC. 2. The provisions of the foregoing section to the
contrary notwithstanding, any person in possession of any of the prohibited
articles therein mentioned, may, without incurring any criminal liabiltiy,
surrender the same to such officer and within such period of time as the
Presisent shall by proclamation designate and fix immediately upon the approval
of this Act: Provided, however, That this seciton shall not be
interpreted to mean as in any way exempting form such liability any person,
wihtout the requisite license, found, within the aforementioned period of time,
making use of any of said articles, except in self-defense, or carrying them on
his person except for the purpose of surrendering them as herein required:
Provided, further, That this section shall not in any way affect any case
pending in court, on the date of the passage of this Act, for violation of
section twenty-six hundred and ninety-two of the Revised Administrative Code;
And provided, lastly, That the President may authorize any officer or
agency of the Government to issue to the persons surrendering their firearms
temporary licenses therefor for periods not exceeding three months at a
time.”

In pursuance thereof the President issued Proclamation No. 1,
dated July 20, 1946, fixing August 31, 1946, as the last day, in the provinces
of Luzon, on which possessors of firearms and ammunition might surrender them
without incurring any criminal liability.

Although the law and the proclamation did not say so in express
language, it is evident from their context that the penalty for the mere
possession of firearms and/or ammunition was suspended up to August 31, 1946. In
providing that firearms and ammunition could be surrendered not later than that
date without the owner incurring criminal liability, the law and the
proclamation by necessary inference legalized mere possession of these articles
before the expiration of the stipulated period.

This meaning is confirmed by the express prohibition against
the use and carrying of firearms and ammunition except in self-defense in the
first case and with the object of presenting hem to the authorities in the
second. In making these exceptions, the law made manifest the intent to permit,
up to August 31, the legitimate use of firearm and the carrying thereof for the
purpose of surrender. It would be senseless to stress the outlawing of the use
and carrying of firearms and ammunition wihtout mentioning the simple possession
if having those articles, say in a wardrobe, were banned. And it would be an
incongruity to allow the use and the carrying of one thing and punish the mere
possession thereof which is necessarily included in the first two acts. Under
the logical and natural process of exclusion, under the maxim “expresio unius
est exclusio alterius,” the specific prohibition to use and carry firearms
excludes from the prohibition the keeping of them at home. As the greater
includes the lesser, the same process of reasoning tells us that the express
legalization during the period of respite of the use and carrying of firearms
and ammunition, subject to the restriction above noted, of necessity also
permitted the simple possession of those articles without penalty. As a general
rule, one could not surrender a firearm or ammunition unless he owned or
possessed it; unless in fact he had it in his possession for sometime before its
surrender. At least this was the situation contemplated by Republic Act No.
4.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs de
oficio.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto,
Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.