LA MALLORCA AND PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. NICANOR RAMOS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. F. A. FUENTES AND MARCOS PLOMANTES, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

This action for prohibition with preliminary injunction, initiated
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the respondents from
enforcing a decision of the Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of
Labor which ordered the petitioners to pay to respondent Nicanor Ramos
the sum of P1,862.00 as compensation for disability due to
tuberculosis, plus P19.00 as fees, is now before this Court on the
appeal interposed by the respondents from the judgment therein entered
by that Court granting the writ therein prayed for, on the ground that
said regional office was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the
claim therein involved.

It appears that respondent Nicanor Ramos was a driver of the
petitioners La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. Sometime prior to
November 19, 1958, said respondent filed against the latter with
Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor a complaint asking for
payment of compensation for disability due to tuberculosis allegedly
contracted by him as a result of his employment in said concerns. The
petitioners resisted the action. After hearing, the Regional Office No.
3 of the Department of Labor, on November 19, 1958, rendered a decision
ordering the petitioners to pay to said respondent the sum of P1,862.00
as disability compensation, and to said office the amount of P19.00 as
fees.

Notified of this decision, the petitioners, on January 23, 1959,
filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila the instant action,
wherein they asked that the enforcement of said decision of the
Regional Office No. 3 be restrained, alleging that it is null and void ab initio
as said regional office had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
claim which was the subject-matter thereof. Respondents filed an answer
to the petition. When the case was called for hearing on February 13,
1959, the parties submitted the same for judgment on the pleadings. The
trial court took the case under advisement, and on March 12, 1959,
rendered judgment on the pleadings, vacating and setting aside the
decision of the Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor
complained of, on the ground that said regional office was without
jurisdiction to hear and decide the claim therein involved, and
granting the writ of prohibition applied for.

From this judgment, the respondents appealed to this Court. They
contend in this instance that the trial court committed error in
granting, on the ground invoked, the writ of prohibition applied for by
the petitioners. It is claimed that the decision of the Regional Office
No. 3 of the Department of Labor complained of is legal and binding,
for the Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, undertaken pursuant to Republic
Act No. 997, as amended, gives said regional office jurisdiction to
hear claims for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The issue raised has already been the subject of previous
pronouncements made by this Court. In three recent decisions on the
subject, this Court held that the provisions of Reorganization Plan No.
20-A, undertaken under the provisions of Republic Act No. 997, as
amended, insofar as they confer judicial power upon the Regional
Offices thereby created and give said offices original and exclusive
jurisdiction over money claims of laborers other than those falling
under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, are null and void and of no
effect. Corominas, et al. vs. Labor Standard Commission, 112 Phil., 551; 59 Off. Gaz., [43] 7432, and companion cases, Miller vs. Mardo, 112 Phil., 792; 59 Off. Gaz., [14] 2307, and companion cases, Caltex (Phil.) Inc. vs. Villanueva, et al., 112 Phil., 890. In the Corominas case, supra, this Court said:

“The provision of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A,
particularly Section 25, which grants to the regional offices original
and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims of laborers, is null and
void, said grant having been made without authority by Republic Act No.
997.”

In that of Miller vs. Mardo, supra, this court held:

“On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we
hold and declare that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it
confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than
those falling under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, is invalid and of
no effect.”

And in the Caltex case, supra, this Court said:

“From the foregoing provisions of law and rules, it
may be gathered that a regional office of the Department of Labor has
original jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for compensation
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. If a claim is controverted, it
shall be heard and decided only by a regularly appointed hearing
officer or any other employee duly designated by the Regional
Administrator to act as hearing officer. But when the claim is
uncontroverted and there is no necessity of requiring the claimant to
present further evidence, the Regional Administrator may enter an award
or deny the claim.”

As we analyze the facts of the present case, appellants’ contention
is not without merits. The claim involved in this action is for
compensation for disability due to tuberculosis, alleged to have been
caused and aggravated by the nature of plaintiff’s employment in the
petitioners’ service. It is then a claim which falls squarely under
Section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law (Act No. 3428, as amended
by Act No. 3812, Commonwealth Act No. 210 and Republic Acts Nos. 772
and 889), which provides:

“SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation.—When an
employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other
illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or
the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the person herein specified. The right
compensation as provided in this Act shall not be defeated or impaired
on the ground that the death, injury or disease was due to the
negligence of a fellow servant or employee, without prejudice to the
right of the employers to proceed against the negligent party.”

And, as the jurisdiction vested by Act No. 3428, as amended, on the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission to hear and decide claims for
compensation coming under its provisions has not been revoked, either
expressly or by necessary implication, by Republic Act No. 992, as
amended, or by any other subsequent statute, and the regional offices
created under Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, in the Department of Labor
partake of the nature of referees which the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission had the right to appoint and clothe with jurisdiction to
hear and decide such claims (Sec. 48, Act No. 3428, as amended), the
provisions of said reorganization plan, insofar as they confer on said
regional offices jurisdiction over claims for compensation falling
under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, is perfectly legal, and their
decisions on such claims are valid and binding.

The petitioners cannot claim, to bolster their stand, that the
Regional Office No. 3 that rendered said decision had no authority to
enforce said decision directly. The records do not disclose that said
regional office had made any attempt to do so. Immediately after the
petitioners were notified of the decision, they brought this action.
Under the circumstances, it cannot be assumed that the Commissioner,
who is presumed to know the law, would make any such attempt. Rather,
it must be assumed that in enforcing said decision said Commissioner
and the parties will follow the procedure prescribed in Section 51 of
the Workmen’s Compensation Law, Act No. 3428, as amended.

The trial court, therefore, committed error in issuing the writ of
prohibition restraining enforcement of the decision of the Regional
Office No. 3 in question.

For the foregoing, we find that the judgment appealed from is
contrary to law. Hence, the same is reversed, and another is hereby
entered dismissing the petition by which this action was initiated,
with the costs in both instances taxed against the
petitioners-appellees. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L. Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.