IN RE ATTY. SATURNINO PARCASIO.

In re Parcasio

The Case

This is a disbarment proceeding brought by the Solicitor General against Attorney Saturnino Parcasio, a member of the Philippine Bar admitted in 1959, on the ground that he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The case matters because it answers a question every Bar candidate must be ready for: what happens to a pending disbarment case when the respondent lawyer receives a full and unconditional executive pardon during its pendency? The Supreme Court holds that the pardon wipes out the guilt itself, and the disbarment case must therefore be dismissed.

Procedural History

The Court of First Instance of Davao, in a decision dated August 31, 1966, convicted Attorney Parcasio and his co-accused Mariano Regis of robbery with intimidation and sentenced Parcasio to an indeterminate penalty and to pay an indemnity to Venancio Sepulveda. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision on November 27, 1968. The Supreme Court, in its resolutions of August 4 and September 29, 1969, denied Parcasio's petition for review of the appellate decision. In a resolution of November 5, 1969, the Supreme Court referred Parcasio's case to the Solicitor General for disbarment proceedings. Acting on that directive, the Solicitor General filed the disbarment complaint on May 5, 1971. The case was set for hearing on September 6, 1971, the parties did not appear, and the case was deemed submitted for decision. After the pardon was granted in June 1975, Parcasio filed a manifestation praying for dismissal, the Solicitor General offered no objection, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended dismissal. The matter thus came before the Supreme Court in its own disciplinary jurisdiction.

Facts

On June 10, 1963, Parcasio and Regis, in collaboration with Ong Pin, extorted two hundred pesos from Venancio Sepulveda, a naturalized Filipino citizen, so that it would not be necessary for Sepulveda to appear in Manila for investigation. Parcasio was then the secretary of Congressman Rasid Lucman, and Regis posed as the Congressman's agent. For this, the trial court convicted Parcasio of robbery with intimidation, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied review.

Parcasio began serving his sentence on November 11, 1970. In his answer to the disbarment complaint, he insisted he disagreed with the factual and legal findings in the judgment of conviction. He recounted that he had moved to reopen his case on the basis of newly discovered evidence, including an affidavit of Patrolman Fidel de Guzman stating that Sepulveda admitted Parcasio never extorted money from him, a summons from Congressman Lucman requiring Sepulveda to appear before the House subcommittee on immigration and naturalization, and a directive from the Congressman to his investigators. The Provincial Fiscal interposed no objection, but the trial court denied the motion on the ground of loss of jurisdiction. Parcasio also attached a certification from the judge who had convicted him, describing him as a bright and promising young lawyer, and a letter from the fiscal who had prosecuted him, stating that an error had been committed and recommending an absolute pardon.

On June 12, 1975, the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, granted Parcasio an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored him to full civil and political rights. He had served his sentence from November 11, 1970 to September 15, 1971. On October 9, 1975, then forty-three years old, he filed a manifestation praying for dismissal of the disbarment case on the basis of the pardon, attaching certifications of good moral character from several judges and fiscals.

Issues

• Whether or not a full and unconditional executive pardon granted during the pendency of a disbarment proceeding, based on a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, warrants the dismissal of that proceeding.
• Whether or not the pardon reaches the guilt of the offender and restores his civil rights, including the right to remain in the practice of law.

Applicable Provisions

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, invoked by the Solicitor General, provides:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.

This is the ground relied upon, the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the case turns on whether the pardon removes that ground.

Ruling

The Court granted the motion for dismissal. It held that the question was not novel, and applied its earlier ruling in the Lontok case, where a disbarment proceeding based on a bigamy conviction was dismissed at the instance of the Attorney-General because the respondent had been pardoned during the pendency of the proceeding. The Court stated the governing rule in these words:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense.

And further:

If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

Because the pardon was absolute and unconditional, it blotted out the guilt on which the disbarment rested and restored Parcasio to his civil rights. The Court distinguished the Gutierrez case, where the rule was not applied precisely because the pardon there was conditional. The Solicitor General interposed no objection, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended dismissal.

Doctrine

A full and unconditional pardon reaches both the punishment and the guilt of the offender. It blots out the guilt so that, in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. Granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores all civil rights. Consequently, a disbarment proceeding grounded on a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court must be dismissed when the respondent receives an absolute and unconditional pardon during the pendency of the proceeding. The rule does not apply where the pardon is merely conditional.

Disposition

The disbarment case against Attorney Saturnino Parcasio was dismissed.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a full pardon blots out the guilt itself, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. Examiners use this case to test the effect of an absolute pardon on a pending disbarment case, and to contrast it with a conditional pardon, which does not produce that effect.