AMADO O. IBAÑEZ AND ESTHER A. RAFAEL-IBAÑEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; ABELARDO SUBIDO, AS COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE; EDILBERTO REGALADO, ENRIQUE ROA, ERNEST…

By the present multi-purpose petition denominated “Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Quo Warranto,
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction”, the petitioners-spouses Amado O. Ibañez and Esther A.
Rafael-Ibañez seek to be declared permanent election
registrars for the City of Manila, to enjoin the respondent Commission on
Elections from assigning them to the provinces, to nullify the appointments of
the respondents Edilberto Regalado,
Enrique Roa, Ernesto Verdejo
and Nestorio Bautista as permanent election
registrars for the City of Manila as well as the Memorandum Order of the respondent Commission of
September 6, 1966 relieving the petitioners from their assignments as election
registrars for the fourth congressional district of Manila, to lift the order
of the respondent Commission of September 9, 1966 suspending the petitioners
for their disobedience of the relief order and their refusal to turn over their
property accountability to the four respondent election registrars, to enjoin
the respondent Commission from proceeding with the administrative investigation
of the petitioners for the disobedience and refusal aforesaid, and to compel
the respondent Benito Tagulao to pay to the
petitioners their withheld salaries; or, in the alternative, to command the
respondent Commission to appoint the petitioners as permanent election
registrars for the City of Manila.

Upon bond filed by the
petitioners and approved by this Court, the corresponding preliminary
injunction was duly issued.

Pursuant to Republic Act
3808 – evidently calculated to streamline the organizational set-up in the
respondent Commission in order to enable it not only to effectively
discharge its constitutional functions but also to cope with the demands of the
inauguration in this jurisdiction of a drasti­cally revised system of permanent
registration of voters under a companion measure, Republic Act 3588 – the
respondent Commis­sion, acting on
the recommendations of a
Committee on Reorgani­zation theretofore created, approved on December 21, 1963 a re­organization
plan which, amongst others, called for the follow­ing positions –

“147. Forty-three
city registrars at

P5,760 . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . P 123,840″

“149. One
thousand three hundred twenty-six municipal registrars

at P5,760 . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . P3,818,880.”

Except
for changes in the compensation attached thereto, these positions were
subsequently incorporated in and authorized by succeeding General
Appropriations Acts, respectively, as items 176 and 178 in Republic Act 4164 for the fiscal year 1964-1965; items 177 and 179 in
Republic Act 4642 for the fiscal
year 1965-1966; and items 177
and 179 in Republic Act 4848
for the fiscal year 1966-1967.  Now, as then, four of the forty-three
positions for city registrars are duly allotted to the City of Manila.

In the implementation of
the reorganization as far as election registrars were concerned, several
problems arose.  There was a dearth of
qualified personnel immediately avail­able to fill the openings for election
registrars required for the whole country. 
In view of the nature of the duties of the office and the
innovations in the new system of regis­tration of voters, even the then
available personnel had first to undergo training and probation.  Not all the local governments called upon to
provide accomodations for the re­gistrars responded
with dispatch.  And the new system did
not itself catch on fast enough that it became necessary to drum up interest
therein and acceptance thereof by the electorate – a campaign which, it was
thought, would be best successful if initially waged in strategic areas of
population concentration.  Considering
that Republic Act 3588 then merely provided that –

“Section 2. – There shall be in each
city, mu­nicipality and municipal district at least one election registrar x x x appointed by the Com­mission
on Elections x x x“,

without categorically requiring that each
election registrar be appointed to a specific station, the respondent
Commission found it expedient to adopt the policy of appointing election
registrars without indicating, in their respective appoint­ments, any specific
official station and shifting them later on from one assignment to another as
the requirements of re­gistration demanded. 
Consonant to this policy, said respond­ent Commission actually named
almost all of its 400 special and field attorneys as “Election Registrars
in the Commis­sion on Elections”. 
And because of the number of prospec­tive registrants in Manila,
some fifty of them were there­after assigned therein from time to time.  The situation be­came specially
critical when, as a condition precedent to the use of the new lists of voters
in the then forthcoming national elections, a certain percentage of the
previously registered voters had to be registered under the new system before a
given deadline.  So that in its all-out
effort to meet the deadline the respondent Commission went so far as to appoint
election registrars-at-large.

Amongst the appointments extended under the aforestated
policy was that of the petitioner Amado O. Ibañez who, on February
1, 1964, was named “Election Registrar in the Com­mission on
Elections”.  Filled thereby, as
indicated in the appointment, was “Item No. 149(165), Page 23, Reorg. of the Comelec
pursuant to RA 3808″ corresponding to one of the positions of municipal
registrars.  The appointment was approved
by the respondent Civil Service Commissioner Abelardo
Subido, and the said petitioner duly qualified and
assumed office.  Thereafter, effective
June 15, 1964, he was, in a memorandum for the purpose, “assigned as
Registrar(s) for the 4th Dis­trict, Manila”,
together with three others.  On November 23, 1964, he was invested
with additional duties as “Election Re­gistrar-at-Large” in Manila
per covering memorandum of even date. 
Similarly, on November 2, 1964, the petitioner Esther A. Rafael-Ibañez, wife of the first-named petitioner, was also
appointed “Election Registrar in the Commission on Elections” to fill
the then “Item No. 178(1271), page 2455, R.A.4164 COMELEC Standardization
Resolution 9/24/64”, corresponding like­wise to one of the positions of
municipal registrars.  Said ap­pointment
was duly approved by the respondent Abelardo Subido and accepted by the appointee who forthwith assumed the duties
of the office.  Per telegraphic directive
of November 12, 1964, the
respondent Esther A. Rafael-Ibañez was also assigned
to act as election registrar in the fourth district of Manila.  But for the adjustments in the compensation
thereof effected on December 27, 1965 and the change in the numbering of the
items involved to make them correspond with the provisions of Republic Act
4642, the General Appropriations Act for 1965­-1966, i.e., for the petitioner Amado O. Ibañez, Item 179(165),
page 2576, and for the petitioner Esther A. Rafael-Ibañez,
Item 179(1271), page 2576, these are the very same positions held by the petitioners
when the present controversy came to a head.

Upon the other hand, the respondents Edilberto Regalado, Enrique Roa, Ernesto Verdejo and Nestorio Bautista – like the petitioners – were also duly
appointed “Election Registrar in the Commission on Elections”.  In his appointment of February 1, 1964, the respondent Regalado
was given “Item No. 149-(129),
Page 23, Reorg. of the Comelec pursuant to RA
3808″.  From his initial assignment
at San Fernando, Pampanga, he was recalled on May 18, 1964 and instructed “to
assume and perform the du­ties of your office as Election Registrar designated by the Commission for the City
of Manila”.  Here he remained until May 21, 1965 when he was detailed to the Law
Department of the respondent Commission. 
The respondent Roa was appointed on February
1, 1964 to
“Item No. 149(132), Page 23, Reorg. of the Comelec pursuant to RA 3808″, which he
accepted and as­sumed.  On June 25, 1964, he was stationed in Manila
“as one of the Registrars on temporary assignment”, a post he occu­pied
until he was transferred to the Policy Staff of the res­pondent Commission in September, 1965.  The respondent Ver­dejo’s
position, per his appointment of February
1, 1964, is “Item No. 149(101), Page 23, Reorg. of the Comelec pursuant to RA 3808″.  He was assigned as such to Manila
on June 4, 1964, and actually assumed office thereat
on June 8 1964.  Finally, the respondent Bautista was, under
an appointment dated January 31, 1964, named
to “Item No. 149(68), Page 23, Reorg. of the Comelec pursuant to
RA 3808″.  Effective June 15,
1964 he was also “assigned as
Registrar for the 4th Dis­trict, Manila”,
and remained thereat until May 21,
1965 when, like the respondent
Regalado, he was assigned to the Law De­partment
of the respondent Commission.  Like the two peti­tioners, the above-named
respondents held positions corres­ponding to those of municipal registrars and
were all amongst the about fifty registrars assigned by the respondent Commis­sion in its saturation drive in the
City of Manila.  None of them, however, was then officially
appointed as election registrar specifically for the said city.

Meanwhile, the validity of the appointments of election
registrars-at-large was challenged.  In Buyat vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R.L-24329, April
8, 1965, this Court ruled out said appointments as void. 
Collaterally, moves in Con­gress
for a more precise statement of
the legislative intent on the matter resulted in the passage of Republic Act
4730, effective June 18, 1966, which
incorporated in section 3 of the
Permanent Registration Act, Republic Act 3588, the qua­lification that –

“* * * every election registrar shall be ap­pointed to a
specific city, municipality or muni­cipal district; and once appointed may not
be transferred or removed to another city, munici­pality or municipal district
without cause or his consent. * * *”

These developments
prompted the respondent Commission not only to reassess its policies in the
implementation of the new system of registration of voters but also to take immediate
steps to comply with the clear mandate of the amendatory law just adverted to.  Realizing that, under the Puyat
vs. Commission on Elections doctrine, even the ap­pointments of election
registrars without specification of station were equally illegal, and
recognizing that no appoint­ments to any place could be extended in excess of
the number of election registrars theretofore authorized by the current
appropriations act, the respondent Commission found no alter­native but to
appoint and/or disperse the then incumbent elec­tion registrars to specific
cities and municipalities as con­templated in the original reorganization
resolution of the respondent Commission. 
The problem of choosing permanent sta­tions for said registrars was
particularly pressing in Manila where, despite the allotment thereto of only
four positions of election registrars, no less than fifty election registrars
have served or were serving as such.  A
duly constituted screen­ing committee which analyzed the records of the said
fifty in­cumbent registrars and considered their respective Bar and Comelec examination ratings, academic background, training,
re­lated experience, performance and dependability, drew up a re­commendation
that the appointments of city election registrars for Manila be made from
amongst Enrique Roa, Edilberto
Regalado, Adelaida Reyes,
Ernesto Verdejo and Nestorio
Bautista.  Acting on this recommendation,
the respondent Commission, in its Re­solution of August 24, 1966, resolved to permanently appoint as
“Election Registrars in the City of Manila”,
effective August 24, 1966,
the respondents Roa, Regalado
Verdejo and Bautista. 
In due season, their appointments as “Election Re­gistrar in the
Commission on Elections for Manila”, respec­tively, under Items 177(2), 177(1),
177(3) and 177(4), all on page 2587, R.A. 4848, the General Appropriations Act
for 1966-1967, were duly issued
by the respondent Commission and approved by the respondent Civil Service
Commissioner Abelardo Subido.  Said respondent registrars thereafter duly
qualified and assumed their respective offices.

Forthwith, in a
Memorandum dated September 6,
1966, the respondent Commission
notified the forty-one other election registrars then detailed in Manila, the
petitioners herein included, of the appointment of the four respondent regis­trars
as permanent city election registrars for Manila, and directed them to turn
over to the latter such properties, equipment and unused registration forms as
they might still have under their respective accountabilities, as well as to
continue assisting the said permanent registrars in the Ma­nila Registrar’s Office pending their permanent
appointments to specific cities or municipalities.  To a man, the said forty-one registrars
demurred and refused to heed the order aforesaid.  Regarding this as “disobedience to
lawful orders of superior authority and conduct prejudicial to the best in­terests
of the service, in violation of the Civil Service Law”, the
respondent Commission forthwith initiated administra­tive proceedings against
the said registrars, including the petitioners herein, and accordingly ordered
their prevent­ive suspension.  The
registrars’ explanation and subsequent motion for reconsideration of the action
taken by the res­pondent Commission proved unavailing.  The petitioners, then, invoked our
intervention.

To be sure, there are preliminary issues raised in the pleadings
which ordinarily deserve preferential resolution before the merits of the
petition are inquired into.  How­ever,
because several other cases posing the same principal question as that here
presented have been spawned by the same factual setting above laid out, we deem
it more profitable to forthwith take the case by its horns, so to speak, and
thereby set the principal issue at rest once and for all.

By the petitioners’ own formulation, the basic issue to be
resolved here is whether the action of the respondent Com­mission in ousting
them, and others like them, from their as­signments in Manila pending their
appointment to permanent stations, as well as in suspending and
administratively investigating them for their alleged disobedience heretofore
adverted to, is illegal and void, in excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion for being a subversion of the permanence of station and security of
tenure contemplated by Republic Act 3588, as amended by Republic Act 4730, and
gua­ranteed by the Constitution.  The gravamen of the petitioners’ pose in sustaining the
affirmative side of this issue is that although their appointment papers did
not specify Manila as their
permanent station, their assignment thereto made them permanent election
registrars thereof and may not now be ousted therefrom
without trenching upon their security of tenure.  This point is deduced from the premise that
permanency of station being of the essence of the office of an election
registrar – as is implicit in the original Republic Act 3588, recognized in Puyat vs. Commission on Elections, supra., and categorically
expressed in the amendatory law, Republic Act 4730 – the pe­titioners’
appointments without indication of a specific sta­tion were defective and
ineffectual until they were comple­mented by corresponding assignments to
particular stations.  Hence, they
theorize that their subsequent assignment to Ma­nila
validated or perfected their appointments as ones for permanent election
registrars thereat.  As such, they claim
to be entitled to seek refuge behind the right to security of tenure.

That security of tenure is an essential and constitu­tionally guaranteed
feature of our Civil Service system, is not open to debate.  The mantle of its protection extends not only
against removals without cause but also against un­consented
transfers which, as repeatedly enunciated, are tan­tamount to removals which are
within the ambit of the fundamental guarantee. 
However, the availability of that security of tenure necessarily
depends, in the first instance, upon “the nature of the appointment”
(Hojilla vs. Marino, et al., G.R.L-20574, February
26, 1965).  Such that the rule which
proscribes transfers without consent as
anathema to the se­curity of tenure is predicated upon the theory that
the of­ficer involved is appointed – not merely assigned – to a particular station (Miclat vs.
Ganaden, et al., G.R.L-14459, May 30, 1960; Jaro vs. Valencia, et al., G.R.L-18352,
August 30, 1963).

Assayed upon the foregoing legal crucible, the peti­tioners’ case
suffers an initial setback.  The
appointments upon which they respectively anchor their claim clearly state that
they were merely appointed as “Election Registrars in the Commission on
Elections”.  Nowhere is it there
intimated, much less stated, to which city, municipality or municipal district
they are appointed as such registrars. 
On top of this, it is there specifically indicated that they were to
fill Items 179(165) and 179(1271), page 2576, Republic Act 4642, both of which
correspond to positions of “municipal registrars”.  There­fore, by these appointments – which, as
aforesaid, are per­force controlling – there can be no gainsaying the fact that
the petitioners were not appointed to, and consequently not entitled to any
security of tenure or permanence in, any spe­cific station.  On general principles, they may be transfer­red
as the exigencies of the service require. 
They ordinarily have no right to complain against any change of
assignment.

True it is that the said appointments may be of doubt­ful
regularity in view of the essential nature of the office of an election
registrar contemplated by Republic Act 3588,
as amended by Republic Act 4730. 
Indeed, the petitioners themselves insinuate that the said appointments
were ini­tially defective but were validated upon their subsequent assignments
to Manila.  This is
definitely off-tangent.  We cannot
subscribe to the theory that an assignment to a par­ticular station, in the
light of the terms of the appoint­ments in question, was necessary to complete
the said ap­pointments.  The approval
thereof by the Commissioner of Civil Service gave those appointments the stamp
of finality.  With the view that the
respondent Commission then took of its power in the premises and the demands of
the mission it set out to accomplish with the appointments it extended, said
appointments were definitely meant to be complete as then issued.  The
subsequent assignment of the appointees thereunder
that the said respondent Commission held in re­serve to be exercised as the
needs of each locality justified did not in may way detract from the perfection
attained by the appointments beforehand. 
And the respective appointees were entitled only to such security of
tenure as the appoint­ment papers concerned actually conferred – not in that of
any place to which they may have been subsequently assigned.  This is particularly true in the case at bar where
the offices filled by the petitioners were those of “municipal regis­trars”,
whereas the assignments given to
them were stations corresponding to “city registrars” – which they
were not – co­vered by item numbers in the current appropriations act which are
altogether different from those stated in their respec­tive appointments.  As things stand, in default of any parti­cular
station stated in their respective appointments, no se­curity of tenure can be
asserted by the petitioners on the ba­sis of the mere assignments which were
given to them.  A con­trary rule will
erase altogether the demarcation line we have repeatedly drawn between appointment and assignment as two distinct concepts in the law of public officers.

Nor is there necessity to
dwell at length on the vali­dity of the appointments extended to
the petitioners which do not state any specific station contrary to the spirit
and expressed mandate of the Permanent Registration Act.  At the very least, having accepted said
appointments as they are and having reaped benefits therefrom,
they cannot now be heard to impugn their validity.  Besides, whichever way the verdict on the
question of validity may go, the petitioners will profit nothing by it.  Were we to uphold said appoint­ments, the petitioners’ cause will necessarily fail because, as
aforesaid, the same involves not an appointment to a particular station
but a mere assignment to a certain place in the interest of the service.  Upon the
other hand, striking down said appointments as void would virtually pull the rug from under the petitioners’
feet.  For, a void appointment confers no
rights whatsoever except, perhaps, those
recognized under the de facto doctrine, but definitely
never so far as to entitle the incumbent to take shelter under the aegis of the
guarantee of security of tenure.  That
the res­pondent Commission may have erred in extending the defec­tively
formulated appointments relied upon is of no moment.  The mistake, acquiescence and tolerance of the proper officials resulting in the non-observance of legal requirements
do not bestow upon the petitioners any right to the positions in question or to the guarantees
provided by law.  As appro­priately
observed elsewhere –

“* * * In the circumstances, for the dura­tion of his occupancy
of the position in ques­tion, the petitioner may be considered merely as a de
facto officer, and may consequently be removed from office even without
cause.” (Favis vs. Rupisan, et al.,
G.R.L-22823, May 19, 1966).

Then,
if said appointments were void, no number of assignments given to the
appointees thereunder could have vali­dated the
same.  Once void, they remained so and
could have been corrected only by subsequent valid reappointments.  Here, no pretense is made by the
petitioners to any validating ap­pointments. 
Instead, they pray – as an alternative relief – that, if new
appointments are required, they be extended new ones as permanent election registrars of Manila
to which they insist they have a preferred right.

But this cannot be done either. 
Under the circumstances at bar, the petitioners have established no
right whatsoever, in preference to anyone, to the positions aspired for.  They may have been performing duties as city
election registrars, it is conceded.
 But –

“* * * one may not claim a right to an office, position or
employment subject to the civil service laws merely because he is performing
the duties of the office, position or employment”.  (67 C.J.S., 174).

Worse still, only forty-three positions
for city election re­gistrars have been provided for, four of which are
allotted to Manila.  If, as the petitioners would have it, they
and their colleagues who are assigned in Manila are all entitled to remain as
permanent election registrars thereat, then, not only will they be perpetuated
in inexistent offices, but also all other cities in the Philippines will be
left without any election registrars at all. 
Certainly, it cannot be seriously contended that the respondent
Commission could, even if it wanted to, validly appoint forty-one permanent
city election registrars for Manila alone when only four have been legally
allotted thereto.  Much less can it
successfully be maintained that the said petitioners should be appointed as
permanent city election registrars of Manila
inasmuch as, anyway, the corres­ponding budgetary authority and provision therefor can always be subsequently made.  Obviously, the petitioners overlook that such
authority is exclusively discretionary for Congress to provide, and it would be
asking us to tread upon a forbidden domain to have us command the respondent
Commission to make the desired appointments on the assumption that Congress
could later be obliged to make provisions therefor.  So also, the respondent Commission can hardly
be begrudged for its efforts at
recti­fying as soon as it can the evident defects in the appoint­ments it had
previously extended.  It is only meet
that it should correct itself if its error is exposed.  Since none of the contenders had theretofore
been extended any appoint­ment as permanent city election registrar for Manila,
it is not for us to say who should be so appointed from amongst the candidates therefor.  To the
respondent Commission is primarily entrusted the discretion to make the
choice.  It had a whole field of about
fifty people, all similarly si­tuated, to choose from.  As we scan the guidelines adopted by its
screening committee for this purpose, we see no evi­dence of discrimination or
favoritism.  The choices were made in keeping with the criteria laid down and
are justified by the comparative records relied upon.  As a matter of fact, vis–a–vis
the petitioners herein, the chosen four respond­ents truly
appear to have a definite
edge.  In these circumstances, we find no
cause to declare that the respondent Com­mission in any way abused its
discretion in the premises.  We have
heretofore conceded that –

“The power to appoint is in essence discre­tionary on the part
of the proper authority, in this case the head of the department.  The appointing power has the right of choice
which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself
who is best qualified for any
competitive position in the Civil Service.” (Jimenez vs. Francisco, et al., G.R.L-9699, Feb­ruary 28, 1957).

We
have been shown no reason to sanction a departure from this salutary rule and
to substitute our own discretion for that of the respondent Commission.

The petitioners’ case
flounders upon still another ve­ritable legal shoal.  They do not pretend to have been named to the
same positions as the respondent registrars.  Their subsisting
appointments are to positions of “municipal re­gistrars”.  The most they can muster is to assert a right
to be appointed to the posts of permanent “city election registrars”
for Manila.  And,
yet, while they impugn the appointments of the four respondent registrars as
such, they do not say which of the four are actually usurping the positions
supposedly pertaining to the two of them. 
Decisive in this posture are the following pronouncements:

“Thus, one who does not claim to be enti­tled to the office
allegedly usurped or unlaw­fully held or exercised by another cannot ques­tion
his title thereto by quo warranto.  In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim
to be en­titled to the office held by respondent herein.  None of them has been appointed thereto and
none of them may, therefore, be placed in said of­fice, regardless of the
alleged flaws in the respondent’s title thereto.  They merely
as­sert a right to be appointed to said office.  Considering, however, that there are seven
(7) petitioners and that only one (1) office is in­volved in this case, none of
them can, or does, give an assurance that he will be the one ap­pointed by the
President, should said office be declared vacant.  In short, the claim of each petitioner is predicated solely upon a more
or less remote possibility that, in said event, he may be the recipient of the
appointment.  It is obvious, therefore,
that none of them has a cause of action against respondent herein (Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil. 18, 22; Lino Luna
vs. Rodriguez, 36 Phil. 401; Nueno
vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12).” (Cuyegkeng, et al. vs. Cruz, G.R.L-16263, July 26, 1960).

“An individual cannot sue and oust two or more persons
although the latter are holding il­legally their respective offices, unless he
is entitled to all of them.  Although
this ques­tion has not been raised by the parties, we may rest our decision on
that ground alone and dis­miss the action; for if we were to decide this case
in favor of the petitioners, we would be at a loss to determine which of the
six respondents should be ousted as holding illegally the four offices or
places claimed by the four petitioners. 
There is nothing in the
record showing which of the six respondents occupy the four seats or of­fices
formerly occupied by the four petitioners.” (Nueno
vs. Angeles, 76 Phil., 12, 21).

The rest is a foregone conclusion.  The respondent Commission was well within its
province in proceeding as it did.  For
the petitioners’ defiance of its lawful directive, the said respondent
Commission rightly called upon them to account. 
Its order suspending the petitioners pending the ad­ministrative
investigation initiated to that end cannot be denounced as a denial of due
process.  Being a mere preserva­tive
measure – not a penal sanction – said
suspension may be resorted to without need of prior notice or opportunity to be
heard (Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil., 188).

In the end, we hold that
the petitioners have not made out a case for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or
quo warranto.  It thus becomes superfluous to delve into the other issues
raised in the pleadings.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued by dissolved, at petitioners’ cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.