RAMIRO S. DE JOYA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 37, QUEZON CITY, RESPONDENT.

De Joya versus Diaz

The Case

This is an administrative case filed directly with the Supreme Court against Judge Augustus C. Diaz of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37. The complainant, Ramiro S. De Joya, a litigant in an unlawful detainer case raffled to the respondent's sala, charged the judge with gross negligence and conduct unbecoming or prejudicial to the service for failing to decide that case within the period fixed by the rules on summary procedure. The case matters because it fixes the Court's settled attitude toward judicial delay: heavy caseload is no excuse, desistance by the complainant does not divest the Court of jurisdiction, and the remedy for an overburdened judge is to ask for more time, not to let the case sit undecided.

Procedural History

The case began as a sworn letter-complaint dated 16 April 2001, filed by De Joya directly with the Supreme Court. The respondent filed a comment dated 27 June 2001, and a supplemental comment dated 25 March 2002 explaining the delay. The complainant then filed a sworn letter dated 30 July 2001 withdrawing the complaint and asking that the case be closed. The Office of the Court Administrator submitted a memorandum finding the respondent liable for inefficiency and recommending a fine of 1,000 pesos. The Supreme Court, treating the letter-complaint as an administrative matter, resolved it in a decision promulgated on 23 September 2003.

Facts

On 20 July 2000, De Joya filed an unlawful detainer case against the spouses Lorenz and Rosana Hornillos, docketed as Civil Case Number 24930. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Diaz. The defendant-spouses filed no responsive pleading, so De Joya moved for summary judgment under the rules on summary procedure. The spouses did not appear at the hearing on the motion.

In an order dated 29 September 2000, Judge Diaz granted the motion for summary judgment and considered the case submitted for decision. Seven months passed, and no decision was rendered. Hence the complaint.

In his defense, the respondent said he had already decided the case on 5 February 2001, with a copy mailed to complainant's counsel on 21 March 2001. He attributed the delay to an oversight caused by the volume of work in his sala, reporting a caseload ranging from 4,605 cases in September 2000 to 4,472 cases in February 2001. He asked for the Court's understanding and promised to be more vigilant. The complainant later withdrew the complaint, saying it was the product of miscommunication.

Issues

• Whether or not the withdrawal of the complaint by the complainant warrants the dismissal of the administrative case against the respondent judge.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for inefficiency in failing to decide Civil Case Number 24930 within the prescribed period.

Applicable Provisions

The Code of Judicial Conduct requires promptness in the disposition of court business:

A judge must dispose of the court's business promptly and to act on cases pending before him within the prescribed periods therefor.

This is the standard against which the respondent's seven-month delay is measured, and its breach is what the Court sanctions.

The rules on summary procedure fix the period for judgment in cases of this nature, as the Court states:

Civil Case No. 24930 was submitted for decision on 29 September 2000, and it should have been decided within 30 days therefrom.

The thirty-day period is the time prescription the respondent failed to observe.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that mere desistance does not warrant dismissal of an administrative complaint against a member of the bench. The withdrawal of a complaint does not divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges and to discipline an erring respondent. The Court's interest in the affairs of the judiciary is a paramount concern that knows no bounds.

On the second issue, the Court held the respondent liable for inefficiency. Civil Case Number 24930 called for summary procedure, which underscores the need for expeditious resolution. It was submitted for decision on 29 September 2000 and should have been decided within thirty days, but the decision came only on 5 February 2001. Decision-making is the primordial and most important duty of a judge, and failure to observe time prescriptions for the rendition of judgments in derogation of a speedy administration of justice is a ground for administrative sanction. The Court expressed sympathy for heavy caseloads, but held that all a judge has to do is request additional time to decide, and meritorious requests are almost invariably granted.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the desistance of a complainant does not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over an administrative complaint against a judge, nor its power to investigate and discipline. Second, a judge must dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the prescribed periods; in summary procedure, judgment must be rendered within thirty days from submission. Third, failure to observe these time prescriptions constitutes a ground for administrative sanction, and a heavy caseload is no defense, because the proper remedy is a request for an extension, which the Court almost invariably grants if meritorious.

Disposition

The Court found Judge Augustus C. Diaz liable for inefficiency and imposed on him a fine of 1,000 pesos, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future would be dealt with severely.

Remember This

Remember the line that desistance does not divest the Court of jurisdiction, and that a judge's remedy for a heavy caseload is to ask for more time, not to let the case languish. Examiners use this case on judicial ethics and the thirty-day period under the rules on summary procedure.