PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BENITO SATORRE AND PAULINO RONDINA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Satorre versus People

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Benito Satorre and Paulino Rondina for the killing of two men, Carlos Espina and Loreto Silva. The trial court convicted both of double murder and sentenced each to reclusion perpetua for each death. The case matters to a reviewee for one reason above all: it is a clean illustration of what happens to a criminal appeal when the accused-appellant dies while the appeal is still pending. The Court does not affirm and it does not reverse on the merits. It dismisses, because death has extinguished the criminal and civil liability of the appellant. The decision also carries a separate concurring opinion that carefully separates criminal liability from civil liability, and that is where the examination value of the case really lies.

Procedural History

The two accused were charged in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch Six, in a criminal case for double murder. After trial, the court found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder. It sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua for each of the two murders, ordered them to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of each of the two deceased in the sum of six thousand pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Both accused appealed to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending, the Administrative Officer of the Bureau of Prisons wrote the Clerk of Court to inform the Court that the accused-appellant Paulino Rondina had died of peptic ulcer with bleeding on December 11, 1975 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital in Muntinlupa. The Court required the Solicitor General to comment on that letter. The Solicitor General commented, confirmed that the person in the death certificate and the appellant were one and the same notwithstanding a discrepancy in the prison number, and recommended that the case against Rondina be dismissed, citing the earlier ruling in People versus Alison. The Court then resolved the appeal as to Rondina.

Facts

Benito Satorre and Paulino Rondina were tried and convicted in the Court of First Instance of Leyte for the deaths of Carlos Espina and Loreto Silva. The trial court characterized the killings as double murder and imposed reclusion perpetua for each death, together with a civil indemnity of six thousand pesos for the heirs of each victim.

Both convicted men appealed to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of that appeal, Rondina was confined at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital, where he died of peptic ulcer with bleeding on December 11, 1975.

The Bureau of Prisons informed the Court of the death by letter. The Solicitor General, asked to comment, verified from the records that the deceased prisoner and the appellant were the same person, noting that the prison number in the death certificate matched the number in the Bureau's letter, even though a letter purportedly written by the appellant withdrawing his appeal bore a slightly different number. The recommendation was dismissal as to Rondina.

Issues

• Whether or not the death of the accused-appellant Paulino Rondina during the pendency of his appeal extinguishes his criminal liability.
• Whether or not the death of the accused-appellant before final judgment also extinguishes his civil liability, including the indemnity awarded by the trial court.

Applicable Provisions

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the concurring opinion, provides:

Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

This is the provision on which the entire result turns, because Rondina died before any final judgment could be entered against him.

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, cited in the concurring opinion, provides:

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

This explains why the civil liability travels with the criminal case in the first place, and why its fate on the death of the accused must be worked out.

Section 3, paragraph c, of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, cited in the concurring opinion, provides:

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

This is the rule that keeps the civil claim alive in principle even when the penal action is extinguished, and the concurring opinion uses it to mark the boundary between the two liabilities.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the death of the accused-appellant pending appeal extinguished his criminal liability. There was as yet no final judgment, because the appeal was still pending. The Court adopted the ruling in People versus Alison, quoted in the decision:

The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death.

Accordingly, the case against the late Paulino Rondina was dismissed, with costs de oficio.

On the second issue, the concurring opinion supplied the reasoning. Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict as to personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties the liability is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. The concurring Justice glossed the Latin maxim mors omnia solvit, meaning death dissolves all things. He then drew a precise distinction: the term pecuniary penalties in Article 89 refers to the fine and costs, and is not the same as the pecuniary liabilities in Article 38, which include reparation and indemnity. He also explained that final judgment in Article 89 means a judgment that has become final and executory because no recourse was taken within the periods allowed by law. Because Rondina died before final judgment, his criminal and civil liability were both extinguished. The concurring opinion added that the criminal and civil actions, though joined in the criminal case, are distinct, with different plaintiffs and different objectives, and that the extinction of the civil liability is governed by the civil law on obligations.

Doctrine

First, the death of the accused before final judgment extinguishes his criminal liability entirely. Pending appeal means no final judgment, so the appeal is dismissed rather than decided on the merits.

Second, under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, the death of the convict extinguishes the personal penalties totally, and extinguishes pecuniary penalties only if death occurs before final judgment. Pecuniary penalties means fine and costs, not the civil indemnity.

Third, the civil liability impliedly instituted with the criminal action is extinguished by the death of the accused before final judgment, following the rule in People versus Alison. But the extinction of the penal action does not by itself extinguish the civil action, unless a final judgment declares that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Fourth, the criminal and civil actions, though tried together, remain distinct in parties and in purpose, and the extinction of civil liability is governed by the civil law on obligations.

Disposition

The appeal of Paulino Rondina was dismissed, with costs de oficio, because he died before final judgment, and the case against him was ordered dismissed.

Remember This

Memorize the line: death of the accused before final judgment extinguishes both criminal and civil liability, because there is as yet no final judgment. Examiners use this case to test the Article 89 distinction between pecuniary penalties, meaning fine and costs, and pecuniary liabilities, meaning reparation and indemnity, and to test whether a student knows that a pending appeal is not a final judgment.