EUGENIO LOPEZ, PUBLISHER AND OWNER OF THE “MANILA CHRONICLE” AND JUAN T. GATBONTON, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FIDEL G. CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.

There is an element of novelty in this appeal by certiorari from
a decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding petitioners, the then
publisher and editor of This Week Magazine, liable in damages to the tune of
eleven thousand pesos arising from the publication of a picture of respondent,
Fidel G. Cruz, as being responsible for the hoax of the year.  The absence of any connection either fanciful
or remote with such event is admitted. 
The view is pressed by petitioners, invoking a liberal construction of
the implications of press freedom, owning up to the mistake, unfortunately not
discovered until it was too late, and publishing a correction as an earnest of
its good faith, that they should not be made to pay at all.  This Court, without discounting the elements
of plausibility of their contention, cannot, however, close its eyes to the
injury inflicted on respondent and indulge them in such a plea.  It is not disposed though to affirm
respondent Court’s decision in its entirety. 
Considering all the circumstances, the damages awarded to private
respondent appear to be far too generous. 
A reduction is in order.  The sum
of one thousand pesos would be enough. 
So we decide.

The antecedents of the case
follow:  In the early part of
January, 1956, there appeared on the
front page of The Manila Chronicle, of which petitioner Eugenio Lopez was the
publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary inspector
assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz by name,
sending a distress signal to a passing United States Airforce
plane which in turn relayed the message
to Manila.  He was not ignored, an
American Army plane dropping on
the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other
things, a two-way radio set.  He utilized
it to inform authorities in Manila
that the people in the place were living in terror, due to a series of killings
committed since Christmas of 1955. 
Losing no time, the Philippines
defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by Major
Wilfredo Encarnacion.  Upon arriving at the reported killer-menaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged
killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted transportation home to Manila.  In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo Encarnacion branded as a
“hoax”, to use his own descriptive word, the report of Fidel
Cruz.  That was the term employed by the
other newspapers when referring to the above-mentioned incident.

This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by
petitioner Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial
article to it in its issue of January
15, 1956.  Mention was made
that while Fidel Cruz’ story turned out to be false, it brought to light the
misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick, only two
individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce.  Then in the January 29, 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the
“January News Quiz” included an item on the central figure in what
was known as the Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did
the country a good turn by calling the government’s attention to that forsaken
and desolate corner of the Republic. 
Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz appearing in its issue of January 13, 1956, reference was made
to a health inspector who suddenly felt “lonely” in his isolated
post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island
of Calayan
so that he could be ferried back to civilization.  He was given the appellation of “Hoax of
the Year”.

The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the person
purporting to be Fidel Cruz. 
Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions were
that of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman-contractor from Santa
Maria, Bulacan.  It turned out that the photographs of
respondent Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the
library of the Manila Chronicle in accordance with the standard procedure
observed in other newspaper offices, but when the news quiz format was prepared,
the two photographs were inadvertently switched.

As soon, however, as the inadvertent error was brought to the
attention of petitioners, the following correction was immediately published in
This Week Magazine on January 27, 1957: 
“While we were rushing to meet the deadline for January 13th issue
of This Week, we inadvertently published the picture of former Mayor Fidel G.
Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan businessman and
contractor, in ‘Our Own Who’s Who feature in the Year End Quiz’ of This Week in
lieu of the health inspector Fidel Cruz, who was connected with a story about a
murderer running loose on Calayan Island.  We here express our profound regrets that
such an error occurred.” Together with the foregoing correction,
petitioners published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the photographs and the
correction moreover were enclosed by four lines, the type used was bolder than
ordinary, and the item was placed in a conspicuous place in order to call the
attention of the readers to such
amends being made.^[1]

Respondent Fidel G. Cruz sued petitioners in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture.  After trial duly had, he was awarded
five thousand pesos as actual damages, another five thousand pesos
as moral damages, and one thousand pesos
for attorney’s fees.  That
judgment was affirmed on appeal to respondent
Court.  Hence, this petition for
certiorari with the result, as already announced at the opening of this opinion,
that while respondent Cruz is entitled to prevail, the damages awarded him
should be reduced.

1.       It is on the freedom
of the press that petitioners would stake
their case to demonstrate that no action for libel would lie arising
from the publication of the picture of respondent Cruz identified as
responsible for the hoax of the year, when such was not the case at all.  It is easily understandable why.  No liability would be incurred if it could be
demonstrated that it comes within the
well-nigh all-embracing scope of freedom of the press.  Included therein is the widest latitude of
choice as to what items should see the
light of day so long as they are relevant to a matter of public interest, the
insistence on the requirement as to its truth yielding at times to unavoidable
inaccuracies attendant on newspapers and
other publications being subject to the tyranny of deadlines.  If no such showing could be plausibly made,
however, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that there was in fact the
commission of such quasi-delict.  It was held in Lu Chu
Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui,^[2]
that “the repeal of the old Libel Law (Act No. 277) did not abolish the
civil action for libel.”^[3] A libel was defined in that Act as a
“malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs
or pictures, or the like, * * *,
tending to blacken the memory of
one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects
of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule.”^[4]
There was an express provision in such legislation for a tort or a quasi-delict action arising
from libel.^[5] There is reinforcement to such a view in the
new Civil Code providing for the recovery of moral damages for libel, slander
or any other form of defamation.^[6]

There has been no time then in our judicial history when civil
actions for libel did not form a staple part of litigations which had reached
this Court.^[7]
Such is the case in a far greater measure in
the United
States.  According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander
and Libel:  “Publication of a
person’s photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person,
is a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person.”^[8] In support of the above statement, he made reference to several cases.^[9] Other decisions to the same effect have been
promulgated since the fourth edition of Newell published in 1924.^[10] Why libel law has both a criminal and a civil aspect is explained by Hale in
his Law of the Press thus:  “On the
one hand, libeling a person results in depriving him of his good
reputation.  Since reputation is a thing
of value, truly rather to be chosen than great riches, an impairment of it is a
personal wrong.  To redress this personal
wrong money damages are awarded to the injured person.  On the other hand, the publication of
defamatory statements tends strongly to induce breach of the peace by the
person defamed, and hence is of peculiar moment to the state as the guardian of the public peace. 
Viewed from this angle, libel is a crime, and as such subjects the
offender to a fine or imprisonment.”^[11]

The first decision cited by Newell is a decision of Justice
Holmes.  The case is Peck v. Tribune Co.^[12]
Plaintiff there complained of her picture being published in an advertise­ment
in defendant’s newspaper.  The Chicago
Sunday Tribune, with certain words of commendation for a brand of liquor
attributed to her when in fact she did not make such a statement at all and
could not have made it, as she was a total abstainer.  The defendant was held liable, for as Justice Holmes pointed out:  “There was some suggestion that the
defendant published the portrait by mistake, and without knowledge that it was
the plaintiff’s portrait, or was not
what it purported to be.  But the fact,
if it was one, was no excuse.  If the
publication was libelous, the defendant took the risk.  As was said of such matters by Lord
Mansfield, ‘Whenever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril.’ * * * The
reason is plain.  A libel is harmful on
its face.  If a man sees fit to publish
manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual, without other
justification than exists for an advertisement or a piece of news, the usual
principles of tort will make him liable if the statements are false, or are
true only of someone else.”^[13]

Learned Hand, in holding that an action for libel would lie
arising from a publication in an advertisement of plaintiff’s photograph
yielding a “grotesque,
monstrous and obscene impression” and that he was “substantially
enough ridiculed” to complain reached
the conclusion “that because the picture taken with the legends was
calculated to expose the plaintiff to more than trivial ridicule, it was prima
facie actionable; that the fact that it did not assume to state a fact or an opinion is irrelevant;
and that in consequence the publication is actionable.”^[14]
It is likewise an accepted fact that such publications do occasion greater injury
to reputation than would mere words alone. 
Cardozo so aptly put the matter thus:  “It has its genesis in evils which the
years have not erased.  Many things that
are defamatory may be said with impunity through the medium of speech.  Not so, however, when speech is caught upon
the wing and transmuted into print.  What
gives the sting to the writing is its permanence of form.  The spoken word dissolves, but the written
one abides and ‘perpetuates the scandal.’ * * * When one speaks of a writing in
this connection, one does not limit oneself to writings in manus­cripts or
books.  Any symbol suffices – pictures,
hieroglyphics, shorthand notes – if only what is written is intelligible to him
who reads.”^[15]

2.       That is only one side
of the picture, however.  There is an
impressive recognition in our decisions of the curtailment to which press
freedom would be subjected if an action for libel were not rigorously
scrutinized to remove doubts as to its being utilized to penalize the exercise
of that constitutional right.  Thus, in
the first leading case, United States
v. Bustos,^[16]
Justice Malcolm could correctly stress: 
“The interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of
public affairs.  Complete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech.  The sharp incision of its probe
relieves the abscesses of officialdom. 
Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation:  the wound can be assuaged
with the balm of a clear conscience.  A
public officer must not to be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon
his official acts.  Only thus can the
intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.  Of course, criticism does not authorize
defamation.  Nevertheless, as an
individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the
common good.”^[17]
On this aspect of the question, which, as answered by him, would require that a
criminal suit for libel should not be
utilized as a means for stifling press freedom, he categorically declared:  “Public policy, the welfare of society,
and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for
public opinion.  The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.”^[18]

In another civil action for libel, such a thought is expressed
differently in this wise:  “So long
as it is done in good faith, newspapers have the legal right to have and
express opinions on legal questions.  To
deny them that right would infringe upon the freedom of the press.”^[19]
The last word on the subject, up to now
at least, came from Quisumbing v. Lopez.^[20] In the language of the then Chief Justice Paras, who penned the opinion:  “The Court of Appeals found as a fact
that ‘there is no evidence in the record to prove that the publication of the
news item under consider­ation was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or
that there was intention to do harm, ‘and that on the other hand there
was ‘an honest and high sense of duty to serve the best interests of the
public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none.’ Every
citizen of course has the right
to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the
respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or
abused the freedom of the press.  The
newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy.  In the preparation of stories, press reporters
and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with
good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point
of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of
words.”^[21]

It was not until 1964 that the United States Supreme Court had
occasion to speak its mind on the subject. 
In the leading case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,^[22]
the nature of the question presented was set forth by Justice Brennan for the
Court in the opening paragraph of his opinion: 
“We are required in this case to determine for the first time the
extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a
State’s power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct.”^[23]
This is the Court’s approach to such an issue: 
“In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither
precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet ‘libel’ than we
have to other ‘mere labels’ of state law. * * * Like insurrection, contempt,
advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other
formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this
Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations.  It must be measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”^[24]
Continuing the same trend, the opinion stressed further:  “Thus we consider this case against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. * * * The present advertisement, as an expression
of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional
protection.”^[25]

For liability to arise then without offending press freedom,
there is this test to meet:  “The
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement
was made with ‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”^[26]
The United States Supreme Court went further in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,^[27]
where such immunity was held as covering statements concerning public figures
regardless of whether or not they are government officials.  Why there should be such an extension is
understandable in the light of the broad scope enjoyed by press freedom which
certainly allows a full and free discussion of public issues.  What can be more logical and appropriate,
then, than such an expansion of the principle. 
As noted by a commentator: 
“Since discussion of public issues cannot be meaningful without
reference to the men involved on both sides of such issues, and since such men
will not necessarily be public officials, one cannot but agree that the Court
was right in Curtis to extend the Times rule to all public
figures.”^[28]

The significance of the foregoing line of decisions impressive
for their consistency is quite obvious.  No
inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action
visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form
of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publi­cation of
respondent’s picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained
of.  This is not to deny that the party
responsible invites the institution either of a criminal prosecution or a civil
suit.  It must be admitted that what was
done did invite such a dire consequence, considering the value the law justly
places on a man’s reputation.  This is
merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press enjoys.  It ranks rather high in the hierarchy of
legal values.  If the cases mean anything
at all then, to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost
care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest
of the party allegedly offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a
news media to disseminate information of a public character and to comment
thereon as well as the conditions attendant on the business of publishing
cannot be ignored.  To single out one
decision, Quisumbing v. Lopez so speaks in tones loud
and clear.

3.       It is to the haven
thus afforded by such a highly sympathetic ruling to press freedom that
petitioners would seek refuge.  The
defamatory matter complained of in the Quisumbing
case appeared in the headline.  It was without
basis, as shown by the text of the news item itself.  Nonetheless, for the reasons expressed with
vigor and clarity by former Chief Justice Paras, no
liability was deemed incurred by the then publisher of the Manila
Chronicle.  A newspaper, it is stressed,
“should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest
mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.” The above ruling,
coupled with the requirement in the New York Times decision of the United
States Supreme Court, would for the writer of this opinion, furnish a
sufficient basis for the success of this appeal.  The Court, however, is not inclined to view
matters thus.  Obviously Quisumbing v. Lopez is not squarely in point.  Here there was no pressure of a daily
deadline to meet, no occasion to act with haste as the picture of respondent
was published in a weekly magazine. 
Moreover, there is the added requirement of reasonable care imposed by
such decision which, from the facts here found, appeared not to be
satisfied.  It cannot be concluded then
that the plea of petitioners is sufficiently persuasive.  The mandate of press freedom is not ignored,
but here it does not speak unequivocally. 
It is not decisive of the basic issue. 
By itself, it does not have a controlling significance.  So we hold.

4. Petitioners would make much, likewise, of their correction,
which has all the force of a retraction, as a basis from being absolved from
any pecuniary responsibility.  The
present Chief Justice in Policarpio v. Manila Times^[29]
restated the controlling principle: 
“We note that the news item published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major inaccuracy
contained in the first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC
had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal’s
office.  It, likewise, indicated the
number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints.  But, this rectification or clarification does
not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the first
article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil.
52).”^[30]

The correction promptly made by petitioners would thus call for a
reduction in the damages awarded.  It should be noted
that there was no proof of any actual pecuniary loss arising from the above
publication.  It is worthwhile to recall
what Justice Malcolm referred to as the tolerant attitude on the part of
appellate courts on this score, the usual practice being “more likely to
reduce damages for libel than to
increase them.”^[31]

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 25, 1966 affirming the lower
court decision of March 22, 1958
is hereby modified, petitioners Eugenio Lopez and
Juan T. Gatbonton being ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of P500.00 as moral damages
and the additional amount of P500.00 for attorney’s fees.  Costs against petitioners.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Zaldivar, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Castro and Barredo, JJ., in the result.

Dizon, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

Makalintal and Villamor, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
The above statement of facts appearing in the Petition, pp. 1-5 was accepted in
the decision now on appeal by respondent Court. 
Vide Appendix, Brief for the Petitioners,
pp. 52-61.

^[2]
76 Phil. 669 (1956).

^[3]
Ibid, p. 676.

^[4]
Section 1, Act No. 277 (1901).

^[5]
According to Section 11 of the Act: 
“In addition to the criminal action hereby prescribed, a right of
civil action is also hereby given to any person libeled as hereinbefore set
forth against the person libeling him for damages sustained by such libel, and
the person so libeled shall be entitled to recover in such civil action not
only the actual pecuniary damages sustained by him but also damages for injury
to his feelings and reputation, and in addition such punitive damages as the
court may think will be a just punishment to the libeler and an example to
others.  Suit may be brought in any Court
of First Instance having jurisdiction of the parties.  The presumptions, rules of evidence, and
special defenses herein provided for criminal prosecutions shall be equally
applicable in civil actions under this section.”

^[6]
Art. 2219 (8).

^[7]
Causin v. Ricamora,
5 Phil. 31 (1905); Causin v. Jakosalem, 5 Phil. 155 (1905); Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42 (1912); Jimenez v. Reyes, 27
Phil. 52 (1914); Sotelo Matti
v. Bulletin Publishing Co., 37 Phil. 562 (1918); Kunkle
v. Cablenews-American, 42 Phil. 757 (1922); Phee v. La Vanguardia, 45
Phil. 211 (1923); Oliver v. La Vanguardia, 48
Phil. 429 (1925); Santiago v. Calvo, 48 Phil.
919 (1926); El Hogar Fili­pino v. Prautch and Poblete, 49 Phil. 171
(1926); Guevara v. Almario, 56 Phil. 476
(1932); Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong
Gui, 76 Phil. 669 (1946); Quisumbing
v. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510 (1955); Sison v. David,
L-11268, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 60; Tolentino v.
Baylosis, L-15742, Jan. 31, 1961, 1 SCRA 396; Policarpio
v. Manila Times Pub. Co., L-16027, May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 148; Duque v. Santiago, L-16916, Nov. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA
661; Dizon v. Encarnacion,
L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714; Deaño v. Godinez, L-19518, Nov. 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 483; Corpus v.
Cuaderno, L-16969, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 807;
Jimenez v. Cabangbang, L-15905, Aug. 3, 1966,
17 SCRA 876; Imperial v. Ziga, L-19726, April
13, 1967, 19 SCRA 726; Ubarra v. Biscom Employees Coop. Asso.,
L-25332, Oct. 14, 1968, 25 SCRA 498; Deles v. Aragona,
Adm. Case No. 598, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 633.

^[8]
Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed., 259-260 (1924).  Cf. Gatley on Libel
and Slander, 5th ed., 19-20
(1960).

^[9]
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S.
185 (1909); Wandt v. Hearst’s Chicago
American, 109 N.W. 70 (1906); James v. Ft. Worth Telegram Co., 117 S.W.
1028 (1909); De Sando v. New York Herald Co.,
85 N.Y.S. 1903; Farley v. Evening Chronicle Pub. Co.,
87 S.W. 565 (1905).

^[10]
Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N. E. 505 (1931); Riley v.
Askin and Marine Co., 132 S.E.
584 (1926); Becker v. Brinkop, 78 S.W. 2d 538
(1935); Knapp v. Post Printing and Publishing Co., 144 P. 2d 981 (1944);
Corbett v. Am. Newspapers, 5 A. 2d 245 (1939); Myers v.
Afro-American Pub. Co., 5 N.Y.S. 2d 223 (1938); Flake v.
Greensboro News Co., 195 S.W. 55 (1938); Petransky v.
Repository Printing Co., 200 N.E. 647 (1936); Lanka v. Park
Entertainments, 1 N.E. 2d 42 (1936); Jackson
v. Consumer Publications, 11 N.Y.S.
2d 462 (1939); Smith v. The
Journal Co., 73 N.W. 2d 429 (1955); Dahl v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 166 N.Y.S. 2d 708 (1957); Greer v.
Skyway Broadcast­ing Co., 124 S.E. 2d 98 (1962).

^[11]
Hale, Law of the Press, 3rd ed.
6 (1948).

^[12]
214 US 185
(1909).

^[13]
Ibid, p. 189.

^[14]
Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co.,
82 F. 2d 154, 156 (1936).

^[15]
Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (1931).

^[16]
37 Phil. 731 (1918).

^[17]
Ibid, pp. 740-741.

^[18]
Ibid, p. 742. Cf. Another decision of Justice Malcolm is United States
v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 225 (1922).

^[19]
El Hogar Filipino v. Prautch,
49 Phil. 171, 176 (1926).

^[20]
96 Phil. 510 (1955).

^[21]
Ibid, pp. 514-515.

^[22]
376 US 254
(1964).

^[23]
Ibid, p. 256.

^[24]
Ibid, p. 269.

^[25]
Ibid, pp. 270-271.

^[26]
Ibid, pp. 279-280.

^[27]
388 US 130 (1967).

^[28]
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times
to Time, California Law Rev., 935, 954 (1968).

^[29]
L-16027, May 30, 1962, 5
SCRA 148.

^[30]
Ibid, p. 156.

^[31]
Guevarra v. Almario,
56 Phil. 476 (1932).

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