G.R. No. L-14223. November 23, 1960
SABINA SANTIAGO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
May 12, 1958, dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint in Civil Case No. Q-2913 of said
Court, on the grounds of lack of cause of action, prescription, and res
judicata.
Substantially, the complaint alleges: that on May 12, 1948, Ynocencio
Santiago, after due proceedings, was declared by the proper officials of the
Spanish Government, owner of the land described in the complaint, as evidenced
by Annex “A”; that said Ynocencio Santiago, from and after May 12, 1948,
continued in the possession of the aforesaid land in the concept of owner,
publicly, continuously, adversely and peacefully until his death, when his two
legitimate children, Isaias and Albina Santiago, succeeded and continued to own
and possess said land pro indwiso in the same character as that of their
predecessor; that upon the death of Isaias Santiago, his 1/2 share therein was
inherited by his eleven children, namely, Elena, Pablo, Geronimo, Cecilio,
Constantino, Irenea (now dead, survived by Jacinto Purificacion), Marta,
Ponciana, Leoncio, Carlos and Benito, all surnamed Santiago, who, together with
their aunt Albina Santiago, continued to own and possess the land in the same
character as that of their predecessors; that plaintiffs only recently learned
that on -March 25, 1949, defendant had filed with the same Court Civil Case No.
Q-27 for “Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession” against their co-owners
(Elena, Pablo, Geronimo, Cecilio, and Constantino), in which defendant herein
(J. M. Tuason & Co.) alleged that the land in Annex “A” formed part of its
TCT No. 119 of the land records of Rizal; that the judgment in Civil Case No.
Q-27, in which plaintiffs were never impleaded as parties, had already become
final (affirmed in G.R. L-5079,[*] July
31, 1956); that the defendant had executed the judgment in said civil case as
against plaintiffs herein, excluding and ousting the latter from the enjoyment
and possession of the land; that defendant’s TCT No. 119 (37679) of the land
records of Rizal, as well as Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from which
the former was derived, does not include the land claimed by plaintiffs; that
granting that TCT No. 119 now includes the land claimed by plaintiffs, its
inclusion in defendant’s certificate of title was made through fraud, in that
neither plaintiffs nor their predecessors were actually notified of said
registration proceedings as no survey party ever entered plaintiffs’ land,
causing them to believe that it was not applied for; as ground for cancellation
of defendant’s certificate of title, it is further alleged that the technical
description in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been falsified to
include areas never brought within the jurisdiction of the land registration
court, since they were not covered by the application and publication in G. R.
L. 0. 7681 which led to the registration of the land; that long before
defendant’s predecessors applied for and secured registration under Act 196 of
their land which allegedly includes plaintiffs’ land, the latter had already
acquired ownership thereof, not only by the document Annex “A” but by
acquisitive prescription; that since defendant’s predecessors obtained their
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which allegedly includes plaintiffs’ land,
the latter has not passed to an innocent third party; that despite demands on
defendant, the latter refused and still refused to desist from the acts
complained of.
Plaintiffs prayed: (1) that defendant be ordered to desist from enforcing
Civil Case No. Q-27 as against plaintiffs; (2) for a survey of the land in
question to determine whether TCT No. 119 (37679) of the land records of Rizal
includes the land described in the complaint; (3) for reconveyance to plaintiffs
of whatever portion of the land claimed by them may be found included in TCT No.
119 (37679); (4) for cancellation of TCT No. 119 and Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 to be substituted with a new certificate of title embracing only
those lands included in the application, publication and/or decree in G.R.L.O.
7681; (5) and for various items of damages.
Upon defendant’s motion, the court below dismissed the complaint, holding, as
aforesaid, that there was no cause of action, that the case was barred by a
prior judgment (Civil Case No. Q-27, affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
L-5079), and that whatever action plaintiffs might have had, had prescribed.
Thereupon, the plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court.
We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to quiet
title, prosecuted by the appellee Tuason & Co. against other heirs of
Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. [11] 5727), can not constitute
res judicata against these appellants who were not parties to that suit
and do not derive their title from the defendants in the previous litigation
(Rule 39, sec. 44 [b]). There is authority for the proposition that a judgment
may be made binding in a subsequent litigation upon one who, although not a
formal party to a previous suit, has actually conducted or controlled the action
or defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was adequately represented in such
previous litigation; but no clear proof of the existence of such exceptional
circumstances is before us in the present case. On the other hand, the rule is
that co-owners are not priviejs inter se in relation to the property
owned in common.
“Since tenants in common are not privies, it is clear that a judgment
rendered in a suit affecting the common property, brought by only one of the
co-owners, is not binding- upon his associates nor can it be invoked by them.
Thus, where a suit to set aside a decedent’s deed conveying all his property to
a single son is brought by only one of the disinherited children, a judgment
declaring the deed to be void can not be availed of in a subsequent partition
proceeding by any of the others.” (14 Am. Jur., sec. 107, p.
169)
But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of the
defendants Santiago in the former litigation over this same property (S.C. G.R.
No. L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former case, to
the effect that the Spanish document (Annex A) issued in favor of Ynocencio
Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was neither a titulo de informacidn
posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado, and,
therefore, vested no ownership over the land therein described in favor of
Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies to herein appellants, since the quality or
legal effect of the document does not depend upon the persons who invoke it.
If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the disputed
property by virtue of the document Annex A, than appellants herein, as heirs of
Ynocencio, have not acquired such ownership either. It follows that the first
and second causes of action of their complaint, predicated as they are on the
assumption that such ownership and its consequential rights resulted from Annex
A, must necessarily fail. Not being owners, they can complain of no invasion of
dominical rights.
As to the third cause of action: the mere fact that appellants herein were
not personally notified oi tfte registration proceedings that resulted in a
decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not
constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The
registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against the
whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the
ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared
in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by publication
but did not appear. The registration by the appellee’s predecessors-in-interest
freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that existed against
the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted
in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs.
Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition, there
being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of
appellants at the registration proceedings; and very much more than one year
having elapsed from the issuance of the decrees of registration in 1914, neither
revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any
more.
It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of
plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a cause of action. If such prescription
was completed before the registration of the land in favor of the
Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and extinguished by the
decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the prescription was either begun
or completed after the decree of registration, it conferred no title
because, by express provision of law, prescription can not operate against the
registered owner (Act 496, section 46).
There remains only the fourth cause of action, the sum and substance of which
is contained in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the dismissed complaint (Rec. App. p.
10-11), reciting:
“22. Plaintiffs, on information and belief, allege that the decree
of registration which resulted in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 of the land records of Rizal does not include the same land or area as
that now appearing in said Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and that the
technical description of the land in said Original Certificate of Title No. 735
has been falsified or tampered with in order to include an area greater than
that applied for by defendant’s predecessors-in-interest and that mentioned in
said decree of registration.23. Plaintiffs, on information and belief, further allege with
reference to said Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of which said Transfer
Certificate of Title 119 (37679) is a part of a derivative:a) that the title includes areas which never were brought within the
jurisdiction of the land registration court since they were not included in the
application and the publication of the registration in G.L.R.O. 7681;b) that the land described in Paragraph 3 and Annex “A” hereof was among the
areas not included in said application and publication nor in the decree of
registration.”
In our opinion, these allegations are insufficient to state a cause of
action, being on their face sham and frivolous. Whether or not the decree of
registration in favor of the Tuasons includes more land than was originally
applied for; and whether or not the application, publication and decree of
registration covered the land claimed by appellants, are not matters to be
alleged on information and belief, since the registration proceedings and plans
are public records, open to appellants’ inspection and verification. No reason
is shown why these facts could not be first positively and definitely
ascertained by plaintiffs, when they could do so upon simple comparison o£ the
descriptions appearing in the application, the decree, and the appellants’ title
deeds. The vagueness and uncertainty of their allegations evidence that
appellants themselves are not convinced of the truth of what they allege, but
wish to avoid being held accountable in case their charges of fraud and
falsification are shown to be untrue. Such indefiniteness of averments
disentitles them to consideration by the Court. The machinery of justice is not
established to verify rumors and conjectures, nor is it designed to do for
parties what is incumbent upon them to do. For the Courts to sanction the
practice of pleading upon information and belief matters of public record or
which pleaders could themselves easily ascertain, would open the door to
irresponsibility and encourage reckless charges and nuisance suits.
The fifth and sixth causes of action are predicated on the others previously
discussed, and need no separate consideration.
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the Court below that the complaint
stated no cause of action, and, therefore, it was properly dismissed, without
prejudice to subsequent amendment in conformity with the Rules.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Order affirmed.
[*] J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Geronimo Santiago, et al., (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz., [11] 5727).