ERLINDA RAVANERA AND HUSBAND OSCAR RAVANERA, PETITIONERS, VS. FELIPE I. IMPERIAL, RESPONDENT.

Appeal by certiorari taken by petitioners from (a) the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-00080, entitled “Felipe I.
Imperial, petitioner, versus Hon. Delfin Vir. Sunga, Judge, Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, Erlinda Ravanera and husband
Oscar Ravanera, respondents” promulgated on November
16, 1971 setting aside the orders dated March 18, 1971 and March 30, 1971
issued by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 5292, entitled “The Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Caceres, plaintiff, versus
Felipe I. Imperial, defendant,” and from (b) the former’s
resolution of January 10, 1972 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The facts found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

“It appears that on October 17, 1961 the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Caceres filed an action for Rescission
of Contract and Recovery of Possession against the herein petitioner before the
respondent court.  Said case was decided
by the respondent court in favor of the plaintiff on January 28, 1966.

“On February 17, 1966
pending approval of the Record on Appeal, plaintiff Archbishop of Nueva Caceres filed a Motion for
Execution of the decision or to order defendant to file supersedeas
bond and to deposit the amount of P500.00 every month as rentals.

“On May 6, 1966 the respondent Court granted the motion for
execution pending appeal and at the same time ordered that to stay the
execution, the defendant put up a supersedeas bond in
the amount of P40,000.00 for the rents due as of February, 1966, for the amount
of moral damages, and for the expenses of suit and to deposit the amount of
P500.00 as monthly rental of the property. 
This order became the subject of a Special Civil Action for Certiorari
and prohibition before the Supreme Court and by reason of the pendency of said special civil action the order of
execution was not enforced by the plaintiff.

“On December 10,
1966, the record on appeal was approved and the appealed case is
now docketed as CA-G.R. No. 39115-R, in this Court.

“On May 22, 1968,
the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground
that the order of execution being incidental to the appeal, the same should be
addressed to the Court of Appeals.  So on
June 21, 1968, the
plaintiff filed another motion for execution. 
On July 16, 1968 the
respondent Court ordered the issu­ance of a writ of execution, but the peti­tioner
was given fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order to put up the P40,000.00 supersedeas bond and to deposit the monthly rental of
P500.00 in order to stay the execution.

“Inspite of his receipt of the order
on July 23, 1968,
petitioner failed to post the required supersedeas
bond and to deposit the P500.00 monthly rental. 
Thus, on November 20, 1968,
the plaintiff Archbishop filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution.  On December 20, 1968 the respondent Court granted
the motion for execution requiring however the plaintiff to put up a bond in
the amount of P20,000.00 to answer for any judgment that may be awarded to
petitioners should the decision be reversed on appeal.

“The plaintiff Archbishop posted the required bond of
P20,000.00 and on February 14, 1969
a writ of execution was issued.  Said
writ was not enforced upon instance of the counsel for plaintiff as an amicable
settlement was proposed and after the 60 days period had lapsed the Sheriff
made a return of the writ stating therein:

“This is to certify that this writ was not acted upon at the
instance of counsel for the plaintiff for the reason that amicable settlement
between parties was proposed.

“Upon request of counsel for the plaintiff let this writ be
returned and an alias writ be issued for the proposed amicable settlement
above-stated failed to materialize.

“Naga City,
Philippines, July 14, 1969.

SGD. MAURO B. FAJARDO

Ex Oficio City
Sheriff”

“Pursuant to this return, the Clerk of Court of the respondent
Court, issued an alias writ of exe­cution on August 24, 1969.  On
September 24, 1969 the
Sheriff issued a notice of Levy by which certain properties of the petitioner
were attached or levied upon.  On September 25, 1969 the alias writ was
personally served by the Sheriff upon the petitioner.  On October
7, 1969, the Sheriff issued a Notice of Public Auction sale of the
properties levied upon which was published in the “Bicol
Star” a weekly newspaper of general circulation on October 11, 18 and 25,
1969.  Private respondent alleges that
copies of the Notice of Levy and the Notice of Sale were sent by Registered
Mail which according to the certificate of the Postmaster was received on October 15, 1969.  Receipt of the Notice of Levy is denied by
petitioner.

“On November 7, 1969
the public auction sale was held, and the respondent Erlinda
Ravanera being the highest bidder a Provisional Deed
of Sale was issued in her favor.  Within
the one-year period of redemption, the petitioner redeemed some of the
properties bought at auction sale, but he failed to redeem some others on
account of which at the end of the redemption period or on December 8, 1970 the
Sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale of said unredeemed properties in the
name of respondent Erlinda Ravanera.  She likewise paid the arrears in real estate
taxes of said properties, redeemed a mortgage on one of them and caused the
properties to be declared in her name.

“On February 9, 1971 respondent Erlinda
Ravanera filed a motion for a writ of possession of
the properties covered by the Definite Deed of Sale, to which motion petitioner
filed his opposition alleging that the notice of levy was null and void and
hence the provisional as well as the definite deed of sale were likewise void,
and that respondent Ravanera had no personality in
the case, she not being a party thereto.

“On March 18, 1971, the respondent Court issued an order
granting the motion for a writ of possession and on March 27, 1971 the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that there was no
formal hearing and reception of evidence on the motion and that the order did
not state the finding of facts which could be the basis for the grant of the
motion.  On March 30, 1971 the respondent Court issued an order
denying the motion for reconsideration, however, it suspended the effectivity of the writ of possession to April 25, 1971.  Hence this petition.

“The petitioner attacks the order of March 15, 1971 granting the motion for a writ of
possession on the following grounds:

1.      
That the writ of execution issued
by the Court on December 30,
1968 is void defendant having on December 10, 1966 perfected his appeal;

2.      
That the Alias writ of Execution
issued by the Deputy Provincial Sheriff is void there having been no order
coming from the Court granting such issuance of an Alias Writ;

3.      
Notice of Levy Null and Void;

4.      
That Erlinda
Ravanera has no personality to file Motion for Writ
of Possession;

5.      
That there was no formal hearing
or reception of evidence from the parties;

6.      
That there is a pending appeal
before the Court of Appeals under G.R. No. 39-115-R;

7.      
That order issuing the Writ of
Possession did not state findings of facts as basis for the order or issuance
of the writ;

8.      
That the price for which the properties
have been bidded is grossly inadequate and is
therefore unconscionable amounting to lack of consideration.

“From the facts recited in the complaint, the answer as well
as the decision of the respondent court appears that the main case partakes
more of the nature of an unlawful detainer and
damages case rather than one for rescission of contract as it is admitted by
the parties that the contract of lease had already expired and there is no
showing that the same had been expressly or impliedly renewed.  Hence there was actually no contract to be
rescinded and subsequent orders of the respondent court reveal that it
considered the case as one for ejectment and
damages.”^[1]

On November 16, 1971,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the orders dated March 18, 1971 and March 30, 1971 issued by the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur
and making the preliminary injunction previously issued permanent.^[2]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of January 10, 1972.^[3]

From the above-mentioned decision and resolution, petitioners
seek in this petition to correct errors committed by the Court of Appeals as
follows:

“1.  The Court of Appeals erred in annulling the
Notice of Levy merely because it did not comply with some of the formal
requirements of the Rules of Court which were not shown to have prejudiced any
substantial rights of the respondent Imperial;

“2.  The Court Of Appeals erred in applying to one
unregistered parcel of land and the one unregistered residential house
described in the Notice of Levy the formal requirements of the Rules of Court
which are applicable only to registered properties;

“3.  The Court of Appeals erred in requiring
service upon respondent Imperial of the Notice of Levy before the publication
of the Notice of Public Auction Sale considering that the Rules of Court does
not so require;

“4.  That the Court of Appeals erred in not
applying to the case at bar the presumption of regularity in the official acts
and proceedings, of the Sheriff, particularly in the matter of leaving with the
occupant of the land, copy of the. 
Notice of Levy, considering that there is no evidence, to the contrary;

“5.  The Court of Appeals erred in not applying
against respondent Imperial the principle, of estoppel
or waiver of whatever procedural defects there were in the Levy when he
repurchased part of the properties levied upon by the Sheriff but failed to
repurchase properties which are now in question herein;

“6. That the
Court of Appeals erred in not considering against respondent Imperial
undisputed facts which show bad faith and intent to delay the proceedings and
to thwart a fair administration of justice;

“7. The Court
of Appeals erred in, not considering in favor of the petitioners undisputed
facts showing that they were innocent purchasers for value, and therefore,
should not be made to suffer the prejudice caused by the alleged invalidity or
ineffectiveness of the levy.” (pp. 9-10, Rollo)

The main issue raised before Us in this petition is whether or
not there was a valid levy upon the properties of respondent Felipe I.
Imperial.

The Court of Appeals annulled the levy and all the proceedings
subsequent thereto on two grounds, to wit: 
1) The occupants or possessors of the properties levied upon were not
furnished with a notice of levy and as Section 7 of Rule 57, paragraph (a)
makes this a requirement for the validity of the levy, non-compliance therewith
has made the levy ineffective, and 2) The Notice of levy made by the sheriff
did not contain the volume and the page in the Registry where the certificate
is registered.^[4]

Anent the first ground, the Court of Appeals, in support thereof,
cited the case of Philippine Surety vs. Zabal^[5]
wherein this Court held:

“In the case at bar, no notice of the levy was given to the
occupant of the land.  There was,
therefore, no valid levy on the land, and its registration in the registry of
deeds and annotation in the title were invalid and ineffective.  The fact that the person in whose name the
land was registered was duly notified of the attachment does not cure the
defect, because personal service of the copy of the writ, description of the
property and notice to the owner, who is not the occupant, does not constitute
compliance with the statute.

“The evident purpose of the law in imposing these requirements
is to make the levy public and notorious, to prevent liens from attaching
secretly and by surreptitious entries and endorsements, and to enable the
affected party to inquire into the date and circumstances surrounding the
creation of the encumbrance, as well as to give him ample opportunity to file
timely claims to the property levied upon.”

The ruling relied upon by the Court of Appeals has already been
modified by the case of Pamintuan vs. Muñoz, 22 SCRA 1109 wherein this Court briefly stated:

“Petitioners finally argue that they had not been served a
notice of the levy nor a notice of the sale as required by the Rules.  The sheriffs return, however shows that the
notice of levy had been registered with the Register of Deeds pursuant to Rule
57, Section 7 in connection with Rule 39, Section 15 of the Rules, and that the
notice of sale had been sent by registered mail on December 28, 1964, to petitioners.  Even assuming then that petitioners were not
served a copy of the notice of levy, yet We have already ruled in Philippine
Bank of Commerce vs. Macadaeg, L-14174, October 31, 1960, that this defect
is cured by service of notice of sale upon the judgment debtors prior to the
sale, which was done here.  The levy was
validly effected then.”

It appears in this case that the notice of levy was registered
with the Register of Deeds on September
29, 1969.  From a
certification of the Postmaster at Naga City,
it also appears that registered letter No. 13687 containing the notice of levy
and the notice of auction sale addressed to respondent Felipe Imperial was
delivered on October 15, 1969
to Pelaguia Comba, member
of the household of the addressee. 
Respondent Imperial was, therefore, notified by registered mail of the
levy and the auction sale long before November
3, 1969, the date of the auction sale.  What is required is that the judgment debtor
must be notified of the auction sale before the actual date of sale which was
done in the case at bar.^[6]

It cannot be gainsaid that if it were only to afford an
opportunity to respondent Imperial to avoid the auction sale, he had ample
opportunity to file his objection to such sale because the auction sale took
place on November 3, 1969.  The respondent had nineteen days after he
received the notice of levy and the notice of auction sale on October 15, 1969 and thirty-nine
(39) days from September 25, 1969
when he was served personally by the Sheriff a copy of the writ of execution to
avoid the sale had he wanted to. 
Moreover, he had exactly one year from November 27, 1969 when the provisional Deed of Sale
executed in favor of the petitioner was registered with the Register of Deeds
to redeem the property.

Regarding the second ground, We are constrained to make a
distinction for the levy of property registered under Act 496 (Land
Registration Act) and the property not brought under the operation of said Act.

The Court of Appeals concluded in its Resolution dated January
10, 1972 that the requirements of Section 7 of Rule 57 do not make distinction
whether the property is under the operation of the Land Registration Act or
not.  Petitioners contend otherwise and
such contention is not without merit, under the provisions of Section 15
(Paragraph 2) of Rule 39 and Section 7 (Paragraph a) of Rule 57, which are
pertinent.

Section 15 (Paragraph 2) of Rule 39 expressly provides:

“x x x

“Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits and other
personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be
levied on in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of
attachment.”

Section 7 (paragraph a) of Rule 57 also provides the following:

“Attachment of real and personal property, recording
thereof.  – Properties shall be attached
by the officer executing the order in the following manner:

“(a) x x x.  Where the property had been brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act, the notice shall contain a reference to
the number of the certificate of title and the volume and page in the
registration book where the certificate is registered.  The registrar must index attachments filed
under this paragraph in the names both of the plaintiff and of the
defendants.”

Section 7 (paragraph a) of Rule 57 is so explicit that only as to
property which has been brought under the operation of the Land Registration
Act should the notice of levy contain the volume and page in the registration
book where the certificate is registered. 
Impliedly, the requirement does not apply to property not registered
under the said Act.  It is enough that
the notice of levy upon unregistered land be registered under Act 3344, as was
done in this case.

In the case of Siari Valley Estates vs.
Lucasan,^[7]
which clearly applies to this case, it was held by this Court:

“The requirement that the notice of levy should contain a
reference to the number of the certificate of title and the volume and page in
the registration book where the certificate is registered is made in order that
the debtor as well as a third person may be properly informed of the particular
land or property that is under the custody of the court.  This can only be accomplished by making a
reference to the certificate of title covering the property.  The situation differs if the land is
unregistered, in which case it is enough that the notice be registered under
Act 3344.  This conclusion finds support
in the following authorities:

‘An attachment levied on real estate not duly recorded in the
registry of property is not an encumbrance on the attached property, nor can
such attachment, unrecorded in the registry, serve as a ground for decreeing
the annulment of the sale of the property, at the request of another creditor.’
(Gonzalez Diez v. Delgado and Imperial, 37, Phil.
389)

‘*** In conformity with the provisions of Section 71 of the Land
Registra­tion Act, the sheriff of the City of Manila filed a notice of the levy
with the register of deeds, which notice was entered in the primary entry book
of the register’s office, but was afterwards, on May 20, 1920, returned to the
sheriff with the information that the property was registered in the name of
Buenaventura Dizon, having been conveyed to the
latter by the defendant in execution, Celerino
Arellano, and that, therefore, no memorandum of the notice had been entered
upon the outstanding certificate of title. 
It may be noted that the notice contained no reference to the number
of the certificate of title of the land to be effected, and the volume and page
in the registry book where the certificate is registered, and that to that
extent, the notice did not meet the requirements of said section 71.’ (De Ocampo v. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 50 Phil.
140, 141; Italics supplied.)”

The properties which were acquired by the petitioners as the
highest bidders in the auction sale on November
3, 1969 are as follows:

1.     
A parcel of land located at Naga City
registered under Act 496 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 257;

2.     
A two-storey residential house
located at Naga City not registered under Act 496
but covered by Tax Declaration No. 14276; and

3.     
A parcel of residential land
located at Naga
City not registered under Act
496 but covered by Tax Declaration No. 8732.  (Annex J to Petition, pages 39 and 40, Rollo.)

From the records of the case, the notice of levy made by the
sheriff as regards the registered land contains reference to the number of its
certificate of title but not to the volume and page in the registry book where
the title is registered.  Nevertheless
from what was stated in the case of Siari Valley
Estate vs. Lucasan, supra, it would seem that
the purpose of the requirement of Section 7(a), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court is substantially complied with. 
This is more so where as in this case, there appears in the notice of
levy the following certification:

“It is hereby certified that this instrument has been duly
registered proper memorandum hereof made on transfer Certificate of Title No.
257 & 258 and on its owner’s duplicate Reg. Book No. 3; File No. 1-248.

“Naga
City, Sept. 29, 1969.”

Reference to the number of the certificate of title of every
registered land in the notice of levy, together with the technical description
thereof, would certainly suffice to inform the debtor, as well as third persons
what particular land or property is brought to the custody of the court, as is
the purpose of the aforecited provision of the Rules
of Court.  Incidentally, no third person
appears to be interested in the matter now before this Court.  From the fact that respondent Imperial was
able to exercise his right of redemption with reference to three registered
parcels of land, it can be easily deduced that insofar as respondent Imperial
is concerned, the purpose of the requirement of reference having to be made to
the number of the certificate of title, and also the volume and page in the
registration book where the certificate is registered, has been fully served or
attained.

It may also be pertinent to note that in the Siari
Valley case, heavily relied upon by the respondent court in voiding the notice
of levy in the instant case, the land involved which was actually registered
with OCT No. 2492 was described in the notice of levy as unregistered land,
which was thus a misleading information.

We, therefore, find no substantial defect in the notice of levy
on all the properties levied upon and sold to petitioners in the auction sale,
that should be a basis, as the respondent court deemed it to be, for annulling
the sale made pursuant to the levy.

Respondent Imperial also brands the levy as irregular for failure
of the occupants of the attached or levied properties to be left with copy of
the order, notice of levy and description of the properties.  The finding of facts of the respondent Court
of Appeals which was quoted in full above, fails to disclose the existence of
occupants of the properties levied upon other than the owner, respondent
Imperial.  It was incumbent on said
respondent to prove by evidence duly submitted to the Court a fact that would
tend to support his claim that the levy is void or otherwise illegal.  The levy being an official act of a
government functionary its regularity is presumed.

The alleged inadequacy of the purchase price of the properties
sold in the execution sale is no ground to assail the validity of the sale, for
the judgment debtor has the right to redeem the property, and the smaller the
price, the easier is it for him to buy back the property.^[8]

Respondent Imperial goes back to the issuance of the order of
execution on December 30, 1968
to show that the order is invalid because it was issued after he has perfected
his appeal on December 10, 1966
(p. 22, Respondent’s Brief).  What the
Court of Appeals, however, stated in its decision is that “on February 17,
1966, pending approval of the Record on Appeals, plaintiff Archbishops of Nueva Caceres filed a Motion for
Execution of the decision or to order defendant to file supersedeas
bond and to deposit the amount of P500.00 every month as rentals,” and
that on May 6, 1966, the respondent court (CFI of Camarines
Sur) granted the motion for execution pending
appeal.  This order was brought up by
respondent Imperial to the Supreme Court on certiorari as a special
civil action, resulting in the stay of the enforcement of the order of the
execution.  The special civil action,
however, was dismissed on May 22, 1968,
by the Supreme Court, and the dismissal merely reactivated the order of
execution pending appeal issued on May
6, 1966.

Clearly, the original order of execution pending appeal was
perfectly ‘valid, and the issuance of alias writ when the original writ
was not acted upon at the instance of the plaintiff for the reason that
amicable settlement between the parties was proposed but failed to materialize,
did not affect the validity of either the original or alias writ of
execution.  Accordingly, We rule that
contrary to the contention of respondent Imperial (see pages 22-23, Brief for
the Respondent), the writ of execution that gave rise to the levy of the
properties in question and their sale in a public auction is valid and regular
in all respects.  That the alias writ of
execution was issued by the Clerk of Court and not by the judge is no ground
for holding invalid said alias writ, considering that the Clerk of Court is not
without authority to issue ordinary writs and processes, under the seal of the
Court (Session 4, Rule 136, Revised Rules of Court).

In any event, respondent Imperial as judgment debtor is in estoppel by his failure to seasonably make an objection to
the allegedly defective notice of levy and notice of sale before the actual
sale, or before redeeming some of his properties despite the supposed defect of
the notice of levy.  He should have
interposed objection to the levy and the sale from the very beginning, from October 15, 1969 when he received
notice of levy and notice of sale.  A
waiver on his part to question the validity of the auction sale may also be
said to arise from his failure to pay the arrears in real estate taxes, or to
redeem the mortgage of one of the properties sold at public auction, during the
period of redemption.  These are
omissions which are clearly an indication of acquiescence in the sale, or his
awareness that the execution sale was valid and legally unassailable.  To allow him to turn back on his manifest
conformity to the levy and sale on execution of his properties, after
petitioners have bought the property as the highest bidder during the auction
sale, would be patently unjust to the said petitioners, who had every reason to
rely on the presumed regularity of the proceedings as official acts of both the
judge and his own court officer, the sheriff.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed.  The notice of levy and the
sale of the properties in question, both registered and unregistered in favor
of the petitioners are hereby declared valid. 
No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., (Chairman), in the result.

^[1]
Annex to Petition, pp. 44-49, Rollo.

^[2]
Page 56, Rollo.

^[3]
Page 60. Id.

^[4]
Pages 53 and 54, Rollo.

^[5]
21 SCRA 682.

^[6] Pamintuan vs. Muñoz, supra.

^[7]
58 O.G. 5882.

^[8] Barrozo vs. Macaraeg, 83
Phil. 378; Tolentino vs. Agcaoili,
L-4349-51, May 28, 1952; Velasquez vs. Coronel,
5 SCRA 985; Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 36
SCRA 289; De Leon vs. Salvador, 36 SCRA 567; Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Vda. de Moll, 43 SCRA 82.