DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), PETITIONER, VS. HON. EDGAR DALMACIO SANTOS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 222, QUEZON CITY AND UNITED P…
ANTONIO-VALENZUELA, J.:
THE FACTS
The following facts are undisputed: On 26 July 1993, petitioner DENR and the United Planners and Consultants, Inc. (“respondent UPCI”) executed the Agreement for Consultancy Services (“Consultancy Agreement”); under the Consultancy Agreement, petitioner DENR was obliged to pay respondent UPCI based on the predetermined percentage of the contract price corresponding to the particular stage of work accomplished; in December 1994, respondent UPCI completed the work required of it under the Consultancy Agreement, and the petitioner DENR formally accepted the completed work; petitioner DENR paid respondent UPCI the amount of Php 2,038,456.30 (47% of the contract price); on 25 October 1994, the Commission on Audit (“COA”) released the Technical Services Office Report (“TSO Report”) which stated that the Consultancy Agreement was 84.14% excessive, and thereafter, petitioner DENR suspended payment, but acknowledged its liability to respondent UPCI in the amount of Php 2,239,479.60, and assured respondent UPCI that the payment would be made at the soonest time possible.
Respondent UPCI filed the Complaint against petitioner DENR before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-07-60321. The Complaint prayed that petitioner DENR be directed to submit the dispute to arbitration, pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Consultancy Agreement.
Petitioner DENR filed its Answer,[4] which pleaded as counterclaim that the excess payment of 37.14%, in the amount of Php1,350,585.44, made to respondent UPCI should be returned to the government.
Petitioner DENR’s Answer prayed that: the dispute be submitted for arbitration before three arbitrators who would be appointed by the RTC; Engineer Victor Balde (“Engr. Balde”) be chosen as one of the arbitrators, and the third arbitrator should come from the COA; the arbitrators who would be appointed, be ordered to include in their adjudication the counterclaim of petitioner DENR against respondent UPCI.[5]
On 10 January 2010, the RTC issued the Order appointing Attorney Alfredo F. Tadiar (“Atty. Tadiar”) and Architect Armando N. Alli (“Arch. Alli”), as the first two members of the Arbitral Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Pursuant to the Order, Atty. Tadiar and Arch. Alli chose Engineer Ricardo B. San Juan, as the third member of the Tribunal.[6]
The court-referred arbitration before the Tribunal was docketed as Arbitration Case No. A-001.
On 07 May 2010, after several conferences, the Tribunal rendered the Arbitral Award[7] in favor of respondent UPCI.
On 02 June 2010, petitioner DENR filed the Manifestation and Motion[8] alleging that: petitioner DENR, through the Office of the Solicitor General (“OSG”), submitted its draft decision to the Tribunal on 07 May 2010, but the OSG received information that the Tribunal had already rendered the Arbitral Award before the draft decision had been received; the arguments and defenses of petitioner DENR contained in the draft decision, were not considered by the Tribunal in arriving at the Arbitral Award; the OSG did not receive a copy of the Arbitral Award, and had to secure a copy from the Legal Department of petitioner DENR.
On 20 September 2010, respondent UPCI filed the Opposition/Motion for Confirmation of the Award before the RTC, which prayed for the confirmation of the Arbitral Award.
However, on 19 November 2010, petitioner DENR filed its Opposition (to the Opposition/Motion for Confirmation dated September 30, 2010),[9] reiterating its averment that the Tribunal did not consider petitioner DENR’s draft decision when it rendered the Arbitral Award, and that the Tribunal did not furnish the OSG copy of the Arbitral Award.
On 30 March 2011, the RTC issued the Order[10] which, among other things, granted respondent UPCI’s Motion for Confirmation of the Award, and ordered petitioner DENR to pay respondent UPCI the amount of Php 50,000.00, representing the cost of confirming the Arbitral Award.
Upon respondent UPCI’s Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution dated 15 June 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order dated 12 September 2011,[11] directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the Arbitral Award dated 7 May 2010.
On 24 November 2011, petitioner DENR filed the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution,[12] but the RTC denied the motion in its assailed Order dated 09 July 2012.[13]
Aggrieved, petitioner DENR files this Petition and makes the following assignment of errors:
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONFIRMING AND ORDERING THE EXECUTION OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT AFFORDED THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE EXECUTION OF AN AWARD WHICH IS PREMATURE AND WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS.
At the outset, we find it necessary to discuss the issues being raised by respondent UPCI, to wit: 1) whether this Petition should be dismissed for assailing the merits of the Arbitral Award and 2) whether this Petition should be dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Respondent UPCI avers that this Petition should be dismissed for having been filed out of time, and for assailing the merits of the Arbitral Award, in violation of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution[14] (“Special ADR Rules”). Respondent UPCI thrusts: petitioner DENR, by questioning the propriety of the allowance or disallowance of respondent UPCI’s claims, actually assailed the merits of the Arbitral Award, and thus violated Rule 19.7 of the Special ADR Rules; petitioner DENR filed this Petition beyond the 15 day reglementary period provided for under Rule 19.28 of the Special ADR Rules.
Petitioner DENR parries that this Petition should be given due course because it does not fall within the ambit of the Special ADR Rules because it does not assail the merits of the Arbitral Award, but instead assails the irregularities in the procedure committed by the Arbitral Tribunal; it was timely filed, pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
THE COURT’S RULING
With respect to the first and second issues, we rule in the affirmative. This Petition should be dismissed for assailing the merits of the Arbitral Award, in violation of the Special ADR Rules, and for having been filed out of time.
Rule 19.7 of the Special ADR Rules is relevant. It reads:
Rule 19.7. No appeal or certiorari on the merits of an arbitral award.– An agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration shall mean that the arbitral award is final and binding. Consequently, a party to an arbitration is precluded from filing an appeal or a petition for certiorari questioning the merits of an arbitral award. (Emhphasis supplied.)
As provided in the above-quoted provision of the Special ADR Rules, as a general rule, a party to arbitration is precluded from filing an appeal or a petition for certiorari to question the merits of an arbitral award.
A perusal of the Petition reveals that it actually assails the merits of the Arbitral Award, which is disallowed under Rule 19.7 above-quoted. Consequently, the Petition must be dismissed.
Petitioner DENR imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for ordering the execution of the Arbitral Award. Petitioner DENR contends that the Arbitral Award, which granted respondent UPCI’s money claim, was improper and without legal basis. Petitioner DENR argues further that the Arbitral Award was improper because respondent UPCI failed to file first its money claim with COA, and thus failed to exhaust all the available administrative remedies available to it. The propriety of respondent UPCI’s money claim against petitioner DENR delves into the very merit of the Arbitral Award, since it was one of the issues submitted before the Tribunal.[15] It is clear therefore that the Petition is a petition for certiorari prohibited under the Special ADR Rules.
It is worthy to note that the State, as a policy, encourages the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, such as the arbitration proceedings in this case, as an important means to achieve speedy and impartial justice, as well as to declog court dockets.[16] Petitioner DENR, by agreeing to submit the dispute with respondent UPCI before the Tribunal, is precluded from questioning the merits of the Arbitral Award, because to do so would render nugatory the purpose of the arbitration proceedings.
The Petition should be dismissed because it was filed out of time.
While the general rule under Rule 19.7 above-quoted precludes a party in an arbitration case from filing an appeal or petition for certiorari questioning the merits of an arbitral award, Rule 19.8 of the Special ADR Rules makes available the remedy of a special civil action of certiorari, but only in specific instances.
Rule 19.8 reads:
Rule 19.8 Subject matter and governing rules. — The remedy of an appeal through a petition for review or the remedy of a special civil action of certiorari from a decision of the Regional Trial Court made under the Special ADR Rules shall be allowed in the instances, and only in the manner, provided under this Rule.
(Emhpasis supplied.)
Further, Rule 19.27 and Rule 19.28 are relevant. They read:
Rule 19.27. Form. — The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the questioned judgment, order or resolution of the Regional Trial Court, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the Rules of Court.
Rule 19.28. When to file petition. — The petition must be filed with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be annulled or set aside. No extension of time to file petition shall be allowed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Rule 19.28 of the Special ADR Rules above-quoted, an appeal via a petition for review, or the special civil action for certiorari, may be allowed in special instances, and by specific procedure outlined in the Special ADR Rules. Notably as provided in Rule 19.28 of the Special ADR Rules above-quoted, appeal via a petition for review, or the special civil action of certiorari must be filed with this Court within 15 days from receipt of the judgment or order.
It is undisputed that on 11 November 2011, petitioner DENR received the assailed Order dated 12 September 2011 (which granted respondent UPCI’s Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution). On 12 July 2012, petitioner DENR received the assailed Order dated 09 July 2012 (which denied petitioner DENR’s Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution).[17]
Applying Rule 19.28 above-quoted, petitioner DENR had 15 days from 12 July 2012 (or until 27 July 2012), within which to file petition with the Court of Appeals. Clearly, this Petition which was filed on 10 September 2012, was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Necessarily it must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 19.30[18] of the Special ADR Rules.
Petitioner DENR argues that this Petition was timely filed, pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides for a reglementary period of 60 days. According to petitioner DENR, this Petition does not fall within the ambit of the Special ADR Rules because it assails the procedural irregularities committed by the Arbitral Tribunal, and not the merits of the Arbitral Award.[19]
We are not convinced.
As previously discussed, since it is clear that the allegations in the Petition assail the merits of the Arbitral Award and not the procedural irregularities committed by the Arbitral Tribunal, it is Rule 19.28 of the Special ADR Rules, and not Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, that should govern.
Moreover, when two rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.[20] The provision in the Special ADR Rules, providing for a period of 15 days from notice to file a petition for certiorari, prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court.
Procedural rules do not exist simply for the convenience of the litigants. While procedural rules are construed liberally, the provisions on reglementary period must be strictly complied with, in order to prevent unwarranted delays, and in order to facilitate the orderly and speedy discharge of justice. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with.[21]
We are mindful that there are recognized exceptions to the strict observance of reglementary period, to wit: 1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; 2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; 3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; 4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; 5) the merits of the case; 6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; 7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; 8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; 9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; 10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; 11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; 12) importance of the issues involved; and 13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.[22] Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.[23]
We find, however, that none of these exceptions are present in this case. On the contrary, it is noteworthy that almost 20 years have lapsed since respondent UPCI fulfilled its obligations and delivered to petitioner DENR the expected output under the Consultancy Agreement. To delay this case further would be detrimental to the rules of fair play and substantial justice.
We DISMISS this Petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Veloso (Chairperson) and Lantion, JJ., concur.
[1] C.A. Rollo, p. 3.
[2] Annex “A” (of the Petition for Review), C.A. Rollo, p. 35.
[3] Annex “C” (of the Petition for Review), C.A. Rollo, pp. 45-49.
[4] Dated 10 March 2008, Annex B (of the Comment), C.A. Rollo, pp. 216-220.
[5] Answer, ibid.
[6] Petition, C.A. Rollo, pp. 3-33, at p. 7.
[7] Annex “J” (of the Petition), C.A. Rollo, pp. 127-152.
[8] Dated 01 June 2010, Annex “D” (of the Petition), C.A. Rollo, pp. 50- 55.
[9] Annex “G” (of the Petition), C.A. Rollo, pp. 109-120.
[10] Annex “H” (of the Petition), C.A. Rollo, p. 121.
[11] Annex “A” (of the Petition), supra note 1.
[12] Dated 22 November 2011, Annex “B” (of the Petition), C.A. Rollo, pp 36-44.
[13] Annex “C’ (of the Petition), supra note 2.
[14] A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC, 01 September 2009.
[15] Award, dated 07 May 2010, Annex “J” (of the Petition), C.A. Rollo, pp. 127-152.
[16] Section 2, R.A. 9285, “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1994,” 02 April 2004.
[17] Dated 22 November 2011, Annex “B” of Petition, C.A. Rollo, pp. 36-44.
[18] Rule 19.30. Court to dismiss petition. –The court shall dismiss the petition if it fails to comply with Rules 19.27 and 19.28 above, or upon consideration of the ground alleged and the legal briefs submitted by the parties, the petition does not appear to be prima facie meritorious.
[19] Reply, dated 24 October 2012, C.A. Rollo, pp. 235-244, at 240-241.
[20] Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No. 175573, 05 October 2010, citing Buencamino v. CA, G.R. No. 175895, 12 April 2007.
[21] Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, 15 November 2010, citing National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009; Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., G.R. No. 73210, 10 February 1994.
[22] Ibid., citing Lim v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 172574, 31 July 2009,; Villena v. Rupisan, G.R. No. 167620, 03 April 2007.
[23] Ibid.