AGAPITO FUELLAS, PETITIONER, VS. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

For serious physical injuries sustained by Pepito Cadano, son of
plaintiff-appellee Elpidio Cadano, two separate actions were
instituted, Civil Case No. 583, filed on October 1, 1954, for damages
against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico Fuellas, who caused
the injuries, and Criminal Case No. 1765, against Rico Fuellas, filed
on November 11, 1954, for serious physical injuries. They were tried
jointly. On May 18, 1956, a judgment of conviction in the criminal case
was rendered, finding Rico Fuellas guilty of the offense charged. No
pronouncement as to his civil liability was made, the trial judge
having ruled that the same “shall be determined in Civil Case No. 583
of this Court.” On May 25, 1956, the same court rendered judgment in
the civil case making defendant therein, now appellant Agapito Fuellas,
liable under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code for the following damages—

	For medicine, etc.		P1,000.00
	For moral damages		6,000.00
	As exemplary damages		2,000.00
	As attorney’s fees		600.00 ===========
		Total	P9,600.00

with 6 per cent annual interest thereon until paid. The Court of
Appeals modified the judgment by reducing the moral damages to P3,000.
An appeal was taken to this tribunal solely on questions of law.

Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant- appellant Agapito
Fuellas, were both 13 years old, on September 16, 1954. They were
classmates at St. Mary’s High School, Dansalan City. In the afternoon
of September 16, 1954, while Pepito was studying his lessons in the
classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and
surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto
asked Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same,
an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him
to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told
them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito
had just gone down of the school- house, he was met by Rico, still in
angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands.
Pepito extended his hand to Rico. Instead of accepting the proffer to
shake hands, Rico held Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed
Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his
right side with his right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on
his left side. While Rico was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried
out “My arm is broken.” Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was
helped by others to go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to
the Lanao General Hospital for treatment Exh. 4). An X-Ray taken showed
that there was a complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right
forearm which necessitated plaster casting (Exhs. A, B and D). On
November 20, 1954, more than a month after Pepito’s release from the
hospital, the plaster cast was removed. And up to the last day of
hearing of the case, the right forearm of Pepito was seen to be shorter
than the left forearm, still in bandage and could not be fully used.

It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate
injury caused by his son; that the said court held the petitioner
liable pursuant to par. 2, of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in
connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code; that according to the last
article, the act of the minor must be one wherein “fault or negligence”
is present; and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of
petitioner-appellant’s minor son, but deliberate intent, the above
mentioned articles are not applicable, for the existence of deliberate
intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or
negligence in its commission. Appellant, therefore, submits that the
appellate court erred in holding him liable for damages for the
deliberate criminal act of his minor son.

The above-mentioned provisions of the Civil Code state:—

“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.” (Article 2176).

“The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.”
The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.

*           *           *           *           *           *           *           *           *           *”

(Article 2180)

In the case of Araneta vs. Arreglado, 104 Phil., 529; 55 Off. Gaz.,
(9) 1561). Benjamin Araneta was talking with other students of the
Ateneo de Manila, seated atop a low ruined wall. Dario Arreglado, a
former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by. The boys twitted him
on his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the De La Salle College.
Arreglado, resenting the banter, pulled a Japanese luger pistol
(licensed in the name of his father Juan Arreglado), fired the same at
Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw. Dario was indicted for
frustrated homicide and pleaded guilty. But in view of his youth, he
being only 14 years of age, the Court suspended the proceedings (Art.
80 of the Revised Penal Code). Thereafter, an action was instituted by
Araneta and his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife and their son
Dario to recover material, moral and exemplary damages. The Court of
First Instance, sentenced the Arreglados to pay P3,943.00 as damages
and attorney’s fees. The Aranetas appealed in view of the meager amount
of indemnity awarded. This tribunal affirmed the decision but increased
the indemnity to P18,000.00. This decision was predicated upon the fact
that Arreglado’s father had acted negligently in allowing his son to
have access to the pistol used to injure Benjamin. And this was the
logical consequence of the case, considering the fact that the civil
law liability under Article 2180 is not respondeat superior but the relationship of pater familias
which bases the liability of the father ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his minor son (Cuison vs. Norton &
Harrison, 55 Phil., 23), and that if an injury is caused by the fault
or negligence of his minor son, the law presumes that there was
negligence on the part of his father (Bahia vs. Litonjua y Leynes, 30
Phil., 625).

In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., 101 Phil., 843)
holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son
Dante for damages, arising from the criminal act committed by the
latter, this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule—

“The civil liability which the law imposes upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the ‘duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in
proportion to their means’, while on the other hand, gives them the
‘right to correct and punish them in moderation’ (Arts. 134 and 135,
Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves
of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art.
1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This, defendants failed to
prove”.

And a noted Spanish commentator said—

“Since children and wards do not yet have the
capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the parents and
guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts of
their children and wards in order that damages to third persons due to
the ignorance, lack of foresight or discernment of such children and
wards may be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with
this duty, they should suffer the consequences of their abandonment or
negligence by repairing the damage caused” (12 Manresa, 649-650). (See
also Arts. 311 and 316, Civil Code).

It is further argued that the only way by which a father can be
made responsible for the criminal act of his son committed with
deliberate intent and with discernment, is an action based on the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability of the
parents; that the minor-Fuellas having been convicted of serious
physical injuries at the age of 13, the provisions of par. 3 of Art.
12, Revised Penal Code, could have been applied, but having acted with
discernment, Art. 101 of the same Code can not include him. And as par.
2, of Art. 101, states that “the exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of Art. 11 of this Code does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following
rules: First, in cases of subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, the
civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person and
by a person under nine years of age or by one over nine but under
fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment,
shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority
or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part”, the appellant concluded that this provision covers only a
situation where a minor under 15 but over 9 years old commits a
criminal act “without discernment.”

In the recent case of Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Bake,
107 Phil., 748; 57 Off. Gaz., (37) 6603, the defendant Balce was the
father of a minor Gumersindo Balce, below 18 years of age who was
living with him. Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having
killed Carlos Salen, minor son of plaintiffs. The trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the case, stating that the civil liability of the
minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be
determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under
Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. In reversing the decision, this
tribunal held—

“It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only
if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over
9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it
appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is
because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by
law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and
3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished’ but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has
the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a minor
over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal
liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary
liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case,
resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code.

The
particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides: ‘The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor
children who lived in their company.’ To hold that this provision does
not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which
arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where
mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily
liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would
attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void
apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this
particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some
recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases.”

Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the
basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties, independently
of the criminal case. And as responsibility for fault or negligence
under Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was
instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability,
arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and
having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any
discussion as to the minor’s criminal responsibility is of no moment.

In view hereof, the petition is dismissed, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.