HIPOLITA ALMACEN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TEODORO N. BALTAZAR, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

ENDENCIA, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the defendant-appellant to
pay plaintiff-appellee a monthly support of P50.00 beginning with the
month of August, 1955. Despite the meagre amount involved in the case,
it was brought to this Court on appeal because the appellant only
raised questions of law.

The facts of the case as found by the lower court
are as follows: that plaintiff and defendant were legally married on
March 24, 1923; that in 1937, plaintiff committed adultery with one
named Jose Navarro, a cousin of defendant; that prior to the infidelity
of the wife, the defendant himself has not been loyal to her, he having
been once confined at the hospital suffering from venereal disease;
that the defendant separated from the plaintiff after the latter’s
infidelity and while estranged from her he lived maritally with another
woman by the name of Lourdes Alvarez; that after their separation there
has been a reconciliation between them or at least a condonation by
defendant of the acts committed by the wife as shown by the fact that
he has been sending her money for her support; that husband and wife
were in pari delicto and, therefore, defendant is bound to support the plaintiff because he has likewise been unfaithful to her.

Appellant contends that the lower court erred:

1. in not taking plaintiff’s adulterous act of infidelity as
   defense against her claim for support and in not exempting him from the
   obligation to give such support; and

2. in
   finding that the evidence on record was sufficient to establish a
   condonation of plaintiff’s adulterous act and reconciliation between
   plaintiff and defendant.

As to the first assignment of error, we find that by
the provisions of Art. 303 of the new Civil Code, the obligation to
support shall cease “when the recipient has committed some act which
gives rise to disinheritance;” that under Art. 921 (k) of the same
Code, a spouse may be disinherited when she has given cause for legal
separation,” and under Art. 97, one of the causes for legal separation
is “adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the
husband”, as defined in the Penal Code. Accordingly, if the plaintiff
was the only one who committed adultery which is a good cause for
disinheritance and legal separation, defendant’s theory would seem to
be correct; but, in the present case, we agree with the lower court’s
ruling that defendant is still bound to support his wife, firstly,
because plaintiff and defendant were both guilty of infidelity and
before the filing of the action they had a reconciliation or, at least,
defendant had pardoned plaintiff’s unfaithfulness, for which reason we
may apply Art. 922 of the aforesaid Code which provides that “a
subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person
deprives the latter of the right to disinherit, aid renders ineffectual
any disinheritance that may have been made;” secondly, the law on
support (Title IX, Book I, Arts. 290-304, Civil Code) contains no
provision squarely applicable to the present case in which both parties
had committed infidelity, neither is there any provision to the effect
that when both spouses committed marital offenses against one another,
one can no longer ask support from the other; thirdly, there is the
general principle that when two persons acted in bad faith, they should
be considered as having acted in good faith, which principle may be
applied to the instant case to the effect that plaintiff and defendant
being in pari delicto, the latter cannot claim the adultery of the former as defense to evade the obligation to give her support.

As to the second assignment of error, we find it
also groundless, for the lower court declared that there has been a
condonation by the defendant of the acts committed by the wife because
of the latter’s testimony and documentary evidence submitted (Exhibits
A, B, C, F and J), which show that the defendant had given money to the
plaintiff on several occasions through third persons and, in our
opinion, such evidence is really sufficient to show condonation or
reconciliation between plaintiff and defendant, for had there been no
condonation of plaintiff’s infidelity and no reconciliation between her
and defendant, the latter would not certainly have given any amount of
money for her support.

Defendant argues, however, that he and plaintiff never resumed their conjugal relationship and, therefore, there has been no legal condonation of
the acts of the erring wife; but it cannot be disputed that the act of
giving money to an erring wife and the fact proven in the case that no
action was taken against her before the courts of justice are
sufficient to establish forgiveness amounting to condonation, for
“condonation is the forgiveness of one of the married parties of an
offense which he knows the other has committed against the other.”
(Words & Phrases 8A, pp. 19-20} At any rate, pardon or condonation
does not require sexual intercourse and it may be express or implied.

Wherefore, finding no errors in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the defendant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.