G.R. No. L-2179. April 12, 1949
MANILA TRADING & SUPPLY COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA TRADING LABORERS’ ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT.
FERIA, J.:
of Industrial Relations, on the ground that the latter committed an error of law
in ordering the reinstatement of the appellee Vicente Fortich.
The conclusions or findings of fact of the lower court are as
follows:
“The following facts are undisputed: Fortich was the branch
manager of petitioner in San Pablo City, and the territory covered by said
branch comprises the provinces of Laguna, Batangas and Tayabas. Beside being a
branch manager, he was also a salesman of petitioner. A truck was assigned to
the branch for demonstration purposes. On April 16, 1947, Fortich used the truck
in going to Manila to attend a meeting of respondent union. On that date, the
union declared a strike, and on the following day, Fortich telegraphed from
Manila to M.P. Agarao, an employee of the San Pablo Branch, ordering the latter
to close the branch office, but to have the doors and windows of the building
secured, Fortich kept the truck until May 9, 1947 when he returned it to the San
Pablo office. During the period from April 17 to May 9, 1947, he used the truck
for demonstration to several prospective buyers in Laguna and Manila. He brought
the truck to Manila at least five times during this period. It was found that
the truck was so used that it could not be sold anymore as a first hand truck
and respondent had to convert it into a service truck.x x x x x
“As regards the first point, Fortich maintains, that as branch
manager, he had the authority to close or order the closing of his branch office
whose employees were all members of the union which voted to strike. It may
easily be conceded that he had that authority insofar as his subordinate
employees in the branch are concerned, but certainly not insofar as his employer
or the main office is concerned unless such authority had been previously
granted him. Not only did he order the closing without securing authority or
permission to do so, but he did not even notify his superiors in the main
office.“Fortich also maintains that there was no need for him to
secure permission or authority before taking the truck outside of his territory
for the purpose of showing it to customers because he had been doing it before.
Petitioner maintains the contrary and insists that Fortich was supposed to
demonstrate the truck only within the territory assigned to him. We are inclined
to accept the contention of petitioner because otherwise, there would be no
meaning to the delimitation of the field of operation of the branch in question
if its manager or any of its personnel could go freely outside their territory
to transact business. * * *“* * * The position of Fortich is not that of an ordinary
employee or laborer. As a matter of fact, he belongs more to the mangerial staff
than to the rank and file of petitioner’s employees and laborers. * * *“In connection with, the retention of the demonstration truck
in his possession when he was already on strike, there can be no doubt that it
was highly improper. It was clearly his duty, upon joining the strike, to return
to petitioning company whatever properties belonging to it were in his
possession. If he cannot properly continue holding suoh properties, much less
could he use them even for the purposes of the business of the company. * * *“The record discloses that Fortich is a mechanical engineer and
he was petitioner’s branch manager in San Pablo even before the war. Although in
the instant case, he actually violated his trust as branch manager, having been
influenced undoubtedly by his loyalty to respondent union, the court is of the
opinion and so holds that the offenses he committed, as above explained, can
hardly justify his complete dismissal from the service. He has been laid-off for
almost 9 months now and that must be considered a sufficient punishment for
him.”
It is well settled that an employer or principal may discharge
or dismiss his employee or agent for just cause or for malfeasance or
misfeasance in the performance of his duties.
When the law does not, directly or inferentially, define the
kind of misfeasance or malfeasance for which an employee or laborer may be
dismissed or discharged, but the law leaves it to the court to determine whether
or not an act or omission on the part of the employee may be considered as a
just cause for his dismissal in view of the facts and circumstances of each case
question for the Court of Industrial Relations to determine is one of fact. It
is a question of fact because there is no law or rule which serves as guide to
the Court in deciding it, and the Court of Industrial Relations may decide it in
a way or another without violating any law, but it may gravely abuse its
discretion if its decision is arbitrary or whimsical, that is, contrary to
reason, logic or equity. The court’s decision in such case is final and can not
be appealed to this Supreme Court by certiorari, because only questions of law
may be raised in the appeal or petition for certiorari according to section 2,
rule 44. And if the Court decides the question of fact with grave abuse of
discretion, a special civil action of certiorari filed with the Supreme Court
would be the proper remedy.
But where the law provides or defines what acts or omission,
misfeasance or malfeasance, constitute a just cause for which an employee or
agent may be discharged by his employer or principal, and those acts or
omissions are found by the court to have been established or proven, the
question whether or not the former has been legally and properly dismissed by
the latter is a question of law, and the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations on that question is appealable to this Supreme Court by
certiorari.
In the present case the Court of Industrial Relations,
according to the above quoted conclusions of fact, has found that the
relationship between the petitioner and the respondent Fortich was that of
agency or of principal and agent, because the respondent was a manager of the
branch office of the petitioner in San Pablo, Laguna; and that the respondent
Fortich “has actually violated his trust as branch manager” of the petitioner’s
office in San Pablo, Laguna, for the sale of automobiles and trucks. The
relationship between them being of trust, based on the confidence of the
prinoipal in the agent, article 300 of the Code of Commerce is applicable.
Said article 300 provides:
“Art. 300. The following shall be special causes for which
merchants may discharge their employees, even though the term of the contract
has not expired:“1. Fraud or breach of trust in the transactions entrusted to
them.“2. Engaging in any commercial transaction for their own
account, without the express knowledge and permission of the principal. * *
*”
In the case of Barretto vs. Santa Marina, (26 Phil., 440), this
Supreme Court held that “even though a period is stipulated during which the
agent or employee is to hold his position in the service of the owner or head of
a mercantile establishment, yet the latter may, for any of the special reasons
specified in article 300 of the Code of Commerce, dismiss suoh agent or employee
even before the termination of the period.” The provision of said article 300 of
the Code of Commerce as well as the above quoted decision of this Court rendered
before the promulgation of Act No. 103 as amended, are still applicable although
the respondent was a member of the Manila Trading Laborers’ Association, a labor
union, because there is nothing in said Act which is in conflict with said
article 300.
To order the petitioner as principal to reinstate the
respondent Fortich would the former to continue with the employment of the
latter as its agent, in whom the petitioner has lost its confidence and whose
continuance in the service is patently inimical to its interest.
The fact that the respondent Fortich had been laid off for
almost nine (9) months without pay during the pendency of this case in the Court
of Industrial Relations, can not be considered, as the lower court does, as a
sufficient punishment for said respondent’s breach of trust and a justification
for his reinstatement in the service of the petitioner. As the respondent
Faction has violated his trust as branch manager, and the petitioner was
justified, under article 300 of the Code of Commerce, in dismissing and
discharging him, the former has no right whatsoever to receive any salaries or
compensation from the latter for services he had not rendered during the time he
has been laid off, and consequently his having been laid off or discharged not
only during said period but definitely cannot be considered as a punishment in
lieu of his discharge or dismissal.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the lower eourt
ordering the reinstatement of the respondent Vicente Fortich in the service of
the petitioner is hereby reversed. So ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
DISIDENTE
BRIONES, M.:
Siento no estar conforme con la decisidn de la mayoria, sobre
todo al aplicar al presente caso el art. 300 del Codigo de Comercio. Este
artlculo, en lo tocante a lag disputas entre el trabajo y el capital, entre los
obreros*y la gerancia (“management” como se dice actualmente) , lia sido
practicamente derogado por las leyes del Commonwealth Kos. 103 y 313 q/ue vienen
a ser cartas orgdni’cas de 1’a Corte de Relaciones Industriales. La regla ahora enresta jurisdicci6n es q.ue rtel dereclio del patrono
o.principal de escoger o destituir libreraente a sus empleados y obreros es
basicamente susceptible de ser reglamentado por el Estado en el ejercicio del
supremo poder de policia”, y a este efecto se aprobaron las referidas leyes del
Commonwealth. Nos. 103 y 213. Asf lo deolaramos en el asunto de Manila Trading
Go. v. Zulueta and Phil. Labor Union, 40 O.G. supp. No.10, pp. 183,
184 y 185, y asi tambien lo hemos declarado en el asunto mas reoiente
de Manila Hotel Company y_. Court of Ind. .Relations and the Ma-nila Hofrsl
Employees’ Association, G.R. No. L-1557 (Enero 29, 1948), del cual tomo los
siguientes , pronunciamientos :
“Puede decirse q.ue-en este asunto no se discute
practicament’e ninguna cuestion rundaipental de defecho. Parece que ambas partes
reconocen y admiten la certezade las’ siguientes proposiciones , a saber: a)
que el derebho del patrono o principal de escfdger o destituir libremente a sus empleados y obreres es basicamente sasceptible de ser reglajiientado par el
Estado en el ejercicio del supremo poder de policia; b) ‘que si
bien es eierto que un patrono o principal no puede ser compeli&oo.legalmen
te a oontinuar empleando a una. persona que es culpable de mala conduct a hacia
dicho principal y suya continuacidn en el servieio de este ultima resulta
perjudicial a% sus intereses, pues’ia ley, al proteger los derechos del obrero,
no autoriza la opresidn ni la destruccion del principal, es, sin embargo, tambien cierto que hay casos en que la destitucion o suspension de un empleado resulta caprichosa, o injustificada, o de otro modo ilegal, en cuyo caso el obrero debe ser protegido por el Estado mediante la agencia o
instrumento que tenga para ello que en nuestro caso es la Corte de Relaciones
Industriales (Leyes del Commonwealth Nos. 103 y 213; Manila Trading Co.
v. Zulueta and Philippine Labor Union, 40 O.G., Supplement No. 10, pp. 183, 184,185). (Underlining supplied) .
“La cuestion que plantea ante Nos la recurrente es mas bien una
de hecho, a saber: jjustifican los heelios probados en autos ladecisidii de la
Gorte de Relaciones Industriales, revocando la destitucidn decretada por la
reeurrente y ordenanfe la reposicidn del empleado destituido? La recurrente dice
que no; que su accidn expulsando a Prancisco David se ejecutd en el curso normal
de los negocios, para eliminar a un elemento subversivo y perjudicial a sus
intereses. Por btro iado, la Corte de Relaciones Industriales dice que, aun
admitiendo que la conducta del empleado David antes de la guerra justificaba una
accidn disclp’inaria e.ncontra suya, su prolongada suspe-mtsidn o cl’sl ^ya es
un adecuado oastigo.“La corte a quo arribo a todas estas oonclusiones de spues
de liaber celebrado audiencias en que oy a los testigos de una yotraparte.
Despues de revisar los autos no liemos, hallado ningun motivo para alterar o
revocar tales conclusiones, formadas por el tribunal inferior con mejores
elementos e ingredientes que nosotros para enjuiciar los lieohos. Solamente nos
sentiriaraos autorizadosa sustittiir nuestro juicio al de la Gortrialers
dentisimo de abuso o de ausencia evidentisima de pruebas que apoyaran la
sentenola objelib de alzada. No es este e TasoTn (underlining supplied)
El caso que nos ocupa es enteramente identico al del Manila
Hotel tlltimamente citado. Alll la Gorte de Relaciones Tndustriales, en vista de
los lieclios que lialld probados, revoco” la destitucidn proveida por la
gerencia del Manila Hotel y ordend la reposicidn del empleado afec bado.
Sstimamos entonces que la Gorte Industrial no a bus de su discrecidn al apreciar
los heclios; as que rehusamos abrogar o de cualquier modo alterar la orden
apelada, dieisndo que el tribunal inferior liabla formulado su conclusion “con
me go res elementos e ingredientes que nosotros para enjuiciar los lieclios” y
que “Solamente nos sentirfamds autorizados a sustituir nuestro juicio al de la
Corte de Helaciones Industriales en un caso evidentfsimo de abuso o de ausencia
evidentlsiraa de pruebas que apoyaran la sentencia objeto dealzada”.
Aqui la mayoria revoca la resolucion de la Corte de Relaciones
Indus triales no porque gsta haya abusado. de au disciecidn en la apreciacidn de
los lieclios. sino por una razdn puramente legal la de gue el art. 300 del
C3digo de Comercio autoriza al patrono o principal para expulsar al. empleado en
un caso de frauds o abuso de ooirfianza en las ::estiones> que aquel les
liabiere confiado; pero ya hemos demostrado que en relacidn eon las disputas
industriales este artlculo ha quedado prficticamente derogado por las leyes
citadas del Comraonwealth Nos. 105 1 213.
Es lamentable que ahora que estamos sentando las bases de una
jurispriidencia progresiva en lo que se refiere a las leyes que regulan las
relaciones entre el capital y el trabajo, venga esta decision de la mayorla que
implica una radical desviacidn de una dootrina muy reciente. No o barrena ello
el princlpio tradicional sobre stare decisls, sino q.ue retarda el expedito y
pie no deaenvolvimiento de nuestra jurisprudencia en ouestiones sociales,
obreras e industriales.
oto, por tanto, en favor de la confirmacidn de la resolueidn
apelada de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales.
Moran, Pres., Concurro con esta opinion disidente.