EUGENIO GARINGAN, ERLINDA GARINGAN, DANILO GARINGAN, CELIA REQUIMIN, GIRLIE TUBBAN, NELSON GARINGAN, NELY GARINGAN AND MILAGROS PADER, PETITIONERS, V. JUDGE RAYMOND REYNOLD LAUI…

Garingan versus Laui

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Eugenio Garingan, Erlinda Garingan, Danilo Garingan, Nelson Garingan, Nely Garingan, Girlie Tubban, Celia Requimin and Milagros Pader against Judge Raymond Reynold Laui of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, and against the private respondent Angelina Lingan. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul two resolutions of the trial court: the resolution of May 2, 2012, which granted the respondent's motion to implement a writ of execution, and the resolution of June 19, 2012, which denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The case matters because it fixes the life of a judgment: a final and executory decision may be executed by motion only within five years from its entry, and after that the winning party must bring an independent action to revive it. It is the classic bar question on the execution of judgments and the doctrine that a winning litigant cannot sleep on his rights.

Procedural History

The case began in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, where the petitioners filed two complaints for reconveyance with damages against the respondent and her co-defendants. The two cases were tried together, and in a joint decision rendered on April 25, 1994, the trial court found that the petitioners had failed to prove their ownership of the lands, and dismissed both cases.

The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the Special Seventh Division dismissed the appeal on November 11, 1994, for non-payment of docket fees. That dismissal became final and executory, and an entry of judgment was issued on December 10, 1994. The respondent then moved for execution, which the trial court granted in an order dated October 17, 1996, and a writ of execution was issued on September 29, 1998.

On August 4, 2005, the respondent filed a petition for indirect contempt, claiming that the petitioners had re-entered the lots after possession had been delivered to her. The trial court, in a decision of October 29, 2009, found the petitioners guilty of indirect contempt and ordered their imprisonment until they surrendered possession. The petitioners appealed, and the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, in a decision of February 28, 2011, granted the appeal, dismissed the contempt petition, and held that the respondent had failed to prove that the petitioners ever vacated the lots. The respondent did not appeal that decision.

On March 5, 2012, the respondent filed a motion to implement the writ of execution. The trial court granted it in the assailed resolution of May 2, 2012, and denied reconsideration on June 19, 2012. The petitioners then went to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari.

Facts

The petitioners sued to recover several lots, identified in the record as Lot 7834, Lot 835 and Lot 7853, which they claimed as their own. The trial court rejected the claim for want of proof of ownership and dismissed the complaints in a joint decision dated April 25, 1994. The petitioners' appeal was dismissed for non-payment of docket fees, so the joint decision became final and executory on December 10, 1994.

The respondent sought execution. A writ of execution was issued on September 29, 1998, but it was never actually carried out. Years later, the respondent tried to prove implementation through a petition for indirect contempt, presenting the testimony of a retired sheriff and an undated certificate of delivery of possession. The Court of Appeals rejected this evidence as insufficient and found that the petitioners had remained in possession all along.

Undaunted, the respondent filed on March 5, 2012 a motion to implement the old writ of execution, more than seventeen years after the judgment had become final. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that the writ had never been fully implemented and that prescription had not set in because the motion did not fall under the rule on execution by motion. Hence the petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the motion to implement a writ of execution issued to enforce a decision that had become final and executory as far back as December 10, 1994.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

This is the core provision: it gives the winning party five years to execute by motion, and after that, an action to enforce the judgment before prescription bars it.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment.

This supplies the statute of limitations referred to in Section 6, Rule 39: the action to enforce a judgment by independent action must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.

Ruling

The Supreme Court granted the petition. On the lone issue, it held that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting a motion to implement a writ of execution seventeen years after the judgment had become final and executory. Reading Section 6, Rule 39 together with Article 1144 of the Civil Code, the Court explained that the winning party has five years from the date of entry of judgment to execute by motion, and another five years to execute by action. A writ of execution issued after the expiration of the five-year period is null and void, and the interested party must instead file an independent action for revival of judgment.

The Court rejected the trial court's reasoning that the motion was outside the coverage of Section 6, Rule 39 because the writ had been partially implemented. It stressed that the lifetime of a writ of execution is sixty days after its receipt by the officer, so a writ issued in 1998 could not be implemented in 2012. It also relied on the finding of the Court of Appeals that the writ had never been implemented at all, since the respondent failed to prove that the petitioners had vacated the lots.

The Court acknowledged the equitable principle that strict adherence to technicality should not defeat justice, but held that these cases remain exceptions to the general rule. The purpose of time limitations is precisely to prevent winning parties from sleeping on their rights, and the Court cannot set aside the statute of limitations into oblivion every time someone cries for equity. As the Court put it, if eternal vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot sleep on one's right for more than a tenth of a century and expect it to be preserved in pristine purity.

Doctrine

A final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of that period, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, the judgment may be enforced only by an independent action for revival of judgment, which must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. A writ of execution issued after the expiration of the five-year period is null and void, and the lifetime of a writ of execution is only sixty days after its receipt by the officer. Equity and the liberal interpretation of procedural rules cannot be invoked to set aside the statute of limitations every time a winning party cries for justice, because the purpose of the law is to prevent winning parties from sleeping on their rights.

Disposition

The petition was granted, and the resolutions of May 2, 2012 and June 19, 2012 were annulled and set aside, leaving the respondent without the execution she sought.

Remember This

Memorize the rule: five years to execute by motion, then ten years to enforce by independent action, and a writ of execution lives only sixty days. Examiners use this case to test execution of judgments, revival of judgment, and the limits of equity against the statute of limitations.